"The proper scope of a search incident to arrest extends to the area within the suspect' s immediate physical control, the area from which he or she might gain possession of a weapon or disposable evidence"
How later courts described this case
- "The proper scope of a search incident to arrest extends to the area within the suspect' s immediate physical control, the area from which he or she might gain possession of a weapon or disposable evidence"
- "a search substantially contemporaneous with arrest may precede the arrest if the police have probable cause to arrest at the outset of the search"
- "stating that 'neither handcuffing nor other restraints will automatically convert a Terry stop into a de facto arrest.'"
- noting that in certain circumstances physical restraint "may be perfectly consistent with an investigatory stop"
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
STATE OF MAINE UNFIED CRIMINAL COURT
CUMBERLAND, SS. PORTLAND
Docket No. CDCR-16-287
STATE )
)
)
V. ) ORDER ON MOTION TO SUPPRESS
)
)
REBECCA HASSETT )
)
Defendant )
Pending before the court is Defendant's motion to suppress evidence found in her pocket
as well as incriminating statements Defendant made before being apprised of her Miranda rights.
Defendant's motion was filed on June 21, 2016 and the court heard oral argument and testimony
on August 11, 2016. Assistant Attorney General LeaAnne Sutton appeared and argued on behalf
of the State, and Attorney Charlene Hoffman appeared and argued on behalf of Defendant. As
agreed by the parties, the court viewed a recording of the police encounter with Defendant in
chambers after the conclusion of the hearing. Having considered the evidence and argument in
light of Maine law, the court finds and concludes as follows:
While on patrol on January 13, 2016, Officer Sean Hurley of the Portland Police
Department came upon a car stopped at the intersection of Elm Street and Cumberland A venue
in Portland. The car was stopped in the left lane with its hazards on and its hood up. As Officer
Hurley approached, he observed that the license plate matched that of a vehicle implicated in a
recent stabbing. Officer Hurley observed a woman standing outside the vehicle behind its opened
hood and a male exiting the passenger side. The woman identified herself as Rebecca Hassett,
which Officer Hurley recognized as the registered owner's name associated with the license plate
alert. When Officer Hurley began a pat-down of Defendant, she tried to pull away, at which
point Officer Hurley handcuffed her. Asked whether she had any needles on her, she answered
that she did, in the front pocket, which she clarified by explaining that "it's in the big one, no,
actually it's in this one right here, there might be two." When Defendant complained about being
cold, Officer Hurley brought her to the sidewalk and responded "of course" when she asked him
whether she could sit. Shortly thereafter Defendant, while off camera, is heard to exclaim "aw,
don't, come on, man, don't" and Officer Hurley is heard to remark that he just found five
packets. He asks, "heroin?" and Defendant responds "yup. Does this mean I'm going to jail
now?" At the suppression hearing, Officer Hurley testified he had taken Defendant to a heated
entryway, that she kept trying to move around, and that she appeared to be "trying to get to her
pocket," at which point he spotted and seized folding papers in a baggie with a brown substance
which field tests showed to be heroin.
Defendant seeks suppression of the heroin seized from her pocket on the ground that her
detention amounted to a de facto arrest for which there was no probable cause. Her motion,
moreover, seeks suppression of all statements made to Officer Hurley on the ground that they
were elicited during a custodial interrogation in the absence of the requisite Miranda warnings.
The First Circuit has noted that "there is no scientifically precise formula that enables
courts to distinguish between valid investigatory stops and de facto arrests." United States v.
Owens, 167 F.3d 739, 749 (1st Cir. 1999). Courts making this inquiry should examine "whether
the police diligently pursued a means of investigation that was likely to confirm or dispel their
suspicions quickly, during which time it was necessary to detain the defendant. A court making
this assessment should take care to consider whether the police are acting in a swiftly developing
situation, and in such cases the court should not indulge in unrealistic second-guessing." Id.
(quoting United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675 (1985)).
The court finds that Officer Hurley's detention of Defendant was appropriate under the
circumstances. Officer Hurley had been advised that a car registered to a Rebecca Hassett with
Maine license plate 8224TM was implicated in a stabbing. The license plate was a match, and
the driver identified herself as "Rebecca Hassett." Given Defendant's conduct in pulling away,
coupled with Officer Hurley's reasonable concern that she might be armed, Officer Hurley's act
of handcuffing Defendant did not transform Defendant's detention into a de facto arrest. See,
e.g., State v. Langlois, 2005 ME 3, 1 10 (concluding that Defendant "was subjected to an
investigatory detention, not an arrest, when Officer Tall ordered him at gunpoint to lie down");
Morelli v. Webster, 552 F.3d 12, 20 (1st Cir. 2009) (noting that in certain circumstances physical
restraint "may be perfectly consistent with an investigatory stop") (citing United States v.
Kapperman, 764 F.2d 786, 790 n. 4 (11th Cir. 1985) ("stating that 'neither handcuffing nor other
restraints will automatically convert a Terry stop into a de facto arrest.'")). As in Langlois,
Officer Hurley's actions here "were 'justified at their inception and reasonably related in scope
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to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place."' Id. (internal citations
omitted).
The court finds, moreover, that even assummg arguendo that the detention should
properly be characterized as a de facto arrest by virtue of Defendant's handcuffing, Officer
Hurley had probable cause to suspect that Defendant was involved in criminal activity such that
no Fourth Amendment violation occurred. See, e.g., State v. Flint, 2011 ME 20, ~ 12 ("The
probable cause standard is flexible and based on common sense. Although requiring more than
mere suspicion, probable cause can be satisfied on less than the quantum of proof necessary to
establish a fact by a fair preponderance of the evidence.").
Suppression of the heroin is not warranted in any event, since pursuant to the plain view
exception "objects falling in the plain view of an officer who has a right to be in a position to
have that view are subject to seizure and may be introduced in evidence." State v. Chattley, 390
A.2d 472, 476 (Me. 1978) (citations omitted). Officer Hurley testified that he seized the baggie
after spotting it in plain view. Defendant did not refute Officer Hurley's testimony on that point,
testifying simply that she "doesn't know whether he noticed the baggie or not," and that she
"thought he pulled it out of my pocket." Moreover, to the extent Defendant's detention may be
characterized as a de facto arrest, seizure of the baggie from Defendant's pocket was permissible
as a search incident to arrest. See, e.g., State v. Le Blanc, 347 A.2d 590, 593 (Me. 1975) ("a
search substantially contemporaneous with arrest may precede the arrest if the police have
probable cause to arrest at the outset of the search"); id. at 595 ("The proper scope of a search
incident to arrest extends to the area within the suspect' s immediate physical control, the area
from which he or she might gain possession of a weapon or disposable evidence").
Accordingly, because seizure of the heroin did not violate Defendant's constitutional
rights, Defendant's motion to suppress evidence of the heroin seized is DENIED .
-'
'
Defendant's motion further seeks suppression of statements Defendant made prior to the
administration of Miranda warnings. The question of whether Defendant's Miranda rights were
violated turns on whether the statements sought to be suppressed 1 were elicited while Defendant
was subject to "interrogation" while "in custody." It is well-established that "[a] suspect who is
not formally arrested is subjected to a custodial interrogation if the suspect's freedom of
1
Defendant's motion does not identify any particular statements she seeks to have suppressed,
but rather asks that "any and all statements made by her to the police" be excluded from trial.
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movement has been restrained 'to the degree associated with a formal arrest." See, e.g., State v.
Lockhart, 2003 ME 108, ~ 17 (citation omitted). Whether an individual is "in custody" depends
on "whether a reasonable person, standing in the defendant's shoes, would have felt he or she
was not at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave." State v. Hassan, 2007 ME 77, ~ 14.
The court finds that a reasonable person, standing in Defendant's shoes, would not have felt free
to leave. Defendant was physically restrained by virtue of the handcuffs, and her request to enter
a building for warmth was denied. While some of Officer Hurley's questions were encompassed
within the administrative and public safety exceptions to Miranda, see, e.g., Lockhart, 2003 ME
108, ~ 18, his question as to whether the baggie contained heroin was "designed to elicit an
incriminating response" such that it constitutes "interrogation" for purposes of Miranda. See,
e.g., Hassan, 2007 ME 77, ~ 13 (citing Rhode Islandv. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980)).
Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that Defendant's Motion to Suppress is hereby
DENIED such that the evidence of heroin seized from Defendant may be admitted at trial.
Defendant's Motion to Suppress is GRANTED such that Defendant's affirmative response to
Officer Hurley's question asking whether the baggie contained heroin is hereby suppressed, and
is DENIED in all other respects.
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