Opinion

Phillips v. LaBombard

Court
Superior Court of Maine
Filed
Nov 7, 2014
Status
Unpublished
On the bench
John O'Neil, Jr.
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 34.2%

The opinion

( NI ERED NOV l 8 20\4

STATE OF MAINE SUPERIOR COURT

YORK, SS. CIVIL ACTION

DOCKET NO. CV-14-154

LAWRENCE W. PlllLLIPS

Plaintiff,

v. ORDER

KATHLEEN PHILLIPS LABOMBARD,

Defendant.

I. Background

A. Procedural Posture

Lawrence W. Phillips ("Phillips") brings this action against Kathleen Phillips

LaBombard ("LaBombard") alleging tortious interference with an expected inheritance.

(Compl. 1-2, 5.) Phillips has moved to attach $630,000 pursuant to Maine Rule of Civil

Procedure 4A and to attach $650,000 by trustee process under Rule 4B.

B. Facts

Margaret Goldie Phillips ("Margaret") died November 27, 2013, at the age of92

while residing in Washington, D.C. The Plaintiff is Margaret Phillips' nephew.

Margaret's will, which is currently in probate in Washington, D.C., devised real and

personal property to two nieces, two grandnieces, and the University of Maine. Margaret

also had two Charles Schwab & Co., Inc. accounts ("the Schwab accounts") totaling over

$1,800,000. Phillips' alleges LaBombard, through fraud, duress, undue influence, or

forgery caused Margeret Phillips to remove him from the will and made herself the sole

beneficiary under the Schwab accounts. Specifically, Phillips claims LaBombard told

Margaret Phillips that he owed $400,000 in back taxes to the Internal Revenue Service

1

("IRS"). (Lawrence W. Phillips Mf. 2-3.) While Phillips concedes the IRS had "at one

time" filed liens totaling approximately $400,000, after engaging an accountant, Phillips

owed the IRS $7,000. (Lawrence W. Phillips Aff. 3.)

II. Discussion

A. Jurisdiction

As a threshold matter, LaBombard argues that this court lacks jurisdiction to hear

this collateral attack, and Phillips should pursue his claims in the District of Columbia

probate proceeding. The Law Court has expressly held that a plaintiff may elect to bring a

tortious interference with an inheritance claim in a separate action for damages while a

probate proceeding is pending. Plimpton v. Gerrard, 668 A.2d 882, 887 (Me. 1995). The

court therefore has jurisdiction.

B. Attachment Under Rules 4A and 4B

Under Rule 4A, attachment is a method of securing property held by the

defendant to satisfy a potential judgment. M.R. Civ. P. 4A(a). Trustee process under Rule

4B permits a plaintiff to freeze a defendant's assets that are in a third party hands, such as

a bank account. Kelly McDonald, Attachment on Trustee Process: A Primer for the

Practitioner, 27 Me. B.J. 36 (2012). A motion for attachment "shall be supported by

affidavit" which must

... set forth specific facts sufficient to warrant the required findings and

shall be upon the affiant's own knowledge, information or belief; and, so

far as upon information and belief, shall state that the affiant believes this

information to be true.

M.R. Civ. P. 4A(c), (i).

"Because prejudgment attachment may operate harshly upon the party against

whom it is sought, there must be strict compliance with the procedures prescribed by

2

legislation and implemented by court rules." Wilson v. De/Papa, 634 A.2d 1252, 1254

(Me. 1993) (citations omitted). A court may grant attachment under Rule 4A only where

it is "more likely than not that the plaintiff will recover judgment in an amount equal or

greater than the aggregate sum of the attachment." Trans Coastal Corp. v.Curtis, 622

A.2d 1186, 1188 (Me. 1993), citingM.R. Civ. P. 4A(c), (g). The same standard applies to

Trustee Process under Rule 4B. See M.R. Civ. P. 4B(c). "More likely than not" is a

preponderance standard. Jacques v. Brown, 609 A.2d 290, 292 n.3 (Me. 1992). Parties

seeking attachment must therefore establish by a preponderance of the evidence that they

will succeed on the claim and they will be awarded a judgment in the amount they seek to

attach. Curtis, 622 A.2d at 1188.

C. Phillips' Motion and Affidavit Fails to Establish He Is "More Likely

Than Not" to Prevail on His Claim.

Phillips brings a claim for. tortious inference with expectation of an inheritance.

The elements of this cause of action include:

(1) The existence of an expectancy of inheritance; (2) an intentional

interference by a defendant through tortious conduct, such as fraud,

duress, or undue influence; (3) a reasonable certainty that the expectancy

of inheritance would have been realized but for the defendant's

interference; and (4) damage resulting from that interference.

Morrill v. Morrill, 1998 ME 133, ~ 7, 712 A.2d 1039.

To prevail on the motion for attachment, Phillips must come forth with evidence

that establishes, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he will prevail on this claim and

will collect a judgment for the $630,000 and $650,000 he seeks to attach pursuant to

Rules 4A and 4B. See Curtis, 622 A.2d at 1188.

The material allegations in Phillips' affidavit1 state:

1

The court grants LaBombard's motion to strike and considers only Phillips' original affidavit

filed with the motion, and not the supplemental affidavit filed with the reply memorandum

3

The only reason I am not named in the will to receive any inheritance from

my late aunt, Margaret G. Phillips a/k/a Margaret Goldie Phillips is that

my sister Kathleen Phillips LaBombard, prior to July 26, 2013, told my

late aunt that I owed the Internal Revenue Service $400,000, which is

false; and, that my aunt should not leave me anything because it would go

to the government and not me. (Phillips Mf. ,-r 14.)

Although at one time the IRS filed at the York County Registry of Deeds

liens totaling approximately $400,000, after I engaged the services of an

accountant the amount owed to the IRS was adjusted to approximately

$7,000 plus interest and penalties. I never owed anywhere near $400,000

to the IRS. (Phillips Aff. ,-r 15.)

After July 26, 2013 and within a month before the death of Margaret G.

Phillips a/k/a Margaret Goldie Phillips, Kathleen Phillips LaBombard

through tortious conduct by means of fraud, duress, undue influence and

forgery had the two Charles Schwab Corporation accounts payable only to

Kathleen Phillips LaBombard upon the death of Margaret G. Phillips a/k/a

Margaret Goldie Phillips. (Phillips Aff. ,-r 20.)

The affidavit further avers that but for LaBombard's acts, Phillips would have

received the same 30% share LaBombard received from the estate, which including the

Schwab Account would total $2,100,000. Phillips states his expectancy and thus damages

total $630,000. (Phillips Mf. ,-r,-r 21-26.)

Even taking all of the allegations contained in the affidavit as true, Phillips fails to

demonstrate he will likely prevail on his claim. The first element requires Phillips

establish he had an expectation of an inheritance. Morrill, 1998 ME 133, ,-r 7, 712 A.2d

1039. While the Law Court has held a child may establish an expectation of an

because the plain text of Rule 4A(c) and 4B(c) do not permit additional filings: "An attachment of

property shall be sought by filing with the complaint a motion for approval of the attachment ...

supported by affidavit ... A defendant opposing a motion for approval of attachment shall file

material in opposition as required by Rule 7(c)." M.R Civ. P. 4A(c); see also Harris v. The

Woodlands Club, 2009 WL 1747883 (Me. Super. March 23, 2009) (Wheeler, J.) (striking

supplemental affidavits filed with reply to defendant's opposition to attachment); Hancock

Lumber Co. Inc. v. Carbary, 2012 WL 315645 (D. Me. Feb. 1, 20 12) (noting that striking

affidavit under Rule 4A would be proper where "plaintiff was attempting to supplement or correct

obvious deficiencies in the evidence presented in the initial motion").

4

inheritance from a parent based on inference, Morrill v. Morrill, 679 A.2d 519, 521 (Me.

1996), this has not been extended to aunt/uncle-niece/nephew relationships. Phillips does

not allege that a prior will or some estate planning devise entitled him to receive an

inheritance, but rests solely on his status as Margaret's nephew. Nonetheless, Margaret's

other devises were to nieces, and thus arguably Phillips fits within the class that qualifies

as the natural objects of her bounty. The court may, for the purposes of analysis, assume

Phillips had such an expectation, because ultimately the other elements are more

problematic for his case.

Phillips alleges, without any further detail, that LaBombard engaged in fraud,

duress, or undue influence to deprive him of the inheritance. Yet, by Phillips' own

admission, "the only reason [he is] not named in the will to receive any inheritance" was

because LaBombard told Margaret that Phillips owed $400,000 to the IRS and any

bequest she made would go to the government. (Phillips Aff. ~ 14.) Phillips goes on to

concede that the IRS had indeed filed liens totaling "approximately $400,000," but

LaBombard's statement was false because he only ended up having to pay $7,000.

Phillips fails to allege when statements were made, what exactly was said, and perhaps

most importantly, how LaBombard's statements were false in light of the fact the liens

were indeed filed. These deficiencies carry into the third element: causation.

Phillips fails to establish that he would have received an inheritance but for

LaBombard's statements. Again, Phillips does not allege that he was, or ever was

intended to be named a beneficiary under the Schwab Accounts or a devisee under the

will. Even assuming Phillips was contemplated as a beneficiary or devisee, if LaBombard

5

told Margaret that $400,000 in liens were filed, this was true and LaBombard has

committed no wrongful act that deprived Phillips of an expectancy.

In sum, Phillips plainly fails to establish that it is "more likely than not that" he is

entitled to damages and will recover a judgment equal to or greater than $630,000. M.R.

Civ. P. 4A(c), (g); M.R. Civ. P. 4B(c). 2

The Defendant's Motion to Strike additional affidavits filed by the Plaintiff is hereby

GRANTED.

The Plaintiff's Motion for Attachment and For Attachment on Trustee Process is hereby

DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

John O'Neil, Jr.

Justice, Superior Court

Tile ~oJJit finthernotes thatPhillips' complaintmay·not aqequately state. adaimfor which relief

2

can begrantecl A leghlly .sufficientcomplaint"requires more than labels.·andconclusions~.and a

formuhtic recitationoftlie elementsofacaw;e ofaction will not .do, »BeltAtLCorp: v: Twofllbly,

550 l)"S, .•. 544, .• 555 . (2007) .. Phillips' .aUegL\tions"must be enough to.r!lisi·.a·.right toreliefabovethe

speculative . level,'' . which~

. .. . . in light

.. of the

. . weaknesses. discussed,

.. it. .is. .not. . clear

. . hehasdone

. . . ... &eicl.

....

6

CV-14-154

ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF:

MARK A KEARNS

LAW OFFICE OF MARK KEARNS

PO BOX 17915

PORTLAND ME 04112

ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT:

RICHARD ABBONDANZA

HOPKINSON ABBONDANZA

511 CONGRESS STREET SUITE 801

PORTLAND ME 04101

GERALD B SCHOFIELD

HOPKINSON & ABBONDANZA PA

746 HIGH STREET

BATHME 04530

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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