Hamilton v. State of Maine Board of Licensure in Medicine

STATE OF MAINE SUPERIOR COURT

KENNEBEC, ss. CIVIL ACTION

DOCKET NO. AP-22-41

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WADE T. HAMILTON, M.D.,

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Petitioner,

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Vv. ORDER ON RESPONDENT’S

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MOTION TO DISMISS

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STATE OF MAINE BOARD OF

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LICENSURE IN MEDICINE,

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Respondent.

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Introduction/ Background

On December 5, 2022, Petitioner Wade T. Hamilton—a licensed Maine

physician specializing in pediatrics and pediatric cardiology—filed a petition for

review of final agency action pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 80C and an independent

complaint for declaratory judgment pursuant to 14 M.R.S. § 5951, et seq.,

against Respondent Maine Board of Licensure in Medicine (“the Board”). The

petition and complaint arose from the Board’s formal interim order directing an

evaluation pursuant to 32 M.R.S. § 3286, which required that Dr. Hamilton

submit to a neuropsychological evaluation by a _ Board-selected

neuropsychologist. Count I seeks Rule 80C review of the Board’s order, and

Count II requests declaratory relief, including a judicial declaration that 32

M.R.S. § 3286 is facially unconstitutional.

The Board has moved to dismiss Count II pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6),

arguing that Rule 80C provides the exclusive path for judicial review of Dr.

Hamilton’s claims. Having considered the arguments of the parties and the

governing law, a decision on the Board’s motion to dismiss is in order.

Discussion

“A motion to dismiss tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint.” Livonia

v. Town of Rome, 1998 ME 39, 4 5, 707 A.2d 83. “For purposes of a Rule 12(b)(6)

motion, the material allegations of the complaint must be taken as admitted.” Id.

“In reviewing a dismissal, [the court] will examine the complaint in the light most

favorable to the plaintiff to determine whether it sets forth elements of a cause

of action or alleges facts that would entitle the plaintiff to relief pursuant to some

legal theory.” Id. “A dismissal should occur when it appears beyond doubt that

a plaintiff is entitled to no relief under any set of facts that he might prove in

support of his claims.” Id. (internal quotations omitted).

In this case, the Board argues that Count II is barred by the so-called

“exclusivity rule,” which holds that when “a municipality or agency's decision is

reviewable pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 80B or M.R. Civ. P. 80C, that process

provides the ‘exclusive process for judicial review unless it is inadequate.”

Antler's Inn & Rest., LLC v. Dep't of Pub. Safety, 2012 ME 143, § 14, 60 A.3d

1248. Dr. Hamilton does not appear to dispute this basic principle, though he

raises one caveat: A matter is reviewable pursuant to Rule 80C only if there is a

“final agency action.” See 5 M.R.S. § § 8002(4), 11001(1). As such, Dr. Hamilton

concedes that review would be exclusive under Rule 80C if the court ultimately

concludes that the Board's order constitutes final agency action.

Nevertheless, the law is apparently unsettled as to whether the Board's

“formal interim Order” directing evaluation qualifies as final agency action. Dr.

Hamilton observes that in other cases, the Attorney General’s Office has taken

the position that licensing board actions similar to those taken here do not

constitute final agency action subject to Rule 80C review. Accordingly, Dr.

Hamilton states that he filed the declaratory judgment action (Count II) to

preserve an alternative claim in the event that the court concludes that final

agency action is lacking and that relief is unavailable pursuant to Rule 80C.

As neither party addresses whether the Board’s “formal interim Order”

directing evaluation pursuant to 32 M.R.S. § 3286 qualifies as final agency

action, the court declines to resolve such an issue at this time. Accordingly, the

court will allow Dr. Hamilton to assert Count II as an alternative claim for relief,

which may be considered if Rule 80C review is precluded.

This ruling is grounded in several considerations. First, the Maine Rules

of Civil Procedure specifically allow parties to plead in the alternative:

A party may set forth two or more statements of a claim or defense

alternatively or hypothetically, either in one count or defense or in

separate counts or defenses. When two or more statements are made

in the alternative and one of them if made independently would be

sufficient, the pleading is not made insufficient by the insufficiency

of one or more of the alternative statements. A party may also state

as many separate claims or defenses as the party has regardless of

consistency and whether based on legal or on equitable grounds or

on both.

MLR. Civ. P. 8(e)(2).

Second, case law supports the proposition that in certain situations,

declaratory relief may be available where the agency has rendered a decision that

is advisory, preliminary, or otherwise nonfinal. See Rockland Plaza Realty Corp.

v. City of Rockland, 2001 ME 81, § 6, 772 A.2d 256 (“We have in the past

permitted parties to appeal an agency's interpretation of a statute as a matter of

law prior to a final agency action”); Help-U-Sell, Inc. v. Me. Real Estate Com., 611

A.2d 981, 983 (Me. 1992) (treating 80C complaint as a complaint for declaratory

judgment where agency had issued a nonfinal advisory ruling); Annable v. Bd. of

Envtl. Prot., 507 A.2d 592, 594-96 (Me. 1986) (notwithstanding agency’s

contention that agency staff had issued a nonbinding advisory opinion, plaintiff

could maintain a declaratory judgment action where a justiciable controversy

over the interpretation of a statute existed).

Third, Petitioner’s declaratory judgment action seeks a declaration as to

the facial constitutional validity of 32 M.R.S. § 3286, and as such, presents at

least one issue that is an appropriate subject of declaratory relief. The

Declaratory Judgments Act provides that “any person . . . whose rights, status

or other legal relations are affected by a statute ... may have determined any

question of construction or validity arising under the... statute... and obtain

a declaration of rights, status or other legal relations thereunder.” 14 M.R.S. §

0954.

While courts generally do not interfere with agency matters until the

administrative process has run its course, the Law Court has “previously held

that, pursuant to section 5954, a plaintiff may file an independent civil action

for a declaratory judgment regarding the validity or construction of a statute

without first availing himself of the administrative process.” Minster v. Gray, 584

A.2d 646, 648 (Me. 1990) (emphasis added); Annable, 507 A.2d at 595 (“Where

the interpretation of a statute is at issue, we have in the past recognized that a

plaintiff may maintain a declaratory judgment action even though an alternative

remedy may be available to him.”). Thus, Dr. Hamilton may preserve an

alternative claim under the Declaratory Judgments Act as declaratory relief may

be available to him.

The entry is: Based on the forgoing, the Board’s motion to dismiss Count

I] is DENIED.

The clerk shall incorporate this Order on the docket by reference

pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 79(a).

Dated: March 10, 2023

Deborah P. Cashman

Justice, Maine Superior Court