Opinion

Gosselin v. Maine Board of Osteopathic Lincensure

Court
Superior Court of Maine
Filed
May 12, 2022
Status
Unpublished
On the bench
William R. Stokes
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 34.2%

The opinion

STATE OF MAINE SUPERIOR COURT

KENNEBEC, ss. CIVIL ACTION

DOCKET NO. AP-2022-13

PAUL G. GOSSELIN, D.O.,

Plaintiff

V. DECISION ON MOTION FOR

TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER

MAINE BOARD OF

OSTEOPATHIC LICENSURE, ET. ALS.,

Defendants

INTRODUCTION

The matter before the court is the Plaintiffs Motion for Temporary

Restraining Order to enjoin an ongoing adjudicatory hearing before the Maine Board

of Osteopathic Licensure. The TRO motion was filed just before 4:00 p.m. on May

10, 2022. The Plaintiff is an osteopathic doctor licensed by the Board. On

November 19, 2021, the Board issued an immediate suspension of Dr. Gosselin's

license for 30 days after it preliminarily determined that he had "engaged in conduct

that constitutes fraud or deceit, .. .incompetence, ... and unprofessional conduct ..

1

• •" On December 23, 2021, the Board issue a Notice of Hearing to Dr. Gosselin

informing him that it would conduct an adjudicatory hearing to determine whether

grounds existed to impose discipline upon him for incompetence and/or

unprofessional conduct for improperly issuing vaccine exemption letters and for

failing to maintain appropriate and adequate records of such exemptions.

1

It is the court's understanding that Dr. Gosselin entered into an interim consent agreement

extending the suspension until the Board takes further action on the allegations.

Page 1 of 4

The adjudicatory hearing was started on April 14, 2022 but did not conclude

on that day. The hearing is scheduled to resume on May 12, 2022, at 9:00 a.m. Upon

receipt and review of the Plaintiffs Verified Complaint and Motion for

TRO/Preliminary Injunction, the court attempted to arrange for a telephonic hearing

on May 11, at approximately 3:30 p.m. Counsel for the Defendants, however, was

not available at that time. Accordingly, the court scheduled and held a telephonic

hearing on May 12, 2022, at 7:45 a.m. The court heard argument from counsel for

Dr. Gosselin and for the Board. The court has reviewed the entire case file, including

the Exhibits accompanying the motion for injunctive relief.

THE STANDARD FOR A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER

A party seeking injunctive relief by a temporary restraining order or a

preliminary injunction has the burden of demonstrating to the court that four criteria

are met. The moving party must demonstrate that: ( 1) it has a likelihood of success

on the merits (at most, a probability; at least, a substantial possibility); (2) it will

suffer irreparable injury if the injunction is not granted; (3) such injury outweighs

any harm which granting the injunctive relief would inflict on the other party; and

(4) the public interest will not be adversely affected by granting the injunction.

Bangor Historic Track, Inc. v. Dep 't ofAgric., Food & Rural Res., 2003 ME 140, 1

9, 837 A.2d 129.

The court does not consider these criteria in isolation, but weighs them

together to determine whether injunctive relief is appropriate to the specific

circumstances of the case. Dep 't ofEnvtl. Prof. v. Emerson, 563 A.2d 762, 768 (Me.

1989). Nevertheless, "[f]ailure to demonstrate that any one of the criteria is met

requires that injunctive relief be denied." Bangor Historic Trtack, Inc., 2003 ME

140, 1 10. It has been observed that "historically, the Maine courts have taken a

conservative attitude towards injunctions, holding the injunction to be 'an

extraordinary remedy only to be granted with utmost caution when justice urgently

Page 2 of 4

demands it and the remedies at law fail to meet the requirements of the case."' Saga

Communs. of New England, Inc. v. Voornas, 2000 ME 156, ~ 19, 756 A.2d 954

quoting Andrew H. Horton & Peggy L. McGehee, MAINE CIVIL REMEDIES §

5.1, at 5-2 to 5-3 (1991).

Likelihood of Success on the Merits

The primary thrust of Dr. Gosselin's argument is that the Board's actions

against him have been instituted and motivated by bad faith, to punish and retaliate

against him for his views, protected by the First Amendment, concerning COVID­

19 and the vaccines.

Based on the material submitted in support of the request for injunctive relief,

the court concludes that Dr. Gosselin has failed to demonstrate by at least a

substantial possibility, his likelihood of success on the merits of his claim of a bad

faith prosecution.

The focus of the Board's adjudicatory proceeding is on whether Dr. Gosselin

acted in an incompetent or unprofessional manner in issuing certain vaccine

exemption letters. While Dr. Gosselin's public statements may have raised red flags

on the part ofthe Board and may or may not be relevant for the Board's consideration

of the allegations in the Notice of Hearing, those allegations are limited to his

conduct in issuing the vaccine exemption letters identified in the notice. 2

Irreparable Injury

Dr. Gosselin maintains that he will suffer irreparable injury if injunctive relief

is not granted. The court disagrees. The Board is literally in the middle of an

adjudicatory hearing and has not rendered any final decision. Even assuming the

Board issues disciplinary sanctions against Dr. Gosselin, he will have a full

2

As discussed during the telephonic conference held today, the Hearing Officer may inquire of

Board member Peter Michaud whether he believes he should recuse himself based on claims of

bias. See 5 M.R.S. § 9063(1).

Page 3 of 4

opportunity to appeal any decision of the Board in accordance with M.R.Civ.P. 80C

and the Maine Administrative Procedure Act. Accordingly, Dr. Gosselin has an

adequate remedy at law.

Balancing the Harms and the Public Interest

In the court's view, balancing the harms and evaluating the public

interest are factors that weigh against the issuance of injunctive relief against

an executive agency engaged in an ongoing adjudicatory proceeding. The

Law Court has cautioned:

The constitutionally mandated separation of powers forbids

precipitous injunctive interference with the legitimate, ongoing

executive function. Moreover, judicial interference with the apparently

legitimate executive department activity not only disrupts the

administrative process but also encourages the circumvention of

statutorily authorized investigation and enforcement mechanisms.

Bar Harbor Banking & Trust Co. v. Alexander, 411 A.2d 74, 77 (Me. 1980).

CONCLUSION

The entry is:

The Plaintiffs Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order is

DENIED.

~

The clerk is directed to incorporate this order into the doc e 15/ eference

pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 79(a). "

Date: May 12, 2022 11liam R. Stokes

Justice, Superior Court

Page 4 of 4

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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