Opinion

Duffy v. Town of Berwick

Court
Superior Court of Maine
Filed
Aug 12, 2011
Status
Unpublished
On the bench
Paul A. Fritzsche
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 34.2%

The opinion

STATE OF MAINE SUPERIOR COURT

CIVIL ACTION

~~KE::%?·. ~~:~f~:/1

YORK, ss.

ROBERT and DONNA DUFFY,

DOUG and JEANNETTE SEIVWRIGHT,

RAYandJOYCEPROVENCHERand

TOM and CAROL PLANCHE,

Plaintiffs

v. ORDER AND DECISION

TOWN OF BERWICK

and

BERWICK IRON & METAL

RECYCLING, INC.,

Defendants

The plaintiffs are property owners in the Town of Berwick (Town) whose homes

either abut or are near to the facility of Berwick Iron & Metal Recycling, Inc. (Berwick).

They have appealed from a written decision of the Berwick Planning Board of March 17,

2011 (R. 107-116), which granted the requested conditional use permit to operate a

metal shredder. The plaintiffs, Berwick and the Town have submitted comprehensive

memoranda of law. The case has been fully briefed and argued.

The plaintiffs raised both procedural and substantive objections. The

procedural challenges are of greater concern and suggest a lack of respect for and fair

treatment of the plaintiffs by the Board. Board members are volunteers who have

assumed an often demanding and frequently thankless job. However, proceedings

must be conducted consistent with due process such that an objective participant, win

or lose, would conclude that he or she had been heard, that the result was not pre-

ordained and that the. process was fair.

The first issue is whether the plaintiffs are entitled to due process at all.

Berwick argues that due process rights are only for the property owner-applicant.

Berwick is correct in that the majority of Law Court land use cases focus on the due

process rights of the property owner who has applied for a permit. The Law Court in

Glasser v. Town of Northport, 589 A.2d 1280, 83-4 (Me. 1991), in an opinion written by

Chief Justice McKusick, determined that an abutter's due process rights had been

"adequately protected throughout the permit approval process." The Law Court

could, but did not, dismiss the claim finding no entitlement to due process. Rather it

reached the merits of the argument and denied it.

More recently, the Law Court reviewed a claim of due process violations by a

group of citizens and neighbors called the Land Association of Washington (LAW) in a

case involving a rock crusher and the Washington Planning Board. Rather than

finding that the neighbors had no entitlement to due process the Law Court stated, "We

conclude that LAW failed to prove that the Planning Board violated its due process ·

rights." Lane Construction Corporation v. Town ofWashington, 2008 ME 45, <[28, 942 A.2d

1202, 10. At 9[29 the Law Court noted, "A party before an administrative board is

entitled to a fair and unbiased hearing under the Due Process Clauses of the United

States and Maine Constitutions." The word that was chosen was "party" not

"applicant" or "land owner." The plaintiffs, as parties who have established standing

to participate, are entitled to due process. With standing comes an entitlement to due

process. The next question is whether they received a "fair and unbiased hearing."

More than "expressions of impatience, dissatisfaction, annoyance and even anger," see

Lane at 9[30, quoting Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555-6 (1994), must be shown.

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Much of the plaintiffs' initial brief outlines what they believe to be an unfair and

biased proceeding. They are in part correct.

Berwick already had an existing business on the property and decided to add a

shredding machine, which would be powered by an older 3600 horsepower diesel

engine. Berwick bought the equipment and did much of the work to install, but not

operate, the new machinery before it sought a building permit or conditional use

permit. A substantial sum, R. 85, had already been invested before the conditional use

permit was sought.

A conditional use permit application dated September 9, 2010 was filed with the

Board (R. 75-102). The Board issued a notice of site walk R. 321, for Saturday,

September 25, 2010, which neither explicitly invited nor excluded the public including

the plaintiffs. On September 17, 2010 an attorney with the Maine Municipal

Association advised the Town Planner by e-mail, R. 369, that "in my opinion, any site

visit that is conducted by a majority of the board constitutes a public meeting that must

be advertised to the public and the public must be allowed to attend in order to comply

with the Maine Right to Know Law." This e-mail apparently was designed to

encourage a recalcitrant board to allow the public to be present. No member of the

public attended the September 25, 2010 site walk. A second walk was scheduled for

January 8, 2011. Here the Board initially excluded the plaintiffs and their counsel. At

the suggestion of the applicant the plaintiffs' attorney was invited to attend. He

declined the invitation but did not explicitly protest the procedure at that time. Later

in a private session the Board mocked plaintiffs' counsel for having been out

maneuvered.

The record, R. 419, though not the public minutes, indicate that on a site visit two

of the "members were astray with one of the owners." .There had been a private site

3

walk in the summer of 2010 by a person who became a non-voting alternate member of

the Board. Lastly, two members took a private site walk in early October, 2010.

These site walks, without the plaintiffs being present, are improper. See City of

Biddeford v. Adams, 1999 ME 49, <JI<JI7-12, 727 A.2d 346, 8-9. The plaintiffs would not

know what evidence was gathered and whether ex parte communications took place.

The plaintiffs also correctly claim that their due process rights were violated

when the Board appeared to conclude the public hearing but, without going into

executive session, privately continued those discussions. SeeR. 522-31, R. 571-86 and a

third unrecorded session of February 17, 2011. Adding to the plaintiffs' concerns are

extensive initially undisclosed e-mails between or among the Board members, most of

which are benign. Two of the members have refused to disclose their e-mails. The

plaintiffs could have but did not further pursue access to those e-mails.

The plaintiffs have additionally alleged that due process violations took place

based on the timing of and tone of the proceedings. They claim that they were not

given enough time to review proposed revisions to Berwick's application and that the

tone of the remarks of the Board Chair and other members indicates a bias against the

plaintiffs and their attorney. The timing of the submissions and the scheduling of

hearings on those submissions were largely within the discretion of the Board. I find

no due process violations on that issue. The tone and nature of comments directed

toward the plaintiffs and their attorney, while perhaps not enough in themselves to

constitute a due process violation, indicate a disdain toward people the Board viewed

as obstructionist.

Once the combined problems with site visits, private board sessions and the

comments of the Board members are all considered, I am convinced that the plaintiffs

did not receive the fair and unbiased hearing that they were entitled to. The actions of

4

the Board also created the appearance of impropriety and undermined public

confidence in their decision. The approval for a conditional use permit is reversed.

The plaintiffs have also raised several substantive issues, which may arise

following a new hearing.

The first involves performance standard 7.1 governing a1r emissions. That

standard, R. 30, states as follows:

"Emission of dust, dirt, fly ash, fumes, vapors or gases which could be

injurious to humans, animals or vegetation, detrimental to the enjoyment

of adjoining or nearby properties or which could soil or stain persons or

property, at any point beyond the lot line of the commercial or industrial

establishment creating that emission, shall not be permitted. Any air

emissions must meet all applicable state and federal statutes."

The Board in its conclusion, at R. 110, conclusion 2(i)(ix), copied the language of

standard 7.1 and determined that it had been met. Berwick sought and received an air

emission license from the Department of Environmental Protection (R. 331-340)

pursuant to 38 M.R.S.A. §590. It appears that the local requirements are stricter than

the State requirements. On remand, should any permits be granted by the Berwick

Planning Board, the Board shall make findings as to whether or not Berwick has met

separate local Performance Standard 7.1 and, if so, how the Board reached that

conclusion.

The second issue concerns standards 7.10 and 7.18 (R. 45-6 and 49) governing

sanitary provisions and water quality. Here Berwick is correct in its efforts to reconcile

the provisions and any apparent ambiguity. The Board had substantial evidence to

make its findings.

The third issue involves frontage and the requirement, at 6.3 of the Berwick Land

Use Ordinance, (R. 35), that "If more than one principal building is constructed on a

single parcel of land all dimensional requirements shall be met separately for each

5

principal building." This does not mean that the amount of required frontage

increases if there was more than one principal building. It means that, if there were

more than one principal building, such requirements as set back or maximum height

limitations would have to be met separately for each principal building. Was that

principal building too high? Was that principal building set back enough from a front,

side or rear line? Here the Board was correct both factually and legally.

The final issue is whether the Board actually granted a site plan permit in

addition to the conditional use permit. Should the conditional use permit be granted

on remand this issue can be dealt with by the Board at that time.

The entry is:

The written decision of March 17, 2011 of the Berwick Planning Board

granting a Conditional Use Permit for the operation of a metal shredder is

reversed. Remanded to the Berwick Planning Board for a new hearing.

Dated: August 12, 2011

Paul A. Fritzsche

Justice, Superior Court

Plaintiffs' Counsel:

Timothy S. Murphy, Esq.

Prescott Jamieson Nelson & Murphy, LLC

37 Beach Street

Saco, ME 04072

Defendant, Town of Berwick's Counsel:

Alan Shepard, Esq.

Shepard & Read

93 Main Street

Kennebunk, ME 04043

Defendant, Berwick Iron & Metal Recycling, Inc's Counsel

Matthew D. Manahan, Esq.

Catherine R. Connors, Esq.

Pierce Atwood, LLP

One Monument Square

Portland, ME 04101

6

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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