The opinion
STATE OF MAINE SUPERIOR COURT
CIVIL ACTION
KENNEBEC, ss. DOCKET NO. AP-06-72
T)l~ ,/v\-)~ L /), 0 ; ';'/':J.:
ROBERT and PATRICIA NELSON,
Petitioners
v. DECISION AND ORDER
MAINE LAND USE REGULATION
COMMISSION,
Respondent
Robert and Patricia Nelson ("Petitioners"), pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 80C and 5
M.R.S.A. § 11001, ask this court to review the September 6, 2006 decision of the Maine
Land Use Regulation Commission ("LURC") approving Bayroot, LLC's Application to
Amend Subdivision Plan for LURC Project No.5 ("SP 5").
In 1972, LURC approved Brown Company's subdivision application, SP 5, with
conditions, for an area around Parmachenee Lake. The 19-1ot subdivision was
approved as a camp lot lease program. The lease lots were dispersed throughout the
31,OOO-acre subdivision and provided outdoor enthusiasts with the opportunity to lease
lots in a remote wilderness area. In its 1972 decision, LURC disapproved Brown
Company's proposed location of four sites for the reason that the soil at those locations
was unsuitable for development,l LURC imposed, in Condition 2 of its decision, a duty
on the applicant to return to the Commission to obtain approval for new locations for
1 "Soil types on sites 1, 3, 9, 13 and 14 are rated with severe to very severe limitations for the uses
proposed." R. at 20, <j[ 10 Finding of Fact. "Certain sites have unsuitable soil types, and should be re
located, except possibly site 1." R. at 20, <j[ 15 Finding of Fact. Site 1 already had an existing camp on it
and LURC allowed it to remain on the condition that it obtain a plumbing permit and certificate of
inspection. R. at 20, Condition 3.
2
those sites. "The applicant shall relocate, with Commission approval, sites 3, 9, 13, and
14 to suitable soils." R. at 20, <JI 2 Terms and Conditions. Subsequent to LURe's
approval of SP 5, Brown Company leased ten of the nineteen sites. During the next 31
years, until Bayroot purchased SP 5, none of the remaining nine sites was improved,
developed, or leased.
Since 1972, LURC has adopted further regulations that apply to the subdivision.
LURC rezoned the shorefront (within 250 feet of the water) to a specially protected zone
called the Great Pond Protection Sub-District (P-GP zone). Residential development
without a special permit from LURC is prohibited in this zone. LURC has also adopted
a provision that prohibits shorefront lots, regardless of the zone, from forming a
contiguous strip longer than 1320 linear feet. Finally, LURC adopted a sunset provision
providing for the expiration of permits for lots that had been neither "substantially
started" nor "substantially completed" by October 1, 2004. 2
In 2004, Bayroot, as landowner and successor to SP 5, sought an advisory ruling
from the Commission asking certain questions regarding its rights and duties regarding
the nine lots that were undeveloped and that they proposed to relocate. In response,
the Commission's staff issued Advisory Ruling AR-04-39 ("Advisory Ruling"). Bayroot,
treating the Advisory Ruling as "Commission approval," thereupon relocated and
leased the four lots that Condition 2 of SP 5 mandated, as well as applied for an
amendment to authorize relocating five additional lots (to increase by four the number
of lots on the shorefront of Lake Parmacheenee). On September 7, 2006, LURC
2 Bayroot disputes that Section 10.17 of the Commission's rules applies to subdivision permits. However,
both the staff advisory opinion and the LURC decision "take the more conservative view that it applies to
both [subdivision and development permits], and therefore the conditions and activities authorized by
that permit had to be met by October 1, 2004." R. at 4, fn. 1. The court is satisfied that LURC's
interpretation of this rule is reasonable and within its realm of expertise, therefore the court will defer to
LURe's position.
3
approved Bayroot's application to relocate the five previously approved lots within the
31,000-acre project area subject to a number of conditions. On October 5, 2006, the
petitioners filed a petition for review, asserting, among other arguments, that Bayroot
failed to meet the October 2004 deadline for fulfilling the conditions affecting sites 3, 9,
13, and 14 in SP 5, therefore, the permit expired. Petitioners continue, arguing that
without a valid permit, LURC could not subsequently authorize the relocation of five
other lots within the subdivision pursuant to an amendment to the expired SP 5. 3
When the decision of an administrative agency is appealed pursuant to M.R. Civ.
P. 80C, this Court reviews the agency's decision directly for abuse of discretion, errors
of law, or findings not supported by the evidence. Centamore v. Dep't of Human Services,
664 A.2d 369, 370 (Me. 1995). "An administrative decision will be sustained if, on the
basis of the entire record before it, the agency could have fairly and reasonably found
the facts as it did." Seider v. Board of Exam'r of Psychologists, 2000 ME 206 <JI 9, 762 A.2d
551, 555 (Me. 2000) (citing CWCO, Inc. v. Superintendent of Ins., 1997 ME 226, <JI 6, 703
A.2d 1258, 1261 (Me. 1997)). In reviewing the decisions of an administrative agency, the
Court should "not attempt to second-guess the agency on matters falling within its
3 Bayroot argues that petitioners lack standing due to their failure to show they have suffered a
"particularized injury" from the LURC decision that "adversely and directly affects [their] property,
pecuniary or personal rights." Anderson v. Swanson, 534 A,2d 1286, 1288 (Me. 1987) (internal citations
omitted). The court is satisfied that the petitioners, as leaseholders who own a residence in SP 5, have
standing. Boiled down, this is what the essential dispute is between the parties. The petitioners, and
others who leased property in SP 5, did so for a unique, rugged wilderness area where camps were
spread out so as to keep the area in a more natural state. This is what LURC encouraged in 1972, when it
followed a philosophy encouraging scattered development. Now however, LURC has changed its
approach and believes that the impact on wilderness is better managed if done in a more concentrated
area-more camps closer together puts the impact in just a few areas as opposed to 19 areas each with a
little impact. This is a significant departure from what the agency followed in 1972 and the petitioner's
expectations (and property value) of their wilderness camp are diminished if a large subdivision with a
cluster of camps and its accompanying roads and construction is allowed to be built under a
grandfathered amendment. While the petitioners may not be abutters in the traditional understanding of
the word, the word can sometimes be "loosely used" in circumstances such as this. Sahl v. Town of York,
2000 ME 180, lJI 9, 760 A,2d 266,269. Further, the court believes that the petitioners, as property owners in
the subdivision in question, have standing as abutters to question decisions regarding development of the
subdivision that will impact their property.
4
realm of expertise" and the Court's review is limited to "determining whether the
agency's conclusions are unreasonable, unjust or unlawful in light of the record."
Imagineering v. Superintendent ofIns., 593 A.2d 1050, 1053 (Me. 1991).
The burden of proof rests with the party seeking to overturn the agency's
decision, and that party must prove that no competent evidence supports the Board's
decision. Seider, 762 A.2d 551. "[Petitioner] must prove that no competent evidence
supports the Board's decision and that the record compels a contrary conclusion."
Bischoffv. Board of Trustees, 661 A.2d 167, 170 (Me. 1995).
Petitioners present the following arguments:
(1) The Commission had no authority to review Bayroot's Application to
Amend as Section 1.02(D) of its rules limits LURe's authority to amend subdivisions to
no more than 10% of a subdivision development;
(2) Under Section 10.17, the permits for the nine relocated lots had expired
because they were not lawfully leased prior to 10.17's October I, 2004 decision;
(3) Even if the permits to the lots had not expired, none of the lots could be
relocated to the shores of Lake Parmachenee as they were subdivision lots and thus
prohibited in the P-GP zone;
(4) The placement of the relocated lots on the shoreline, regardless of the
shoreline's zoning classification, would unlawfully extend the subdivision lots in a
contiguous line well beyond the 1320 linear foot limit set forth in Ch. 10.25,Q3,b.
LURC asserts that the petitioners' first argument is patently wrong because they
misread Chapter 1 of the Commission's rules. Chapter 1 deals only with the
establishment of a fee schedule for applications and petitions processed by LURe. The
"minor changes" defined in Chapter 1 are defined because under Part C Exceptions (2)
minor changes are not assessed a fee. The petitioners respond that 12 M.R.S.A. § 685-B
5
requires ALL subdivision amendment applications to pay a fee ("fees apply to all
amendments except for minor changes to building permits." (emphasis added). Since
this is not a building permit, petitioners argue that a fee must apply and therefore
Chapter 1 cannot exist to merely distinguish between no fee minor changes to
subdivision permits and fee required major changes (as LURC asserts) because section
685 requires the imposition of a fee for both minor and major amendments.
LURC responds that the petitioner takes section 685 out of context (as they do
Chapter 1) because section 685-B(5) concerns unilateral amendments or modifications of
a Commission permit and states that these unilateral actions without authorization are
violations. Section 685-B does not apply to permit amendments that are voluntarily
sought by the permit holder, as in this case. Further, LURC argues that nothing in the
regulations or statutes cited by the petitioners supports their argument that the
Commission only has authority to authorize amendments to permits affecting less than
10 percent of the original project. LURC asserts that it has, throughout its history,
considered and issued amendments to permits in response to permit holders' requests.
In fact, section 10.11 of LURC's rules contemplates amendments of previously
permitted activities that have become non-conforming or grandfathered, such as the
subdivision in question, which was previously authorized under SP5 but does not
conform to LURC's current zoning scheme.
The court finds that LURC has the authority to promulgate regulations to enact
statutory provisions such as Section 685-B, and even if section 685 can be interpreted as
the petitioners' desire, it is entirely legitimate for an agency to enact a regulation stating
that minor changes to permits other than building permits can also be done without a
fee.
6
The court will next review petitioner's argument that Bayroot failed to meet the
October 2004 deadline imposed under section 10.17 for meeting the conditions affecting
the approved lots under SP 5. LURC notes that there is some doubt as to the
applicability of this section to subdivision permits. All of the terms of section 10.17
apply to construction and related activities. SP 5, being a subdivision permit,
authorizes only the division and conveyance of lots and not any construction activities
upon those lots. Following issuance of SP5, any construction on the authorized lots
required a separate building permit from the Commission. Nevertheless, the
Commission decision and the Advisory Ruling take the view that section 10.17 applies
to both development and subdivision, therefore the conditions and activities authorized
by the permit would, under this interpretation, needed to have been met by October 1,
2004. As noted in footnote two, the court finds LURC's interpretation of the
applicability of this rule reasonable.
Applying section 10.17, the Commission argues that the October 2004 deadline
was met because it upheld its staff's advisory ruling that stated that the approved lots
under SP 5 could be moved to areas having approved soils, provided that this
relocation occurred by the October 2004 deadline. LURC argues that in issuing this
advisory ruling, its staff relied upon evidence provided by Bayroot of satisfactory soils
at the new site locations, and the Commission found that these sites were in fact
relocated by the deadline.
Petitioners argue that the Commission's attempt at recharacterizing an advisory
opinion as a staff decision is fatally flawed because (1) if the advisory ruling is
construed as a "staff decision," then aggrieved parties have been denied their statutory
right to appeal the staff decision to the Commission within 30 days, as that deadline
passed in 2004 with no actual or constructive notice to the public; and (2) the advisory
7
ruling cannot, as a matter of fact, constitute "Commission approval" of the proposed
sites because it recites future actions Bayroot must take before approval can be given.
These stated future actions presume a second review to determine if those conditions
were met ("Provided Bayroot completes and complies," "Provided all terms and
conditions . . . are complied with"). In further support of their position that the
Advisory Ruling was not a final determination, the petitioners note that the Advisory
Ruling actually states that it "is an informal response and not a legal determination,"
clearly demonstrating to any reasonable person that the ruling was, as its name implies,
advisory.
Petitioners' arguments on this point are compelling. The Commission has
delegated to staff the authority to approve, approve with conditions, or disapprove all
applications submitted pursuant to section 685-B that are routine in nature and do not
raise significant policy issues. LURC's regulations state that staff can be delegated the
authority to approve or disapprove applications only upon finding that the applications
are of a routine nature, that its handling by the staff will eliminate a waiting period
between completion of the staff work and the next Commission meeting, and that the
nature of the application is such that it can be made by the staff by following the strict
basis of the statutory criteria in section 685-B and the policies, standards and rules
adopted by the Commission. LURC Reg., Ch. 3.02(A).
This presumes that the only decision LURC staff is authorized to make is one
that any reasonable, disinterested person, reviewing the same laws and regulations,
would be compelled to make. In other words, LURC staff can make decisions regarding
applications only if the applications are routine in nature and can be disposed of by
simply following the applicable laws and regulations. This case clearly does not
involve a "routine" application that is without significant policy issues.
8
In addition, chapter 3.02(B) of LURC's regulations states that "[a]ny person
aggrieved by a decision of the staff ... has the right to review of that decision by the
Commission. A request for such review must be made in writing within 30 days of the
staff decision." However, reading the advisory opinion in the way LURC wishes
completely divests the petitioners of their right to appeal to the full Commission. The
court simply cannot accept an argument that an advisory ruling can constitute
"Commission approval" due to the lack of adequate notice provided in the advisory
ruling to potentially aggrieved parties who wish to have the Commission review the
decision.
The nature of advisory opinions is to inform people the steps that need to be
taken so that the correct regulatory process is understood and followed, resulting in less
burdensome and more efficient work done so as to make the more formal, future
decision-making process go smoother. Petitioners have convinced the court that
LURC's decision to treat a staff advisory ruling as "Commission approval" is
unreasonable. Likewise, Bayroot and LURC have failed to convince the court that an
advisory opinion is anything other than what its name proclaims it to be. Bayroot and
LURC's reasoning is further undermined by the clear language of the advisory
opinion's first paragraph, which also demonstrates that no independent analysis was
conducted by LURC: "[I]n providing our views on these matters, we have relied entirely
upon the facts as you have presented them to us." Even more convincing is the scope of
advisory rulings as defined in LURC's regulations. According to LURC regulations
chapter 4.02, staff may issue an advisory ruling with respect to the applicability of any
statute, standard or rule administered by the Commission. Further, 4.02(2) states that
an advisory ruling shall not be binding on the Commission. The court notes the lack of
9
any language indicating that an advisory ruling otherwise constitutes "Commission
approval."4
LURC, as a regulatory body, is charged with overseeing the granting of permits,
and it is not reasonable to believe that the Commission grants approval to applicants
based on an advisory ruling with no requirement that evidence supporting the
application be submitted and reviewed to demonstrate that in fact the advisory ruling
was complied with. Advisory rulings are a blueprint for a person to follow if they wish
to have a smooth application process, and the person can choose to follow the advice or
not, with the understanding that if the advice is not followed, they will have to convince
the agency their decision was appropriate. It is LURC's job to oversee and ensure
compliance, and allowing applicants to self-police themselves is contrary to LURC's
purpose.
An argument could be made that there was no permit or amendment for LURC
to approve because SP 5 was already issued; all that needed to be done was to get soil
approval for the new locations, which staff is competent to do without full Commission
oversight. The court notes that Bayroot did submit soil data to LURC for the proposed
new locations prior to the October deadline, and Bayroot asserted that the soil, under its
analysis, was suitable. However there is no determination or analysis in the record by
LURC (or its staff) confirming that the soil was indeed acceptable, or any finding that
the new locations would not increase the extent of nonconformity, as section 10.11
requires. The LURC decision also states in paragraph 12, "In September of 2004,
4 5 M.R.S.A. § 9001 grants the authority to agencies to, upon request, make advisory rulings. It further
states that an advisory ruling shall not be binding on the agency, except in one instance: provided that in
any subsequent enforcement action initiated by the agency, justifiable reliance on the ruling shall be
considered in mitigation of any penalty sought to be assessed. This action was not initiated by the
agency, further supporting the proposition that the advisory ruling at issue in this case cannot reasonably
be viewed as "Commission approval."
10
Bayroot LLC informed the Commission that it had complied with the terms and
conditions of SP5, as clarified through" the Advisory Ruling. Further, "According to
the applicant, as of September of 2004 all of the 19 approved sites ... had been leased
and remained currently under lease." Nothing, however, indicates that LURC
performed its oversight role to confirm that the terms and conditions were complied
with. 5
This approach is in contrast to the analysis LURC conducted in the Commission
decision to grant Bayroot's application to relocate five lots. As to that application,
paragraph 30 under Review Comments details the extensive comments from a Maine
State Soil Scientist regarding the soils in the areas proposed for development. However,
as to the relocation of the four sites necessary to maintain SP 5, the Commission simply
states in paragraph 1 of its conclusions that the applicant sought and obtained
Commission approval for the relocation of the four sites to sites with suitable soils for
development. The only Commission approval it points to is its staff advisory ruling.
Even if the court were to credit the argument asserting that LURC staff had the
authority to declare that the soil samples were suitable, and even if the court were to
accept an argument that there was no application or permit being approved (just a
condition of an already existing permit), the fact remains that based upon the record
before the court, no soil was ever "approved" by LURC or its staff. The Advisory
Ruling states that it was written merely to provide its views on the matter, based upon
evidence submitted to it by the applicant, and LURC cannot point to any evidence in
the record confirming that it performed its oversight duties to ensure that the soil
samples were indeed "suitable," and as a result, issued its "approval."
5 While the court does not have any reason to doubt the analysis of the soil samples submitted by
Bayroot, it also does not have the expertise to make that determination. The court merely finds that
LURe failed to make its own separate determination.
11
Finally, because the Court finds that these 4 lots were not properly relocated
prior to October 2004, Bayroot's subsequent application to relocate 5 other lots6 is
vacated because Bayroot was only able to request that these sites be relocated on the
condition that it was found to have possessed a valid permit. A valid permit only
existed to the extent that all of the terms and conditions of the SP5 were complied with.
This could only have been accomplished by first having properly relocated (as required
by the original permit) the 4 sites discussed earlier. By the terms of the permit, the 4
lots had to be relocated to a site with suitable soil in order for the permit to remain
valid, and LURC failed to fulfill its regulatory role and make the affirmative
determination that the soils were indeed suitable.
In addition, the Advisory Ruling also stated that it recommended that Bayroot
submit an application to amend SP 5 prior to October I, 2004, to relocate the five other
sites, which it did not do until seven months after the October deadline. Further, the
use of the nine undeveloped lots needed to be "substantially started", defined by LURC
staff as approved at their new locations and leased. It was only after Bayroot deemed
itself to have been in compliance and moved the 4 lots by October 2004 that it could be
seen as having substantially started and was then able to make a subsequent request
that it be allowed to move the other 5 lots. Because the 4 lots were not "authorized by
the Commission," the SP5 permit lapsed and Bayroot, should it wish, if it wishes to
continue, must submit a petition to rezone the lakefront subject to the more stringent
permitting requirements in effect today.
6 The lots proposed to be relocated are Brown Company sites 10/ 11/ 17, 18/ and 19.
12
As to the 5 other lots (relocation of which was not authorized by SP5), the
Commission evaluated Bayroot's requested relocation of the Amendment Lots pursuant
to section 10.11 of its rules. Commission rules allow a permit to be issued for
relocations of nonconforming lots if the Commission finds compliance with its permit
authorizing statute and the project will not adversely affect surrounding uses and
resources and that there is no increase in the extent of nonconformity. The majority of
the LURC decision deals directly with this request.
The Commission reviewed the permit application, received comments from
other agencies, as well as comments from opponents of the application, and determined
that Bayroot had demonstrated that the relocation of the 5 lots complied with its rules
and other permitting requirements. The Commission found: (1) that the proposed
relocation would concentrate the previously approved scattered development onto two
shoreline areas in keeping with the Commission's current Comprehensive Land Use
Plan7; (2) that the relocated lots would comply with the Commission's dimensional
requirements; (3) that the relocated lots would have suitable soils; (4) that the relocated
lots would be accessible by an existing road while the unrelocated lots would require
construction of a new road; (5) that the proposed right-of-way to the relocated lots
would provide adequate access; (6) that the relocated lots would have no adverse effect
on water quality or fish and wildlife resources; (7) and that the proposal would
otherwise comply with section 685-B(4). The Commission followed these conclusions
7 Boiled down, this is what the essential dispute is between the parties. The petitioners, and other who
leased camp-sites on this property did so for a unique, rugged wilderness area where camps were spread
out so as to keep the area in a more natural state. This is what LURC encouraged in 1972, when it
followed a philosophy encouraging scattered development. Now however, LURC has changed its
approach and believes that the impact on wilderness is better managed if done in a more concentrated
area-more camps closer together puts the impact in just a few areas as opposed to 19 areas each with a
little impact. This is a significant departure from what the agency followed in 1972 and the petitioners'
expectations (and property value) for a wilderness camp are diminished if, as they believe, a large
subdivision with a cluster of camps is allowed to be built.
13
with 15 conditions to the permit amendment, designed to assure that the relocated lots
would conform with the Commission's findings and requirements. LURC argues that
this comprehensive analysis and decision approving the application should be given
deference.
The petitioners main arguments are (1) that LURC could not relocate these lots
into the prohibited shore zone and (2) that the lots as approved would extend along a
contiguous line further than allowed. 8 LURC does not appear to argue these two
specific points, instead relying on the thoroughness of the Commission's decision. An
evaluation of the Commission decision shows that the decision specifically states under
the review criteria that a subdivision is not allowed within the Great Pond Protection
Sub-Distriet9 ("P-GP zone") and that there can be no increase in nonconformance. The
decision's specific response to these criteria states the reasons (numbered 1-7 above)
why it believes relocation is appropriate. The court notes, however, that as to relocating
more sites into a P-GP zone, the Commission's reasoning is that relocation "will
concentrate the previously approved development, scattered on the shoreline and to the
south and north of Parmachenee Lake, onto two shoreline area of the lake in keeping
with the Commission's development goals . . . which states that the Commission
discourages growth that results in scattered and sprawling development patterns."
Concerning the physical location of the 5 lots prior to relocation. According to <JI
9 of the decision, "[o]f the 19 sites approved by SP 5, 13 were proposed to have frontage
on Parmachenee Lake, 2 had frontage on Rump Pond, and the remaining 4 were
8 LURC and Bayroot argue that petitioners' argument concerning the lots extending in a contiguous line
further than allowed was not argued below and cannot be raised here. Petitioners argue that they
specifically argued to the Commission that the lots had to meet all of section la's impact standards, which
include the contiguous line requirement. The court finds that the petitioners sufficiently raised the issue
of the lots having to comply with section la's impact standards such that the issue could be raised on
appeal.
9 A Great Pond Zone applies to all areas within 250 feet of the normal high water mark around all lakes
and ponds greater than 10 acres in size.
14
proposed to be located on the Magalloway River." Paragraph 6 clarifies the proposed
relocation. "The applicant seeks to amend ... SP 5 ... to allow for the relocation of 5
previously approved, but as yet undeveloped lots for seasonal camp development. ...
The original proposal for SP 5 included 13 shorefront lots on Parmachenee Lake. The
applicant's proposed relocation of 5 lots does not increase the total number of
previously approved lots, but does increase the number of shorefront lots on
Parmachenee lake by 4, eliminates 2 previously approved lots located at sensitive"
locations on the Magalloway River, and reduces the amount of road construction
required to access the lots."
While the 1972 permit imagined that the sites would be waterfront, it authorized
them on three different waterways. As the petitioners state, "[t]here is a substantial
difference in impacts between the original site locations, and the proposed new
locations. Bayroot's Amendment results in 17 sites being located on the direct shore
frontage of the lake." LURe asserts, however, that the relocation of 4 more sites onto
the lakeshore will not have an adverse impact and will otherwise conform with LURC's
regulations. Further, the sites are being moved from one subdistrict with substantial
limitations on development to another, therefore there is no real increase in
nonconformi ty.
The entry will be:
The petition to vacate LURC's September 6, 2006 decision regarding Bayroot's
application to amend SP-5 is GRANTED; this matter is REMANDED to LURe for
further proceedings consistent with this decision and order.
~
Donald H. Marden
Justice, Superior Court
Date Filed _-....].....0'-#-/.....6-1-1.....
°-'-'-6 _ Kennebec P-"'-O.>L6_-_~7"'-2
Docket No. _------6.'A..... ~ _
County
Action ---LP.....e.....t.....i'-lt....Ji.....O.l.Jn""-------fL..>.....o rL..-Ru.e...v-"--'-i~e.lOlw _
80C tLMARDE.N
vs. et al
Plaintiff's Attorney Defendant's Attorney
Peggy L. McGehee. Esq. William V. Ferdinand. Jr •• Esq. (Bayroot)
One Canal Plaza Eaton Peabody
PO Box 426 77 Sewall Street. Suite 3000
Portland. Maine 04112-0426 Augusta. ME 04330
- Dennis J. Harnish. AAG
6 State House Station
Augusta, Maine 04333-0006
Date of
Entry
10/5/06 Petition for Review, filed. s/McGehee, Esq.
10/12/06 Entry of Appearance, filed. s/Ferdinand, Jr., Esq.
11/3/06 Certification of Record. filed. s/Carroll, Dir. LURC (in vault)
11/13/06 Notice of briefing schedule mailed to attys of record.
12/13/06 Plaintiffs' Brief in Support of Petition, filed. s/McGehee, Esq.
12/15/06 Plaintiffs' Amended Brief in Support of Petition, filed. s/McGehee, Esq.
12/20/06 Respondent Maine Land Use Regulation Commission's Motion for Enlargement
of Time in Which to File Brief, filed. s/Harnish, AAG
Proposed Order. filed.
1/5/07 ThirdiParty-in-Interest Bayroot, LLC's Motion for Enlargement of Time in
Which to File Brief, filed. s/Ferdinand, Jr., Esq.
Proposed Order, filed.
1/22/07 ORDER GRANTING ENLARGEMENT, Studstrup, J.
Bayroot LLC may file its brief on or before January 26, 2007.
Copies mailed to attys of record.
1/22/07 ORDER GRANTING ENLARGEMENT OF TIME. Studstrup, J.
Maine Land Use Regulation Commission may file its brief on or before
January 26, 2007.
Copies mailed to attys of record.
1/26/07 Brief of Respondent Maine Lane Use Regulation Commission, filed. s/Pidot,AA
Brief of Bayroot, LLC Third Party in Interest, filed. s/Ferdinand, Jr., Esq
No:;ce 01 sc~;,ng tor__ ~ Iq ) () 1 .
sent to attorneys of record.
Date of
Entry Docket No.
2/12/07 Petitioners' Brief In Reply To Bayroot's Rule BOC Brief, filed.
s/McGehee, Esq.
Petitioners' Reply To Maine Land Use Regulation Commission's Rule 80C
Brief, filed. s/McGehee, Esq.
7/12/07 DECISION AND ORDER, Marden, J. (6/29/07)
the petition to vacate LURC's September 6, 2006 decision regarding
Bayroot's application to amend SP-S is GRANTED;this matter is REMANDED
to LURC for further proceedings consistent with this decision and order.
Copies mailed to attys. of record.
Copies mailed to Donald Goss, Garbrecht Law Library and Deborah Firestone.