Opinion

Jaclins Way Rd. Assn v. Madore

Court
Superior Court of Maine
Filed
Oct 24, 2014
Status
Unpublished
On the bench
John O'Neil, Jr.
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 34.2%

The opinion

f NT E Rf D NOV 1 9 7014

STATE OF MAINE SUPERIOR COURT

YORK, SS. CIVIL ACTION

DOCKETNO. CV-13-225

:WN- YVR- IO-;{lJ-flf

JACLINS WAY ROAD

ASSOCIATION BY

LAUREN FRIES,

Road Commissioner,

Plaintiff,

v. ORDER

ROBERT MADORE and

MJCHELLE L. MADORE,

Defendants.

I. Background

A. Procedural Posture

This is an action for declaratory relief arising out of Robert and Michelle L.

Madore's ("the Madores") refusal to pay maintenance fees for the private road, Jaclins

Way, benefitting their property. Plaintiff Jaclins Way Association ("the Association")

originally brought claims in three counts: Count One for failure to pay assessment fees

under 23 M.R.S. § 3101(2), Count Two for equitable estoppel seeking to enforce the road

maintenance agreement, and Count Three for unjust enrichment due to the Madores'

continued use of the road without payment. The Association has amended its complaint,

dropping Counts Two and Three. (Pl.'s Amended Compl. 3-4.) 1 The court previously

1 /

The Association has also withdrawn a motion for attorney's fees pending resolution of this

motion for summary judgment.

1

denied the Association's motion for judgment on the pleadings because an issue of fact

remained as to whether the Madores had the opportunity to vote on matters of Jaclins

Way maintenance. The Association now moves for summary judgment on the only

remaining count.

B. Facts

Jaclins Way is a private way in Kennebunk, Maine. (Pl.'s S.M.F. ~ 1.) The way

benefits four parcels, including the Madores, who live at 11 Jaclins Way. (Pl.'s S.M.F. ~

2.) In 2009, a Road Maintenance Agreement ("the Agreement") was drafted and executed

by three of the benefitted parcels on Jaclins Way, but the Madores have refused to sign

the Agreement and have not contributed to the cost of maintaining the Way, including

grading and plowing. (Pl.'s S.M.F. ~~ 3-4, 14-15i The three owners who signed the

Agreement have born these expenses between 2009 and 2013, which total "at least

$700." (Pl.'s S.M.F. ~ 16.)

On July 15, 2013, a meeting was held at which the Association voted on various

agenda items related to the maintenance and repair ofthe Way. (Pl.'s S.M.F. ~ 8.) Items

to elect a road commissioner, authorize repairs, and assess the cost of those repairs

equally among the four owners were voted on and passed 3-0. (Pl.'s S.M.F. ~~ 8, 11.) The

Jaclins Way owners received written notice from a notary public of the meeting, and

Defendant Robert Madore attended, but he maintained that the meeting was not legal and

elected not to exercise a vote. (Pl.'s S.M.F. ~~ 7-8.) The Madores have refused to pay the

$1,250 assessed for 2013 and otherwise refused to pay for repairs and maintenance of the

Way. (Pl.'s S.M.F. ~~ 12-13.)

2

While the Madores argue that they were not bound by the Agreement because they did not sign

it, the Madores do not dispute the fact that they had an opportunity to review and sign the

Agreement. (Def. 's Opp. Summ. J. 1.; Pl.'s S.M.F. ~ 3.)

2

,·

IT. Discussion

A. Summary Judgment Standard

"Summary judgment is appropriate if the record reflects that there is no genuine

issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter oflaw." Dussault

v. RRE Coach Lantern Holdings, UC, 2014 :ME 8, ~ 12, 86 A.3d 52, quoting F.R.

Carroll, Inc. v. TD Bank, NA., 2010 :ME 115, ~ 8, 8 A.3d 646. "A material fact is one

that can affect the outcome of the case." Mcilroy v. Gibson's Apple Orchard, 2012 ME

59,~ 7, 43 A.3d 948, quoting N E. Ins. Co. v. Young, 2011 :ME 89, ~ 17, 26 A.3d 794. If

facts are undisputed but nevertheless capable of supporting conflicting, plausible

inferences, "the choice between those inferences is not for the court on summary

judgment." Lewis v. Concord Gen. Mut. Ins. Co., 2014 :ME 34, ~ 10, 87 A.3d 732.

B. Private Way Meetings and Repair Obligations

Under Section 3101(2) governing private ways and repair fees, "When 4 or more

parcels of land are benefited by a private road, private way or bridge as an easement or by

fee ownership of the private road, private way or bridge," any three parcel owners

(provided the parcels are owned by different individuals) may apply to a public notary to

call a public meeting according to the statutory procedure. 23 M.R.S. § 3101(2) (2013).

By a majority vote of the owners present and voting in person or by

written proxy or absentee ballot, the owners may determine what repairs

and maintenance are necessary and the materials to be furnished or

amount of money to be paid by each owner for repairs and maintenance

and may determine the amount of money to be paid by each owner for

other costs .... The determination of each owner's share of the total cost

must be fair and equitable and based upon a formula provided for in the

road association's bylaws or adopted by the owners at a meeting called

and conducted pursuant to this section.

3

23 M.R.S. § 3101(5). In construing this provision, the Law Court has held that "a

majority vote" means a majority of association members "actually present or represented

by proxy at a properly called road association meeting." Goudreau v. Pine Springs Rd &

Water, LLC, 2013 :ME 20, ~ 13, 60 A.3d 788.

The Madores raise a number of arguments in their opposition to summary

judgment First, the Repair Maintenance Agreement ("the Agreement") is not signed by

them, and they therefore argue they are not bound by its terms. The Madores point to

their easement as authority for their use of Jaclins Way. (Def 's Opp. Summ. l 4.) The

Madores further contend the requirements of Section 3101(2) have not been met because

the items had already been decided before Robert Madore arrived at the July 15, 2013

meeting. (Def 's Opp. Summ. J 2-3.) Finally, the Madores object to the Association's

desired maintenance-to improve the road with a reclaimed tar rather than maintaining

the original dirt surface. (Def's Opp. Summ.l2-3.)

While the Madores have an easement to use Jaclins Way, this does not excuse

them from any payment obligations they may have to the Association. See Goudreau v.

Pine Springs Rd & Water, LLC, 2012 :ME 70, ~~ 12-15, 44 A.3d 315 (holding lot

owner's easements conferred the right to use private way and to form an association

under Section 3101(2)). Whether Madores may lawfully use Jaclins Way is not disputed.

The issue is whether the requirements of Section 3101(2) have been met, in particular

whether a proper vote was held.

The Madores argue that the vote at the July 15, 2013 meeting was invalid because

the "majority of the items were decided prior to the meeting and other agenda items were

not voted on." (Def 's Opp. Summ. J. 1.) For example, the Madores aver that Lauren

4

Phipps was elected road commissioner, established a bank account, and established the

costs and distribution prior to the meeting. (Def. 's Opp. Summ. J. 1.) As authority for this

assertion, the Madores point to the "Handout" from the July 15, 2013 meeting that

established an agenda of items to be voted on; the material portions of the Handout

appear as follows:

1. A vote to elect a Road Commissioner, or a Board of Road

Commissioners for Jaclins Way having all of the powers of such office

under the Laws of the State of Maine.

Vote Lauren Phipps Road Commissioner3

2. A vote approving the list of repairs planned for the Jaclins Way for

the 12 months from July 1, 2013 to June 30, 2014 and a budget for

repair expenses.

Road Repairs- Grating and reclaim fill material to be completed

immediately. Cost: $1,200- $1,500 4

3. A vote approving a budget for plowing and other maintenance

expenses for the 12 months from July 1, 2013 to June 30, 2014 not to

exceed $5,000.

$1,250 per household per year. $625 biannually. My suggestion is to pay

$625 now (July- to repair the road) Next installment due December for

winter plowing.

I am open to suggestions on a payment schedule.

A dedicated Jaclins Way Road Association escrow account has been

set up at Kennebunk Savings.

Checks for road maintenance can be made payable to the Jaclins Way

Road Association and can be delivered to Lauren Phipps, 26 Jaclins Way. 5

3

The document has hand-written notes. An arrow appears pointing to this entry that states: "they

already voted? Why?"

4

Hand-written in the margin is: "Quotes?"

5

"Lauren Phipps" is circled with another arrow, with more handwriting that states: "She set this

up before the meeting why? Why can't we all be present?"

5

(Def. 's Opp. Summ. J. 3, Ex. E.) The Madores argue that 23 M.R.S. § 3101 "rests on all

parties getting together and voting on the statutory elements" which in their view, "did

not occur." (Def.'s Opp. Summ. J. 1-2; Def.'s Reply Pl.'s Reply Opp. 1.)

The Madores do not contend they lacked notice of the meeting. (Def. 's Opp.

Summ. J. 2, ,-r 10) ("Admitted; Defendants received the noticed [sic].") Neither do they

dispute that Robert Madore attended the meeting. (Def.' s Opp. Summ. J. 2, ,-r 12.) Rather,

the Madores appear to press two arguments. First, they were not a party to the

Association Agreement and therefore were "not a party to [the Association's]

proceeding." (Def. 's Opp. Summ. J. 2l Second, the meeting was improperly conducted

because items had been voted on ahead of time.

Even drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the Madores, which this court

must do on summary judgment, no reasonable reading of the Handout indicates items had

been decided and voted upon before the meeting. Rather, the Handout clearly outlines an

agenda with proposals for the Association to vote on as a group, which apparently

occurred. (Pl.'s S.M.F. ,-r 8.) The Madores are unable to point to any evidence (aside from

their reading of the Handout) that establishes items were voted on before the meeting. By

its plain terms, the statute does not even require all members of an association be present

and vote for a vote to be valid:

By a majority vote of the owners present and voting in person or by

written proxy or absentee ballot, the owners may determine what repairs

and maintenance are necessary and the materials to be furnished or

amount of money to be paid by each owner for repairs and maintenance

and may determine the amount of money to be paid by each owner for

other costs.

6

As noted above, the Madores do not dispute they there were aware of and had the opportunity to

sign the Agreement.

6

23 M.R.S. § 3101(5). The Law Court has construed the requirements of this section

broadly, holding it does not require a majority of all member owners vote for a road

maintenance cost vote to be valid, but simply those owners who elect to attend the

meeting and vote. Goudreau, 2013 ME 20, ~~ 12-13, 60 A.3d 788.

The Madores have come forward with only their subjective view of how the

meeting agenda was set and how the meeting proceeded. Robert Madore attended the

meeting, but apparently contested that the Madores were bound by the agreement,

complained the Handout indicated matters had already been decided, and took issue with

the costs and materials to be used to maintain the road. 7 The Madores had notice and the

opportunity to vote at the meeting. They elected not to do so, and this decision does not

render the meeting and vote invalid under Section 3101. The fees calculated and assessed

had a rational basis in accord with Section 3101, the Madores have acknowledged the

validity of the Association agreement and participated in Association business, and

continue to use the road maintained by the Association. They are therefore "owners of [a]

parcel[] ofland benefitted by a private road" within the meaning of the statute, and liable

for the assessments. See 23 M.R.S. § 3101(2), (5); see also Tisdale v. Rawson, 2003 ME

68, ~~6-7, 822 A.2d 1136 (fees and assessments with a rational basis that follow

procedures of the statute are valid and enforce against non-paying benefitted owners).

7

The Madores argue the use of reclaimed tar is "the first step towards paving this private way ...

in direct violation of [23 M.R.S. § 3101]." The Madores do not argue that this "first step" is in

fact "paving" within the meaning of the statute. In any event, the statute does not strictly prohibit

paving. 23 M.RS. § 310l(l)(B) ('"Repairs and maintenance' does not include paving, except in

locations where limited paving is demonstrated to be a cost-effective approach for fixing an

erosion problem .... ").

7

The Madores' opposition to summary judgment thus fails to create a genuine

issue of material fact and the Association is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on its

claim for maintenance costs under Section 3101.

The Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby GRANTED.

SO ORDERED.

DATE: October..2 f 2014

C\9

John O'Neil, Jr.

Justice, Superior Court

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8

CV-14-192

ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF:

DAVID LOURIE

LAW OFFICE OF DAVID A LOURIE

189 SPURWINK AVENUE

CAPE ELIABETH ME 04107

DEFENDANTS PRO SE:

ROBERT & MICHELLE MADORE

11 JACLINS WAY

KENNEBUNK ME 04043

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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