State of Maine v. Doe

STATE OF MAINE UNIFIED CRIMINAL DOCKET

KENNEBEC, ss. AUGUSTA

DOCKET NO. CD-CR~lS-0444

STATE OF MAINE

V. ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S

MOTION TO SUPPRESS

AARON DOE,

Defendant

This matter came forward on the Defendant's Motion to Suppress on July

2, 2018. After hearing, the Court makes the following Findings of Fact and

Conclusions of Law upon which the ORDER set out below is based:

I. Findings of Fact:

1. Defense counsel informed the undersigned at the start of the hearing

that only the issue of probable cause to stop the vehicle was being challenged, and

so the other issues raised in the Defendant's motion are not addressed below.

2. On Thursday, March 15, 2018 at approximately 10:25 p.m. Trooper

Hunter Belanger (hereinafter "Trooper") was on patrol in a marked cruiser on

Route 32 in China, Maine. The Trooper observed a vehicle entering Route 32

ahead of the Trooper that proceeded to pass the Trooper. The Trooper believed

the vehicle had not stopped completely at the stop sign before entering Route 32

and appeared to take a "wide turn" momentarily coming into the Trooper's lane.

3. The Trooper's radar unit detected the vehicle proceeding at 53 mph in a

posted 40 mph zone.'

4. A gentleman, Samuel Miller, was a "ride-along" with the Trooper. Mr.

Miller described the Defendant's vehicle as "flying through" the stop sign and that

the vehicle then proceeded "slightly over the speed limit." Miller also testified

that Defendant appeared to have trouble maintaining his vehicle within the

confines of the Defendant's lane of travel.

' The Trooper also testified that he visually estimated the vehicle, which turned out to be

Defendant's van, proceeding at 55 mph.

5. The Trooper activated his blue lights and attempted to stop the vehicle.

The vehicle took 30 seconds to stop. The Trooper testified that he had no idea who

the operator of the vehicle was before stopping the vehicle.

II. Conclusions of Law:

5. Defendant asserts that stopping Defendant's vehicle "was made without

reasonable suspicion of criminal activity and was in violation of Defendant's

Constitutional rights pursuant to the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments to the

United States Constitution as well as the relevant provisions of the Maine

Constitution."

6. In order to support a brief investigatory stop of a motor vehicle, such as

the stop in this case, the Trooper had to have an objectively reasonable, articulable

suspicion that either criminal conduct, a civil violation, or a threat to public safety

has occurred, is occurring, or is about to occur. Moreover, the suspicion that any

of these circumstances exist must be objectively reasonable in the totality of the

circumstances. State v. Sylvain, 2003 ME 5, <j[ 11; State v. Turner, 2017 ME 185, <j[ 8.

At a hearing on a motion to suppress evidence obtained in the course of a traffic

stop, the State bears the burden of demonstrating that the officer's actions were

objectively reasonable under the circumstances. State v. Brown, 675 A.2d 504, 505

(Me. 1996). A "reasonable suspicion" is not the same as proof by a preponderance

of the evidence or even probable cause to believe that impairment exists. An

investigatory stop is valid when it is "supported by specific and articulable facts

which, taken as a whole and together with the rational inferences from those facts,

reasonably warrant the police intrusion." State v. Hill, 606 A.2d 793, 795 (Me. 1992)

(citations omitted). Suspicion of a civil violation provides adequate specific and

articulable facts. State v. Carsetti, 536 A.2d 1121, 1122 (Me. 1988), habeas corpus

denied, 932 F.2d 1007 (1st Cir. 1991) (partially obstructed plate and expired

registration sticker).

7. In this case the officers had reason to believe that the defendant was

committing a traffic violation by failing to stop at a stop sign, as well as speeding.

Thus, the Court finds there was no problem with the officers stopping the

defendant, see State v. Bolduc, 1998 ME 255; State v. Taylor, 1997 ME 81.

8. Defense counsel, apparently for the first time at least with respect to

bringing the issue before the Court, raised an argument that the State had violated

Defendant's rights under Giglio v. United States, 450 U.S. 150 (1972). The Court finds

no such violation.

9. Accordingly, for the reasons stated above, the Motion to Suppress is

denied.

Date: 7 /26/18

Ro ett E. Mullen, Deputy Chief Justice

Maine Superior Court

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