Geisel v. Spurwink

Geisel v. Spurwink, CV-09-454 (Superior Ct. Cumberland) '-VW-C iJ, N l!t;"'!

Before the court are motions to dismiss filed by defendants DHF:I~{l1a~ih~a,nd=:

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Children Together (FACT), Winterport Family Medicine, Sunbury Medical Associa-tes,­

Spurwink Services, Sweetser Children's Services, and MSAD 22. 1

Count One of the second amended complaint is directed to defendants Spurwink

Services and Sweetser Children's Services and appears to allege professional negligence

claims under state law, specifically an alleged breach of a duty to protect plaintiff from

harm. Count Two of the second amended complaint is brought againstEMMC, Acadia

Hospital, Winterport Family Medicine, Eastern Maine Counseling and Testing Services

Inc., MSAD 22, FACT, Hampden Police Officer Christian Bailey, and DHHS. Count Two

also appears to assert claims of professional negligence based on an alleged failure to

protect Geisel from harm. Count Three asserts claims against DHHS, officer Bailey, and

MSAD 22 under 42 U.s.c. § 1983.

To the extent that certain of the defendants are seeking dismissal based on a

failure to file a return of service within 90 days pursuant to M.R.Civ.P. 3, plaintiff

Raymond Geisel has opposed those motions and has alternatively sought an extension

of time in which to effect service and file a return of service. However, many of the

motions raise alternative grounds for dismissal, and Geisel has not submitted any

opposition to the motions to dismiss except as to the issue of timely service.

1. Motion by DHHS: The motion by DHHS is not based on a failure to comply

with Rule 3. To the extent that that the complaint asserts claims against DHHS under

state law, DHHS points out that Geisel has not complied with the Maine Tort Claims

Act and that there is no waiver of immunity under that Act for the claims asserted

against DHHS. DHHS also argues that Geisel has failed to state a claim under 42U.s.C.

§ 1983, see DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services, 489 U.s. 189

(1989) (no cause of action under § 1983 to protect a person who is not in state custody

from harm), and that DHHS, as an agency of the state, is not a person subject to suit

under §1983.

As noted above, Geisel has not filed any opposition to the motion filed by

DHHS, and that motion is granted.

2. Motion by Winterport Family Medicine and Sunbury Medical Associates: The

second amended complaint lists "Winterport Family Medicine - Sunbury Medical

Associates" as a defendant in the caption of the second amended complaint. Only

Winterport is mentioned in the text of the second amended complaint, but it appears

that Winterport and Sunbury, and it appears that both counsel for Geisel and counsel

for Winterport and Sunbury are treating Winterport and Sunbury as a single entity.

In addition to raising a defense pursuant to M.R.Civ.P. 3, Winterport and

Sunbury assert that the claim against them is barred by Geisel's failure to follow the

requirements of the Health Security Act, which are applicable to any action for

1 On March 8 two other defendants, Eastern Maine Medical Center and Acadia Hospital, also

filed a motion to dismiss, but the time in which to oppose that motion has not expired.

professional negligence against any "health care provider" or "health care practitioner."

24 M.R.S. § 2502(6).

The claims in paragraph 8 of the second amended complaint can only be

construed as stating a claim of professional negligence against a health care provider.

Geisel has not filed any opposition to Winterport and Sunbury's argument that his

claim against them is barred for failure to comply with the Health Security Act, and

their motion to dismiss is granted on that ground.

3. Motion by MSAD 22: MSAD 22 argues, inter alia, that the complaint fails to

allege compliance with the Maine Tort Claims Act and fails to state a claim that could

be cognizable under any of the exceptions to sovereign immunity that are set forth in

the Maine Tort Claims Act. MSAD 22 also argues that Geisel's § 1983 claims fail to state

a cause of action under the DeShaney case and its progeny, that there is no respondeat

superior liability under § 1983, and that Geisel has failed to allege any school district

policy or practice that could support liability against MSAD 22 even if Geisel's

allegations otherwise stated a claim.

Geisel has not offered any opposition to the above arguments, and MSAD 22' s

motion to dismiss is granted.

4. Motions by FACT, Spurwink, and Sweetser: FACT and Spurwink have filed

motions to dismiss based on a failure to comply with M.R.Civ.P 3 and upon an alleged

failure to comply with the Health Security Act. Sweetser has filed a motion to dismiss

that relies solely on M.R.Civ.P. 3.

Whether the claims against FACT and Spurwink are barred by the Health

Security Act is not apparent on the face of the complaint. Spurwink is alleged to have

been responsible for educating, counseling, and housing Geisel when Geisel was a

child. FACT is alleged to have been responsible for supervising visitation between

Geisel and his sisters. As noted above, the Health Security Act applies to actions for

"professional negligence" against a "health care provider" or "health care practitioner."

24 M.R.S. § 2502(6). The allegations in the complaint do not necessarily suggest that

either Spurwink or FACT fall within the definitions of "health care provider" or "health

care practitioner" set forth in 24 M.R.S. §§ 2502(1-A) and 2502(2).

Geisel has not filed any opposition to the arguments by FACT and Spurwink that

the Health Security Act applies. If the motions were to be granted on that ground, the

court would grant Geisel leave to replead. As a result, the court is required to consider

the other argument advanced by FACT and Spurwink - that the complaint should be

dismissed against them for failure to comply with Rule 3. Sweetser has also moved for

dismissal on that ground.

On that issue the file reflects that this action was commenced on August 14, 2009

by the filing of a complaint. One September 16, 2009, before any service was made or

any responsive pleadings were filed, Geisel filed an amended complaint. On November

13, new counsel appeared for Geisel and moved (1) for leave to file a second amended

complaint and (2) for a 30 day extension of time in which to serve the defendants. Both

those motions were granted on November 24. The order granting an extension of the

2

time in which to complete service specified that service was to be made by December

22,2009.

The record reflects that counsel for Geisel then served most or all of the

defendants, including FACT, Spurwink, and Sweetser, by certified mail. This was not

valid service under NLR.Civ.P. 4. It might have constituted valid service on any

defendant who returned an acknowledgement of service pursuant to Rule 4(c)(1), but

none of the defendants did so.

FACT filed its motion to dismiss on January 10, 2010, and Spurwink and

Sweetser filed similar motions on January 25, 2010. In opposing those motions, plaintiff

argues that formal service is unnecessary because FACT, Spurwink, and Sweetser have

notice of this action and the claims against them. In the alternative, plaintiff seeks a

further 30 day extension to effect service.

There are three problems with plaintiff's argument. First, while providing notice

of the action is the primary purpose of service and technical defects in service may be

overlooked if notice is given, the Law Court has never held that service may be entirely

omitted so long as notice is given. See Brown v. Thaler, 2005 ME 75 <J[<J[ 9-11, 880 A.2d

1113, 1116. Second, Rule 4(c)(1) is clear that if the summons and complaint are mailed to

a defendant but no acknowledgement of service is received within 20 days after

mailing, personal service must then be made. As a result, Geisel is not entitled to rely on

themailingofsummonsestothedefendants.Id.

Finally, as far as the record reflects, plaintiff has not yet made valid service even

though (1) considerably more time has passed above and beyond the 30 days that

plaintiff requested to effect service when he filed the second amended complaint; (2) to

the extent plaintiff is relying on Rule 4(c)(1), he did not seek to effect personal service

when the defendants did not acknowledge service by mail; and (3) plaintiff has known

since FACT, Spurwink, and Sweetser filed their motions in January that service was

contested. The court would not necessarily fault plaintiff for first attempting service by

mail after leave to file the second amended complaint was granted and this would be a

much closer case if, after attempting service by mail, plaintiff had requested a short

extension to effect personal service once the defendants failed to acknowledge service

under Rule 4(c)(1). In this case, however, personal service has not been made even

though seven months have elapsed since the filing of the complaint, even though

almost three months have elapsed since the deadline set by the court to file returns of

service in its November 24, 2009 order, and even though plaintiff has been on notice

since January that service is contested. 2

Under these circumstances, the motions by FACT, Spurwink, and Sweetser to

dismiss pursuant to M.R.Civ.P.3 are granted. See Brown v. Thaler, 2005 ME 75, 880 A.2d

1113. Pursuant to Fries v. Carpenter, 567 A.2d 437, 438 (Me. 1989), the granting of a

motion to dismiss under Rule 3 is without prejudice.

2 As far as the court can tell, instead of promptly seeking to effect service, plaintiff is sitting back

to see if his motion for a further extension will be granted.

3

The entry shall be:

The motions to dismiss filed by DHHS, Winterport Family Medicine-Sunbury

Medical Associates, and MSAD 22 are granted with prejudice. The motions to dismiss

filed by defendants FACT, Spurwink, and Sweetser are granted without prejudice.

Plaintiff's motion for a further extension of time in which to effect service is denied. The

Clerk is directed to incorporate this order in the docket by reference pursuant to Rule

79(a).

Dated: March IS ,2010

Thomas D. Warren

Justice, Superior Court

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UTN:AOCSsr -2009-0089472 CASE #:PORSC-CV-2009-00454

01 0000002924 BENJAMIN, EDWARD R JR

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F CHRISTIAN BAILEY DEF RTND 12/23/2009

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02 0000003163 BROGAN, JONATHAN

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415 CONGRESS STREET PO BOX 4600 PORTLAND ME 04112-4600

F WINTERPORT FAMILY PRACTICE-DISMISSED DEF RTND 01/26/2010

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03 0000007907 KNOWLTON, THOMAS A

6 STATE HOUSE STAT~I~O...:.N~A...:.U-=G~U..!.S-T-=A..:..:..::ME..:..=..::.::0""':'4-::3~3-=3--""':'0-:0""':'0""':'6----------------

F MAINE DEPART OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERV-DI =~---_..:..:..:~:....----=:....=...:..-=....:...:......::....::....:~

DEF RTND 01/07/2010

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04 000000708 4 .:::L~U..::C..:.Y..!.,......:::.J..::O.:.:H::..:N__=B:...._ _

ONE MERCHANTS PLAZA, SUITE 603 PO BOX 2429 BANGOR ME 04402-2429

F FAMILY AND CHILDREN TOGETHER-DISMISSED DEF RTND 12/31/2009

05

RTND 08/14/2009

W/DRWN 03/02/2010

06 00000092 51 :.:R..::O.=B-=I::..:N.=S..::O::..:N..!.,---=..:RAN::..=.:.=D-=Y _

PO BOX 8013 PORTLAND ME 04104

F RAYMOND H GEISEL PL RTND 11/13/2009