Maine Automobile Dealers v. State of Maine and Dirigo Health Agency

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CIVIL ACTION

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DOCKET NO: AP-05-090,

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MAINE ASSOC. of HEALTH PLANS,

MAINE AUTOMOBILE DEALERS,

and MAINE STATE CHAMBER OF COMMERCE,

Petitioners

ORDER ON

80C APPEAL

STATE OF MAINE, and

DIRIGO HEALTH AGENCY,

Respondents

This case comes before the Court on Petitioners' 80C appeal of a decision

of the Superintendent of Insurance that $43.7 million dollars of "aggregate

measurable cost savings" determined by the Board of Directors of Dirigo Health

Agency is reasonably supported by the record evidence pursuant to 24-A

M.R.S.A. 6913.

BACKGROUND

The Dirigo Health Act established the Dirigo Health Agency (the

"Agency") as an independent executive agency of the State of Maine to arrange

for the provision of comprehensive, affordable health care coverage to eligible

small employers, including the self-employed, their employees and dependents.

24-A M.R.S.A. § 6902. The Health Reform Act established a Board of Directors

(the "Board") to oversee the work of the Agency. 24-A M.R.S.A. 5 6904.

An essential component of the Act is the provision of subsidies for the

purchase of Dirigo Health Insurance coverage by low-income individuals and

employees. 24-A M.R.S.A. 5 6912.' These subsidies are funded by savings offset

payments made by health insurance carriers, employee excess benefit insurance

carriers, and 3rdparty administrators. 24-A M.R.S.A. $j6913(2). The Act aims to

benefit member carriers by increasing the number of Maine people covered by

Dirigo Health Insurance, which in turn provides cost savings to member carriers.

Member carriers are encouraged to recover further cost savings through

negotiation of reimbursement rates with health care providers. 24-A M.R.S.A. 5

In order to provide subsidies to the target population, the Board is

charged with collecting savings offset payments from its member health

insurance carriers. 24-A M.R.S.A. 5 6913(3)(A). The first step in establishing the

savings offset amount is the determination of "aggregate measurable cost

savings" ("AMCS") pursuant to 24-A M.R.S.A. § 6913(1)(A). The Act requires the

Board to determine the "aggregate measurable cost savings, including any

reduction or avoidance of bad debt and charity care costs to health care

providers in t h s state as a result of the operation of Dirigo Health and any

increased MaineCare enrollment due to an expansion in MaineCare eligibility

occurring after June 30, 2004." 24-A M.R.S.A. 5 6913(1)(A).

1

24-A M.R.S.A. 5 6912 provides:

Dirigo Health may establish sliding-scale subsidies for the purchase of Dirigo Health

Program coverage paid by eligible individuals or employees whose income is under

300% of the federal poverty level. Dirigo Health may also establish sliding-scale subsidies

for the purchase of employer-sponsored health coverage paid by employees of

businesses with more than 50 employees, whose income is under 300% of the federal

poverty level.

The procedure for determining AMCS in the first year of savings offset

payments is as follows: The Superintendent of Insurance must convene a

working group to advise the Board on a number of issues. P.L. 2005, ch. 400, §

B-1. The working group includes 5 members representing the interests of

insurers, self-insured entities and Yd party administrators, and 5 members

representing the Agency. The working group is commissioned to make a

recommendation on the definition of paid claims and a recommendation on the

methodology for calculating AMCS. The Board must then file with the

Superintendent its calculation of AMCS no later than September 17, 2005. P.L.

2005, ch. 400, § 8-2. The Superintendent must issue an order approving, in

whole or in part, or disapproving the filing made by the Board with regard to

AMCS. 24-A M.R.S.A. 5 6913(1)(C). The filing is to be approved if the

Superintendent determines that the AMCS filed by the Board are reasonably

supported by the evidence in the record. P.L. 2005, ch. 400, § B-2(B); 24-A

M.R.S.A. 5 6913(1)(C).

The Act limits the savings offset amount in that it may not exceed the

calculated AMCS, is limited to the amount of funds necessary to provide

subsidies, and may not include general administrative expenses, except for

general administrative expenses of the Maine Quality Forum. 24-A M.R.S.A. §

6913(2)(C),(D).The Act contains other limitations on the calculations of savings

offset payments for each category of member^.^

24-A M.R.S.A. § 6913(3)(B),(C) provides as follows:

B. Maximum savings offset payments are as follows:

(1)For health insurance carriers, the savings offset payment may not exceed 4.0% of

annual paid claims for health care on policies issued pursuant to the laws of this

State that insure residents of this State;

After many meetings with the working group to establish the

methodology for calculating AMCS, the Board determined that AMCS comprise

five categories of savings initiatives: hospital savings, uninsured savings, health

care provider fee savings, certificate of need and capital investment fund savings,

and insurance carrier savinp3 The Board reported its finding to the

Superintendent on September 19, 2005. The Superintendent then conducted a

public hearing to determine whether the AMCS determined by the Board were

reasonably supported by the evidence. 24-A M.R.S.A. § 6913(1)(C).

After hearing, the Superintendent approved the Dirigo filing in part. He

disapproved completely the amounts calculated for the certificate of need and

capital investment savings, and the insurance carrier savings. He ultimately

reduced the AMCS calculated by the Board from $136.8 million to $43.7 million.

T h s appeal followed.

DISCUSSION

(2) For 3rd-party administrators, the savings offset payment may not exceed 4.0% of

annual paid claims for health care for residents of this State; and

(3) For employee benefit excess insurance carriers, the savings offset payment may

not exceed 4.0% of annual paid claims on employee benefit excess insurance

policies, as defined in section 707, subsection 1, paragraph C-1, issued pursuant to

the laws of this State that insure residents of this State.

C. A health insurance and employee benefit excess insurance carrier may not be required

to pay a savings offset payment on policies or contracts insuring federal employees.

3

The Board determined that hospital savings initiatives encompass consolidated operating

margins ("COM") and c'ost per case-mix adjusted discharge ("CMAD"); uninsured savings

initiatives encompass the reduction of uninsured bad debt and charity care, and the woodwork

effect; health care provdi-ves encompass hospital fee initiatives and physician

fee initiatives; certificate of need and capital investment fund savin s initiatives encompass

certificate of need ("CON") moratorium and capital investment fund ("CIF"); and insurance

carrier s a v i n ~ initiatives,

s encompass voluntary underwriting gain ("VUG) limitation.

First, Petitioners argue that the Dirigo Health Act is unconstitutional in

that it is void for vagueness and improperly delegates the taxing powers of the

Legislature. Second, Petitioners argue that the methodology adopted by the

Board to calculate AMCS is flawed and the record evidence does not reasonably

support the Superintendent's decision.

a. The Constitutionalitv of the Dirigo Health Act

A strong presumption of constitutionality attaches to all statutes, which

will be construed,,where possible, to preserve their constitutionality. Maine Milk

Producers, Inc. v. Commissioner of Agriculture, Food and Rural Resources, 483 A.2d

1213, 1218 (Me. 1984). Any party attaclung the constitutionality of a state statute

thus carries a heavy burden of persuasion. Id. In order to prevail here,

Petitioners must prove that no logical construction can be given to the words of

the Dirigo Health Act that will make it constitutional.

1. Void for Vaeueness

Petitioners assert that the Act is void for vagueness because it provides no

standards to guide the Board in its calculation of AMCS. In response,

Respondents assert that Petitioners did not preserve the void for vagueness issue

because they did not raise it before the Superintendent. Next, Respondents

contend that the fact that the standards for calculating AMCS may not be precise

does not render the Act vague. See Maine Milk Producers, 483 A.2d at 1221 (the

mere fact that the Legislature has not spoken "in precise and pellucid language,

failure to meet this Olympian standard" does not render it void for vagueness).

"An issue raised for the first time at the appellate stage will be denied

cognizance in the appellate review of the case. This rule is controlling even

when, as here, the belatedly raised issues allege constitutional violations."

Oronoka Restaurant, Znc. v. Maine State Liquor Com., 532 A.2d 1043, 1045 (Me. 1987)

(quoting Maine Real Estate Commission v. Kelby, 360 A.2d 528, 530 (Me. 1976)).

At hearing before this Court, Petitioners admitted that they did not raise

the void for vagueness argument before the Superintendent. Accordingly, they

are barred from raising it here before the Superior CourL4

2. Unconstitutional Delepation of the Taxing Powers

Petitioners argue that the savings offset payment calculation in the Act is

an unconstitutional delegation of the taxing powers of the Leg~slature.~

Article IX, section 9 of the Maine Constitution states that "the legislature

shall never, in any manner, suspend or surrender the power of taxation." That

language creates a "strong and sweeping prohibition" against delegation of the

legislature's power to tax. Maine Milk Producers, 483 A.2d at 1220. The test for

whether an assessment is a tax rather than a license fee is whether it is primarily

intended to raise revenue rather than to cover costs of administering a program

under the police power of government. Id. at 1218; Board of Overseers of the Bar v.

Lee, 422 A.2d 998,1004 (Me. 1980).

In Maine Milk Producers, the Law Court found in that payments made into

4

However, even if this argument were preserved for appeal, the Court finds that the

statute 24-A M.R.S.A. § 6913 is not void for vagueness. The Board was charged with determining

AMCS as a result of the operation of Dirigo Health. Although, the legislative scheme is complex,

a person of general intelligence would understand that a number of factors determine these kind

of savings, such as hospital savings, uninsured savings, health care provider fee savings,

certificate of need and capital investment fund savings, and insurance carrier savings. See Maine

Milk Producers, 483 A.2d at 1220 (A statute is void for vagueness only when "it sets guidelines

which would force men of general intelligence to guess at its meaning, leaving them without

assurance that their behavior complies with legal requirements and forcing courts to be uncertain

in their interpretation of the law.").

5

In a footnote in its Hearing Brief before the Agency, Petitioners noted a concern that the

savings offset provision may constitute a tax under Article IX of the Maine Constitution. The

Court finds that this was sufficient to preserve the issue.

the Maine Wlk Pool to carry out its redistributive function were not taxes, but

rather the mechanism for carrying out the legislature's price-fixing power over

milk produced in Maine. 483 A.2d at 1218. In the instant case, savings offset

payments are the means by whch the Legislature redistributes savings in the

health care system in order to make health insurance available to a greater

percentage of Maine citizens. Similar to the Maine Milk Pool, savings offset

payments are the mechanism created to fund the administration of the Dirigo

subsidy program. The Act specifically states that savings offset payments may

not fund general administration costs.6 As such, the savings offset payments are

appropriately characterized as costs of administering a program under the police

power of government, not a tax.

b. 80C Review of the Superintendent's Decision

Petitioners' main challenges to the Agency decision are that the

methodology adopted by the Board to calculate aggregate measurable cost

savings is flawed and the record does not reasonably support the

Superintendent's de~ision.~

6

The Court interprets these general administration costs to be more in the line of

photocopying, ordering supplies, mailing correspondence.

7

Petitioners also argue that 1) the determination of AMCS is not final agency action and

therefore not ripe for review, 2) the Agency failed to provide for a hearing as required under the

Act, and 3) the Superintendent erred in denying Petitioners' motion to dismiss based on the

Board's failure to submit the Dirigo filing to the Superintendent by September 17,2005.

First, this is final agency action. Although Petitioners are not required to contribute to

the savings offset payments until that amount is determined by the Board and reviewed by the

a

Superintendent, the determination of AMCS provides the ceiling for the savin s offset payment

amount and therefore affects the legal rights and duties of Petitioners for whic no further

recourse is provided within the Agency. See 5 M.R.S.A. 5 8002(4).

Second, 24-A M.R.S.A. 5 6913(A) provides interested parties with "an opportunity for a

hearing" on the issue of AMCS pursuant to 5 M.R.S.A. 5 9052(1). For a hearing to occur when a

statute provides "an opportunity for a hearing," as opposed to a required hearing, the Agency

must provide interested parties with advanced notice to allow the submission of evidence and a

request for a hearing if so desired. Id. In this case, interested parties were notified that the AMCS

issue was before the Board in June 2005. Pursuant to the Act, the Board was charged with

calculating AMCS to be filed with the Superintendent by September 17,2005. Although

1. Standard of Review

In review of an administrative agency decision, the Superior Court, in its

intermediate appellate capacity, will uphold the decision unless the agency has

abused its discretion, made an error of law, or its findings are not supported by

substantial evidence in the record. Thackev v. Konovev Dev. Coy., 2003 ME 30, qI

14,818 A.2d 1013 1019. Generally, interpretations of law are reviewed by the

Superior Court de novo. The Court will examine the plain meaning of the

statutory language in order to ascertain the legislative intent. Botting v. Dcp't of

Behavioral and Developmental Servs., 2003 ME 152, 99,838 A.2d 1168, 1171. In

doing so, the entire statutory scheme is considered so that a harmonious result

may be acheved. However, when a dispute involves an agency's interpretation

of a statute it administers, "the agency's interpretation, although not conclusive,

is entitled to great deference and will be upheld unless the statute plainly

compels a contrary result." Town of Eagle Lake v. Comm'r, D q t . ofEduc., 2003 ME

37, 98,818 A.2d 1034,1037. If the statute is ambiguous the Court reviews

whether the agency's construction is reasonable. Id. The Court will not "second-

guess" an agency on issues w i h n its area of expertise; rather, it reviews only to

ascertain whether its conclusions are "unreasonable, unjust, or unlawful." Id.

2. Methodology for Calculatinn AMCS

Petitioners did request a hearing, they did not do so until September 14,2005. Once notified, the

burden shifted to Petitioners to request a hearing. Although technically, Petitioners requested a

hearing, the Court finds that Petitioners failed to meet their burden. A request 3 days before the

Board was required submit its filing to the Superintendent does not allow ample time for a

hearing and the proper adjudication on the matter. Petitioners request for a hearing simply came

too late.

Third, the Act required the Board to submit its filing on AMCS on September 17,2005.

September 17,2005 happened to fall on a Saturday. As such, the Board submitted its filing to the

Superintendent the following business day, Monday September 19,2005. The Court sees no

infirmity in this.

The Act authorizes the Board of Directors of the Dirigo Health Agency to

determine the methodology for calculating AMCS. The Act does not explicitly

define AMCS. It states that the Board shall determine "the aggregate measurable

costs savings, including any reduction or avoidance of bad debt and charity care

costs to health care providers in h s State as a result of the operation of Dirigo

Health and any increased MaineCare enrollment due to the expansion of

MaineCare eligibility occurring after June 30,2004." 24-A M.R.S.A. § 6912(1)(A).

Petitioners argue that the Board erred as a matter of law by determining

that the calculation of AMCS included anything other than bad debt and charity

care costs.' A review of the statute and the legislative history does not compel

h s result. The language of the statute states that AMCS include bad debt and

charity care costs. It does not state that bad debt and charity costs are the only

costs to be factored into the AMCS determination. Rather, bad debt and charity

care costs are separated from AMCS by a comma and the word "including," thus

supporting the Board's interpretation that the Legislature contemplated other

cost savings to be factored into the AMCS determinati~n.~

Since the Court has determined that the Legislature envisioned costs other

than bad debt and charity care costs for the determination of AMCS, the next

question is whether the five categories of savings initiatives adopted by the

Board are unreasonable or are otherwise an abuse of discretion. See Town of Eagle

Lake., 2003 ME 37, '38,818 A.2d at 1037. In reviewing the overall scheme of the

8

Although Petitioners argue that the Superintendent erred as a matter of law by refusing

to review the methodology adopted by the Board to determine AMCS, it is clear under the Act

that he was not authorized to do so. Accordingly, the Court will review the methodology

adopted by the Board.

9

The legislative history, although voluminous, does not clarify this issue to the Court's

satisfaction.

Act, the initiatives adopted by the Board are either savings identified in the Act''

or flow from initiatives included in the Act.'' Whether or not they are the best

initiatives is not for the Court to decide. The Court will not second-guess the

Agency on issues within its area of expertise.12The initiatives adopted by the

Board are reasonable and are not the result of an abuse of discretion.

3. A Review of the Superintendent's Decision

After a public hearing, the Superintendent thoroughly analyzed the

evidence presented and evaluated whether the AMCS filed by the Board were

reasonably supported by the evidence in the record. Of the five savings

initiatives proffered by the Board, he found that only three were reasonably

supported by the evidence in the record: hospital savings, uninsured savings,

and health care provider fee savings. And of those three, he disapproved $41.3

million for hospital savings ($7.6 million for CMAD and $33.7 million for COM),

$3 million uninsured savings (the woodworking effect), and $15.8 million for

health care provider fee savings ($6.7 million for the time value of early

settlement payments by hospitals, $4.1 million for accelerated PIP payments, and

$5 million of increased physician payments). In all, the Superintendent found

that of the $136.8 million recommended AMCS calculated by the Board, only

Components identified in the Act are CMAD, hospital expenses per case mix adjusted

discharge; COM, hospital consolidated operating margins; health insurance carrier underwriting

gains; and growth in health care practitioner net revenue. P.L. 2003, ch. 469 § F(l)(A)-(C).

" Components that flow from the Act are time value of accelerated supplement payments

to hospitals; accelerated prospective interim payments (PIP); increased physician payments; and

moratorium on certificate of need and limits in spending set capital investment funds.

12

Although Petitioners are not required to contribute to the savings offset payments until

that number is determined by the Board and later the Superintendent, the determination of

AMCS is final agency action because the determination of AMCS provides the ceiling for the

savings offset payments.

$43.7 million was reasonably supported by the evidence in the record. The Court

finds that the Superintendent's determination is supported by substantial

evidence in the record.

The entry is:

Petitioners 80C appeal is DENIED.

The independent claims are DISMISSED.

24-A M.R.S.A. 5 6913 is Constitutional.

DATE:

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Justic ,Superior Court

Date Filed 1 1 / 7 8 / 0 5 _ _

Action 80CAPPEAL------

-

MAINE ASSOCIATION OF HEALTH PLANS

CUMBERLAND-

County

s

Docket No.

(CONS. W/AP-05-95, AP-05-96)

STATE OF MAINE (SUPERINTENDENT, BUREAU

INSURANCE, DEPT. OF PROFESSIONAL &

FINANCIAL REGULATIONS)

DIRIGO HEALTH AGENCY

VS.

Plaintiff's Attorney Defendant's Attorney

D. MICHAEL FRINK, ESQ. William H. Laubenstein, 111, AAG (Dirigo)

GEORGE M. LINGE, ESQ. 6 State House Station

PO BOX 7320 Augusta, ME 04333-0006

PORTLAND, ME 04112-7320 626-8800

774-9000 Thomas Sturtevant Jr AAG (Sup. of Ins)

WILLIAM STILES ESQ. 6 State House Station Augusa 04333

(Me. st. Chamber of Commerce) Joseph P. Ditre Esq. (Cons. for Aff. Heal

Bruce Gerrity Esq ( W A I T )

Date of Rufus Brown Esq(Cons. for Afford.

Roy Pierce Esq. ( W A I T )

Entry PO Box 7530 Health Care)

P a MF Q&&?

2005

Nov. 28 Received on 11/28/05:

Plaintiff's Petition for Review of Final Agency Action (Rule 80C) to Superi

Court filed.

Dec. 7 Received 12-7-05.

Superintendant's motion to consolidate with proposed order filed.

Dec. 8 Received on 12/08/05:

Atty. William ~aubenstein's Entry of Appearance on behalf of Dirigo Health

Agency filed.

i

Dec. 8 Received 12-8-05.

Joint stipulation specifying the future course of proceedings pursuant to

M.R.Civ.P. 80C(i) with proposed order filed.

Dec. 14 Received 12-9-05.

Order Specifying Future Course of Proceedings filed. (Cole, J.)

Pursuant to M.R.C~V.P. 79(a) this order may be incorporated by reference

into the docket.

12-14-05 copy mailed to D. Michael Frank and ~illiam~aubensteinEsqs

Dec. 16 Received 12-16-05.

Entry of appearance, statement of position and answer of respondent,

Superintendent of Insurance filed.

Dec. 19 Received 12-15-05.

The superintendent's motion is granted with the three identified actions

consolidated into one proceeding in Superior Court (Cumberland

County) Docket AP05-90. (cons. with Kennebec County Superior Court

cases AP05-74, APO-75)

12-19-05 copy mailed to D. Michael Frink, William Laubenstein 111 and

Thomas Sturtevant Jr Esqs and to Kennebec County Superior Court.

Dec. 19 Received 12/19/05:

Dirigo Health Agency's Answer to Petition for Review filed.

Date Filed 12/22/05 Docket No. AP-05-95 [~U!AP -05 -gl

County

Action C& APPEAL (FROM KENNEBEC COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT; CONSOLIDATED W/AP-05-90)

MAINE AUTOMOBILE DEALERS ASSOC. INS. TRUST SUPERINTENDENT OF INS.

BANKERS HEALTH TRUST DIRIGO HEALTH AGENCY

ANTHEM HEALTH PLANS OF MAINE (PII)

MAINE STATE CHAMBER OF COMMERCE (PII)

MAINE ASSOC. OF HEALTH PLANS (PII)

CONSUMERS FOR AFFORDABLE HEALTH CARE (I

vs.

Received on 12/22/05:

Date Filed 1 2 / 2 2 / 0 5 (ITTMAF,RT.AW

Action APPEAT. ( F R n M KENNERET:RIOR COURT ; CONSOLIDATED W/AP-05-90)

M I N E STATE CHAMBER OF COMMERCE

BUREAU OF INSURANCE

DEPARTMENT OF PROFESSIONAL AND FINANC

REGULATION

STATE OF MAINE

Plaintiff's Attorney efendant's Attorney

WILLIAM STILES, ESQ. SEPH DITRE, ESQ. (CONSUMERS)

BRETT WITHAM, ESQ. OMAS STURTEVANT, AAG (SUPERINTENDENT)

LLIAM LAUBENSTEIN, AAG (DIRIGO)

UCE GERRITY, ESQ. (ME AUTO & BANKERS TK

Y PIERCE, ESQ. (ME AUTO & BANKERS TRUST