The opinion
STATE OF MAINE SUPERIOR COURT
HANCOCK, ss: CIVIL ACTION
DOCKET NO. AP-08-010
EVE D. HARRISON,
Appellant,
v. DECISION AND ORDER
TOWN OF CRANBERRY ISLES,
Appellee.
This matter is before the Court on an appeal filed by
Appellant, Eve D. Harrison, pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 80B.
BACKGROUND
On July 2, 2008, the Town of Cranberry Isles Planning
Board denied Appellant's application for a permit to build
a residence upon a certain parcel of land on Great
Cranberry Island. The Planning Board denied the
application because Appellant's application failed to
comply with the following sections of the Town's Land Use
Ordinance for Shorelands (llOrdinance"): [1] Section
IX(E)(2), dealing with maximum lot coverage; [2] Section
XI(J), dealing with storm water runoff; and [3] Section
XI(N), dealing with soils.
The Town Board of Appeals (llBOA") conducted a de novo
hearing and affirmed the decision of the Planning Board on
August 26, 2008. 1 It agreed with the Planning Board that
[1] the proposed use was residential and did not comply
with the 20% maximum lot coverage requirement under Section
IX(E)(2). The BOA also agreed that [2] the application
should fail because no storm water runoff plan was
submitted. Cranberry Isles, Me. Land Use Ordinance for
Shorelands § XI(J) (Mar. 9, 1992). However, it did not
agree with the Planning Board that [3] the soils were
inadequate. Cranberry Isles, Me. Land Use Ordinance for
Shorelands § XI(N) (Mar. 9, 1992). Agreeing with two of
1Appellant served as Chair of that Board but recused
herself for this hearing.
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the three reasons for denial relied on by the Planning
Board, the BOA affirmed the Planning Board's decision
following its de novo hearing.
Judging from the BOA's minutes, it clearly focused on
the interpretation of "mixed use" in Section IX(E)(2) of
the Ordinance and Appellant has made that the thrust of her
appeal as well. Appellant interprets the term "mixed use"·
as referring to a lot having a mixture of functionally
water-dependent uses and residential uses. The BOA
interpreted the term "mixed use" as referring to commercial
and residential uses. The question Appellant and the Town
wish this Court to answer is what is the proper
interpretation of "mixed use" as it appears in the
Ordinance.
DISCUSSION
When reviewing governmental action under M.R. Civ. P.
80B, the Superior Court reviews the operative decision of
the municipality for "abuse of discretion, errors of law,
or findings not supported by substantial evidence in the
record." Camp v. Town of Shapleigh, 2008 ME 53, ~ 9, 943
A.2d 595, 598 (quoting McGhie v. Town of Cutler, 2002 ME
62, ~ 5, 793 A.2d 504, 505). "Substantial evidence is
evidence that a reasonable mind would accept as sufficient
to support a conclusion." Toomey v. Town of Frye Island,
2008 ME 44, ~ 12, 943 A.2d 563, 566 (quoting Sproul v. Town
of Boothbay Harbor, 2000 ME 30, ~ 8, 746 A.2d 368, 372).
"That inconsistent conclusions can be drawn from evidence
does not mean that a finding is not supported by
substantial evidence." Id. The court does "not make any
findings other than those found explicitly or implicitly by
the Board" and does "not substitute [its] judgment for that
of the Board." Camp, 2008 ME 53, ~ 9, 943 A.2d at 598.
Notwithstanding the interest of the parties in
exploring the interpretation of "mixed use" in the
Ordinance, the reality is that if the denial of Appellant's
application is sustainable on anyone ground, discussion of
the alternative grounds becomes an academic exercise. In
this instance, the Planning Board and the BOA in its de
novo hearing, found that the there was no storm water
runoff plan submitted showing compliance with Section
XI(J)(l). Nothing submitted in support of this appeal
indicates that there was a storm water runoff plan
submitted to the BOA and, therefore, the finding that the
application failed under Section XI(J) was supported by
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substantial evidence. Likewise, the submissions on appeal
do not indicate that the BOA's findings reflected an error
of law or an abuse of discretion. For that reason, the
decision of the BOA is AFFIRMED and Appellant's appeal is
DENIED.
This order is incorporated into the docket by
reference pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 79(a).
Dated: March 10, 2009
Kevin M. Cuddy
Justice, Superio
RECEIVED & FILED
1,1AR 1 0 2009
t=lANCl,;~-"';f" COUNTY
COURTS
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