Bonney v. Stephens Mem'l Hosp.

STATE OF MAINE SUPERIOR COURT

OXFORD, ss. RECEIVED CIVIL ACTION

Docket No. CV-09-12

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DWAYNE & DEBBIE BONNEY, MAY 04 2010

Plaintiffs Oxford Superior Court

v. ORDER

STEPHENS MEMORIAL HOSPITAL,

and

JOHN DOE, GUARD,

Defendants

This matter is before the court on the motion of the defendants, Stephens

Memorial Hospital and John Doe, a guard at Stephens Memorial Hospital (collectively

SJ\1H), to dismiss and for summary judgment on the plaintiffs', Dwayne and Debbie

Bonney, pending claims against them. Hearing was held on the motions on March 17,

2010.

1. BACKGROUND

Most of the facts of this case are undisputed and may be briefly summarized as

follows: On February 1, 2007, the Bonneys were victims of ~L assault that occurred

during an invasion of their home. Both of the Bonneys suffered three severe skull

fractures from the assault. The Bonneys drove themselves to S:MH, and when they

arrived a security guard working at the hospital called the Norway Police to report the

incident while the Bonneys received medical care. The police came to the hospital

where they were given access to the Bonneys to question them about the assault.

Based in part on information obtained while at SMH, the police obtained a

warrant to search the Bonneys' home for evidence pertaining to the invasion and

assault. 1 After the warrant was issued, the police entered the Bonneys' residence and

observed a significant amount of marijuana cultivation. This evidence eventually

resulted in the Bonneys criminal prosecution and conviction for drug trafficking.

The Bonneys filed a notice of claim against the defendants, alleging that hospital

personnel violated their rights under state and federal law by reporting to the police

confidential medical information. They specifically claim that the defendants violated

their privacy under state and federal law by wrongfully reporting the incident to the

police. See 22 M.R.S.A. § 1711-C; Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act

("HIPAA"), 42 U.s.c. §§ 1320d et seq. They claim to have suffered both intentional and

negligent infliction of emotional distress as a result of the report to the police. The

defendants have moved for summary judgment on ,the claims arising under state law,

contending that 30-A M.R.S.A. § 287 provides immunity to health care providers who

report assaults to law enforcement when serious bodily injury has been inflicted, even

where no written authorization has been provided. The defendants have also moved to

dismiss the ffiP AA claim, arguing that HIPAA does not provide plaintiffs with a

private right of action.

II. DISCUSSION

A. State Law Oaims

1. Standard of Review: Motion for Summary Judgment

"Summary judgment is appropriate when review of the parties' statements of

material facts and the referenced record evidence, considered in the light most

favorable to the non-moving party, indicates that no genuine issue of material fact is in

1 The Bonneys contend that they requested the hospital to not contact the police, that the assault was

merely an excuse to search their home because of police suspicions that Dwayne possessed marijuana,

t~at the search was beyond the warrant's parameters, and that the search was based on a faulty affidavit.

(P.S.A.M.F. 11 10-13.) These issues, however, are not material to the Bonneys' claims, and even if they

were material facts they are not disputed and would not bar summary judgment.

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dispute." Blue Star Corp. v. CKF Props. LLC, 2009 1'vfE 101, <J[ 23, 980 A.2d 1270, 1276

(citing Dyer v. Dep't of Transp., 2008 ME 106, <rr 14, 951 A.2d 821, 825; Stanley v. Hancock

County Comm'rs, 2004 i\1E 157, <rr 13, 864 A.2d 169, 174); see also M. R. Civ. P. 56. A party

wishing to avoid summary judgment must present a prima facie case for the claim or

defense that is asserted. Reliance National Indemnity v. Knowles Industrial Services, 2005

1'vfE 29, <rr 9, 868 A.2d 220, 224-25.

A genuine issue is raised "when sufficient evidence requires a fact-finder to

choose between competing versions of the truth at trial." Parrish v. Wright, 2003 ME 90,

<J[ 8, 828 A.2d 778, 781. A material fact is a fact that has "the potential to affect the

outcome of the suit." Burdzel v. Sobus, 2000 ME 84, CJI 6, 750 A.2d 573, 575. "If material

facts are disputed, the dispute must be resolved through fact-finding." Curtis v. Porter,

2001 ME 158, CJI 7, 784 A.2d 18, 21-22.

2. Title 30-A M.R.S.A. § 287

The defendants contend that 30-A M.R.SA. § 287 entitles them to summary

judgment on all state law claims because that statute provides immunity to physicians

and hospitals that report treating victims of crimes causing serious bodily injury. The

plaintiffs disagree and argue that the statute provides no such immunity.

When interpreting the meaning of a statute, courts "must give effect to the intent

of the Legislature as evidenced by the language of the statute." Stone v. Board of

Registration in Medicine, 503 A.2d 222, 226 (Me. 1986) (citing Concord General Mutual

Insurance Co. v. Patrons-Orford Mutual Insurance Co., 411 A.2d 1017, 1020 (Me. 1980)).

'1t is proper for a court to go to the legislative history for guidance only when

the legislative intent cannot be detennined by the 'plain meaning' of the statutory

language." Pennings v. Pennings, 2002 ME 3, <rr 13, 786 A.2d 622, 627 (citing Kimball v.

Land Use Reg. Comm 'n, 2000 NIB 20, err 18, 745 A.2d 387, 392; Coker v. City of Lewiston,

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1998 ME 93, 17, 710 A.2d 909, 910; Rowe v. Chapman Trucking, 629 A.2d 1224, 1226 (Me.

1993)). "Only if the language of a statute is ambiguous will [the court] look beyond it to

the legislative history or other external indicia of legislative intent:' In re Adoption of

Patricia S., 2009 ME 76, <J[ II, 976 A.2d 966, 969 (noting that ambiguous language is

"language that is reasonably susceptible of different interpretations") (internal citations

and quotations omitted); see also Rowe, 629 A.2d at 1226 (if the meaning of a statute is

plain, there is no need to look at secondary indicia of legislative intent).

In light of these rules of statutory construction, the court first looks to the plain

meaning of the statute. The statute states, in pertinent part:

§ 287 Physical examination of crime victims

1. PAYMENT OF EXPENSES BY DISTRICT ATTORNEY. Except as

provided in subsection 2, in all cases reported to a law enforcement officer

of sexual crimes against minors or assault when serious bodily injury has

been inflicted, the office of the district attorney of the county in which the

alleged crime occurred shall pay the expenses of a physical examination of

the victim conducted for the purpose of obtaining evidence for the

prosecution ....

3. MEDICAL PERSONNEL NOT LIABLE FOR FURNISHING

REPORTS, RECORDS OR TESTIMONY. A physician, nurse, hospital,

clinic or any other person, firm or corporation attending a victim under

subsection 1 is not liable in damages or otherwise for providing reports or

records, copies of reports or records or for their testimony relating to any

examination performed under this section when those reports, records or

testimony are provided to a district attorney, a law enforcement officer or

a court for the purpose, of prosecuting the alleged crime, whether or not

the reports, records or testimony are provided with the written

authorization of the victim examined under this section.

30-A M.R.S.A. § 287.

Since neither the term "serious bodily injury" nor "reports" is expressly defined,

"they must be accorded their plain and common meaning and should be construed

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according to their natural import." Stone v. Board of Registration in Medicine, 503 A.2d

222,226 (Me. 1986) (internal quotations and citations omitted).

The court concludes that the plaintiffs sustained "serious bodily injury" within

the meaning of 30-A M.R.S.A. § 2871(1).2 Both Plaintiffs suffered three skull fractures

during the assault. One of the fractures that Debbie Bonney sustained was so serious

that it "pushed a section of her skull into her brain one half an inch deep." (D.S.M.P.

<n:CJf 2-3.) Plaintiff Dwayne Bonney's skull fractures resulted in his hospitalization, and

required physical therapy so that he could walk again. (D.S.M.P. <n:CJf 5-7.) It is difficult

to dispute that these are serious bodily injuries.

Similarly, the court construes the statute to conclude that providing a "report" to

law enforcement includes an oral report. The plain language of the statute provides

immunity to reports provided "for the purpose of prosecuting the alleged crime;" the

statute does not direct that such reports must be written. The statute permits health

care providers to report to law enforcement the treatment of an assault victim when

serious bodily injury has been inflicted when the purpose of the report is to prosecute

an alleged crime.3 The report may be written, but that is not a requirement.

2 The Law Court has concluded that injuries arguably less egregious than those suffered by the

plaintiffs fall within the definition of serious bodily injury. See e.g., State v. Cunningham, 1998 ME 167,

112-4, 715 A.2d 156, 156-57 (finding serious bodily injury where the victim was treated "for minor cuts

and a 20% pneumothorax (partial collapse of the lung), that, if left untreated, could have resulted in a

total collapse of the lung"); State v. Frost, 564 A.2d 70, 70-71 (Me. 1989) (serious bodily injury found where

"[t]he evidence revealed that the victim ... sustained three fractures of the cheekbone and four fractures

of the nose, [and] was not able to breathe through his nose until it had been repaired surgically"); State v.

Colamy, 407 A.2d 1115,1120 (Me. 1979) (serious bodily injury found where damage to the victim's kidney

included resulted in a hospitalization for several. days).

3 Pursuant to the interpretation of the statute as urged by the plaintiffs, perpetrators of crimes would

be given more protection than victims and potential future victims. This would produce an illogical

result, one tha t was not intended by the legislature. See State v. Hopkins, 526 A.2d 945, 950 (Me. 1987)

(citing State v. Rand, 430 A.2d 808, 817 (Me. 1981) ("The Legislature is presumed not to intend an absurd

result, and legislation will be construed to avoid, if possible, inconsistency, contradiction and

illogicality.") .

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The plaintiffs here sustained serious bodily injuries, caused by an assault that

took place during a home invasion. S:MH provided a report of the assault and the.

resultant serious bodily injuries to law enforcement for the purpose of prosecuting the

alleged crime. Therefore, SJvlH is immune from suit even though the plaintiffs did not

provide written authorization to report the home invasion to the police. See 30-A

M.R.S.A. § 287(3).

This construction of the statute is consistent with its purpose of protecting the

public. The prevention of violent crimes is of great public interest. This is especially

true where the crime is a violent home invasion. Public policy mandates the reporting

of these crimes to help law enforcement apprehend criminals. Health care providers

are in a unique position to aid public welfare by reporting violent crimes when victims

seek treatment. The Legislature granted immunity to health care providers when they

report violent crimes to law enforcement. A patient's interest in confidentially has to be

balanced against society's interest in detecting and reporting crimes, especially crimes

of violence.

A. Federal Oaim

1. Standard of Review: Motion to Dismiss

A "motion for judgment on the pleadings is the functional equivalent of a motion

to dismiss for failure to state a claim." Stevens v. Bouchard, 532 A.2d 1028, 1029

(Me. 1987). The court must "examine the complaint in the light most favorable to the

plaintiffs to determine whether it alleges the elements of a cause of action or facts

entitling the plaintiffs to relief on some legal theory" and "assume that all factual

allegations in the complaint are true." Id. at 1030; see also Saunders v. Tisher, 200611E 94,

CJ[ 8, 902 A.2d 830, 832 (stating that in determining whether a motion to dismiss should

be granted, the court considers "the allegations in the complaint in relation to any cause

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of action that may reasonably be inferred from the complaint," and a claim will be

dismissed only "when it appears beyond a doubt that the plaintiff is not entitled to

relief under any set of facts that he [or she] might prove in support of his [or her]

claim." (quoting Johanson v. Dunnington, 20011vfE 169, i 5,785 A.2d 1244, 1246)).

2. HIPAA Oaim

The plaintiffs allege that the defendants violated their right to privacy pursuant

to HIPAA regulations. See 42 U.S.c. §§ 1320d et seq.

In this instance, however, the court need not detennine whether the plaintiffs

had a right to maintain the confidentiality of their medical records under HIPAA

because the statute does not provide a private right of action to the individuals it

purports to protect. See Kelly v. United States, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 123117 (D.N.H.

Nov. 10,2009) (internal citations ornitted).4 Although Maine has not addressed whether

individuals have a private cause of action under HIPAA, courts that have addressed the

issue have consistently held that HIPAA does not provide a private cause of action. See

id.; Acara v. Banks, 470 F.3d 560, 571-72 (5th Cir. 2006) (listing District Court decisions

finding that IDPAA does not create a private cause of action). "While civil and criminal

penalties are available for certain violations of HIPAA's requirements, the statute

specifically delegates enforcement of those penalties to the Secretary of Health and

Human Services." Id. (citing 42 U.s.c. § 1320d-5; Acara v. Banks, 470 F.3d 569, 571 (5th

cir. 2006)); Marquez v. Principi, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12733, 13-14 (D.P.R. Feb. 18, 2009)).

Accordingly, the plaintiffs are precluded from asserting a claim in this court for

any breach of IDPAA privacy provisions. See Acara, 470 F.3d at 572 ("[w]e hold there is

4 The court also notes that the statute provides exceptions to confidentiality where reporting is

authorized or required. See 42 U.S.C.S. § 1320d-7(b) ("Nothing in this part [42 USc. §§ 1320d et seq.]

shall be construed to invalidate or limit the authority, power, or procedures established under any law

providing for the reporting of disease or injury ... or public health investigation or intervention.").

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no private cause of action under HIPAA and therefore no federal subject matter

jurisdiction over [plaintiff's] asserted claims").

The Plaintiffs' further contention that HIPAA provides a "common law suit for

the violation of health care information" is unpersuasive and unsupported by law.

(Pl.'s Obj. to Def.'s M. Dismiss at 33.) Accordingly, the court must grant the defendants'

motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' HIPAA claim.

The entry is:

The defendants' motion for summary judgment is

granted. Judgment for the defendants on plaintiff's

State claim. Plaintiffs' claim brought pursuant to

42 U.s.c. §§ 1320 et seq. is dismissed.

Dated: May 3, 2010

obert W. Gifford

Active Retired Justice

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