The opinion
STATE OF MAINE SUPERIOR COURT
CIVIL ACTION
KENNEBEC, ss. DOCKET NO. AP-03-54
RICHARD T. CALCAGNI,
Plaintiff
OPINION AND ORDER
TOWN OF WINTHROP,
et al.,
Defendants , -,..
T h s matter is before the court upon plaintiff's amended complaint pursuant to
M.R. Civ. P. 80B and 14 M.R.S.A. § 6051. Plaintiff seeks a reversal of the decision of the
Town of Winthrop Planning Board of August 6, 2003, denying h s application to amend
the Vista Heights Subdivision Plan and to grant waivers of design standards in the road
and street construction ordinance and subdivision ordinance of the Town of Winthrop.
T h s case has a long and tortured history starting in 1990, when the town issued a
number of permits to the plaintiff regarding development of a lot in the town abutting
the Vista Heights Subdivision. At the time, the existing right-of-way for access to the lot
was over ground of difficult passage. Plaintiff asserts that without substantial blasting,
the access would be unsuitable for municipal vehicles and emergency vehcles to access
the building lots upon development. Accordingly, the plaintiff acquired a 50-foot right-
of-way through Vista Heights Subdivision and built a road. As a result, he built and
constructed a residential building. As plaintiff was in the process of building additional
homes in conjunction with numerous permits issued by the town, plaintiff was notified
by the code enforcement officer that the road he had built as access through the Vista
Heights Subdivision was in violation of the design standards of the road and street
construction ordinance. The Planning Board had previously ruled that the plaintiff's
road would not affect the subdivision or its approval and building permits were issued.
In 2000, the code enforcement officer for the Town of Winthrop advised the plaintiff
that the right-of-way as constructed through the Vista Heights Subdivision violated the
town's subdivision's zoning ordinance and no further building permits would be
issued. At t h s point, plaintiff filed an application with the Winthrop Planning Board
aslung for an amendment to the subdivision plan. Numerous requests were made and
additional information was provided by the plaintiff over the period of years in support
of his application. When it became evident that waivers of design standards would be
necessary in order to acheve the approval, plaintiff made the appropriate requests.
After numerous submissions without action from the Town Planning Board, and
w h l e the application was pending, the property owner in the subdivision filed an
application to amend the subdivision proposing a compromise in an attempt to satisfy
both the concerns of the owners of two lots in the subdivision and Mr. Calcagni. At the
August 6, 2003 planning board meeting, the property owners1 proposal was accepted
and the plaintiff's proposal was denied. Given h s hstory, plaintiff asserts that the
decision by the Planning Board was an abuse of its discretion, based upon an error of
law and on findings not supported by substantial evidence in the record. In addition,
plaintiff asserts that the hstory of multiple permits for the construction of homes
accessed by the road in question, should estop the town from interfering with h s use
and approval of the road and that the court should grant equitable injunctive relief in
that regard.
Another matter was presently brought before h s court on a complaint for
review of governmental action in accordance with M R .Civ. P. 80B by property owners
in the subdivision.' Plaintiffs in that case challenged the actions of the To~vnof
Winthrop arising out of the Planning Board decision and the constitutionality of the
ordinance provision itself. A decision in that companion case dated September 24,
2004, ordered that the decision of the Winthrop Planning Board regarding the
application to amend the subdivision as brought by the property owner be vacated.
It is clear from the record that in order for Mr. Calcagni's amendment to the
subdivision plan to be approved, he must receive waivers of certain design standards of
the road heretofore constructed within the 50-foot right-of-way or to be further refined.
It required waivers relating to the width of the traveled portion of the right-of-way as
well as the setback.
The road and street construction ordinance # 22 of the Town of Winthrop
provides for certain variances and waivers. ARTICLE VII; VARIANCES AND
WAIVERS, Section A.
Where the Planning Board finds extraordinary and unnecessary hardshp
may result from the strict compliance with these standards or where there
are special circumstances of a particular application, it may vary these
standards upon recommendation of the Town manager or h s agent, who
may be a professional e n p e e r , so that substantial justice may be done
and the public interest served.
Plaintiffs in the companion case argued that the language to avoid
"extraordinary and unnecessary hardships" and in "special circumstances of a
particular application" is an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority and an
unconstitutionally vague standard. In its decision of September 24, 2004, t)us court
agreed finding that w h l e there are comprehensive and specific design standards in the
ordinance, there are no standards enumerated to guide the town manager or the
planning board as to what may constitute extraordinary and unnecessary hardshp,
1
David A. Leonard, et al, v. T o w n of W i n t h r o p , et al., KENSC-AP-03-52 (Me. Super. Ct., Ken. Cty., Sept. 24,
2004) (Marden, J.).
special circumstances or, further quoting from the ordinance, variances "so that
substantial justice may be done and the public interest served." Road and Street
Construction, Ordinance # 21, ARTICLE VII.
The court stated:
The issue is not w h c h construction standards or design standards are
necessary for an acceptable road and street in the Town of Winthrop but
under what circumstances a property owner may determine that he or she
is entitled to the waiver. The lack of a standard also puts the Board's
decision-malung authority well into the zone wherein unconstiltional
legislative authority lies.
David A. Leonard, et al. v. Town of Winthrop, et al., KENSC-AP-03-52, p. 7 (Me. Super. Ct.,
Ken. Cty., Sept. 24,2004) (Marden, J.). Inasmuch as plaintiff's application to amend the
subdivision plan to allow the street or road constructed on h s right-of-way is
dependent upon the waiver article, and h s court has found that article to be
unconstiltionally vague, the decision in the companion case has essentially removed
the vehcle by w h c h Mr. Calcagni can comply with the ordinance in order to acheve
approval of h s application. Since the Planning Board did not grant the waiver and the
decision of the Planning Board is consistent with its ordinance, the plaintiff cannot
acheve relief on M.R. Civ. P. 80B grounds. Mr. Calcagni can find w i h n h s ordinance
no standard upon which he could rely in requesting the waiver except the relative
impassability of other means to access h s real estate.'
Plaintiff's alleged cause of action on grounds of estoppel must be denied as a
matter of law because estoppel is not a cause of action. "Estoppel bars the assertion of
2
In contrast, the court notes the Town of Winthrop Zoning Ordinance dated March 18, 2003, in which
section 5.8.2 establishes a Zoning Board of Appeals and language at 5.8.2.3, Powers and Duties, in
subsection 2, Variance Appeals, provisions are made for "for variances in specific cases where a
relaxation of the terms of this Ordinance would not by (sic) contrary to the public interest and where
literal enforcement of this Ordinance results in undue hardship. A financial hardship shall not constitute
grounds for granting a variance. The term 'undue hardship' shall mean:" followed by four very specific
standards of undue hardship regarding reasonable return, unique circumstances of the property,
alteration of the essential character of the locality or not the result of action taken by the prior owner.
the truth by one whose misleading conduct has induced another to act to h s detriment
in reliance on what is untrue." Anderson v. Commissioner of Department of Human
Services, 489 A.2d 1093, 1099 (Me. 1985).
It is an equitable affirmative defense that operates to absolutely preclude a
party 'from asserting rights whch might perhaps have otherwise existed,
either of property, of contract, or of remedy, as against another person
who has in good faith relied upon such conduct, and has been led thereby
to change h s position for the worse, and who on h s part acquires some
corresponding right, either of property, or contract or of remedy.
Waterville Homes, Inc. and Trafton Property, Inc. v. Maine Department of Transportation, 589
A.2d 455 (Me. 1991) (quoting Martin v. Me. Central R.R. Co., 83 Me. 100, 21 A. 740 (1890).
More particularly, equitable estoppel can be asserted against a municipality only as a
defense and "cannot be used as a weapon of assault." Waterville Homes, 589 A.2d at 457.
Concluding that the waiver provisions of the Road and Street Construction
Ordinance # 21 of the Town of Winthrop is an unconstitutional delegation of legslative
authority to the Planning Board and the Town Manager, the ordinance does not have a
valid waiver provision. This does not implicate the design standards contained therein.
Inasmuch as the decision of the Town of Winthrop Planning Board in the Calcagni
matter was based upon a denial of an application based upon a denial of a waiver, h s
court is satisfied that the decision is not an error of law and that substantial evidence on
the record exists to support the denial of plaintiff's application.
For reasons stated herein, the entry will be:
The Decision of the Town of Winthrop Planning Board dated
August 6, 2003, In re: Application to Amend Vista Heights Subdivision,
Item No. 03-10, is AFFIRMED.
Dated: May (7 , 2005 /&&--
Donald H. Marden
Justice, Superior Court
Date Filed 9/ R ~ ~ p n T l p h p - Docket No. 8 P 0 3 - 5 4
County
Action f o r Review
80B
PRO SE- Ronda Strumfeld J, MARDEN
Gregory Strumfeld
PRO SE- Joseph Remley
Deborah Remley
VS.
r d T. Calrg~ni n f Winthrno
Plaintiff's Attorney Defendant's Attorney
John S. Bobrowiecki, Jr., Esq. Christopher L. Vaniotis, Esq.
251 Water Street 100 Middle Street, West Tower
P.O. Box 120 P.O. Box 9729
Gardiner, Maine 04345-0120 Portland, Maine 04104-5029
Date of
Entry
Complaint (pursuant to Maine Rules of Civil Procedure BOB) and 14 M.R.S.A
6051, filed. s/Bobrowiecki, Jr., Esq.
Motion and Incorporated Memorandum of Lae, filed. s/Bobrowiecki, Jr., Esq.
Proposed Order, filed.
Original Summons with return service made upon Town of Winthrop on 9/3/03.
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Counts I and I1 of plaintiff's Complaint
with Incorporated Memorandum of Law, filed. s/Vaniotis, Esq.
Proposed Order, filed.
Request for Hearing, filed. s/Vaniotis, Esq.
Defendant's Memorandum in Response to plaintiff's Motion to Specify the
Future Course of Proceedings, filed. s/Vaniotis, Esq.
Defendant's Proposed Order Specifying Future Course of Proceedings, filed.
Answer of Defendant Town of Winthrop, filed. s/C. Vaniotis, Esq.
Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Counts I and I1 and Motion
for Enlargement of Time, filed. s/Bobrowiecki, Jr., Esq.
Proposed Order, filed.
Affidavit of Linda B. Pekins, filed. s/Pekins
Defendant's Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss Counts I and I1
of Plaintiff's Complaint; and
Defendant's Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Enlargement of Time, filed.
s/C. Vaniotis, Esq.
Notice of setting for r/,/25los -
I sent to attorneys of recod.
Hearing had, Hon. Donald Marden, Presiding. (No recording made)
Attorney Bobrowiecki and Ronald Schneider present. Court takes matter
under advisement.