The opinion
STATE OF MAINE SUPERIOR COURT
CIVIL ACTION
KENNEBEC, ss. DOCKET NO. CV-06-305
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LAPOSA PROPERTY OWNERS ASSN.,
Plaintiff
v. D DECISION AND ORDER'
ONALD l. GARBREC
LINDA TODEY, !,A\N LnV'ARV HT
Defendant JAN 2 4 2008
This case is before the court on cross-motions for summary judgment.
Defendant owns property and lives1 in the La Posa subdivision in Mount Vernon. She
rents units on Lot # 6 of the subdivision on a weekly, monthly and yearly basis. The
units that defendant rents out were constructed prior to 1974, have been rented each
summer since 1974, and do not have insulation allowing for long-term winter rental.
Defendant has advertised rentals of the property in question as a destination for
country vacations, romantic weekend getaways, rental by groups of families or friends
and has highlighted in advertisements use of the property's suites and cabins?
Defendant acquired the property with a restriction in her deed reading:
1 There is no clear evidence on the subject but the court infers from all the agreed facts that defendant
resides on lot #7 of the subdivision.
2 Plaintiff objects to 12-15 of defendant's Opposition to Plaintiff's Statement of Additional of Material
Facts, because in qualifying the facts outlined in the above sentence, defendant did not cite to the record.
M.R. Civ. P. 56(h)(4) provides that "[t]he court may disregard any statement of fact not supported by a
specific citation to record material properly considered on summary judgment. The court shall have no
independent duty to search or consider any part of the record not specifically referenced in the parties'
separate statements of fact." There is no need for a separate ruling on a separate motion, because as the
Advisory Committee Notes in the most recent publication of Maine's Rules of Civil Procedure note:
The purpose of these amendments is to make Rule 56 more uniform and efficient, in
particular to eliminate the practice of filing motions to strike in order to raise or preserve
objections to factual assertions contained in statements of material facts filed in
connection with motions for summary judgment. This practice has led to a situation
where motions for summary judgment, which are often complicated enough in their own
right have spawned multiple subsidiary motions and needless additional filings in the
form of motions to strike and objections thereto.
2
Each numbered lot shall be used or occupied solely for single-family
residential purposes, excepting structures on lot #6 on said Plan existing
prior to 1974, which structures may be used for multi-family residential
purposes but not to exceed six (6) units on said lot #6. No trade, business
or commercial activity of any nature whatsoever shall be conducted on
any numbered lot, provided, however, that this restriction shall not be
construed to prevent the rental of any dwelling but solely for private
residential purposes.
Both parties have filed summary judgment motions arguing that the above deed
is unambiguous and should be construed as a matter of law in their favor.
[A]lthough summary judgment is no longer an extreme remedy, it is not a
substitute for trial. It is, at base, "simply a procedural device for obtaining
judicial resolution of those matters that may be decided without fact
finding." If facts material to the resolution of the matter have been
properly placed in dispute, summary judgment based on those facts is not
available except in those instances where the facts properly proffered
would be flatly insufficient to support a judgment in favor of the
nonmoving party as a matter of law.
Arrow Fastener Co., Inc. v. Wrabacon, Inc., 2007 ME 34, <JI 18, 917 A.2d 123, 127
(quoting Curtis v. Porter, 2001 ME 158, <JI 7,784 A.2d 18, 21-22).
This case turns on the interpretation of a restrictive covenant in a deed.
Particularly important is interpretation of the language limiting rentals of the subject
property to those for "private residential purposes." Construction of a deed is a
question of law. N. Sebago Shores, LLC v. Mazzaglia, 2007 ME 81, <JI 13, 926 A.2d 728, 733.
This court must, "first attempt to construe the language...by looking only within the
'four corners' of the instrument." Id. (quoting Pettee v. Young, 2001 ME 156, <JI 8, 783
A.2d 637, 640). In evaluating the language of the deed, this court "should give effect to
the common everyday meaning of the words in the instrument." Id. While restrictive
covenants should be narrowly construed, this does not mean that they should be
Though there is no motion to strike here, it is unnecessary for the plaintiff to file a separate objection,
defendant's qualifications are (in addition to lacking proper record citation) not discussions of material
facts, rather legal conclusions as to the relevance of those facts asserted by plaintiff. The court has simply
accepted the material facts outlined by the plaintiff as undisputed.
3
limited if the language is unambiguous. See Green v. Lawrence, 2005 ME 90, <J[ 8, 877
A.2d 1081, 1082 (citing Naiman v. Bilodeau, 225 A.2d 758, 759 (Me. 1967». "If the deed is
unambiguous, the court must construe the deed without considering extrinsic evidence;
if the deed is ambiguous, however, the court may admit extrinsic evidence of the
parties' intent." Id. The question of the parties' intent is a factual one ambiguity thus
creates a genuine issue of material fact as to the parties' intent which this court should
not answer on summary judgment. See Forrest Assocs. v. Passamaquoddy Tribe, 2000 ME
195, <J[ 9, 760 A.2d 1041, 1044; see also Spottiswoode v. Levine, 1999 ME 79, <J[ IS, 730 A.2d
166, 172; see also Van Vorhees v. Dodge, 679 A.2d 1077, 1080 (Me. 1996); see also June Roberts
Agency, Inc. v. Venture Props., Inc., 676 A.2d 46, 48 (Me. 1996). Thus whether summary
judgment is appropriate here for either party depends on whether the language is
ambiguous. Ambiguity exists when the language "is reasonably susceptible to more
than one interpretation." Madore v. Kennebec Heights Country Club, 2007 ME 92, <J[ 7, 926
A.2d 1180.
Predictably, the question of construction becomes a battle of dictionary
definitions. The defendant cites Merriam-Webster's Online Dictionary
(http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary) to define residential as "used as a
residence by residents"; "of or relating to residence or residents"; "provided to patients
residing in a facility"; "used or designed for residence or limited to residences, a
residential hotel; a residential quarter, a residential college."3
The plaintiff on the other hand provides a definition of "residence" from the
same source, "the act of dwelling in a place for some time; the act or fact of living
regularly staying at or in some place for the discharge of a duty or the enjoyment of a
3 The defendant also stresses the determination of Mount Vernon's CEO and the Mount Vernon land use
ordinance's definition of residential. However, this is extrinsic evidence not permissible in the initial
determination of whether the language is ambiguous.
4
benefit; the place where one actually lives as distinguished from one's domicile or a
place of temporary sojourn."
Defendant correctly notes that plaintiff chooses to define the term "residence"
rather than "residential" which is the term used in the deed. This is a distinction with
some meaning The noun "residence" carries with it legal concepts not present in the
adjective, "residential." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1310 (7th ed. 1999) defines
"residence: The act or fact of living in a given place for some time; the place where one
actually lives, as distinguished from a domicile; the place where a corporation or other
enterprise does business or is registered to do business; a house or other fixed abode."
This comports with the statutory definitions offered by the plaintiff of "resident" and
"residence.,,4 Unlike "residence", BLACK'S contains no definition for the adjective
"residential." The question then is whether "residential" contains the same durational
significance as "residence." The defendant notes that the Webster's definition of
"residential" includes reference to a "residential hotel." The accommodations of a
"residential hotel" are more like an apartment or a "residence" than a normal hotel,
however conceptually it is similar in that the stay of an individual in such
accommodations is not necessarily longer than in a normal hotel. s
The plaintiff points the court in the direction of North Yarmouth v. West Gardiner,
58 Me. 207, 210 (Me. 1870) for a support of its durational definition of "residence."
Again however this deals with "residence" rather than "residential." "In the same case,
as in numerous others, it is held that to establish a 'residence' within the meaning of the
4 See 36 M.R.S.A. § 5102(5) (tax code definition of "resident individual") and 21-A M.R.S.A. 112 (election
law definition of "residence for voting purposes").
5 Thou h such accommodations are advertised for "extended stay" customers. See
htt: www.marriott.co.uk Channels lobalSites findRese ve brands marriottExecutiveA artments.
mi?country=UK;
5
statute, there must be 'personal presence without any present intention to depart.'" Id.
(quoting Turner v. Buckfield, 3 Me. 229 (Me. 1824)).
The plaintiff also cites a decision of the Texas Appellate Court, enforcing a
restriction that "No lot shall be used except for single-family residence purposes" to
prohibit "renting for a period of less than ninety days and prohibits renting to anyone
other than a single family." Benard v. Humble, 990 S.W.2d 929, 930 (Tex. App. 1999).
Defendant notes two distinctions, the inclusion in the Benard restriction of "single
family" and its use of "residence" rather than "residential." While these distinctions are
meaningful, there are some other fundamental differences that make this case of no
value in drawing the parallel plaintiff seeks. The presence of Tex. Prop. Code Ann.
202.003(a) required the court to include in the "judicial toning" of "strictly constru[ing]"
a restrictive covenant against the party seeking to enforce it the "strong but clear
statutory language of § 202.003(a)" intending that "restrictive covenants be construed in
a manner which may occasionally run hard afoul of strict common law requirements."
Plaintiff further cites a Michigan case, O'Connor v. Resort Custom Builders, Inc., 591
N.W.2d 216 (Mich. 1999) which, plaintiff claims, held that a deed restricting use to
residential purposes prohibited time shares or interval ownership because the time
period of buyer's occupancy was too temporary to fit the definition of residence. This
6In fact, the Lone Star State's anomalous statute created the result in Berner in conflict with the decision
that would have been made in the absence of the statute:
The present case is a prime example of the dilemma: The deed restrictions in question do
not explicitly contain language covering temporary renting of property. Were we to give
construction against the drafter of the covenant, we would be required to reverse the trial
court's judgment. However, understanding the mandate of §200.003(a), and paragraph
II, § 1 of the deed restrictions, which provides that, "No lot shall be used except for
single-family residence purposes," we must attempt to give purpose to the intended
meaning of "single-family residence purposes."
Berner, 990 S.W.2d at 931.
6
case is readily distinguishable in that its holding was limited to the feature of multiple
ownership uniquely common to time-shares. The Michigan Supreme Court adopted
the reasoning of the circuit court. Essential in its determination was that the restriction
to residential use had not been waived by short-term rentals because in the context of
short term rentals "there remains a single known owner in a rental whom neighboring
property owners can contact if a renter causes a problem." Thus, O'Connor assists the
defendant in this case much more than it does the plaintiff. Further, the Michigan
Supreme Court stated:
With regard to whether plaintiffs waived the use restriction by allowing
short-term rentals, we agree with the circuit court that such an alternative
use is different in character and does not amount to a waiver of
enforcement against interval ownership. Further defendants have not
demonstrated that the occasional rentals have altered the character of the
Valley View subdivision to an extent that would defeat the original
purpose of the restrictions?
Id., 591 N.W.2d 216, 459 Mich. 335, 346.
While plaintiff provided the court a great deal of out of jurisdiction authority, it
did not provide a case that this court finds particularly persuasive. The Court of
Appeals of Maryland dealt with the question "whether a restrictive covenant, which
requires that building lots ...be used for 'single family residential purposes only,'
prohibits the owners on those lots from renting their homes to residential tenants on a
short term basis." Lowden v. Bosley, 909 A.2d 261, 262 (Md. 2006). The Court held that
"the restrictive covenant is unambiguous and that it does not prohibit the short-term
rental to a single family of a home." Id. 8 Notably, the Lowden covenant was more
7 In this regard, it seems that the requirement of permanence of "residential purpose" is attributed to the
primary owner, thus the language utilized by the court in characterizing "residence" applies to a primary
owner who in their permanent" residential purposes" is allowed to make short-term rentals. See id. at 345.
8 The trial court had denied cross-motions for summary judgment because it found the restriction
ambiguous. The Court of Appeals agreed with the court's ultimate conclusion that the restriction did not
apply to short-term rentals, however found that the restriction "on its face does not prohibit the short
7
restrictive than the one In question here, as the covenant here excepts Lot #6 from
"single-family" restrictions and explicitly states that its "business or commercial
activity" restriction "shall not be construed to prevent the rental of any dwelling but
solely for private residential purposes."9 The court in Lowden stated "[i]n the present
case, there is no prohibition on any business or commercial use or benefit. If there were
such an express prohibition, our analysis would be different or the Declaration might be
ambiguous." Id. at 268. An exception for business and commercial use does exist here,
but the prohibition on "business or commercial activity ... shall not be construed to
prevent the rental of any dwelling but solely for private residential purposes"; thus the
exception that exists here is similar to that of Lowden and "as long as a tenant's use of a
home.. .is residential, a commercial benefit accruing to the landlord-owner is not
prohibited." Id. And as the Court emphatically put it, "[t]o reiterate, there is no
inherent inconsistency between a residential use by a tenant and a commercial benefit
for the landlord." Id. Additionally, the covenant makes a clear exception for some form
of rental, as in Lowden "there is utterly nothing in the language of the [covenant] which
provides any basis for drawing a distinction between long-term rentals and short-term
rentals." ld. at 268. The Court's logic on this matter is convincing, "at what point does
term rental of a defendant's home to a single family which resides in the home. Unlike the Circuit Court,
we find no ambiguity with respect to this issue. Consequently, we have no occasion to consider extrinsic
evidence relating to intent." [d. at 266.
9 In fact, the Court found that if the rentals were excluded it would not be because of the term
"residential" but because of "single-family"
"Residential use," without more, has been consistently interpreted as meaning that the
use of the property is for living purposes, or a dwelling, or a place of abode. The word
"residential" has been applied to apartment buildings, fraternity houses, hotels, and bed
and-breakfasts, because such structures are used for habitation purposes. The transitory
nature of such use does not defeat the residential status. What may exclude fraternity
houses, hotels, motels, boarding houses, and bed and breakfasts under [the restrictive
covenant] is not the "residential purposes" language of [the restrictive covenant]; instead,
if they are excluded, it would be the "single family" language of [the restrictive covenant]
which would accomplish such result.
[d. (citations omitted).
8
the rental of a home move from short-term to long-term: a week? a month? a season?
three months? six months? one year? or several years?" [d. lO
The one fathomable distinction between this case and Lowden is the use of the
modifier "private" before "residential purposes." Plaintiff provides a definition of the
modifying term, "private: belonging to or concerning an individual person, company,
or interest (a private house) ... "11 Plaintiff contrasts private with its antonym "public:
exposed to general view; of, relating to, or affecting all the people or the whole area of a
nation or state; of or relating to business or community interests as opposed to private
affairs; and accessible to or shared by all members of the community."12
The defendant raises an important question with regards to the publici private
distinction. She claims that regardless of her advertising to the general public, it is not a
place of public accommodation because she screens her tenants. 13 Nothing indicates
that "private" precludes rental to short or long term tenants. This court cannot give
significance to the term "private" in a linguistic vacuum. The deed was crafted to have
a very clear provision providing for the existence of rentals on Lot #6 in contemplation
. of the deed's general restriction on commercial activity. That the whole of the deed
unambiguously expresses this purpose obviates the plaintiff's rigid interpretation of
10 Two more cases from other jurisdictions are cited in Lowden, Pinehaven Planning Board v. Brooks, 70 P.3d
664 (Idaho 2003) and Mullin v. Silvercreek Condominium Owners Assoc., 195 S.W.3d 484 (Mo. 2006). In
Pinehaven, the covenant limited use to "residential use" and prohibited "commercial or business venture
uses", nevertheless the Idaho Supreme Court held that, "as a matter of law, the covenants are
unambiguous and clearly allow the rental of residential property for profit." Pinehaven, 70 P.3d at 667. In
Mullin, the Missouri Supreme Court held that a similar covenant clearly and unambiguously did not
prohibit nightly rentals and opined on the meaning of "residential purposes":
[O]ne in which people reside or dwell or which they make homes ...Stated another way,
the unit owners' use of their units and restricted common elements must be for the
purpose of residing or dwelling there, or in a manner making the realty home.
Mullin, 195 S.W.3d at 490 (emphasis added).
11 http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary I public.
12 [d.
13 Plaintiff takes issue with the word tenant because it implies a legal relationship which it argues does
not here exist, though the use of the term tenant seems appropriate with reference to short or long-term
rentals. See Generally Lowden v. Bosley, 909 A.2d 261, 262 (Md. 2006)
9
"private" which would seemingly preclude use of Lot #6 by anyone other than the
defendant herself. Additionally, plaintiff's interpretation of the word "private" seems
to give it the effect of modifying the noun "purposes." However, that would assume
that "private" and "residential" are coordinate adjectives. Coordinate adjectives
however are to be separated by a comma or a conjunction. 14 Thus, grammatically the
order of the words is important and essentially it is the "residential purpose" and not
the "purpose" itself that must be private. See Primary Children's Hospital v. Dep't. of
Health, 993 P.2d 882, 886 n. 3 (Utah Ct. App. 1999) (quoting Chicago Manual of Style § 5.51
(14th ed. 1993». Given the entire text of the restrictive covenant and persuasive
authority cited in the discussion above, this court does not interpret "residential
purpose" to contain the durational component which would distinguish between short
and long term rentals as sought by the plaintiff. Nothing about that "residential
purpose" being "private" adds a time component to this clause which clearly and
unambiguously allows the holder of the deed to rent the unit. The restrictive covenant
is unambiguous and does not prohibit the plaintiff's short-term rentals of her property.
The entry is:
Defendant's motion for summary judgment is GRANTED;
judgment for defendant; plaintiff's motion for summary judgment is
DENIED.
Dated: December to 2007
Donald H. Marden
Justice, Superior Court
14 For example, they would be coordinate and thus both modify "purposes," if the phrase was worded
"private and residential purposes" or "private, residential purposes."
LA POSA PROPERTY OWNERS ASSN - PLAINTIFF SUPERIOR COURT
HERMAN MATTHIJSSEN, PRES 60 LA POSA DRIVE KENNEBEC, ss.
MT VERNON ME 04352 Docket No AUGSC-CV-2006-00305
Attorney for: LA POSA PROPERTY OWNERS ASSN
DANIEL W MARRA - RETAINED 12/04/2006
MARDEN DUBORD ET AL DOCKET RECORD
44 ELM STREET
PO BOX 708
WATERVILLE ME 04901-0708
vs
LINDA TODEY - DEFENDANT
PO BOX 3,
MOUNT VERNON ME 04352
Attorney for: LINDA TODEY
BRIAN D CONDON JR - RETAINED
LAW OFFICE OF BRIAN D CONDON
126 MAIN STREET
PO BOX 169
WINTHROP ME 04364
Filing Document: COMPLAINT Minor Case Type: DECLARATORY JUDGMENT
Filing Date: 12/04/2006
Docket Events:
12/04/2006 FILING DOCUMENT - COMPLAINT FILED ON 12/04/2006
12/04/2006 Party(s): LA POSA PROPERTY OWNERS ASSN
ATTORNEY - RETAINED ENTERED ON 12/04/2006
Plaintiff's Attorney: DANIEL W MARRA
12/04/2006 CERTIFY/NOTIFICATION - CASE FILE NOTICE SENT ON 12/04/2006
12/07/2006 party(s): LINDA TODEY
RESPONSIVE PLEADING - ANSWER FILED ON 12/06/2006
Defendant's Attorney: BRIAN D CONDON JR
12/07/2006 Party(s): LINDA TODEY
ATTORNEY - RETAINED ENTERED ON 12/06/2006
Defendant's Attorney: BRIAN D CONDON JR
12/18/2006 Party{s): LINDA TODEY
SUMMONS/SERVICE - ACK OF RECEIPT OF SUMM/COMP SERVED ON 11/28/2006
Defendant's Attorney: BRIAN D CONDON JR
BRIAN D. CONDON, ESQ. FOR LINDA TODEY
01/05/2007 ORDER - SCHEDULING ORDER ENTERED ON 01/05/2007
DONALD H MARDEN , JUSTICE
ORDERED INCORPORATED BY REFERENCE AT THE SPECIFIC DIRECTION OF THE COURT. COPIES TO
PARTIES/COUNSEL
01/05/2007 DISCOVERY FILING - DISCOVERY DEADLINE ENTERED ON 09/05/2007
01/05/2007 ASSIGNMENT - SINGLE JUDGE/JUSTICE ASSIGNED TO JUSTICE ON 01/05/2007
Page 1 of 3 Printed on: 12/10/2007
AUGSC-CV-2006-00305
DOCKET RECORD
DONALD H MARDEN , JUSTICE
08/31/2007 Party(s): LINDA TODEY
MOTION - MOTION SUMMARY JUDGMENT FILED ON 08/30/2007
Defendant's Attorney: BRIAN D CONDON JR
STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS, AFFIDAVIT OF LINDA TODEY AND RICHARD MARBLE, FILED.
09/24/2007 Party(s): LA POSA PROPERTY OWNERS ASSN
MOTION - MOTION FOR ENLARGEMENT OF TIME FILED ON 09/21/2007
Plaintiff's Attorney: DANIEL W MARRA
FOR RESPONSE TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
09/28/2007 Party(s): LA POSA PROPERTY OWNERS ASSN
MOTION - MOTION SUMMARY JUDGMENT FILED ON 09/28/2007
Plaintiff's Attorney: DANIEL W MARRA
WITH MEMORANDUM OF LAW, DRAFT ORDER, NOTICE OF HEARING
09/28/2007 Party(s): LA POSA PROPERTY OWNERS ASSN
OTHER FILING - OPPOSING MEMORANDUM FILED ON 09/28/2007
Plaintiff's Attorney: DANIEL W MARRA
PLT'S OBJECTION TO DEF. MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT & MEMORANDUM OF LAW
10/02/2007 Party(s): LA POSA PROPERTY OWNERS ASSN
MOTION - MOTION FOR ENLARGEMENT OF TIME GRANTED ON 09/28/2007
COPIES TO PARTIES/COUNSEL HAS TIL OCTOBER
9, 2007
10/19/2007 Party(s): LINDA TODEY
OTHER FILING - OPPOSING MEMORANDUM FILED ON 10/19/2007
Defendant's Attorney: BRIAN D CONDON JR
DEFENDANT OPPOSITION TO PLT MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT DEFENDANT
OPPOSING STATMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS TO PLT ADDITIONS 11/9/07 - DEFT'S REVISED
OPPOSING STATMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS TO PLTF'S ADDITIONS.
10/19/2007 party(s): LINDA TODEY
OTHER FILING - AFFIDAVIT FILED ON 10/19/2007
Defendant's Attorney: BRIAN D CONDON JR
SECOND AFFIDAVIT OF LINDA TODEY
10/29/2007 party(s): LA POSA PROPERTY OWNERS ASSN
OTHER FILING - OPPOSING MEMORANDUM FILED ON 10/26/2007
Plaintiff's Attorney: DANIEL W MARRA
TO DEFENDANT'S OPPOSING STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS TO PLAINTIFF'S ADDITIONS.
11/05/2007 HEARING - MOTION SUMMARY JUDGMENT SCHEDULED FOR 12/04/2007 @ 1:00 in Room No. 1
DONALD H MARDEN , JUSTICE
11/16/2007 Party(s): LA POSA PROPERTY OWNERS ASSN
OTHER FILING - OPPOSING MEMORANDUM FILED ON 11/15/2007
Plaintiff's Attorney: DANIEL W MARRA
PLTF'S OBJECTION TO DEFT'S REVISSED OPPOSING STMT OF MATERIAL FACTS
12/04/2007 HEARING - MOTION SUMMARY JUDGMENT HELD ON 12/04/2007
Page 2 of 3 Printed on: 12/10/2007
AUGSC-CV-2006-00305
DOCKET RECORD
DONALD H MARDEN , JUSTICE
Defendant's Attorney: BRIAN D CONDON JR
Plaintiff's Attorney: DANIEL W MARRA
ORAL ARGUMENTS MADE TO THE COURT. COURT TO TAKE MATTER UNDER ADVISEMENT.
12/04/2007 Party(s): LA POSA PROPERTY OWNERS ASSN
MOTION - MOTION SUMMARY JUDGMENT UNDER ADVISEMENT ON 12/04/2007
DONALD H MARDEN , JUSTICE
12/10/2007 FINDING - JUDGMENT DETERMINATION ENTERED ON 12/10/2007
DONALD H MARDEN , JUSTICE
ORDERED INCORPORATED BY REFERENCE AT THE SPECIFIC DIRECTION OF THE COURT. COPIES TO
PARTIES/COUNSEL
ORDER - SUMMARY JUDGMENT ENTERED ON 12/10/2007
DONALD H MARDEN , JUSTICE
ORDERED INCORPORATED BY REFERENCE AT THE SPECIFIC DIRECTION OF THE COURT. COPIES TO
PARTIES/COUNSEL
Judgment entered for LINDA TODEY and against LA POSA PROPERTY OWNERS ASSN.
12/10/2007 FINDING - FINAL JUDGMENT CASE CLOSED ON 12/10/2007
12/10/2007 party(s): LA POSA PROPERTY OWNERS ASSN
MOTION - MOTION SUMMARY JUDGMENT GRANTED ON 12/10/2007
DONALD H MARDEN , JUSTICE
COPIES TO PARTIES/COUNSEL
12/10/2007 Party(s): LINDA TODEY
MOTION - MOTION SUMMARY JUDGMENT GRANTED ON 12/10/2007
DONALD H MARDEN , JUSTICE
COPIES TO PARTIES/COUNSEL
A TRUE COPY
ATTEST:
Clerk
page 3 of 3 Printed on: 12/10/2007