Opinion

Osprey Cove Rd. v. Kempin

Court
Superior Court of Maine
Filed
Dec 12, 2013
Status
Unpublished
On the bench
Nancy Mills
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 34.2%

The opinion

STATE OF MAINE SUPERIOR COURT

CUMBERLAND, ss CIVIL ACTION

DOCKET NO. CV-~2f81

;J M· CAJJ'A- "~j I ~o t5 7/

OSPREY COVE ROAD

HOMEOWNERS

ASSOCIATION, et al.,

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Plaintiffs

v. ORDER ON PLAINTIFFS'

MOTION FOR PARTIAL

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

ELLEN M. KEMPIN, et al.,

Defendants

Before the court is the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment on count I

of the plaintiffs' complaint. The plaintiffs ask the court to declare that the

defendants' activity on their residential lot violates covenants limiting the lot to

residential uses and prohibiting commercial activity. For the following reasons,

plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment is granted.

BACKGROUND

Osprey Cove Road Homeowners Association (OCRHA) is a non-profit,

non-stock corporation duly organized under the laws of the State of Maine.

OCRHA was formerly known as Partridge Cove Road Homeowners Association,

which was incorporated in the State of Maine on September 21, 1993. (Pis.' S.M.F.

<j[ 1.) OCRHA is a five-lot-residential subdivision. (Pis.' S.M.F. <j[ 2.)

All individual parties own lots in the subdivision. (Pis.' S.M.F. <j[<j[ 3-9.)

Plaintiffs Robert V. Toothaker, II and Dimitra Toothaker own a subdivision lot

located at 57 Osprey Cove Road in Freeport, Maine. The Toothaker plaintiffs'

real property abuts the real property owned by defendant Ellen M. Kempin.

1

(Pis.' S.M.F. <J[ 4.) Defendant Ellen M. Kempin resides in Malibu, California, but

owns property located at 58 Osprey Cove Road in Freeport. (Pis.' S.M.F. <J[ 7.)

Defendant Fiona Kempin, daughter of Ellen M. Kempin, and defendant Alecia

Nelson live at 58 Osprey Cove Road. (Pis.' S.M.F. <J[<J[ 8-9.) In addition to residing

at 58 Osprey Cove Road, defendants Fiona Kempin and Alecia Nelson co-own

and operate a dog kennel, which includes daycare and boarding facilities, on the

property under the business name "It's A Dogs Life." 1 (Pis.' S.M.F. <J[ 9; Defs.'

Reply Pis.' S.M.F. <J[ 9.)

Each lot is served by a single private road, Osprey Cove Road. (Pis.'

S.M.F. <J[ 10.) The deeds to all of the lots in OCRHA contain binding restrictive

covenants, including that the lots are to be "used solely for residential purposes"

and that "[n]o livestock, poultry or other animals shall be kept or maintained on

any part of any lot, except dogs, cats or other household pets may be kept

thereon in reasonable numbers for the pleasure and use of the occupants, but not

for any commercial use or purpose." (See Pis.' S.M.F. <J[<J[ 12-15; Ex. B). In

addition, a restrictive covenant provides: "No signs and advertising devices,

other than temporary signs less than three feet in size, will be allowed on any lot

or parcel of land without the prior written consent of Declarant." (Pis.' S.M.F. <J[

16.)

In January 2012, defendant Alicia Nelson obtained a license from the State

of Maine to operate the dog care and boarding facility at 58 Osprey Cove Road.

1

Defendants object to plaintiffs' characterization of "It's A Dogs Life" as a "commercial

dog kennel" as a misleading description. (Defs.' Reply Pls.' S.M.F. ~~ 8-9.) The

defendants admit the facility has a capacity for twenty-five dogs at one time, that they

own and operate a dog care and boarding facility on their property, and that they

market and advertise the facility to the general public. (Compl. ~~ 18-20; Answer~~ 18,

20; Defs.' Reply Pis.' S.M.F. <JI<Jl 8-9.).

2

(Pis.' S.M.F. <][ 20; Compl. <][ 19; Answer <][ 19.) Defendants subsequently

published a website and produced other advertising and marketing materials for

"It's A Dogs Life," which advertise the dog kennel as an "exclusive boutique

hotel and day camp for dogs," open seven days a week. (Pis.' S.M.F. <][ 22; Ex. C.)

The website states that the defendants operate the business as both a "day camp"

and "boarding facility" for dogs, and charge its customers fees for all services

provided. (Pis.' S.M.F. <][ 22.) In addition to the website, defendants have placed a

large sign related to their dog kennel business on their property. (Pis.' S.M.F. <][

25.)

In March 2012, the OCRHA held a meeting at which defendant Fiona

Kempin attended on behalf of defendant Ellen Kempin (Pis.' S.M.F. <][ 26.) At the

meeting, the members of OCRHA discussed whether defendants' operation of

"It's a Dogs Life" violated any of the restrictive covenants of the subdivision.

(Pis.' S.M.F. <][ 27.) At the conclusion of the meeting, the Board of Directors voted

4-1 to obtain a legal opinion regarding the applicability and enforceability of the

covenants with regard to defendants' dog kennel. Ms. Kempin cast the only

dissenting vote. (Pis.' S.M.F. <][ 28.)

In May 2012, OCRHA held another meeting to review and discuss the

legal opinion obtained from counsel; none of the defendants was present. (Pls.'

S.M.F. <][ 29.) At the meeting the Board of Directors voted to pursue legal action,

including litigation, to prevent the operation of the dog kennel located at 58

Osprey Cove Road. (Pis.' S.M.F. <][ 30.)

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiffs filed their complaint in June 2012. They seek a declaratory

judgment that defendants' actions are prohibited under the restrictive covenants,

3

an injunction to prevent the violations from continuing, and costs and attorneys'

fees. Plaintiffs contest both the operation of "It's A Dogs Life" and the use of a

sign to advertise the dog kennel. Defendants deny that they violated the

covenants by operation of the kennel or by advertising at the location.

Defendants additionally argue that even if they are operating a commercial dog

kennel, other members of the association are also in violation of the covenants

and thus are prohibited from prosecution of the complaint. Plaintiffs now move

for partial summary judgment on count I, declaratory judgment, with regard to

the restrictive covenants proscribing commercial activity and signs and

advertising devices at 58 Osprey Cove Road.

DISCUSSION

1. Summary Judgment Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate when there is "no genuine issue as to

any material fact ... and that any party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of

law." M.R. Civ. P. 56(c); see also Levine v. R.B.K. Caly Corp., 2001 ME 77, Cj[ 4,

770 A.2d 653. A "genuine issue of material fact exists when there is sufficient

evidence to require a fact-finder to choose between competing versions of the

truth at trial." Inkell v. Livingston, 2005 ME 42, Cj[ 4, 869 A.2d 745 (quoting Lever

v. Acadia Hosp. Corp., 2004 ME 35, Cj[ 2, 845 A.2d 1178). In considering a motion

for summary judgment, the court views the facts in the light most favorable to

the non-moving party, and considers only the portions of the record referred to

and the material facts in the parties' Rule 56(h) statements. Johnson v. McNeil,

2002 ME 99, Cj[ 8, 800 A.2d 702. Rule 56(h) requires a party that is opposing a

motion for summary judgment to support any qualifications or denials of the

4

moving party's statement of material facts with record references. Levine, 2001

ME 77, CjJ: 6, 770 A.2d 653.

2. Additional Discovery Request

Defendants contend first that no action should be taken on the motion at this

stage in the case, before discovery has been substantially started. Defendants'

arguments are focused on discovery required to support their defenses 2 rather

than their objection to the motion for partial summary judgment before the court.

The narrow issue to be decided on this motion is whether, as a matter of law, the

ownership and operation of "It's a Dogs Life" is a violation of OCRHA restrictive

covenants.

3. Partial Summary Judgment

Plaintiffs seek a declaratory judgment that defendants have violated sections

one and six of the Declaration. The court has the power to issue declaratory

judgments concerning legal rights. 14 M.R.S. §5953 (2012). "An action for

declaratory judgment is appropriate for the determination of the validity ... of a

deed. " Colquhoun v. Webber, 684 A.2d 405, 411 (Me. 1996) (citations omitted).

A declaratory judgment remedy should be used to obtain "a binding judicial

determination of [a party's] legal rights, status, or relations pursuant to statutes

or written instruments." Id. "Construction of a deed, including a restrictive

2

Defendants argue the restrictive covenants are unenforceable against them because

"the covenants have been terminated by abandonment, Plaintiffs have waived, and are

estopped from enforcing, their rights; and plaintiffs are barred from selectively

enforcing the covenants in unequal and arbitrary fashion .... " (Defs.' Opp'n to Pls.'

Mot. Summ. J. 6.) To support their position, defendants contend that they "are merely

doing what three of the other four lot owners in the neighborhood are doing: conducting

some kind of revenue-generating activity on their property." (Defs.' Opp'n to Pls.' Mot.

Summ. J. 6.) Although the defendants' claims may raise a genuine issue of material fact

regarding the plaintiffs' request for equitable relief in count II, the claims are not

relevant to the court's determination of whether defendants violated the restrictive

covenants through their ownership and operation of "It's a Dogs Life" on their property.

5

covenant, is a question of law." River Dale Assn. v. Bloss, 2006 ME 86, 'IT 6, 901

A.2d 809.

To construe a deed, the "language must be given its ordinary meaning,

and if there is no ambiguity the plain meaning controls. If the language is

ambiguous, then extrinsic evidence may be consulted to ascertain the grantor's

intent." Id. (citations omitted). The covenants in all OCRHA deeds explicitly

prohibit commercial activity and any uses other than residential. The first

section, "Use," provides: "[a]ll lots or parcels of land conveyed shall be used

solely for residential purposes and the usual and natural uses in connection

therewith .... " (Pis.' S.M.F. 'IT 14.) The sixth section, "Restrictive Uses," provides:

No livestock, poultry or other animals shall be kept or maintained

on any part of any lot, except dogs, cats or other household pets

may be kept thereon in reasonable numbers for the pleasure and

use of the occupants, but not for any commercial use or purpose.

(Pis.' S.M.F. 'IT 15.) The sixth covenant further provides: "No signs or advertising

devices, other than temporary signs less than three square feet in size will be

allowed on any lot or parcel of land without the prior written consent of

Declarant.'' (Pis.' S.M.F. ']I16.) These restrictions are not ambiguous.

As noted, the defendants object to the term "commercial dog kennel" and

its misleading connotations. They argue that '"It's a Dogs Life' is a relatively

small dog care and boarding facility that usually has 12 dogs at any one time, has

never more than 20 dogs at any one time, and that has a maximum capacity of 25

dogs at any one time." (Defs.' Reply Pis.' S.M.F. 'IT 8.) Defendants admit,

however, they charge fees to customers of "It's a Dogs Life." (Pis.' S.M.F. 'IT 22.)

Under Maine law, anyone maintaining a boarding kennel must obtain a license

from the Department of Agriculture, Conservation and Forestry. See 7 M.R.S. §

6

3932(1) (2012). 3 Defendant Nelson obtained this license. (Pis.' S.M.F. Cj[ 9.)

Further, defendants do not dispute that they have placed a sign related to their

dog kennel business on their property.

In spite of these facts, defendants argue further that because they "are not

operating a commercial farm, allowing animals to roam free, raising howling

coyotes, paving their front lawn to create a massive parking lot, or doing

anything else to change the character of the neighborhood[,]" they have not

violated the restrictive covenants. (Defs.' Mem. 6.) Although defendants argue

that it is misleading to describe the operation of a facility of less than 25 dogs as a

"commercial dog kennel," they fail to cite any legal authority to support their

position. "Commercial activity" is defined as "[a]n activity, such as operating a

business, conducted to make a profit." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 38 (9th ed.

2009). Considering the for-profit nature of "It's a Dogs Life," defendants' use of

their lot is not "solely for residential purposes, and the usual and natural uses in

connection therewith."

The entry is

Plaintiffs' Partial Motion for Summary Judgment is

granted on Count I of the Complaint as follows: the

Court declares that Defendants' operation of "It's a

Dogs Life" at 58 Osprey Cove Road in Freeport, Maine

violates the following restrictive covenants in their

deed:

3

Maine Law further defines "boarding kennel" as,

any place, building, tract of land or abode in or on which 3 or more

privately owned companion animals are kept at any one time for their

owners in return for a fee or compensation and includes a facility where 3

or more companion animals are kept for training purposes for

compensation.

7 M.R.S. §3907(8) (2012).

7

Section 1, "Use" ("All lots or parcels of land conveyed

shall be used solely for residential purposes and the

usual and natural uses in connection therewith, unless

otherwise designated by Declarant, its successors and

assigns.") and

Section 6, "Restrictive Use" (No signs and advertising

devices, other than temporary signs less than three feet

in size, will be allowed on any lot or parcel of land

without the prior written consent of Declarant.

No livestock, poultry or other animals shall be kept or

maintained on any part of any lot, except dogs, cats or

other household pets may be kept thereon in

reasonable numbers for the pleasure and use of the

occupants, but not for any com ercial use or

purpose.")

•

Date: Aprill7, 2013

Nancy Mills

Justice, Superior Court

8

OSPREY COVE ROAD HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION - SUPERIOR COURT

PLAINTIFF CUMBERLAND, ss.

Docket No PORSC-CV-2012-00281

Attorney for: OSPREY COVE ROAD HOMEOWNERS

K~I:OM.£ - RETAINED 06/25/2012

JENSEN BAIRD ET AL DOCKET RECORD

10 FREE STREET

PO BOX4510

PORTLAND ME 04112

Attorney for: OSPREY COVE ROAD HOMEOWNERS

~Ji\\lrnwER -RETAINED 06/25/2012

JENSEN BAIRD ET AL

10 FREE STREET

PO BOX4510

PORTLAND ME 04112

ROBERT V TOOTHAKER III - PLAINTIFF

Attorney for: ROBERT V TOOTHAKER III

KENNETH COLE -RETAINED 06/25/2012

JENSEN BAIRD ET AL

10 FREE STREET

PO BOX4510

PORTLAND ME 04112

Attorney for: ROBERT V TOOTHAKER III

MARK A BOWER -RETAINED 06/25/2012

JENSEN BAIRD ET AL

10 FREE STREET

PO BOX 4510

PORTLAND ME 04112

DIMITRA TOOTHAKER - PLAINTIFF

Attorney for: DIMITRA TOOTHAKER

KENNETH COLE -RETAINED 06/25/2012

JENSEN BAIRD ET AL

10 FREE STREET

PO BOX4510

PORTLAND ME 04112

Attorney for: DIMITRA TOOTHAKER

MARK A BOWER -RETAINED 06/25/2012

JENSEN BAIRD ET AL

10 FREE STREET

PO BOX4510

PORTLAND ME 04112

vs

ELLEN M KEMPIN - DEFENDANT

Attorney for: ELLEN M KEMPIN

DANIELL ROSENTHAL -RETAINED 07/09/2012

MARCUS CLEGG & MISTRETTA PA

ONE CANAL PLAZA SUITE 600

PORTLAND ME 04101-4035

PORSC-CV-2012-00281

DOCKET RECORD

Attorney for: ELLEN M KEMPIN

GENE LIBBY -RETAINED 11/20/2012

LIBBY O'BRIEN KINGSLEY & CHAMPION LLC

62 PORTLAND RD

UNIT 17

KENNEBUNK ME 04043

Attorney for: ELLEN M KEMPIN

TYLER SMITH -RETAINED 11120/2012

LIBBY O'BRIEN KINGSLEY & CHAMPION LLC

62 PORTLAND RD

UNIT 17

KENNEBUNK ME 04043

FIONA KEMPIN - DEFENDANT

Attorney for: FIONA KEMPIN

DANIELL ROSENTHAL -RETAINED 07/09/2012

MARCUS CLEGG & MISTRETTA PA

ONE CANAL PLAZA SUITE 600

PORTLAND ME 04101-4035

Attorney for: FIONA KEMPIN

GENE LIBBY -RETAINED 11120/2012

LIBBY O'BRIEN KINGSLEY & CHAMPION LLC

62 PORTLAND RD

UNIT 17

KENNEBUNK ME 04043

Attorney for: FIONA KEMPIN

TYLER SMITH -RETAINED 11120/2012

LIBBY O'BRIEN KINGSLEY & CHAMPION LLC

62 PORTLAND RD

UNIT 17

KENNEBUNK ME 04043

ALECIA NELSON - DEFENDANT

Attorney for: ALECIA NELSON

DANIELL ROSENTHAL -RETAINED 07/09/2012

MARCUS CLEGG & MISTRETTA PA

ONE CANAL PLAZA SUITE 600

PORTLAND ME 04101-4035

Attorney for: ALECIA NELSON

GENE LIBBY -RETAINED 11120/2012

LIBBY O'BRIEN KINGSLEY & CHAMPION LLC

62 PORTLAND RD

UNIT 17

KENNEBUNK ME 04043

Attorney for: ALECIA NELSON

TYLER SMITH - RETA IN ED 11120/2012

LIBBY O'BRIEN KINGSLEY & CHAMPION LLC

62 PORTLAND RD

UNIT 17

KENNEBUNK ME 04043

PORSC-CV-2012-00281

DOCKET RECORD

RALPH L HARDING -THIRD PARTY DEFENDANT

I6 OSPREY COVE ROAD

FREEPORT ME 04032

Attorney for: RALPH L HARDING

KENNETH COLE -RETAINED 08/24/20I2

JENSEN BAIRD ET AL

I 0 FREE STREET

PO BOX4510

PORTLAND ME 04I12

Attorney for: RALPH L HARDING

MARK A BOWER -RETAINED 08/24/20I2

JENSEN BAIRD ET AL

I 0 FREE STREET

PO BOX45IO

PORTLAND ME 04I12

KATHERINE H HARDING -THIRD PARTY DEFENDANT

I6 OSPREY COVE ROAD

FREEPORT ME 04032

Attorney for: KATHERINE H HARDING

KENNETH COLE -RETAINED 08/24/20I2

JENSEN BAIRD ET AL

I 0 FREE STREET

PO BOX45IO

PORTLAND ME 04112

Attorney for: KATHERINE H HARDING

MARK A BOWER -RETAINED 08/24/2012

JENSEN BAIRD ET AL

10 FREE STREET

PO BOX 45IO

PORTLAND ME 04112

DAVID BRENNAN -THIRD PARTY DEFENDANT

45 OSPREY COVE ROAD

FREEPORT ME 04032

Attorney for: DAVID BRENNAN

KENNETH COLE - RET AI NED 08/24/2012

JENSEN BAIRD ET AL

I 0 FREE STREET

PO BOX45IO

PORTLAND ME 04II2

Attorney for: DAVID BRENNAN

MARK A BOWER -RETAINED 08/24/20I2

JENSEN BAIRD ET AL

IO FREE STREET

PO BOX4510

PORTLAND ME 04I12

PAMELA BRENNAN -THIRD PARTY DEFENDANT

45 OSPREY COVE ROAD

FREEPORT ME 04032

Attorney for: PAMELA BRENNAN

PORSC-CV -2012-00281

DOCKET RECORD

KENNETH COLE -RETAINED 08/24/2012

JENSEN BAIRD ET AL

10 FREE STREET

PO BOX4510

PORTLAND ME 04112

Attorney for: PAMELA BRENNAN

MARK A BOWER -RETAINED 08/24/2012

JENSEN BAIRD ET AL

10 FREE STREET

PO BOX4510

PORTLAND ME 04112

Filing Document: COMPLAINT Minor Case Type: DECLARATORY JUDGMENT

Filing Date: 06/25/2012

Docket Events:

06/25/2012 FILING DOCUMENT- COMPLAINT FILED ON 06/25/2012

06/25/2012 Party(s): OSPREY COVE ROAD HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION

ATTORNEY- RETAINED ENTERED ON06/25/2012

Plaintiff's Attorney: KENNETH COLE

Party(s): ROBERT V TOOTHAKER III

ATTORNEY- RETAINED ENTERED ON06/25/2012

Plaintiff's Attorney: KENNETH COLE

Party(s): DIMITRA TOOTHAKER

ATTORNEY- RETAINED ENTERED ON06/25/2012

Plaintiff's Attorney: KENNETH COLE

06/25/2012 Party(s): OSPREY COVE ROAD HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION

ATTORNEY- RETAINED ENTERED ON06/25/2012

Plaintiff's Attorney: MARK A BOWER

Party(s): ROBERT V TOOTHAKER III

ATTORNEY- RETAINED ENTERED ON06/25/2012

Plaintiff's Attorney: MARK A BOWER

Party(s): DIMITRA TOOTHAKER

ATTORNEY- RETAINED ENTERED ON06/25/2012

Plaintiff's Attorney: MARK A BOWER

06/26/2012 Party(s): OSPREY COVE ROAD HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION

OTHER FILING- OTHER DOCUMENT FILED ON 06/25/2012

EXHIBITS OMITTED FROM ORGINAL COMPLAINT

07112/2012 Party(s): ELLEN M KEMPIN,FIONA KEMPIN,ALECIA NELSON

MOTION- MOTION FOR ENLARGEMENT OF TIME FILED ON 07/09/2012

DEFS' ASSENTED TO MOTION TO ENLARGE TIME TO RESPOND TO COMPLAINT WI PROPOSED

ORDER.(RU)

STATE OF MAINE SUPERIOR COURT

CUMBERLAND, ss CIVIL ACTION

DOCKE: ~~~V-12-281

/l/!11- 'a.;, aot3

OSPREY COVE ROAD 7

HOMEOWNERS

ASSOCIATION, et al.,

Plaintiffs ORDER ON PLAINTIFFS'

MOTION TO ENFORCE AND

v. TO AMEND COMPLAINT

ELLEN M. KEMPIN, et al.,

Defendants

Before the court is the plaintiffs' motion to enforce settlement agreement

and amend complaint. 1 The plaintiffs argue they entered a settlement agreement

with the defendants on 8/18/13 and seek to enforce the terms of that agreement.

(Ex. H attached to Rielly Aff.) The defendants argue that even if a settlement was

reached, the agreement was not binding on the defendants because Attorney

Libby did not have authority to settle the claim. (Ex. I attached to Rielly Aff.,

email from Attorney Libby dated 8/20/13.)

In Maine, "an attorney clothed with no other authority than that arising

from his employment in that capacity has no power to compromise and settle or

release and discharge his client's claim." Perkins v. Philbrick, 443 A.2d 73, 74

(Me. 1982) (quoting Pomeroy v. Prescott, 106 Me. 401, 76 A. 898 (1910)). The

party seeking to enforce a settlement bears the burden of proving that the

opposing counsel acted within his authority. Lane v. Me. Cent. R.R., 572 A.2d

1

The defendants argued that no evidentiary hearing was necessary; the plaintiffs

disagreed. (Defs.' Mem. 3-4; Pls.' Rep. Mem. 2.)

1

1084, 1085 (Me. 1990). In this case, there is no evidence that the defendants

authorized Attorney Libby to compromise their claim.

In Lane, the trial judge granted the "motion to confirm settlement" and

concluded, "it is important that one lawyer be able to accept another lawyer's

representation." Lane, 572 A.2d at 1084. The Law Court stated that "such

considerations might support the imposition of sanctions" but were insufficient

to discharge a party's claim. Id.; see Pls.' Mem. at 8. The issue of an award of

sanctions will be addressed at trial.

The entry is

The Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement and

Amend Complaint is DENIED. This case is restored to

the docket and will be scheduled for trial on the

March-April2014 trial list.

Date: December 12, 2013

Nancy Mills

Justice, Superior

2

OF COURTS

:rland County

y Street, Ground Floor

td, ME 04101

GENE LIBBY ESQ

LIBBY O'BRIEN KINGLSEY & CHAMPION

6 2 PORTLAND RD

UNIT 17

KENNEBUNK ME 04043

OF COURTS

land County

"Street, Ground Floor

i, ME 04101

BRENDAN RIELLY ESQ

JENSEN BAIRD GARDNER & HENRY

PO BOX 4510

PORTLAND ME 04112

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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