The opinion
STATE OF MAINE SUPERIOt( COURT I
Sagadahoc, ss.
DEVIN E. BROvVN
Plaintiff
v.
Docket No. SAGSC-CV-12-025
WILLIAM A. POORE
Defendant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT
This civil personal injury case came before the court for a hearing on damages, default having
previously been entered against the Defendant William A. Poore, as a result of his failure to file a timely
answer or other response to the complaint. Before convening the damages hearing, the court considered
a motion to set aside default flied by Defendant, and denied the motion.
Based on the entire record, the court enters the following fmdings and conclusions and renders
judgment as follows.
Default
Before the evidentiary hearing on damages, the court ruled on Defendant's Motion to Set Aside
Default and to Allow Late Answer dated November 2, 2012 and docketed today, November 6, 2012, as
well as Plaintiffs opposition, also docketed today. The court ruled without oral argument. See M.R. Civ.
P. 7(b)(7). See also SouthemProperties Co., Inc. v.]ohnson, 1999 ME 37, ~ 8, 724 A.2d 1255, 1257.
According to the return of service flied in this case, Defendant Poore was served in hand with the
complaint August 27, 2012. At the Plaintiffs request, default was entered September 19, 2012.
Defendantfrrst appeared through counsel in a Notice of Appearance dated October 26, 2012 and
docketed October 29, 2012.
A motion to set aside default must be supported by "good cause." M.R. Civ. P. 55(c), which
requires the moving party to demonstrate both "a good excuse for his or her untimeliness and a
meritorious defense." Truman v. Browne, 2001 ME 182, 'li 9, 788 A.2d 168, 170. Defendant Poore's
showing of a good excuse is limited to his claim that, because Plaintiff's counsel and Defendant's insurer
had been in communication before the complaint was flied, Plaintiff's counsel should have warned the
Defendant's insurer that a default was being sought. Defendant Poore's motion does not explain his
delay in answering. Plaintiff's response acknowledges that his counsel and Defendant's insurer were in
contact before the complaint was flied, but also points out that the insurer denied coverage for the claim.
There is no support in Maine law for the proposition that a plaintiff who through counsel has been
in contact with a defendant through an insurer before filing suit has any duty to warn the defendant before
obtaining a default based on the defendant's failure to file a timely answer or other response after being
validly served with the complaint. On the other hand, one can envision circumstances under which it
would be appropriate to set aside a default based on communications between parties prior to suit. This
case does not present such circumstances.
Defendant's motion is also lacking in presenting a meritorious defense. Defendant questions the
viability of the statutory claim in Count III of the complaint, but as to the negligence claim in Count IV,
Defendant's motion says simply that he denies knowledge of any dangerous propensity or other action on
the part of the dog sufficient to trigger any duty, and thus falls short of affrrmatively presenting a
meritorious defense.
For these reasons, Defendant's Motion to Set Aside Default and to Allow Late Answer is denied.
Merits
The Defendant's default having established liability on his part, the issues are limited to damages
and causation. The sole witness at the damages hearing was the Plaintiff Devin Brown. Plaintiff's
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Exhibits 1 and 2 were admitted by stipulation. The parties also stipulated that the medical and hospital
services reflected in Plaintiff's Exhibit 1 were rendered in connection ·with the injury alleged in the
complaint and dnt the services were reasonably necessary. However, the Defendant did not stipulate that
the medical and hospital bills contained in Plaintiff's Exhibit 1 reflected the reasonable value of the
medical and hospital services reflected in the bills, noting that the medical and hospital providers accepted
payment of the Plaintiff's bills by MaineCare, Maine's Medicaid program, at an amount well below the
face value of the bills.
Plaintiff is en tided to damages in an amount equal to the reasonable cost of the medical and
hospital expenses rendered to him. The face amount of the bills is evidence of the value of the services
reflected, and so is the amount accepted in payment by the providers. Based on the entire record, the
court fmds the reasonable value of the services rendered to be $2,464.50.
This accident occurred September 9, 2011, at a time when Plaintiff, who was renting a room in
Defendant's home, was taking care of the Defendant's dog while Defendant was away. Plaintiff came into
the home after mowing the lawn, and the dog, a large boxer, growled and lunged toward the Plaintiff. One
of the dog's front paws clawed the Plaintiff just above the right side of his upper lip, causing a laceration
that required eight stitches. Plaintiff did not complain of any significant pain at the hospital, according to
the records. The wound has left a visible scar about an inch long, running from the edge of the right side
of Plaintiff's upper lip, upward toward his right cheek. Although more than a year has passed, Plaintiff
still experiences some pain associated with the injury,
Plaintiff is a young man who receives Social Security disability benefits as a result of his mental
health conditions, which include bipolar disorder, depression and anxiety, the last of which sometimes
manifests in panic attacks. As a result of being attacked by a dog as a result, he has always had some fear
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of dogs, and the September 9 incident vvas therefore particularly disturbing to him. He feels self-
conscious about his scar, to d1e point he thinks it is interfering with his social life.
It is not clear whether the scar is permanent or will fade over time, and also not clear as to whether
it could be ameliorated through cosmetic surgery. Damages in this case therefore do not assume
permanent disfigurement, but do reflect the status of the scar during the past year and the reasonably
foreseeable future, meaning that it seems likely to remain visible, and thus likely to be upsetting to the
Plaintiff, for some time to come.
Plaintiff is entitled to damages for the reasonable value of medical and hospital treatment, and for
pain and suffering, including the residual pain and distress associated with the scar.
Judgment shall be entered for the Plaintiff Devin E. Brown against Defendant William A. Poore in
the amount of Eight Thousand Dollars ($8,000), with pre-judgment interest. Plaintiff is also awarded his
costs.
Pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 79(a), the Clerk is hereby directed to incorporate this order by reference
in the docket.
Dated November 6, 2012
A.M. Horton
Justice, Superior Court
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DEVIN BROWN - PLAINTIFF SUPERIOR COURT
SAGADAHOC, ss.
Attorney for: DEVIN BROWN Docket No BATSC-CV-2012-00025
SHELDON J TEPLER - RETAINED
HARDY WOLF & DOWNING
186 LISBON ST DOCKET RECORD
PO BOX 3065
LEWISTON ME 04243-3065
vs
WILLIAM POORE - DEFENDANT
100 RIVER ROAD
BOOTHBAY ME 04537
Attorney for: WILLIAM POORE
JAMES M BOWIE - RETAINED
THOMPSON & BOWIE
THREE CANAL PLAZA
PO BOX 4630
PORTLAND ME 04112-4630
Filing Document: COMPLAINT Minor Case Type: OTHER NEGLIGENCE