easement can be relocated by mutual con. enl of the owners of the dominant and serv ient estates
How later courts described this case
- easement can be relocated by mutual con. enl of the owners of the dominant and serv ient estates
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
STATE OF MAINE BUSINESS AND CONSUMER COURT
Cumberland, ss.
TESTA'S, INC.
Plaintiff/ Counterclaim Defendant
v. Docket No. BCD RE-11-03 .,,...
JACK COOPERSMITH and SHERRI COOPERSMITH,
Defendants/Counterclaim Plaintiffs
and
TOURMALINE KING, LLC and TOURMALINE QUEEN, LLC,
Defendants
and
THOMAS J. TESTA, JR., ANNA T. STRIEFEL
MLS PROPERTIES, LLC, and JOAN E. PURCELL
Parties-in-Interest
ORDER AFTER SITE VIEW AND HEARING
By agreement of the parties, the only remaining issue in this case involves the
specific terms of the Defendants' easement over the Plaintiffs property for purposes of
access to the Defendant's properties. After the Law Court mandate, the parties filed a Joint
Motion for Clarification of that point.
Pursuant to a previously issued notice and by agreement of the parties, the court
conducted a site view and a hearing June 30, 2016. At the hearing, Plaintiff and Defendants
presented evidence in the form of sworn testimony and exhibits. After the close of evidence
the court issued several oral rulings and set a schedule for further submissions by the
1
parties. This Order is to set forth that schedule and also to summarize the court's oral
rulings for the benefit of counsel in preparing their submissions.
Procedural Posture
Because the Business and Consumer Court has issued what is now a final judgment
by virtue of being affirmed on appeal, any "clarification" of the final judgment needs to be
pursuant to Rule 60(b) of the Maine Rules of Civil Procedure. See Bonner v. Emerson, 2014
ME IS5, ~ 10, 105 A.sci 102S, 1026 (Rule 60(b) is the source of trial court's authority to
modify final judgment). Although the parties' Joint Motion for Clarification does not
mention Rule 60(b), the court will proceed on the basis that the Joint Motion for
Clarification invokes the court's Rule 60(b) jurisdiction, and that the parties agree that Rule
60(b)( 1) and/or 60(b)( 6) authorize the court to issue an amendment to the judgment
clarifying the location and scope of the easements. Any objection to the foregoing should
be filed in writing within 10 days of this Order, or be deemed waived.
Format efAmended Judgment
The court further assumes that the end result of the present procedure will be at
least an amendment to the final judgment, and also either a recordable abstract of the
amendment or perhaps a separate recordable easement deed for each of the Defendants' two
properties. The parties are requested to confer on what documents are involved and what
form they should take.
Summary ef Rulings
The following summarizes the court's oral rulings made at the close of the June SO,
2015 hearing:
• The easements appurtenant to Defendants' properties will allow vehicles operated
by persons seeking access to Defendants' properties to travel over any portion of the
Plaintiffs parking lot that is now or hereafter accessible to other users of the
parking lot, except that no vehicle operated by a person going to Defendants'
2
properties will be permitted to park in any of the Plaintiffs' parking spaces, and
vehicles leaving Defendants' property will exit only via the same way they entered,
i.e. to Main Street.
• Nothing in the easements will limit the Plaintiffs right to change the parking lot
either as to its configuration or its usage, provided however, that the Plaintiff will
not reduce the travel way for vehicles to go to and from Defendants' properties
below the following minimums:
oa travel way IS feet wide at the Main Street entrance to the parking lot
oa 16 foot-wide rectangular travel way centered on and running lengthwise
from the Main Street entrance westerly to the southwesterly corner of the
20-foot wide travel way described below
o a 20-foot wide rectangular travel way running northerly from the westerly
end of the above-describedl6-foot wide travel way to the southerly edge of
the building at the northwest corner of the parking lot. The easterly side of
said 20-foot wide rectangular travel way abuts the 25 x 18 rectangle
described in the following subparagraph.
o a 25 foot by 18-foot rectangular area abutting the 20-foot wide travel way,
with the longer sides abutting the 20-foot wide travel way on the west and
the Defendants' property lines on the east. Defendants may determine
where the 25 x 18 foot area is positioned along Defendants' westerly
boundary lines.
The foregoing travel way sections are hereinafter collectively referred to as the
"minimum travel way."
• No part of any parked vehicle shall be within or over the above-defined minimum
travel way. (See below for potential limited exception for delivery vehicles).
• No vehicle parked on Defendants' property will protrude onto or over Plaintiffs
property, and no vehicle parked on Plaintiffs property will protrude onto or over
Defendants' property. This means that a vehicle parked on a party's property must
be entirely on that party's property and may not overhang another party's property.
Further Potential Provisions
The court is considering the following additional provisions and invites the parties'
further input:
• A provision to the effect that delivery vehicles that stop partly or entirely in the
above-defined minimum travel way solely for the purpose of making a delivery to a
party will not be deemed to be in violation of the easement as long as the delivery
vehicle does not interfere with any other vehicles using that portion of the travel
way. This means that vehicles making deliveries or pickups for any party could stop
anywhere within the Defendants' above-defined minimum travel way as long as they
did not block other parties or other users of the parking lot. Such a provision could
3
benefit all parties. Without it, vehicles making deliveries to the Plaintiffs property
or the Defendants' properties would be required to stop entirely outside the
minimum travel way. The court is open to setting time limits as well.
• A provision requiring the parties to notify each other of any violations
• A provision defining the terms under which the easement can be terminated, but
requiring that termination is effective only if ordered by a court with jurisdiction
• A provision authorizing any party to obtain legal and equitable relief for a violation
by another party
• The court encourages, but will not require, the parties to include an ADR procedure
to be exhausted before any party invokes the aid of the court
• In addition, the documents need to contain standard appurtenant easement language,
• Eventually a metes and bounds description of the "minimum travel way" will be needed,
to be included in the easement description and also depicted on a plan.
Schedule
The court adopts the following schedule for the parties' further submissions:
By July 22, 2015, Plaintiff will draft and submit to Defendant on behalf of Plaintiff and
the parties-in-interest the document or documents that the Plaintiff will be asking the court to
adopt.
By July 29, 2015, Defendants will draft and submit to Plaintiff and parties-in-interest
the Defendants' response, along with a red-lined version of the Plaintiffs submittals, indicating
the Defendants' deletions and additions. If the Plaintiff agrees with any changes made by
Defendants, Plaintiffs counsel will endeavor to notify Defendants' counsel prior to August 5.
By August 5, 2015, all parties who wish to file proposed documents for the court's
consideration will do so, including memoranda in support of a party's position on any disputed
issue of fact or law.
The Clerk will schedule this case for oral argument on the parties' submissions on any
available date after August 5, 2015. If all parties agree, the oral argument may be held in
4
Portland with any counsel who wishes able to participate telephonically. Otherwise, the oral
argument will be at the court of origin in Ellsworth.
Pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 79(a), the Clerk is hereby directed to incorporate this order by
reference in the docket.
Dated July 1, 2015
l
.,.. A. M. Horton
Justice
Entered on the Docket: '1- d .. / £l(
Copies sen! via Mail - Electronically
5
Testa's Inc. v. Jack Coopersmith, Sherri Coopersmith, Tourmaline King, LLC,
Tourmaline Queen, LLC, Thomas Testa, JR., Anna Striefel, MLS Properties, LLC and Joan
E. Purcell
BCD-RE-11-03
Testa's Inc.
Plaintiff
Counsel: Aaron Baltes, Esq.
Two Canal Plaza
PO Box4600
Portland, ME 04112-4600
Jack and Sherri Coopersmith,
Tourmaline King, LLC and
Tourmaline Queen, LLC,
Defendants
Counsel: Gerard Fournier, Esq. and
Joshua Randlett, Esq.
One Merchants Plaza Suite 603
PO Box 2429
Bangor, ME 04402-2429
David Soley, Esq.
100 Middle St
PO Box9729
Portland, ME 04104-5029
MLS Properties, LLC
Party-in-Interest
Counsel: Timothy Bryant, Esq.
One City Center
PO Box 9546
Portland, ME 04112-9546
Thomas Testa, JR. and Anna Striefel
Parties-in-Interest
Counsel: Douglas Chapman, Esq. and
Thomas Wheatley, Esq.
109 Main St
Bar Harbor, ME 04609
STATE OF MAINE BUSINESS AND CONSUMER COURT
CUMBERLAND, ss . Location: Portland /
Docket No. BCD-RE-11-03
TESTA'S, INC.,
Plaintiff/Counterclaim Defendant,
V. FINAL
DECISION AND JUDGMENT 1
JACK COOPERSMITH, et al.,
Defendants/Counterclaim Plaintiffs,
and
THOMAS J. TESTA,JR.,ANNA T. STRIEFEL,
MLS PROPERTIES, LLC, and JOAN PURCELL,
Parties-in-Interest
On September 9 - 11, 2013, this matter was tried to the Court on Plaintiff's Complaint
and Defendants' Counterclaim. The central issue generated by the complaint and counterclaim is
1
On October 1, 2013, after a bench trial, the Court issued its Decision and Judgment in this matter. In the
Decision and Judgment, in determining that Defendants had an easement over Plaintiff's property, the
Court declined to address all but one of the theories by which Defendants maintained the existence of an
easement. Plaintiff subsequently filed post-trial motions, which motions raised certain substantive and
procedural issues. On October 8, 2013, the Court conducted a telephonic conference with counsel to
discuss with the parties some of the issues raised in the motions and the future course of the case. One of
the isi,ues raised by the motions and during the conference was the possibility that this Court would not be
available to address any post-judgment issues that might be generated in the event of an appeal and
subsequent remand. Citing the interests of judicial economy, the parties requested that the Court address
all of Defendants' theories and any related legal defenses. The Court agrees that judicial economy
militates in favor of the Court addressing some of the other issues in the case. The Court, therefore,
issues this Final Decision and Judgment, which shall supersede and not be in addition to the October 1,
2013, Decision and Judgment.
I
whether Defendants' property benefits from an easement over Plaintiff's property in Bar Harbor,
Maine.2 After consideration of the evidence, the Court makes the following findings:
FINDINGS OF FACT 3
1. Plaintiff owns certain real property located on the westerly side of Main Street in Bar
Harbor, Maine, which consists of several contiguous lots (the Testa property).
2. Defendants Coopersmith also own certain property on Main Street in Bar Harbor,
Maine, which property they acquired by deed dated November 1, 2005 (the Coopersmith
property). Defendants Tourmaline King, LLC, and Tourmaline Queen, LLC, (Defendants
Tourmaline), which are now owned by Defendants Coopersmith, own certain property on Main
Street in Bar Harbor, Maine, which property is described in a deed dated December 24, 2012 (the
Tourmaline property) .
3. The Coopersmith property and the Tourmaline property include retail businesses with
space for parking ·immediately behind the building.
4. The deed to the prior owners of the Tourmaline property included a right of way over
adjoining property, at least a portion of which is now the Testa property, to permit access to the
rear of the Tourmaline property. The Coopersmiths' deed also includes a grant of a right of way.
5. The Coopersmith property consists of the consolidation of two lots. One of the
historical lots is located along the westerly side of Main Street. Lot two abuts lot one to the
west. The right of way in the Coopersmith deed describes a right over Lot two for the benefit of
Lot one.
2
Plaintiff had fil ed, bu t wi thdre w prior to tri al, a c laim for damages.
3
T h Court wi ll set forth some of the basic fac ts established at trial. The en umerated facts are not, however, an
exhaustive list of all of the Court's fac tual findings . As part of the Court's analysis in the Discussion secti on that
follows, the Court makes additional findings.
2
6. For many years, beginning in the 1950's and through and including the mid-1970's,
the Coopersmiths' predecessors-in-title accessed the rear of their property over the Testa
property for business deliveries and other purposes.
7. In the 1970's, Plaintiff's predecessor-in-title developed plans to expand the parking
area behind the Testa property and the Coopersmith property. The expansion included the
construction of a concrete wall that would prevent the owners of the Coopersmith property from
accessing the rear of their property in the manner they were accustomed.
8. Philip ' and Nathan Sanborn were the owners of the Coopersmith property at the time
of the proposed construction of the concrete wall. In the 1970's, Catherine Riccardo was the
record owner of the Tourmaline property, which abutted the Coopersmith property along Main
Street. Ms. Riccardo's daughter, Joan Purcell, operated a retail business out of the building on
the Tourmaline property.
9. Soon after learning of the proposed construction of the concrete wall, Philip and
Nathan Sanborn, together with Joan Purcell and Catherine Riccardo, commenced a lawsuit on
September 9 , 1977 , in Hancock County Superior Court against Joseph and Michael Testa, the
then owners of the Testa property, in an effort to prevent the construction of the concrete wall
(the Lawsuit). They alleged that the construction would interfere with their rights of way, and
their ability to access the rear of their property as they and their predecessors had done
historically. On September 29, 1977, the court entered a temporary restraining order prohibiting
the defendants in the case (the Testas) from interfering with the access of the plaintiffs (in the
Lawsuit) to their property.
10. During the course of the Lawsuit, through their attorneys, the Sanborns and Riccardo
negotiated an agreement with Joseph and Michael Testa, Jr., (through their attorneys), by which
3
agreement the Sanborns and Riccardo would be able to continue to access. the rear of their
properties over a portion of the Testa property.
11. Joseph Testa, Michael Testa, Jr., Philip Sanborn, and Nathan Sanborn signed the
agreement, in June 1978. Other than the dismissal of the case in October 1980, the Hancock
County Superior Court's record does not reflect any court activity after the execution of the
agreement by the Sanborns and the Testas. Catherine Riccardo did not sign the agreement. Ms.
Riccardo's failure to sign the agreement was not the result of any objection that she had to the
terms of the agreement. Given that the parties undertook no further action regarding the lawsuit
after June 1978, and given that after June 1978, Ms. Purcell, Ms. Riccardo's daughter and the
occupant of the parcel owned by Ms. Riccardo, accessed the rear of the Tourmaline property
over the Testa property in accordance with the agreement without any objection from Joseph and
Michael Testa, all parties to the Lawsuit, including Ms. Riccardo, assented to the terms of the
June 1978 agreement.
12 . The Hancock County Superior Court dismissed the lawsuit on October 15, 1980,
pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 41(b) for failure to prosecute the Lawsuit.
13. After the execution of the agreement in 1978, the Sanborns and Ms. Purcell accessed
the rear of their properties over the Testa property in a manner consistent with the parties' June
1978 agreement.
14. In or about 2010, the Town of Bar Harbor passed an ordinance that eliminated the
need for businesses to have a minimum amount of parking space available for customers. This
change made the. parking area behind the Coopersmith property and the Tourmaline property
available for potential development.
4
15. From time to time after their purchase of the Coopersmith property, Defendants'
ability to access their property from the rear of the building has been hindered.
DISCUSSION
In this action, both parties request that the Court enter a declaratory judgment regarding
Defendants' assertion of an easement over Plaintiff's property for the benefit of the Coopersmith
property and the Tourmaline property. Defendants also seek to recover damages for Plaintiff's
alleged nuisance and unreasonable interference with Plaintiff's easement rights. The Court will
first address the parties' request for declaratory judgment.
At trial, both parties presented evidence regarding the right of way or easement language
in the chain of title to the Coopersmith property and the Tourmaline/Purcell properties.
Defendants also maintain that the deeds to the Coopersmith and Tourmaline/Purcell properties
contain express easements, which granted rights of way over the Testa property. In addition, the
parties submitted evidence as to the historical use of the parking area behind the Coopersmith
and Tourmaline/Purcell properties. Through the historical evidence, Defendants attempt to
establish the existence of a prescriptive easement and an implied easement over the Testa
property.
A. The June 1978 Agreement
Defendants' predecessors-in-title commenced the Lawsuit as the result of the efforts of
Plaintiff's predecessors-in-title to construct a concrete wall that would prevent Defendants'
predecessors-in-title from accessing their property over the Testa property. In the Lawsuit,
Defendants, Ms. Riccardo and Ms. Purcell maintained that they had a legal right to cross the
Testa property to access Defendants' property. The evidence and common sense establish that
5
the parties negotiated a resolution of the Lawsuit through an agreement that would allow
Plaintiff's predecessor-in-title to complete construction of the parking lot, including the proposed
concrete wall, and which agreement would also allow Defendants' predecessor-in-title to
continue to have access to the rear of their properties. Indeed, Plaintiffs have offered no logical
explanation for the failure of the plaintiffs in the Lawsuit to continue prosecuting the Lawsuit
without confirming their ability to continue to gain access to their properties as they had prior .to
the proposed construction of the wall. Consistent with this conclusion, the Court record contains
no reference to any substantive action in the case after the Testas and Sanborns signed the
agreement in June 1978. Given that the parties' reached a resolution of the access issues to
resolve the Lawsuit, the parties' failure to object to the dismissal of the action pursuant to M.R.
Civ. P. 4l(b) is not surprising.
Despite the fact that Plaintiffs' predecessors-in-title signed the June 1978 agreement that
ended the lawsuit, Plaintiffs contend that the agreement is not valid because Catherine Riccardo
did not sign the agreement. First, Ms. Riccardo's signature was not necessary to establish an
enforceable agreement between the Testas and the Sanborns. In other words, the Testas and the
Sanborns are the only necessary parties to establish an easement over the Testa property for the
benefit of the Coopersmith property. Thus, all parties necessary to establish an easement over
the Testa property for the benefit of the Coopersmith property signed the agreement. 4
Furthermore, if Ms. Riccardo's assent to the agreement is necessary, the Defendants have
established that she consented to the terms of the agreement. In essence, Plaintiff argues that
even though its predecessors-in-title, Joseph Testa and Michael Testa, Jr., negotiated and signed
the agreement, acted in accordance with and abided by the terms of the agreement, the Court
4
Insofar as Defendants Coopersmith now own both the Coopersmith and Tourmaline properties, a right of way over
the Testa property for the benefit of the Coopersmith property effectively would allow Defendants Coopersmith to
access both properties.
6
should invalidate the agreement because Ms. Riccardo did not sign and thereby did not consent
to the terms of the agreement.
The absence of Ms. Riccardo's signature on the agreement is not the result of her
objection to any of the terms of the agreement. In fact, there is no evidence that Ms. Riccardo
expressed to any person that she had any concerns about the terms of the agreement.
The evidence in fact demonstrates that Ms. Riccardo consented to and, through her
daughter (Joan Purcell) who occupied the property and was a party to the Lawsuit, endorsed and
acted in accordance with the terms of the agreement. Ms. Riccardo was an owner of the property
in name only. Ms. Riccardo's daughter, Joan Purcell, transferred the property to Ms. Riccardo as
part of her effort to protect the asset should her husband incur any future liability .5 Ms. Purcell,
who occupied the Tourmaline property at all pertinent times, testified that she understood that
the parties ended the lawsuit with an agreement that permitted her to access the rear of the
property from Main Street over the Testa property. Ms. Purcell continued to operate a business
out of the property until she sold the property to Defendants Coopersmith in 2012. While
occupying the Tourmaline property, in accordance with the terms of the June 1978 agreement,
Ms . Purcell continuously accessed the rear of the property from Main Street over the Testa
property. Simply stated, Plaintiff's contention that the agreement is invalid because Ms.
Riccardo did not assent to the terms of the agreement is not supported by competent, reliable
evidence.
As mentioned above, Defendants also argued that they have an express easement by
virtue of the language in the deeds to the Coopersmith and Tourmaline properties. The express
5
Ms. Purcell testified that after her husband had been involved in a motor vehicle accident, she became concerned
that if her husband were involved in a future accident in which a person was injured, the property could be at risk.
She testified, therefore, that she transferred the property to her mother to avoid exposure for any claims that might
arise as the result of her husband's future conduct.
7
easement language in the deeds does not grant to Defendants access to the rear of their properties
from Main Street over the Testa property. At most, the deeds contain easements that grant
access over the Testa property from the rear of the properties. While the Court cannot conclude
that the express language in the deeds is controlling, the inclusion of the easement language in
the deeds further convinces that Court that the parties reached a binding agreement by which
Defendants ' predecessors-in-title could continue to access their property. In the Court's view,
the deed language, as well as use consistent with the existence of the easement, provided
Defendants' predecessors-in-title with a compelling argument in support of their request for
injunctive relief in the Lawsuit. Plaintiff's predecessor-in-title faced the possibility that the
Lawsuit could end with an injunction prohibiting the expansion of the parking area. A
reasonable person in the position of Plaintiffs' predecessors-in-title would recognize that risk,
and seek to resolve the Lawsuit in a way that permitted expansion of the parking area and
construction of the concrete wall. 6
Plaintiff also argues that because Ms. Riccardo did not sign the agreement, the statute of
frauds bars enforcement of the agreement. 33 M.R.S. § 51(4) (2012) provides in pertinent part
that "No action shall be maintained in any of the following cases ... [u]pon any contract for the
sale of lands, tenements or hereditaments, or of any interest in or concerning them ... unless the
promise, contract or agreement on which such action is brought, or some memorandum or note
thereof, is in writing and signed by the party to be charged therewith ... "
6
Plaintiff has argued U1at Defendan ts' predecesso rs-in-ti tle abandoned any express ease men t through no n-use. The
" non-use" occu rred followin g execution of the June J 978 agreement. The consLruction of the concrete wall re ndered
use of the easement im poss ible. Defenda nts, therefo re, did not abandon the easement. Instead, Lhe parties si mply
agreed to relocate the easement, which is permissible. See Davis v. Bruk, 411 A.2d 660 (Me. 1980) (easement can
be relocated by mutual con. enl of the owners of the dominant and serv ient estates).
8
Plaintiff's statute of frauds argument is essentially a reiteration of its contention that the
agreement is invalid because Ms. Riccardo did not sign the agreement. Contrary to Plaintiff's
argument, there is an agreement signed by "the party charge therewith ... " That is, the owners of
the property to be burdened by the right of way (i.e., Michael and Joseph Testa) signed the
agreement and agreed to bound by its terms. Plaintiff's statute of frauds issue fails for that
reason.
Furthermore, the purpose of the statute of frauds is not to invalidate meritorious claims.
Rather, "[t]he purpose of the statute of frauds is to prevent actions based on false claims."
Brown Development Corp. v. Hemond, 2008 ME 146, ~ 11, 956 A. 2d 104, 108 (citing, Wells
Fargo Home Mortgage, Inc., v. Spaulding, 2007 ME 116, ~ 20,930 A.2d 1025, 1030; Dehahn v.
Innes, 356 A.2d 711, 717 (Me. 1976)). The law recognizes that the statute of frauds should not
be a shield for a party to avoid a clear obligation to which the party plainly consented, and for
which the party received valuable consideration.7 In this case, despite the existence of a writing
signed by its predecessor-in-title, Plaintiff attempts to void Defendants' right of access, for
which right Plaintiff's predecessor-in-title received valuable consideration (i.e., the end of the
Lawsuit which permitted the expansion of the parking lot and the construction of the concrete
wall). As explained above, the lack of Ms. Riccardo's signature does not inv'alidate the
agreement. In short, the agreement satisfies the writing requirement of the statute of frauds.
("almost any writing is sufficient for statute of frauds purposes" Brown Development Corp.,
2008 ME 146, ~ 12).
7
In Chapman v. Bowman, 381 A.2d 1123, 1128 (Me . 1978), the Law Court, in adopting and applying the "broad
formulation of the doctrine of promissory estoppel set forth in the .... Restatement (Second) of Contracts," observed,
"since it is the purpose of the Statute of Frauds to prevent fraud, that Statute cannot be permitted to be itself an
instrument of fraud."
9
Plaintiff has asserted that if the June 1978 agreement is valid, it only conveyed a personal
license to the Sanborns. In other words, Plaintiff contends that the interest did not run with the
land and, therefore, Defendants are not the beneficiaries of the right of way. "The construction
of language creating an easement is a question of law." Anchors v. Manter, 1998 ME 152, ! 16,
714 A.2d 134, 138 (citing, Fine Line, Inc. v. Blake, 677 A.2d 1061, 1063 (Me. 1996)). 8 The
legal question is whether in the Court's view, Defendants obtained an appurtenant easement over
the Testa property or whether their predecessors merely obtained an easement personal to the
grantees.9
"The traditional rules of construction for grants or reservations of easements require that
whenever possible an easement be fairly construed to be appurtenant to the land of the person for
whose use the easement is created." Anchors v. Manter, 1998 ME 152, f 10, 714 A.2d 134, 138
(quoting, LeMay v. Anderson, 397 A.2d 984, 987 (Me. 1979)). Not insignificantly, the expert
witnesses for both the Plaintiff and Defendants opined that if valid, the agreement conveyed an
appurtenant easement. The indicia of an appurtenant easement are clearly present in the
agreement. Perhaps most importantly, use of the right of way as expressed in the agreement is
not limited to a specific person or persons, which is an essential distinguishing feature between
8
Plaintiff argued that the agreement could be read to convey a license , and, therefore , the agreement was amb ig uous
and Plaintiff should be able to present the testimony of the Testas' counsel as to his intent when d rafting the
agreement. Given that the expert witnesses for the P laintiff and Defendants agreed lhat the ag reement conveyed an
app urtenant easeme nt, and given the plai n language of the agreement, the Court determined , conb·ary to Plaintiff's
argume nt, that lhe agreement was not amblguous. In addition , the Court was not convinced thal Lhe intent of the
Testas' counsel in drafting the agreement was relevant. The Court, therefore , excluded the testimony of T es tas
counsel. ·
9
"The law recognizes two different types of easements or ri ghts of use over the property of another: caseme nts
ap pur tenan t and easements in gross . Grante rs create ease ments appurtenant to be nefit a do minant estate and such
easements run wi th the land . To be appurtena nt, the easement must be attach ed or related to a domi na nt es tate. In
contras t, easements in gross are personal in terests in land or the ri gbt to use another's land. They are not appu rtenant
to any estate in lan d ru1d do not belon g to any pe rson by virtue of hi s ownershi p of an estate in olher land. An
easement in gros is gene.ral ly nol assignable and terminates upon the death of the grantee." Wentworth v. Sebra,
2003 ME 97, ~~ 12, 13,829 A .2d 520,524. '
10
an easement in gross (i.e., a personal easement) and an easement appurtenant. Wentworth v.
Sebra, 2003 ME 97, !! 12, 13,829 A.2d 520,524. In particular, the agreement provided that the
right of way could be used by the "[Sanborns' and Riccardo's'] immediate families, for delivery
purposes or persons occupying said land of Sanborn and Riccardo under a written lease." In the
Court's view, consistent with the only expert testimony presented at trial, this language plainly
creates an interest that benefitted the Coopersmith property and the Tourmaline property and was
not, as Plaintiff argues, an interest granted only to Philip Sanborn, Nathan Sanborn and Catherine
Riccardo.
Plaintiff also argues that in the event the Court determines that the parties entered into a
binding agreement in June 1978, the agreement is terminated because Defendants abused the
easement. In support of its contention, Plaintiff cites the term of the June 1978 agreement that
provides, "[a]ny abuse of the access given hereunder by Sanborn [Defendants' predecessor] or
Riccardo shall terminate and cancel this Agreement with respect to the party abusing said
access.]" Plaintiff asserts that Defendants abused the easement because either Defendants or
those performing work for Defendants parked in or used portions of the parking area that were
beyond the scope of Defendants' rights of access.
Plaintiff's argument is unpersuasive. Plaintiff presented photographs that depicted the
temporary use in May 2013 of portions of the parking area by contractors or others who were
arguably Defendants' agents. Even if Plaintiff were to prove that Defendants were responsible
for some or all of the use of the parking lot as depicted on the photographs, Plaintiff has not
established sufficient grounds to terminate the agreement. The agreement does not permit
termination in the event of isolated, limited, use that might extend beyond the use contemplated
11
by the agreement. The fact that the conduct occurred well before the tourist season began in
earnest further convinces the Court that the alleged conduct does not constitute abuse.
B. Prescriptive Easement/Implied Easement
Defendants alternatively maintain that they acquired an easement by prescription over the
Testa property. "[f]he party asserting an easement by prescription must prove continuous use
for at least 20 years under a claim of right adverse to the owner, with his knowledge and
acquiescence, or a use so open, notorious, visible, and uninterrupted that knowledge and
acquiescence will be presumed." Town of Manchester v. Augusta Country Club, 477 A.2d 1124,
1130 (Me. 1984) (citation omitted). Acquiescence implies "passive assent or submission to the
use, as distinguished from the granting of a license or permission given with the intention that
the licensee's use may continue only as long as the owner continues to consent to it." Pace v.
Carter, 398 A.2d 505,507 (Me. 1978).
As explained earlier, the Court believes that Defendants' predecessors-in-title had a right
of way, which they exercised until resolution of the Lawsuit, which they initiated after Plaintiff's
predecessor-in-title decided to expand the parking area and construct a concrete wall. Even if the
Court found that the June 1978 agreement did not bind the parties, Defendants have
demonstrated the existence of a prescriptive easement, by which Defendants would continue to
access their property. The evidence at trial overwhelmingly established that for more than 20
years before the Lawsuit, and for the years after the Lawsuit until the dispute that resulted in this
action, Defendants' predecessors-in-title, delivery companies, and individuals regularly,
consistently, and without objection from Plaintiff's predecessors-in-title, accessed the
Coopersmith and Tourmaline properties over the Testa property. The Court concludes,
therefore, that even if Defendants had not persuaded the Court that the June 1978 agreement was
12
valid and binding upon the parties, Defendants would have an easement by prescription over the
Testa property .10
C. Nuisance
In their counterclaim, Defendants assert claims of nuisance and unreasonable interference
with easement rights. To prevail on their common law nuisance claim, Defendants must
establish that "(1) the [counterclaim] defendant acted with the intent of interfering with the use
and enjoyment of the land by those entitled to that use; (2) there was some interference with the
use and enjoyment of the land of the kind intended, although the amount and extent of that
interference may not have been anticipated or intended; (3) the interference that resulted and the
physical harm, if any, from that interference proved to be substantial ... The substantial
interference requirement is to satisfy the need for a showing that the land is reduced in value
because of the defendant's conduct; and (4) the interference that came about under such
circumstances was of such a nature, duration or amount as to constitute unreasonable
interference with the use and enjoyment of the land." Charlton v. Town of Oxford, 2001 ME
104, ~ 36,774 A.2d 366,377.
Here, while Defendants introduced evidence that on occasion one of Plaintiff's
employees parked in an area that interfered with Defendants' ability to access their property, the
Court is not convinced that Plaintiff's employee acted at the direction of the Plaintiff in an effort
to inte1fere with Defendants' access. In addition, Defendants have not proven by competent,
reliable evidence that they have suffered monetary damages, including a diminution in value of
10
Defendants also assert that they have access to their properties over the Testa property by virtue of an implied
easement. While the Court believes that Defendants and their predecessors-in-title have had access over the Testa
property for a sufficient period of time and under circumstances to establish an easement by prescription, the Court
is not convinced that at the time that the common owner of the properties divided the properties, the use was such
that "it is reasonable to infer that the parties to the conveyance intended that the use continue." McGeechan v.
Sherwood, 2000 ME 188, 1) 57, 760 A.2d 1068, 1080. The Court, therefore, determines that Defendants do not have
an implied easement over Plaintiff's property.
13
Defendants' property, as the result of Plaintiff's interference with Defendants' access.
Defendants, therefore, cannot prevail on their nuisance claim. For the same reasons, Defendants
cannot prevail on their claim of unreasonable interference with their easement rights.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing analysis, the Court orders:
1. On the parties' request for declaratory judgment, the Court determines that the June
1978 agreement grants an appurtenant easement from Main Street over the Testa property to the
rear of the Cooopersmith property and the Tourmaline property, which easement is for the
benefit cif the Coopersmith property and the Tourmaline property. The Court also determines
that Defendants acquired an easement by prescription over the Testa property, which easement is
for the benefit of the Coopersmith property and the Tourmaline property. The Court further
determines that Defendants do not have an implied easement over the Testa property.
2. On Counts II and III of Defendants' Counterclaim, the Court enters judgment in favor
of Plaintiff and against Defendants.
Pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 79(a), the Clerk shall incorporate this Decision and Judgment
into the docket by reference .
Date: 11/rJ;/1
Entem<l on lhe Dr.>ek~: rj~
Gooies sP.11t vif.'I Mall ·-·- l::lectmnically Y
14
STATE OF MAINE BUSINESS AND CONSUMER COURT
CUMBERLAND, ss. Location: Portland
Docket No. BCD-RE-11-03
TESTA'S, INC.,
Plaintiff/Counterclaim Defendant,
v. DECISION AND JUDGMENT
JACK COOPERSMITH, et al.,
Defendants/Counterclaim Plaintiffs,
and
THOMAS J. TESTA, JR., ANNA T. STRIEFEL,
MLS PROPERTIES, LLC, and JOAN PURCELL,
PaI1ies-in-Interest
On September 9 - 11, 2013, this matter was tried to the Court on Plaintiff's Complaint
and Defendants' Counterclaim. The central issue generated by the complaint and counterclaim is
whether Defendants' property benefits from an easement ove1· Plaintiff's property in Bar Harbor,
Maine. 1 After consideration of the evidence, the Court makes the following findings:
Findings of Fact 2
1. Plaintiff owns certain real prope1ty located on Main Street in Bar Harbor, Maine,
which consists of several contiguous lots (the Testa property).
1
At the trial, Plaintiff withdrew Its claim under the Unfair Trade Practices Act.
2
The Court will set forth some of the basic fncts established at trial. The enumerated facts are not, however, an
exhaustive list of nil of the Court's factual findings. As part of the Court's analysis in the Discussion section that
follows, the Court makes additional findings.
2. Defendants also own certain property on Main Street in Bar Harbor, Maine, which
property they acquired by deed dated November l, 2005 (the Coopersmith property).
3. The Coopersmith property includes a retail business with space for parking
immediately behind the building.
4. The deed to the pl'iot' owners of the Coopersmith prope1ty included a right of way over
adjoining property, at least a portion of which is now the Testa property, to permit access to the
rear of the Coopersmith property. The Coopersmiths' deed also includes a grant of a right of
way.
S. The Coopersmiths' predecessors-in-title accessed the rear of their property over the
Testa property for business de1iveries and other purposes.
6. In the I 970's, Plaintiff's predecessor-in-title developed plans to expand the parking
area behind the Testa property and the Coopersmith property. The expansion included the
constrnction of a concrete wall that would prevent the owners of the Coopersmith property from
accessing the rear of their property in the manner they were accustomed.
7. Philip and Nathan Sanborn were the owners of the Coopersmith property at the time
of the proposed construction of the concrete wall. Catherine Riccardo was the record owner of
real property that abutted the Coopersmith property along Main Street. Ms. Riccardo's daughter,
Joan Purcell, operated a retail business out of the building on the property (the Purcell property).
8. Philip and Nathan Sanborn, together with Joan Purcell and Catherine Riccardo,
commenced a lawsuit on September 9, 1977, in Hancock County Superior Comt against Joseph
and Michele Testa, the then owners. of the Testa property, in an effort to prevent the construction
of the concrete wall (the lawsuit). They alleged that the construction would inte1fere with their
rights of way. On September 29, 1977, the court entered a temporary restraining order
2
prohibiting the defendants in the case (the Testas) from interfering with the access of the
plaintiffs to their property.
9. During the course of the lawsuit, the Sanborns and Riccardo negotiated an agreement
with Joseph and Michele Testa, Jr., by which agreement the Sanboms and Riccardo would be
able to access the rear of their properties over a portion of the Testa property.
10. Joseph Testa, Michele Testa, Jr., Philip Sanborn, and Nathan Sanborn signed the
agreement in June 1978. The court's record does not reflect any court activity after the
execution of the agreement by the Sanborns and the Testas. Catherine Riccardo did not sign the
agreement. Ms. Riccardo's failure to sign the agreement was not the result of any objection that
she had to the terms of the agreement. Given that the parties undertook no further action
regarding the lawsuit after June 1978, and given that after June 1978, Ms. Purcell, the occupant
of the parcel owned by Ms. Riccardo, accessed the rear of the Purcell property over the Testa
property, Ms. Riccardo assented to the terms of the June 1978 agreement.
11. The Hancock County Superior Court dismissed the lawsuit on October 15, 1980,
pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 4I(b) for failure to prosecute the lawsuit.
12. After the execution of the agreement in 1978, the Sanborns, their successors-in-title,
and Ms. Purcell accessed the rear of their property over the Testa property in a manner consistent
with the pal'ties' agreement.
13. The deeds in the chain of title to the Coopersmith property and the Purcell property
include language that provides for a right of way over a portion of the parking area currently
owned by Plaintiff.
14. In or about 2010, the Town of Bar Harbor passed an ordinance that eliminated the
need for businesses to have a minimum amount of pal'ldng space available for customers. This
3
change made the parking area behind the Coopersmith property and the Purcell prope1ty
available for potential development.
15. From time to time after their purchase of the Coopersmith property, Defendants,
ability to access their property from the rear of the building has been hindered.
Discussion
In this action, both parties request that the Court enter a declarato1·y judgment regarding
Defendants' assertion of an easement over PJaintiff's property for the benefit of the Coopersmith
property. Defendants also seek to recover damages for Plaintiffs alleged nuisance and
unreasonable inte1ference with Plaintiff's easement rights. The Court will first address the
parties' request for declaratory judgment.
At trial, both parties presented evidence regarding the right of way or easement language
in the chain of title to the Coopel'smith property and the Purcell property. In addition, the parties
submitted evidence as to the historical use of the parking area behind the Coopersmith and
Purcell properties. Through the historical evidence, Defendants attempt to establish the
existence of a prescriptive easement over the Testa property. As explained below, after
consideration of the evidence, the Comt concludes that Defendants have an appurtenant
easement over the Testa property from Main Street to the rear of the Coopersmith property as the
result of the June 1978 agreement by which the parties' predecessors in title resolved the
lawsuit.3
The lawsuit was commenced as the result of the efforts of Plaintiff's predecessors-in-title
to construct a wall that would prevent Defendants' predecessors-in-title from accessing their
property over the Testa property. In the lawsuit, Defendants, Ms. Riccardo and Ms. Purcell
3
Because tho Court concludes thnt the parties' ngreed to an express easement in June 1978, the Court does not
address Defendants' contention that they have an express easement by deed, a prescriptive easement, or a quasi
easement.
4
maintained that they had ft legal right to cross the Testa property to access Defendants' prope11y .
The only logical conclusion is that the parties negotiated a resolution of the lawsuit, which
agreement would allow Plaintiff's predecessor-in-title to complete construction of the parking
lot, including the wall, and allow Defendants' predecessor-in-title to continue to have access to
the rear of their property. Consistent with this conclusion, the Court record contains no reference
to any substantive action in the case after the Testas and Sanborns signed the agreement in June
1978. Given that the pai1ies' reached a resolution of the access issues to resolve the lawsuit, the
parties' failure to object to the dismissal of the action pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 41(b) is not
surprising.
Despite the fact that Plaintiffs' predecessors-in-title signed the June 1978 agreement that
ended the la)vsuit, Plaintiffs contend that the agreement is not valid because Catherine Riccardo
did not sign the agreement. First, Ms. Riccardo's signature was not necessary to establish an
enforceable agreement between the Testas and the Sauboms. In other words, the Testas and the
Sanborns are the only necessary parties to establish an easement over the Testa property fol' the
benefit of the Coopersmith property, Thus, all parties necessary to establish an easement over
the Testa property for the benefit of the Coopersmith property signed the agreement.
Fmthermore, if Ms. Riccardo's assent to the agreement" was necessary, the Defendants
have established that she consented to the terms of the agreement. In essence, Plaintiff argues
that even though its pl'edecessors-in-title, Joseph Testa and Michele Testa, Jr., negotiated and
signed the agreement, acted in accordance with and abided by the terms of the agreement, the
Comt should invalidate the agreement because Ms. Riccardo did not sign and thereby did not
consent to the terms of the agreement.
5
The absence of Ms. Riccardo's signature on the agreement is not the result of her
objection to any of the terms of the agreement. Indeed, there is no evidence that Ms. Riccardo
expressed to any person that she had any concerns about the terms of the agreement.
The evidence ln fact demonstrates that Ms. Riccardo . consented to and, through her
daughter who occupied the property, endorsed and acted in accordance with the terms of the
agreement. Ms. Riccardo was an owner of the property in name only. Ms. Riccardo's daughter,
Joan Purcell, transferred the property to Ms. Riccardo as part of her effort to protect the asset
should her husband incur any future liability.4 Ms. Purcell, who occupied the Purcell property at
all pertinent times, testified that she understood that the parties ended the lawsuit with an
agreement that permitted her to access the rear of the property from Main Street over the Testa
property. Ms. Purcell continued to operate a business out of the property until she sold the
prope1ty to Defendants in 2012. While occupying the Purcell property, in accordance with the
terms of the June 1978 agreement, Ms. Purcell continuously accessed the rear of the property
from Main Street over the Testa property. Simply stated, Plaintiff's contention that the
agreement is invalid because Ms. Riccardo did not assent to the terms of the agreement is not
supported by competent, reliable evidence.
In this case, Plaintiff has asserted that if the June 1978 agreement is valid, it only
conveyed a personal license to the Sanborns. That is, Plaintiff contends that the interest did not
run with the land and, therefore, Defendants are not the beneficiaries of the right of way. "The
construction of language creating an easement is a question of law." Anchors v. Manter, 1998
ME i52, 9 16, 714 A.2d 134, 138 (citing, Fine Lhie, Inc. v. Blake, 677 A.2d 1061, 1063 (Me.
4 Ms. Purcell testified that after her husband had been Involved In a motor vehicle accident, she became concerned
that if her lmsband were lm•olved in a future accident In which a person was Injured; the property could be at risk.
She testified, therefore, that she transferred the property to her mother to avoid exposure for any claims that might
arise ns the result of her husband's future conduct.
6
1996)). 5 The legal question is whether in the Court's view, Defendants obtained an appurtenant
easement over the Testa property or whether their predecessors merely obtained an easement
personal to the grantees.6
"The traditional rules of construction for grants or reservations of easements require that
whenever possible an easement be fairly construed to be appurtenant to the land of the person for
whose use the easement is created." Anchors v. Manter, 1998 ME 152, j 10, 714 A.2d 134, 138
(quoting, LeMay v. Anderson, 397 A.2d 984, 987 (Me. 1979)). Not insignificantly, the expert
witnesses for both the Plaintiff and Defendants opined that if valid, the agreement conveyed an
appurtenant easement. The indicia of an appurtenant easement are clearly present in the
agreement. Perhaps most importantly, use of the right of way as expressed in the agreement is
not limited to a specific person or persons, which is an essential distinguishing feature between a
easement in gross (i.e., a persona.I easement) and an easement appurtenant. Wentworth v. Sebra,
2003 ME 97, fj 12, 13,829 A.2d 520,524. In particular, the agreement provided that the right
of way could be used by the 0 [Sanborns' and Riccardo's'] immediate families, for delivery
purposes or persons occupying said land of Sanborn and Riccardo under a written lease." In the
Court's view, consistent with the only expel't testimony presented at tl'ial, this language plainly
5
Plaintiff argued that the agreement could be read to convey a license, and, therefore, the agreement was ambiguous
and PJaintlff should be nbJe to present the testimony of the Testes' counsel as to his Intent when drafting the
agreement. Given that the eitpert witnesses for the Plaintiff and Defendants agreed that the agreement conveyed an
appurtenant casement, and given the plain language of the agreement, the Court determined, contrary to Plaintiff's
argument, thnt the agreement was not ambiguous. In addition, the Court was not convinced that the intent of the
Testas' counsel in drafting the agreement was relevant. The Court, therefore, excluded the testimony of Testas'
counsel.
6
"The law recognizes lwo different types of easements or rights of use over the property of another: easements
appurtenant and easements In gross. Grantors create casements appurtenant to bencfil n dominant estate and such
easements run with the land. To be appurtenant, the casement mus! be attached or related to a dominant estate. In
contrast, casements In gross arc pcrsonnl lnteresls In land or the right to use another's land. They are not appurtennnt
lo any estate In land and do not belong to any person by virtue of his ownership of an estate In other land. An
easement In gross Is generally not assignable and terminates upon the death of the grantee." \Ve11tworrh v. Sebra,
2003 ME 97, 9! 12, 13,829 A.2d 520,524.
7
creates an interest that benefitted the Coopersmith property and the Purcell property and was not,
as Plaintiff argues, an interest granted only to Philip Sanborn, Nathan Sanborn and Catherine
Riccardo.
Plaintiff nlso argues that in the event the Court dete1mines that the parties entered into a
binding agreement in June 1978, the agreement is terminated because Defendants abused the
easement. In support of its contention, Plaintiff cites the term of the June 1978 agreement that
provides, "[a]ny abuse of the access given hereunder by Sanborn [Defendants' predecessor] or
Riccardo shall terminate and cancel this Agreement with respect to the party abusing said
access.l" Plaintiff asserts that Defendants abused the easement because either Defendants or
those performing work for Defendants parked in or used portions of the parking area that were
beyond the scope of Defendants' rights of access.
Plaintiff's argument is unpersuasive. Plaintiff presented photographs that depicted the
tempora1·y use in May 2013 of portions of the parking area by contractors or others who were
arguably Defendants' agents. Even if Plaintiff were to prove that Defendants were responsible
for some or all of the use of the parking lot as depicted on the photographs, Plaintiff has not
established sufficient grounds to terminate the agreement. The agreement does not permit
termination in the event of isolated, limited, use that might extend beyond the use contemplated
by the agreement. The fact that the conduct occurred well before the tourist season began in
earnest further convinces the Court that the alleged conduct does not constitute abuse.
In their counterclaim, Defendants assert claims of nuisance and unreasonable inte1ference
with easement rights. To prevail on their common law nuisance claim, Defendants must
establish that "(I) the [counterclaim] defendant acted with the intent of inte1fering with the use
and enjoyment of the land by those entitled to that use; (2) there was some inte1ference with the
8
use and enjoyment of the land of the kind intended, although the nmount and extent of that
inte1ference may not have been anticipated or intended; (3) the interference that resulted and the
physical harm, if any, from that inte1ference proved to be substantial ... The substantial
inte1ference requirement is to satisfy the need for a showing that the land is reduced in value
because of the defendant's conduct; and (4) the interference that came about under such
circumstances was of such a nature, duration m· amount as to constitute unreasonable
interference with the use and enjoyment of the land." Charlton v. Town of Oxford, 2001 ME
l 04, j 36, 774 A .2d 366,377.
Here 1 while Defendants introduced evide1.1ce that on occasion one of Plaintiffs
employees parked in an area that inte1fered with Defendants' ability to access their property, the
Court is not convinced that Plaintiff's employee acted at the direction of the Plailitiff in an effort
to interfere with Defendants' access. Jn addition, Defendants have not proven by competent,
reliable evidence that they have suffered monetary damages, including a diminution in value of
Defendants' property, as the result of Plaintiff's inte1ference with Defendants' access.
Defendants, therefore, cannot prevail on their nuisance claim. For the same reasons, Defendnnts
cannot prevail on their claim of umeasonable interference with thei.1· easement rights.
Conclusion
Based on the foregoing analysis, the Court orders:
1. On the parties' request for declaratory judgment, the Couit determines that the June
1978 agreement grants an appurtenant easement from Main Street over the Testa property to the
rear of the Cooopersmith property and the Purcell property, which easement is for the benefit of
the Coopersmith property and the Purcell property.
9
2. On Counts II and III of Defendants' Counterclaim, the Court enters judgment in favor
of Plaintiff and against Defendants.
Pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 79(a), the Clerk shall incorporate this Decision and Judgment
--f.~-
~
into the docket by reference.
Date: 10/t/t3
Ju tice, Maine Business & Consumer Court
10 ~nt~recJ on the Docket: /0 ·/ ·I 3
vop,es sent via Mall_ l:lectroni cally,C