The opinion
STATE OF MAINE SUPERIOR COURT
YORK, SS. CIVIL ACTION
DOCKET NO. AP-14-18
PORTER HOLDINGS, INC.
Appellant,
v. ORDER
TOWN OF YORK, MAINE,
Respondent,
ROBERT & ROBIN RUBIN,
Parties-in-interest.
This action concerns a Rule 80B appeal from a decision of the Town of York to
grant Robert and Robin Rubin a conditional use permit to operate a dog daycare and
boarding business out of their home. Porter Holdings and the Town of York have agreed
to voluntarily dismiss the case, but the Rubins wish to proceed pursuant to Maine's anti-
Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation ("SLAPP") statute, 14 M.R.S. § 556.
"Maine's anti-SLAPP statute has provided a mechanism for the disposal of
baseless claims brought to punish or deter a petitioning party from exercising its
constitutional right to petition the government." Town ofMad.awaska v. Cayer, 2014 :ME
121, ~ 2, 103 A.3d 547. The statute protects First Amendment rights by granting the party
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who has petitioned the government the ability to file a special motion to dismiss.
Schelling v. Lindell, 2008 1\.1E 59, ~ 6, 942 A.2d 1226.
Maine's anti-SLAPP statute may not be employed to dismiss an action brought by
a municipality to enforce zoning laws. Cayer, 2014 1\.1E 121, ~ 11, 103 A.3d 547. In
Cayer, landowners asserted that the Town of Madawaska had brought a zoning
enforcement action to punish or deter their participation in petitioning local government.
The landowners lost their appeal at the Zoning Board of Appeals and appealed to the
Superior Court pursuant to Rule 80B. In holding that anti-SLAPP did not apply, the Law
Court stated: "zoning disputes make up many of the classic anti-SLAPP cases, the
context for such cases has generally occurred when citizens who publically oppose
development projects are sued by companies or other citizens, rather than by a
government entity alleging violation of a land use ordinance." !d. ~ 13.
Cayer stands for two propositions that apply here. First, anti-SLAPP cannot be
used to stay a municipality's hand in matters of zoning enforcement. Second, the party
asserting the anti-SLAPP claim must have actually been sued. This is because the whole
purpose of the statute is to protect defendants from costly litigation employed for the
purpose burdening First Amendment rights. Lindell, 2008 1\.1E 59, ~ 6, 942 A.2d 1226.
("The anti-SLAPP statute provides defendants who are the targets of such suits with a
'special motion to dismiss,' a statutory motion designed to minimize the litigation costs
associated with the defense of such meritless suits.") Here, the Rubins voluntarily became
parties-in-interest to this case after prevailing at the Zoning Board of Appeals. The Town
of York shouldered the burden to defend the ZBA decision in this court. The Rub ins
therefore cannot avail themselves of 14 M.R.S. § 556.
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Even if the Rubens could proceed under the anti-SLAPP statute, the parties have
agreed to voluntarily dismiss the action. A special motion to dismiss would be moot
because there is no live case to dismiss.
The entry shall be:
The motion under 14 M.R.S. § 556 is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
DATE: Aprilc:2-(2015
John 'Nell, Jr.
Justice, Superior Court
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AP-14-18
ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF:
MATTHEWWHOWELL
CLARK & HOWELL LLC
POBOX 545
YORK ME 03909
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT:
MARY E COSTIGAN
BERNSTEIN SHUR
POBOX9729
PORTLAND ME 04104
PIIPRO SE:
ROBERT & ROBIN RUBIN
37PAUL STREET
POBOX441
YORKBEACHME 03910