The opinion
STATE OF MAINE UNIFIED CRIMINAL DOCKET
KENNEBEC, ss. LOCATION: AUGUSTA
Docket No. KENCD-CR-18-20348
STATE OF MAINE, )
)
v. ) ORDER ON MOTION TO SUPPRESS
)
STEVEN GALATI, )
)
Defendant )
Defendant has been charged with two counts of Unlawful Possession of Scheduled Drugs,
Classes D and E pursuant to 17-A M.R.S.A. § 1107-A(l)(C) and 17-A M.R.S.A. § 1107-A(l)(F).
Before the Court is Defendant's Motion to Suppress filed on June 25, 2018 and argued before this
Court on September 20, 2018.
BACKGROUND
The Motion to Suppress filed by the Defendant addresses three different cases with an array
of constitutional challenges. For our purposes, this Court will only be addressing the constitutional
issues associated with the incidents occurring on February 6, 2018. On February 6, 2018, Trooper
Jon Brown (hereinafter Trooper Brown) of the Maine State Police was one of several officers
engaging in a detail regarding distracted drivers, focusing specifically on the "move over law"
depicted in 29-A M.R.S.A. § 2054(9) (2017). Around 10:00 A.M. on February 6, 2018 Trooper
Brown, while in uniform, was completing a traffic stop of a commercial truck. After finishing the
traffic stop, Trooper Brown was sitting in his fully marked SUV cruiser behind the commercial
truck waiting for the truck to pull onto the freeway. While waiting in the breakdown lane, with his
emergency lights still engaged, a white Chevrolet motor vehicle passed Trooper Brown and shook
his cruiser due to its proximity in the adjacent lane.
Pursuant to Maine law, a driver passing a stationary authorized emergency vehicle with
emergency lights on must attempt to move over to a passing lane rather then pass the stationary
vehicle in the adjacent lane. 29-A M.R.S.A. § 2054(9)(A). If it is impossible for a vehicle to move
to a passing lane, the operator is required to pass the stationary authorized emergency vehicle "at
a careful and prudent speed reasonable for passing the authorized vehicle." 29-A M.R.S .A. §
2054(9)(B). Based on 29-A M.R.S.A. § 2054(9), when Trooper Brown saw there were no vehicles
in the passing lane which would have hindered the white Chevrolet from moving over, he pulled
out onto the interstate and began to pursue the Chevrolet.
Due to the speed at which the Chevrolet was traveling, it took Trooper Brown a few
moments to catch up to the vehicle. While in pursuit, Trooper Brown contacted dispatch to inform
them and his detail that he was administering a traffic stop. Trooper Brown proceeded to pull the
vehicle over at mile marker 116 on I-95 and approached the car on foot. There were three people
in the vehicle which included the Defendant as the driver and two passengers. Trooper Brown
engaged in regular traffic citation practice and asked the parties for their identification, for vehicle
information, and asked all parties a few informative questions. As testified to at the Motion to
Suppress hearing, Trooper Brown stated he asked the Defendant and the passengers the following:
Where are you going? Where are you coming from? What are you doing? According to Trooper
Brown, this conversation lasted for 1-2 minutes. During this dialogue, Trooper Brown became
suspicious because the Defendant and his passengers were inconsistent in their answers. The
Defendant and the passengers informed Trooper Brown they were going to New York to visit the
Defendant's sick father, but all parties were inconsistent as to where they would be staying and
what else they would be doing in New York. Trooper Brown articulated his suspicion at the Motion
to Suppress hearing and explained that this suspicion led him to call in a second officer with a
canine unit.
While waiting for the second officer to arrive, Trooper Brown continued with his traffic
stop in relation to the Defendant's violation of 29-A M.R.S.A. § 2054(9). Within a couple of
minutes of calling in a second officer, Corporal Derrick Record (hereinafter Corporal Record)
arrived on the scene with his canine unit. After Corporal Record pulled over behind Trooper
Brown's cruiser, he approached Trooper Brown and asked for details regarding the situation.
Although there are some inconsistencies in testimony as to whether Trooper Brown was getting in
his car or was already in his car when Corporal Record arrived on the scene, what is clear is that
Trooper Brown had not yet finished the traffic stop when Corporal Record appeared. After being
filled in on the circumstances of the stop, Corporal Record approached the white Chevrolet and
Trooper Brown remained in his cruiser to continue the necessary steps to complete the traffic
citation. Trooper Brown testified this took a few minutes and that he had not finished the stop prior
to Corporal Record arriving at the scene.
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From Corporal Record's point of view, he too was working the "move over" detail with
Trooper Brown and was located at mile marker 120 when he heard over dispatch that Trooper
Brown was in pursuit of a white Chevrolet. Within 2-3 minutes, Corporal Record was asked to
join Trooper Brown at mile marker 116 with his canine. Corporal Record testified that it took him
3-4 min to arrive at mile marker 116. Trooper Brown informed Corporal Record about the reason
for the stop and that he was suspicious of the Defendant and the two passengers due to their
inconsistent statements and nervousness. Due to this suspicion, Trooper Brown wanted to have
Corporal Record on the scene as a second officer for back up and for Corporal Record to have his
canine sniff around the vehicle.
After speaking to Trooper Brown, Corporal Record approached the Chevrolet, without his
canine, and addressed the Defendant and the two passengers. Corporal Record informed the
Defendant and the passengers he was going to have his dog sniff around the car; however, prior to
doing that he asked all three people if there were any narcotics or weapons in the vehicle. At first
all parties said no, but Corporal Record asked again if there were any narcotics and the female
passenger informed him she had marijuana on her person. After the female passenger spoke up,
the male passenger in the back seat also informed Corporal Record he had marijuana on his person.
Corporal Record informed the parties that his canine is not triggered by marijuana, but asked both
passengers to show him the marijuana. The female passenger showed Corporal Record her
marijuana without incident. The male passenger opened a backpack to show his marijuana, and
while looking into the backpack Corporal Record saw narcotic paraphernalia. Specifically, he saw
what appeared to be a crack or heroin pipe used to smoke illegal narcotics. Corporal Record also
saw a razor blade in the backpack. After seeing the drug paraphernalia, Corporal Record asked
both passengers to step out of the car.
Corporal Record patted down the male passenger for weapons and narcotics and also patted
down the female passenger for weapons. Once the pat downs were completed, Corporal Record
asked the Defendant if he would exit the vehicle and speak to him on the roadside. Corporal Record
spoke to the Defendant for 3-5 minutes and asked if he had any narcotics on him, which led the
Defendant to admit that he had prescription pills that were not his. After gaining this information,
Corporal Record did a pat down of the Defendant, felt an item on him that felt like cash, and
eventually pulled out a wad of cash in the sum of $800.00. After the pat down, Corporal Record
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returned to his vehicle to run the names of the Defendant and the passengers with other officers
and agencies. Corporal Record testified that the process of the name search took 5-6 minutes.
After finishing the name search, Corporal Record returned to the Defendant and inquired
what the money was for. The Defendant and the passengers changed their original story and stated
they were bringing rent money to the Defendant's sister in New York. Thereafter, the Defendant
told Corporal Record that the illegal pills he had were in the trunk of his vehicle in a bag. Corporal
Record opened the trunk of the vehicle, saw a duffle bag, and found suboxone strips, prescription
pills determined to be Xanax after being tested, and $4,000.00 in $1,000.00 bundles. Corporal
Record then brought out his canine and did person sniffs of the Defendant and the passengers.
Thereafter, Corporal Record called for other officers to come to the scene. At the end of the
interaction between police and the Defendant, Mr. Galati was not arrested. Rather, he was
summoned by Corporal Record for the drug possession charges and was given a traffic citation by
Trooper Brown pursuant to his violation of 29-A M.R.S.A. § 2054(9).
The Defendant brought this Motion to Suppress challenging the constitutionality of the
traffic stop claiming under several grounds of law that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated.
Based on the evidence presented at the hearing, this Court denies the Defendant's Motion to
Suppress.
DISCUSSION
I. Validity of Traffic Stop
The Defendant argues that the State has failed to meet its burden in proving that there was
a violation of 29-A M.R.S.A. § 2054(9). At the Motion to Suppress hearing, Defense counsel
argued that the State has to meet at least the burden of preponderance of the evidence that the
traffic infraction did occur, and by failing to meet this burden the stop was not justified under the
Fourth Amendment. This is an incorrect interpretation of the law. Under 29-A M.R.S .A.§ 2054(9)
the law states the following:
9. Stationary vehicles. Tbe operator of a vehicle passing a
stationary authorized emergency vehicle using an emergency
light or a stationary wrecker using its authorized li ghts with
due regard to the saf ty and traffic conditions, shall:
A. Pass in a lane not adjacent to that of the authorized
emergency vehicle or wrecker, if possible; or
4
B. If passing in a nonadjacent lane is impossible or unsafe,
pass the emergency vehicle or wrecker at a careful and
prudent speed reasonable for passing the authorized
emergency vehicle or wrecker safely.
A violation of this subsection is a traffic infraction for which a minimum fine of
$250 must be adjudged. 29-A M.R.S.A. § 2054(9).
In regard to the above statute, law enforcement officers are guided by Title 29-A as to their
authority in stopping motor vehicles as follows:
1. Authority to stop motor vehicle. If a law enforcement officer
has reasonable and articulable suspicion to believe that a violation
of law has taken or is taking place, that officer, if the officer is in
uniform, may stop a motor vehicle for the purpose of:
A. Arresting the operator for a criminal violation;
B. Issuing the appropriate written process for a criminal or
civil violation or a traffic infraction; or
C. Questioning the operator or occupants.
29-A M.R.S.A. § 105(1) (emphasis added).
The Law Court also addressed the guidelines regarding an investigatory stop of a motor
vehicle and has stated the standard as follows:
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and
article I, section 5 of the Maine Constitution protect motorists from
being unreasonably stopped by police .... Those provisions require
that, [i]n order to support a brief investigatory stop of a motor
vehicle ... a police officer must have an objectively reasonable,
articulable suspicion that either criminal conduct, a civil violation,
or a threat to public safety has occurred, is occurring, or is about to
occur.
State v. Laforge, 2012 ME 65, 1 8, 43 A.3d 961 (internal quotations omitted) (emphasis
added).
The Supreme Court defined the reasonable articulable suspicion standard by finding that a
"police officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with
rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,
21 (1968). In compliance with the Supreme Court holding, the Law Court has further addressed
the standard of reasonable articulable suspicion by stating that:
5
[T]he threshold for demonstrating an objectively reasonable
suspicion necessary to justify a vehicle stop is low, in that
reasonable articulable suspicion is considerably less than proof
of wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence, and need not
rise to the level of probable cause. The suspicion need only be
more than speculation or an unsubstantiated hunch.
Laforge, 2012 ME 65, ~ 10, 43 A.3d 961 (internal quotations omitted).
Here, the State does not carry any burden to prove either by a preponderance of the
evidence or beyond a reasonable doubt whether or not the Defendant did in fact violate 29-A
M.R.S.A. § 2054(9). Rather, the State must establish that Trooper Brown had reasonable and
articulable suspicion that the Defendant violated 29-A M.R.S.A . § 2054(9) when Trooper Brown
saw and felt the Defendant pass his car in the adjacent lane. Trooper Brown clearly articulated to
the Court that he reasonably believed the Defendant passed his car in violation of 29-A M.R.S.A.
§ 2054(9) based on his first-hand perception at the time of the incident.
The Court is not seeking to find if the Defendant has committed a traffic infraction
regarding the above "move over law" violation because it is both not necessary nor the purpose of
a Motion to Suppress hearing. The purpose of this Motion to Suppress hearing is to establish
whether law enforcement properly followed the guidelines of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.
This Court finds that Trooper Brown was able to reasonably articulate his suspicion that the
Defendant had passed by his stationary authorized emergency vehicle in the adjacent lane, that it
was possible for him to move over to the passing lane, and the Defendant failed to do so. Therefore,
because Trooper Brown was able to reasonably articulate his suspicion regarding the Defendant's
conduct under 29-A M.R.S.A. § 2054(9) pursuant to Fourth Amendment doctrine, the traffic stop
was constitutionally valid.
II. Traffic Stop Duration
The Defendant argues that Trooper Brown illegally prolonged his traffic stop by calling
Corporal Record and requesting he come to the scene with his canine. The Court disagrees with
the Defendant's contention and finds that the traffic stop was not prolonged. The Supreme Court
has established in relation to routine traffic stops that "[a] seizure that is justified solely by the
interest in issuing a warning ticket to the driver can become unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the
time reasonably required to complete that mission." Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 407 (2005).
6
Following that doctrine, the Supreme Court noted that "[a]uthority for the seizure thus ends when
tasks tied to the traffic infraction are-or reasonably should have been-completed." Rodriguez v.
United States, 575 U.S._, 135 S. Ct. 1609, 1614 (2015).
For guidance as to when a traffic stop has gone on too long, the Supreme Court held that a
court should "examine whether the police diligently pursued a means of investigation that was
likely to confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly, during which time it was necessary to detain
the defendant." United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 657, 686 (1985). Looking to Maine policy
specifically, it is suggested to Maine law enforcement that a stop which exceeds 20-25 minutes
most likely becomes a seizure that requires appropriate probable cause. See Ferdico & Walton,
Maine Law Enforcement Officer's Manual 4-22 (2013-2016 ed.). As for dog sniffs, "[a] dog sniff
conducted during a concededly lawful traffic stop that reveals no information other than the
location of a substance that no individual has any right to possess does not violate the Fourth
Amendment." Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 410 (2005).
Here, the facts of this specific case are paramount as to whether the stop was
unconstitutionally prolonged. Based on the testimony of Trooper Brown and Corporal Record
detailed above, this Court finds that the duration of the stop lasted less than 20-25 minutes. Not
only was the stop within a reasonable duration of time, the stop was not prolonged because
Corporal Record was conducting further investigation while Trooper Brown was completing the
original traffic stop. At the Motion to Suppress hearing, Defense counsel incorrectly claimed that
Trooper Brown completed the traffic stop prior to calling Corporal Record. It is clear from the
testimony of both officers that Trooper Brown called Corporal Record prior to finishing the traffic
stop and was still completing the necessary traffic stop paperwork as Corporal Record interacted
with the Defendant. Nothing was prolonged in this case; rather, two officers worked together to
effectively handle both a valid traffic stop and conduct a brief investigation based upon reasonable
articulable suspicion.
Looking to the Defendant's specific allegation that the canine sniff prolonged the stop, the
Court finds this sentiment incorrect for two reasons. First, as noted in Caballes, a person is not
entitled to Fourth Amendment protection from a dog sniff conducted during a traffic stop for
contraband that is illegal to possess. Id. Here, Corporal Record could have had his dog sniff around
the Defendant's vehicle without a Fourth Amendment violation occurring. Second, this issue is
not even relevant because there was no canine sniff of the vehicle. Corporal Record did not have
7
the opportunity to have his dog sniff the vehicle because the Defendant and his passengers admitted
to possession of narcotics on their own volition . While the dog did engage in a person sniff, that
occurred after the discovery of the narcotics in the Defendant's vehicle. With that and all of the
above, the traffic stop conducted by law enforcement was not unconstitutionally prolonged.
III. Stop and Frisk of Mr. Galati
a. Protective Frisk
The Defendant argues that Corporal Record's search of his person was unconstitutional
because the Corporal could not state a particularized belief that the Defendant was armed and
dangerous.' This Court finds that the search of the Defendant was permissible because Corporal
Record had probable cause. In Terry v. Ohio, the Supreme Court held that law enforcement may
conduct a stop and frisk of a person's clothing, without a warrant, if the officer can articulate a
reasonable belief that the suspect is armed and dangerous which poses a safety risk to the officer
and the public. 392 U.S. at 30-31. However, probable cause to search can arise during an
investigation or questioning of a person. State v. Melvin, 2008 ME 118,955 A.2d 245; see Ferdico
& Walton,Maine Law Enforcement Officer's Manual l-8 (2013-2016 ed.) An officer has probable
cause to conduct a search of a person if "the facts and circumstances within [the officers']
knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information [are] sufficient in
themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that [property subject to seizure
under the law would be found in particular place, or on a particular person.]" Carroll v. United
States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925); see Ferdico & Walton, Maine Law Enforcement Officer's
Manual l-l (2013-2016 ed.)
Here, this Court finds that Corporal Record did not violate the Defendant's Fourth
Amendment rights by patting down his person because Corporal Record had probable cause to
believe the Defendant possessed illegal contraband. The facts here are fairly simple: Corporal
Record asked the Defendant to exit the vehicle, spent 3-5 minutes having a calm and non
aggressive conversation with the Defendant, and at the end of the conversation the Defendant
voluntarily admitted that he had illegal prescription drugs in his possession. Following the law
established in Carroll, Corporal Record gained information that led him to reasonably believe the
Defendant had illegal narcotics from the Defendant's own admission, thus Corporal Record had
1
This Court will not be addressing the pat down searches of the passengers in this matter.
8
probable cause to conduct a search. Therefore, regardless of whether Corporal Record did a pat
down of the Defendant looking for weapons or for narcotics, he was permitted to engage in that
search because he had probable cause to be believe a crime had occurred based on the statements
of the Defendant himself. Thus, there was no violation of the Defendant's Fourth Amendment
rights when Corporal Record did a pat down of his outer clothing.
b. Search of the Trunk
The Defendant's challenge as to the admissibility of the evidence found in the trunk of his
vehicle is incorrect because of the applicable automobile exception doctrine. Pursuant to Carroll
v. United States,
On reason and authority the true rule is that if the search and
seizure without a warrant are made upon probable cause, that
is, upon a belief, reasonably arising out of circumstances known
to the seizing officer, that an automobile or other vehicle contains
that which by law is subject to seizure and destruction, the search
and seizure are valid. 267 U.S. 132, 149 (1925).
The above rule, also known as the automobile exception, permits officers to search a
vehicle if there is proper probable cause that there is contraband in the vehicle. As articulated
above, Corporal Record had probable cause to believe illegal narcotics were in the vehicle based
on the assertions made by the Defendant. Therefore, this Court agrees with the State that Corporal
Record's actions are protected by the automobile exception because he had probable cause to open
the trunk, locate the illegal narcotics, and the evidence obtained may be used against the Defendant
under solidified Fourth Amendment doctrine.
IV. Fruits of the Poisonous Tree
The Defendant contends that all evidence found in the Defendant's car and any statements
made by the Defendant should be excluded from evidence as fruits of the poisonous tree. Under
the exclusionary rule, evidence that comes about from an unconstitutional search or seizure under
the Fourth Amendment will not be admissible at trial against the Defendant. Silverthrone Lumber
Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 3 85, 392 ( 1920). Here, because this Court finds that there have been
no Fourth Amendment violations, the Defendant's fruits of a poisonous tree argument is moot.
Thus, the State may use any evidence or statements that came about from this constitutionally valid
traffic stop.
9
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, based on the above findings, it is hereby ORDERED that Defendant's
Motion to Suppress is DENIED.
DATED: September 28, 2018
Maine District Court
Entered on the docket 1- J.1 ~ /g
10
STATE OF MAINE CRIMINAL DOCKET
V. KENNEBEC, ss.
STEVEN GALATI Docket No KENCD-CR-2018-20348
41 MONROE ROAD
SEARSPORT ME 04974 DOCKET RECORD
DOB: 04/25/1968
Attorney: HARRIS MATTSON State's Attorney: MAEGHAN MALONEY
SILVERSTEIN LAW
21 MAIN ST SUITE 202
BANGOR ME 04401
APPOINTED 06/28/2018
Filing Document: CRIMINAL COMPLAINT Major Case Type: MISDEMEANOR (CLASS D,E)
Filing Date: 04/11/2018
Charge(s)
1 UNLAWFUL POSSESSION OF SCHEDULED DRUG 02/06/2018 SIDNEY
Seq 8571 17-A 1107-A (1) (C) Class D
RECORD / MSP
2 UNLAWFUL POSSESSION OF SCHEDULED DRUG 02/06/2018 SIDNEY
Seq 8574 17-A 1107-A (1) (F) Class E
RECORD / MSP
Docket Events:
04/11/2018 FILING DOCUMENT - CRIMINAL COMPLAINT FILED ON 04/11/2018
04/11/2018 Charge (s) : 1, 2
HEARING - ARRAIGNMENT SCHEDULE OTHER COURT ON 04/17/2018 at 01:00 p.m.
WATDC
04/18/2018 Charge(s): 1,2
HEARING - ARRAIGNMENT FTA ON 04/17/2018
04/18/2018 BAIL BOND - $400.00 CASH BAIL BOND SET BY COURT ON 04/17/2018
VALERIE STANFILL, JUDGE
NO THIRD PARTY BAIL, BAIL FOR WATERVILLE DC
04/18/2018 WARRANT - $400.00 FOR FAILURE TO APPEAR ORDERED ON 04/18/2018
VALERIE STANFILL, JUDGE
NO THIRD PARTY BAIL, BAIL FOR WATERVILLE DC
04/18/2018 WARRANT - $400.00 FOR FAILURE TO APPEAR ISSUED ON 04/18/2018
NO THIRD PARTY BAIL, BAIL FOR WATERVILLE DC
06/05/2018 MOTION - MOTION TO TRANSFER FILED BY DEFENDANT ON 06/04/2018
AGREED UPON MOTION TO TRANSFER THIS CASE TO WALDO FOR GLOBAL RESOLUTION
06/05/2018 MOTION - MOTION FOR ENLARGEMENT OF TIME FILED BY DEFENDANT ON 06/04/2018
MOTION TO ENLARGE TIME TO FILE PRETRIAL MOTIONS.
06/14/2018 MOTION - MOTION FOR ENLARGEMENT OF TIME GRANTED ON 06/14/2018
ROBERT E MURRAY JR, JUSTICE
COPY TO PARTIES/COUNSEL
CR_200, Rev. 07/15 Page 1 of 4 Printed on: 09/28/2018
STEVEN GALATI
KENCD-CR-2018-20348
DOCKET RECORD
06/14/2018 MOTION - MOTION TO TRANSFER GRANTED ON 06/14/2018
ROBERT E MURRAY JR, JUSTICE
COPY TO PARTIES/COUNSEL TO WALDO COUNTY
COURTS
06/J,4/2018 Charge (s) : 1, 2
TRANSFER - TEMPORARY TRANSFER REQUESTED ON 06/04/2018
06/14/2018 Charge(s): 1,2
TRANSFER - TEMPORARY TRANSFER GRANTED ON 06/14/2018
ROBERT E MURRAY JR, JUSTICE
06/14/2018 Charge(s): 1,2
TRANSFER - TEMPORARY TRANSFER TRANSFERRED ON 06/14/2018
WALCD
06/15/2018 Charge(s): 1,2
TRANSFER - TEMPORARY TRANSFER RECVD BY COURT ON 06/15/2018
06/27/2018 Charge(s): 1,2
TRANSFER - TEMPORARY TRANSFER RETURN TO ORIG COURT ON 06/25/2018
ROBERT E MURRAY JR, JUSTICE
A GLOBAL RESOLUTION WAS NOT REACHED WITH THIS CASE AND OTHERS, AND ACCORDINGLY,
THE CASE IS BEING TRANSFERRED BACK TO KENNEBEC COUNTY FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS.
06/27/2018 MOTION - MOTION TO SUPPRESS FILED BY DEFENDANT ON 06/25/2018
MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE AND STATEMENTS
06/28/2018 Party(s): STEVEN GALATI
ATTORNEY - APPOINTED ORDERED ON 06/28/2018
Attorney: HARRIS MATTSON
06/28/2018 Charge(s): 1,2
HEARING - DISPOSITIONAL CONFERENCE SCHEDULED FOR 07/19/2018 at 08:30 a.m. in Room No. 1
SCHEDULED ON A MISC DAY BECAUSE THERE ARE OTHER CASES IN OTHER COURTS AND MANY MOVING
PARTS
06/28/2018 Charge(s): 1,2
HEARING - DISPOSITIONAL CONFERENCE NOTICE SENT ELECTRONICALLY ON 06/28/2018
06/28/2018 WRIT - HABEAS CORPUS TO PROSECUTE ISSUED ON 06/28/2018
CERTIFIED COPY TO SHERIFF DEPT.
06/28/2018 Charge(s): 1,2
TRANSFER - UCD CS FILE TRANS TO RESP CRT RECVD BY COURT ON 06/28/2018
AUGSC
06/29/2018 WRIT - HABEAS CORPUS TO PROSECUTE ORDERED ON 06/29/2018
WILLIAM STOKES, JUSTICE
07/16/2018 Charge(s): 1,2
MOTION - MOTION TO CONTINUE FILED BY DEFENDANT ON 07/13/2018
0 7 / 1 7 / 2 O18 Charge ( s ) : 1 , 2
MOTION - MOTION TO CONTINUE GRANTED ON 07/16/2018
WILLIAM STOKES, JUSTICE
COPY TO PARTIES/COUNSEL
CR_200, Rev. 07/15 Page 2 of 4 Printed on: 09/28/2018
STEVEN GALATI
KENCD-CR-2018-20348
DOCKET RECORD
07/17/2018 Charge(s): 1,2
HEARING - DISPOSITIONAL CONFERENCE SCHEDULED FOR 08/06/2018 at 10:00 a.m. in Room No. 3
O7 / 1 7 / 2 O18 Charge ( s ) : 1 , 2
HEARING - DISPOSITIONAL CONFERENCE NOTICE SENT ELECTRONICALLY ON 07/~7/~018
07/17/2018 WRIT - HABEAS CORPUS TO PROSECUTE ISSUED ON 07/17/2018
CERTIFIED COPY TO SHERIFF DEPT.
07/17/2018 WRIT - HABEAS CORPUS TO PROSECUTE ORDERED ON 07/17/2018
ERIC WALKER, JUDGE
07/18/2018 Charge(s): 1,2
HEARING - DISPOSITIONAL CONFERENCE CONTINUED ON 07/18/2018
07/20/2018 MOTION - MOTION TO CONTINUE FILED BY DEFENDANT ON 07/20/2018
Attorney: HARRIS MATTSON
07/30/2018 MOTION - MOTION TO CONTINUE GRANTED ON 07/26/2018
ERIC WALKER , JUDGE
COPY TO PARTIES/COUNSEL
07/30/2018 WRIT - HABEAS CORPUS TO PROSECUTE VACATED ON 07/30/2018
07/30/2018 HEARING - MOTION TO SUPPRESS SCHEDULED FOR 08/23/2018 at 10:00 a.m. in Room No. 1
NOTICE TO PARTIES/COUNSEL
07/30/2018 HEARING - MOTION TO SUPPRESS NOTICE SENT ELECTRONICALLY ON 07/30/2018
07/30/2018 WRIT - HABEAS CORPUS TO PROSECUTE ISSUED ON 07/30/2018
CERTIFIED COPY TO SHERIFF DEPT.
07/30/2018 WRIT - HABEAS CORPUS TO PROSECUTE ORDERED ON 07/30/2018
THOMAS NALE, JUDGE
07/31/2018 Charge(s): 1,2
HEARING - DISPOSITIONAL CONFERENCE CONTINUED ON 07/16/2018
WILLIAM STOKES, JUSTICE
08/10/2018 MOTION - MOTION TO CONTINUE FILED BY STATE ON 08/10/2018
~~ OBJECT. MOTION TO CONTINUE MOTION TO SUPPRESS HEARING.
08/14/2018 MOTION - MOTION TO CONTINUE GRANTED ON 08/10/2018
WILLIAM STOKES, JUSTICE
COPY TO PARTIES/COUNSEL
08/14/2018 HEARING - MOTION TO SUPPRESS CONTINUED ON 08/10/2018
WILLIAM STOKES, JUSTICE
DA: ALISA ROSS
08/14/2018 HEARING - MOTION TO SUPPRESS SCHEDULED FOR 09/20/2018 at 10:00 a.m. in Room No. 1
NOTICE TO PARTIES/COUNSEL
08/14/2018 HEARING - MOTION TO SUPPRESS NOTICE SENT ELECTRONICALLY ON 08/14/2018
09/18/2018 WRIT - HABEAS CORPUS TO PROSECUTE ISSUED ON 09/18/2018
CERTIFIED COPY TO SHERIFF DEPT.
CR_ 200, Rev. 07/15 Page 3 of 4 Printed on: 09/28/2018
STEVEN GALATI
KENCD-CR-2018-20348
DOCKET RECORD
09/20/2018 WARRANT - FOR FAILURE TO APPEAR RECALLED ON 09/20/2018
ERIC WALKER, JUDGE
09/20/2018 WARRANT - FOR FAILURE TO APPEAR CANCEL ACKNOWLEDGED ON 09/20/2018 at 11:41 a.m .
09/20/2018 HEARING - MOTION TO SUPPRESS HELD ON 09/20/2018
ERIC WALKER, JUDGE
09/20/2018 Charge(s): 1,2
HEARING - ARRAIGNMENT HELD ON 09/20/2018
ERIC WALKER, JUDGE
Defendant Present in Court
DEFENDANT INFORMED OF CHARGES.
09/20/2018 Charge(s): 1,2
PLEA - NOT GUILTY ENTERED BY DEFENDANT ON 09/20/2018
09/28/2018 MOTION - MOTION TO SUPPRESS DENIED ON 09/28/2018
ERIC WALKER, JUDGE
COPY TO PARTIES/COUNSEL
09/28/2018 ORDER - COURT ORDER FILED ON 09/28/2018
ERIC WALKER, JUDGE
ORDER ON MOTION TO SUPPRESS IT IS HEREBY
ORDERED THAT DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS IS DENIED.
COPY TO ATTY MATTSON AND DA'S OFFICE
COPY TO REPOSITORIES
09/28/2018 ORDER - COURT ORDER ENTERED ON 09/28/2018
09/28/2018 WRIT - HABEAS CORPUS TO PROSECUTE REMANDED ON 09/20/2018
ERIC WALKER, JUDGE
A TRUE COPY
ATTEST:
Clerk
CR_200, Rev. 07/15 Page 4 of 4 Printed on: 09/28/2018