The opinion
STATE OF MAINE SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT
DIV. OF SO. KENNEBEC
CIVIL ACTION
KENNEBEC, ss. DOCKET NO. AUG-CV-03-137
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LINDA J. VOSS, ;t
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Plaintiff
DECISION AND ORDER
WOODMASTER OF MAINE, INC., t
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Defendant
Tlus matter is before the court after bench trial. The amended complaint alleges
an agreement for defendant to install a metal roof on plaintiff's home, that certain
representations were made to plaintiff prior to entering into the agreement, that work
was performed that resulted in an entirely unsatisfactory product, and that plaintiff
paid the defendant a sum of money but she will have future expenses as a result of
defendant's conduct. She seeks damages for breach of contract, fraud, unfair trade
practice, breach of express warranty and breach of implied warranties.
The plaintiff is the owner of a home at 25 Highland Avenue in Waterville.
Having suffered ice damage to her roof in November of 2001, she and her companion
discussed with representatives of the defendant the installation of a new metal roof.
After a conversation of some two and a half to three hours, plaintiff entered into a
written contract with the defendant on the evening of November 27th. The contract
executed by the parties called for the defendant to install steel roofing, forest green in
color, and perform the following the work:
Inspect roof and renail as needed.
Strap roof with 1x 3 strapping.
Provide and install Bi-ribbed steel roofing to all sections of roof.
Includes all accessories, vented ridge cap L-bend closure strips.
25 year warranty on steel roofing.
Includes all labor, materials taxes and permits.
Any additional work requires additional work order.
Consideration for the performance was to be $7,650 with bank financing to be arranged.
The preprinted contract carries a "Buyer's Right To Cancel." T h s gave a right to
the plaintiff to cancel the contract provided the notice was mailed to the defendant
before midnight of December 14, 2001, and the address for that purpose of the
defendant was listed.
A change order was executed December 28,2001, as follows:
Terms of original contract are changed to cash with 20% down payment
$1,530 due on check out and balance of $6,120 due on completion.
During the discussions with the representatives of the defendant leading up to
the contract, the plaintiff understood from representations made that the roof would be
completed and fit to a tolerance of 1/ 16" and that all cut edges of the material would be
"factory sealed." Plaintiff indicates that defendant's representatives told her that "no
other company could do this." Finally, the terms as proposed by the defendant were
described as a "one day deal" and required the plaintiff to enter the contract, if at all, on
the very evening it was discussed.
On February 4, 2002, the material was delivered and placed on the grounds of
plaintiff's home and the work on the roof started on February 5, 2002. The roof job was
completed on February 13.
P h l Crandlemire, friend and housemate of plaintiff, videotaped the material as it
was positioned on the ground of the home and inspected it. He noted a tag on the
material that suggested that the material should not be stored on the ground. He noted
scratches on the top of sheets and wood on top of the metal sheets. Because of h s , he
called the general manager of the defendant corporation and complained. As the
workers were making the installation, Mr. Crandlemire also videotaped the entire
pr0cess.l
As the work was being completed, plaintiff noticed that damage had been done
to her property including damage to a door handle, screens, etc. and cigarette butts in
the area. She also noticed gaps in the fit of the roof. At the time of completion, a
member of the installation crew advised plainbff that they expected to receive timely
payment. P h l Trask, expediting manager of the defendant, inspected the job on
February 14 when Mr. Crandlemire made the complaints regarding the job. On that
same date, Mr. Trask prepared an "additional work authorization" for work to be done
without charge to the plaintiff.
Woodmaster agrees to screw down metal where necessary. File down cut
edge where possible. Repair one screen, replace mailbox, paint scratches
on metal in warm weather. Flash around chimney with metal.
The repairs were completed with respect to the plaintiff's house but it was
agreed that further work on the roof would wait until warmer weather in the Spring. In
the meantime, defendant's representative asked for payment in the amount of $4,500
toward the contract price. It was reported to plaintiff and Mr. Crandlemire that an
employee of defendant who had worked on the job was getting married and defendant
wished to see that he was fully paid for the job. Somewhat influenced by that
motivation, plaintiff paid $3,800 to the defendant on the contract with an understanding
that the balance of the contract would be paid in the Spring when the work was done.
Between February and May, the plaintiff and Mr. Crandlemire noticed addtional
discrepancies and deficiencies in the roof. Most importantly, they did not believe the
1
The court accepts the defendant's explanation as more likely than not that the material was placed on
the ground for a 24-hour period immediately prior to the installation and that the manufacturer's
instruction relates to long-term storage. Furthermore, Mr. Trask testified that the material was protected
from the ground and on the top by wood and other unusable pieces of roof sheeting.
roof was fit to a 1/ 16" tolerance and there were bare edges where cutting of sheet metal
had been done whch did not appear to be sealed. Because plaintiff felt that those two
representations were a fundamental part of her expectations under the contract, she and
Mr. Crandlemire did further inspection of the job.
Defendant was given a window/door screen from plaintiff's home to make
repairs. The repairs were completed by the defendant. A dispute arose over whether
the repair was made w i h n a reasonable period. Phil Crandlemire complained that
defendant had possession of the screen for over two months and had not returned it in
a repaired condition. The general manager of the defendant advised Crandlemire that
the repairs were made in a timely fashon, the screen was returned to the plaintiff's
residence but because no one was home when it was returned, it was set up against the
garage in a manner to be seen by the plaintiff. When Mr. Crandlemire denied the truth
of that statement, the general manger and Mr. Trask went to the plaintiff's residence
where the general manager retrieved the screen and took it to the front door of the
residence to hand it to Mr. Crandlemire. Words were exchanged and a struggle ensued.
As a result of h s confrontation, plaintiff changed her mind in allowing defendant to
repair, correct or "cure" the defect. As a result, Mr. Trask asked for a meeting with
plaintiff and Mr. Crandlemire. On May plaintiff and Mr. Crandlemire met with
P h l Trask of Woodmaster at plaintiff's home to discuss the deficiencies as noted by the
plaintiff. T h s meeting was surreptitiously <ideotaped by Mr. Crandlemire hiding a
videotape camera on the floor.
Plaintiff and Mr. Crandlemire explained their complaints about the quality of the
work that had been performed and also the manner in which they believed defendant's
general manager had treated them. Mr. Trask tried to explain the nature of the
installation and some of the matters whch plaintiff perceived as deficient but continued
to express a willingness to take such action as to complete the job to the satisfaction of
the plaintiff and, finally, even agreeing to remove and replace the entire roof. At t h s
offer, Mr. Crandlemire responded by demanding that defendant pay plaintiff for her
trouble in addition to replacing the roof.
The gravamen of the dispute in h s case is the position of the plaintiff that she
was promised a metal roof fit to a 1/16" tolerance with all cut edges factory sealed.
Defendant's position, as explained to plaintiff, is that only the full sheets are cut at the
factory and they are, indeed, cut to a 1/ 16" tolerance. Mr. Trask further explains that it
is impossible to fit a roof to a house without making new cuts to the metal but that they
have the factory supplied paint so that they may affect a "factory seal" on the cut edges
on the job. Mr. Trask does not deny that h s representatives may have made some
reference to factory sealed edges or to 1/16" tolerance but he has no explanation for
why a representative of the company would promise a I / 16" fit tolerance and all pieces
precut and sealed at the factory. Basically, it is defendant's position that it cannot be
done. Mr. Trask testified he has 33 years experience in small building construction with
the defendant and has installed over 100 metal roofs.
The plaintiff presented a retired building contractor of some 28 years who has
been a professional inspector for nine years. He testified as to a number of deficiencies
in the roof in great detail. Some of the deficiencies were agreed to exist by the
defendant and some were not. For example, plaintiff's expert asserted that upon h s
inspection he could find places where appropriate gaskets had not been used or that
inappropriate sealing material had been used. Mr. Trask denied that the gaskets had
not been used and specifically denied that the inappropriate material complained of by
plaintiff's expert had been used or was present on the job. Plaintiff's expert indicated
that the metal sheets should have had screws placed in a flat portion. Defendant denied
that requirement and presented evidence that screws were to be placed next to the
ridges. Interestingly enough, in spite of all of the disagreements between the two
experts, both agreed that a metal roof cannot be fit to a house unless pieces are cut and
fit on the scene. They further agree that edges can be factory sealed on site as well as at
the factory. In addition to h s set of facts raising the issue of interpretation of
representations made to the contract, from the evidence the court notes that it is more
likely than not that Ms. Voss expected a metal roof known as a raised seamed roof
rather than a bi-ribbed roof whch was actually installed. In other words, she did not
get the roof she expected.
Count I of the complaint alleges that the defendant has breached its contract with
the plaintiff. While it seems clear that some of the deficiencies complained of by the
plaintiff are, in fact, acceptable in the installation of h s lund of roof, the court is
satisfied that there were enough deficiencies and problems to make a findng that it is
more likely than not that the defendant did not perform under theterms of the contract
as it should have, has breached the contract, and should be held liable.
Defendant insists that it was denied a right to cure or correct the deficiencies and
had it had an opportunity to do so, the plaintiff would have received exactly what she
bargained for under the contract. In order for the court to find the right in a defendant
to cure deficiencies in the performance of a contract, it must find that the defendant has
substantially performed its responsibilities under the contract. If the installer has
simply made slight omissions and defects which can be usually remedied so that the
court can consider the ratio of costs of curing the defects to the total contract price, the
contractor is entitled to h s price less the cost to cure or, may affect the cure and recover
the entire contract consideration. In the absence of such substantial performance, the
right to cure does not exist. See Gray v. Weiss, 519 A.2d 716 (Me. 1986).
In the instant case, whether it is the quality of the work performed by
defendanrs crew or difficulties presented by a roof with dormers of uneven
dimensions, the court is satisfied that there has not been substantial performance under
thls contract by the defendant and the plaintiff is entitled to recover damages to place
her in the position she would have been in but for the breach by awarding the value of
the promised performance. There has been no evidence presented specifically as to the
value of a properly installed bi-ribbed metal roof. The only amount w h c h may be
considered in that regard is the contract price. The contract was an arm's length
contract entered into by parties with no special relationshp and in the absence of any
evidence to the contrary, the court assumes that the $7,650 is the fair market value of the
roof in November of 2001.
The second count of plaintiff's complaint charges the defendant with a tort --
fraud. To prevail on a claim for intentional fraud, the plaintiff must prove by clear and
convincing evidence (1)that the defendant made a false representation, (2) of a material
fact, (3) with knowledge of its falsity or in reckless disregard of whether it is true or
false, (4) for the purpose of inducing the plaintiff to pct in reliance upon it, and (5) the
plaintiff justifiably relied upon the representation as true and acted upon it to the
plaintiff's damage. See Rand v. Bath Iron Works, 2003 ME 122, 832 A.2d 771. The
standards for the court to find fraud is that there must be evidence to prove the fraud
by clear and convincing evidence. In such a case, the party with the burden of
persuasion may prevail only if he can place in the ultimate factfinder an abiding
conviction that the truth of h s factual contentions are highly probable. Taylor v.
Commissioner, Mental Health 13Mental Retardation, 481 A.2d 139 (Me. 1984). The court is
satisfied that the plaintiff has presented evidence with regard to the 1/ 16" tolerance and
factory seal of material fact, that it was for purpose of inducing the plaintiff to enter into
the contract in reliance upon the representation and Ms. Voss justifiably relied upon the
representation as true and acted upon it to her damage. The court is not satisfied that
there is clear and convincing evidence that the defendant made a false representation
with knowledge that it was malung a false representation or recklessly disregarding
whether the representation was true or false. The court concludes that based upon all
the evidence, it is more likely than not that the representative of the defendant
. negligently represented the two important elements to the plaintiff by failing to assure
that she understood the import of the representations made. Under these
circumstances, the plaintiff cannot prevail on her claim of fraud.
However, that does not resolve the issue completely. One who, in the course of
h s business, supplies false information for the guidance of others in their business
transactions, is subject to liability for pecuniary loss caused to them by their justifiable
reliance upon the information, if he fails to exercise reasonable care or competence in
OF TORTS5 552(1) (1977) as cited in
.'
communicating the information. RESTATEMENT
(2ND)
Chapman v. Rideout, 568 A.2d 829 (Me. 1990). T h s tort of negligent misrepresentation
must be proven by a preponderance of the evidence. Its elements are that the plaintiff
establish that (1)defendant supplied false information, (2) of a material fact, ( 3 ) to guide
the plaintiff in h s business transactions, (4) that the defendant failed to exercise
reasonable care or competence in communicating the information, and (5) the plaintiff
justifiably relied upon the information as true and acted upon it causing him economic
loss. Id. It would appear from the evidence that the defendant negligently
misrepresented that whch plaintiff would receive by supplying information whch
reasonably could be interpreted to be a result not consistent with actual performance
but also the standards of installation of this metal roof. The defendant led the plaintiff
to believe that the roof could be applied and fit to a 1/ 16" tolerance and that the factory
seal would prevent any cut edges in the application. Clearly, the defendant failed to
exercise reasonable care in communicating the information and the plaintiff justifiably
relied upon the information and entered into a contract resulting in damage to her
property.
The plaintiff has not made a claim for negligent misrepresentation in her
complaint. The legal question was not presented at trial and the parties did not reach
an express agreement to litigate that precise doctrine. The court, analyzing the
evidence, is satisfied that the elements of the tort have been proven by preponderance
and relies upon M.R. Civ. P. 15(b):
When issues not raised by the pleadings are tried by . . . implied consent
of the parties, they shall be treated in all respects as if they had been raised
in the pleadings. Such amendment of the pleadings as may be necessary
to cause them to conform to the evidence and to raise these issues may be
made upon motion of any party at any time, even after judgment; but
failure so to amend does not affect the result of the trial or these issues.
In examining the elements of fraud in light of the elements of negligent
misrepresentation and after full review of the evidence in this case, the court is satisfied
that a claim of negligent misrepresentation was tried and proved. There was no motion
to amend. The court is reaching h s conclusion sua sponte after trial. See Bernier v.
Merrill Air Engineers, 2001 ME 17, 770 A.2d 97.
Count I11 of plaintiff's complaint alleges violation of the Maine Unfair Trade
Practices Act (UTPA), 5 M.R.S.A. Part I, Chapter 10. Plaintiff relies on two grounds for
the establishment of a violation of the UTPA, first, fraud, and secondly, violations of the
warranty provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC). The court has not found
fraud in h s case and the UCC does not apply to a contract the predominant feature of
wluch is services rather than goods. Under the UTPA, 5 M.R.S.A. § 207 provides:
"Unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct
of any trade or commerce are declared unlawful." In order to find a violation of this
Act, the court must be satisfied that the activities of the defendant were unfair or
deceptive and requires an act of intentional giving of false impression. BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY
7THED. The plaintiff is entitled to recover from the defendant for
defendant's negligence, not its deceit. There is nothing in the defendant's acts in the
creation of h s contract whch rises to the level of unfairness required by the UTPA.
The court has previously determined that, as a matter of law, under the
circumstances of this case, the defendant does not have a legal right to cure or correct
defiaencies. The concept of fairness under the UTPA creates a requirement for an
analysis talung into consideration the defendant's offer to correct deficiencies. It is
agreed that a representative of the defendant at a meeting held to attempt to resolve
differences offered to remove and completely reinstall a Bi-ribbed steel metal roof. It is
also undisputed that h s was accepted by the plaintiff provided the defendant paid to
the plaintiff all collateral expenses arising out of the disagreement whch the defendant
declined to do. The court examines h s set of circumstances in light of both a doctrine
of fairness under the UTPA as well as the obligation on the part of the plaintiff to
mitigate her damages.
"Fair" is defined as impartial; just; equitable; disinterested. BLACK'S LAW
7' ed. Assuming the offer by the defendant to remove the deficient roof
DICTIONARY,
and install a new roof in accordance with the contract would have provided what the
plaintiff bargained for, including any repairs to the pre-existing roof and siding
acknowledged by the defendant, the court finds that such an offer removed any
unfairness that might have existed from the previous negligent action by the
defendant's representatives. Secondly, at the time the defendant made the offer to
replace the roof, it also had fully disclosed the nature of the roof project and such
disclosure corrected any misunderstanding on the part of the plaintiff thereby removing
any unfairness created by the misrepresentation. Furthermore, the obligation of both
parties to proceed in good faith under the contract was met by the defendant after
observing the deficiencies in the installation and the misunderstanding by negligent
misrepresentations by its own agents2
Count IV of plaintiff's complaint alleges breach of express warranties and count
V breach of implied warranty. The contract provides, "25 year warranty on steel
roofing." There is nothing in the evidence to suggest the goods, the steel roofing, was
deficient in any way. The performance of w h c h the plaintiff complains is in the
application. Under the principles of implied warranty, the warranty is the performance
of the contract. The court has already found that breach.
Plaintiff argues that further evidence of defendant's violation of the UTPA is
defendant's violation of implied warranties of merchantability and fitness implicating
11 M.R.S.A. 5 2-316(5)(a). Plaintiff quotes paragraph 16 of the contract in question
containing the sentence, "Warranty rights and remedies set forth in the Maine Uniform
Commercial Code apply to tlus ~ontract."~
Plaintiff goes on to utilize the provision of
the Uniform Commercial Code that indicates that a violation of the UCC addressing the
implied warranty of merchantability, 11 M.R.S.A. § 2-314, implied warranty for fitness,
11 M.R.S.A. § 2-315, and exclusion or modification of warranties, 11 M.R.S.A. § 2-316,
2
The court is troubled by the activities of Mr. Crandlemire in these entire circumstances. It is clear from
his activities that he did not trust the defendant from the very beginning starting with a videotape of the
material placed on the premises prior to installation through the physical confrontation with defendant's
representation and the surreptitious videotaping of the meeting called to resolve differences.
Furthermore, the demand, initiated by Mr. Crandlemire, to require the defendant to pay extraordinary
expenses in order to allow the defendant to replace the roof, at that stage of the proceeding, was clearly
unreasonable. Although Mr. Crandlemire is not a plaintiff but a domestic partner and witness to the
proceedings, the court finds his credibility to be highly suspect and lacking good faith.
The implication of this paragraph in a "boilerplate contract" form is unclear. This court does not believe
that parties to a contract may incorporate law specifically not applicable. Or it only applies to materials,
not at issue in this case.
arising from a retail sale of "consumer goods and services" constitutes a violation of
Title 5, ch. 10, Unfair Trade Practices Act. Plaintiff goes on to argue that defendant is a
merchant as defined by 11 M.R.S.A. § 2-104 and a definition that, "consumer goods and
services are those new or used goods and services, including mobile homes, that are
used or bought primarily for personal, family or household purposes." 11M.R.S.A. § 2-
316(5).
Plaintiff further cites to Sylvain v. Masonite Corp., 471 A.2d 1039 (Me. 1984), where
the court found that defective house siding material breached the implied warranty of
Plaintiff further goes on to cite State of Maine ex rel. v. Tierney, 436
mer~hantability.~
A.2d 866 (Me. 1981), for the purposes of guidance in the court's interpretation of the
language found in the UCC.
The defendant, in its memorandum, also relies on State of Maine, ex rel., Tierney v.
Ford Motor Company, 436 A.2d 866 arguing for an interpretation in its favor. Defendant
also cites Suminski v. Maine Appliance Warehouse, Inc., 602 A.2d 1173 (Me. 1992), malung
reference to implied warranties created by 11M.R.S.A. § 2-314.
Neither party has addressed the issue of jurisdiction and application of the
Maine Uniform Commercial Code. Article 2 of that Code governs the matter of "sales."
Title 11 M.R.S.A. § 2-102 provides, "Unless the context otherwise requires, this Article
applies to transactions in goods; . . .." Title 11 M.R.S.A. § 2-103 defines a "buyer" as a
person who buys or contracts to buy goods and a "seller" is a person who sells or
contracts to sell goods. Title 11 M.R.S.A. § 2-104 defines a "merchant" as a person who
deals in goods. Title 11 M.R.S.A. § 2-105 defines "goods" as "all h n g s (including
specially manufactured goods) whch are movable at the time of identification to the
4
The court notes that this was an action by a consumer against a manufacturer for the sale of hardboard
siding.
contract for sale other than the money in whch the price is to be paid." Title 11
M.R.S.A. § 2-106 defines "contract" and "agreement" as "limited to those relating to the
present or future sale of goods." The warranty sections of the Sales Article of the UCC
include section 2-312, Warranty of Title, as to goods, section 2-316 as to express
warranties relating to goods, section 2-314 relating to implied warranty of
merchantability as to goods, section 2-315 as to implied warranty for fitness as to a
particular purpose for which the goods are required and finally the section relied upon
in h s case, section 2-316, exclusion or modification of warranties. Notwithstanding the
I/
language as to sales of consumer goods or services" and "consumer goods and
services," the context of the article on sales is the sale of goods and not services.
T h s statutory application then requires the court to determine whether the
contract in question is for goods or services or both. Under the title "work to be
performed," the defendant promises to inspect the roof and re-nail as needed, strap the
roof, install Bi-ribbed steel roofing, provide accessories, vented ridge cap and closure
strips, and includes all labor, materials, taxes and permits. It also provides an express
25-year warranty on the steel roofing.
The present contact provides for the sale of both goods and services. This court
is required to determine whether the "predominant feature of the transaction" relates to
goods or to services. Smith v. Urethane Installations, Inc., 492 A.2d 1266, 1268 (Me. 1985);
(citing Arvida Corp. v. A.J. Industries, Inc., 370 So.2d 809 (Fla. App. 1979); Air Heaters, Inc.
v. Johnson Electric, Inc., 258 N.W.2d 649 (N. D. 1977)). In Smith, the court was required to
determine the nature of the contract for the insulation of a home. The court found that
the predominant feature of the Urethane contract was provision of a service, namely the
insulation of a home. Among other reasons for its conclusion, the court found that,
"The nature of the 'goods,' foam insulation, is difficult to conceptualize in the absence
of installation." Smith, 492 A.2d at 1268. T h s conclusion was further reinforced in
Lucien Bourque, Inc. v. Cronkite, 557 A.2d 193 (Me. 1989). T h s involved a contract for
excavation and construction work. "When as here the transaction involves provision of
both goods and services, the question for the application of the UCC becomes whether
as a factual matter the transaction predominantly relates to goods." Id. at 195.
In the present case, it is clear that labor and service, rather than the roofing
materials, are the predominant features of the agreement. One cannot conceptualize the
nature of the goods in h s instance in the absence of installation. They have no value to
the plaintiff and no purpose in the contract except as installed. Furthermore, plaintiff
has asserted no complaint as to the quality, merchantability or fitness as to the materials
supplied. The complaint is in its installation. Accordingly, the court is satisfied that
Article 2 of the Maine Uniform Commercial Code does not apply to the transaction in
question.
Plaintiff's and defendant's experts in this area disagree on the issue of whether
irreparable damage was done to the pre-existing siding over plaintiff's home by the
defendant's roof installation. To the extent portions of the siding would be required to
be replaced, the plaintiff's position is that because of the age of the pre-existing siding,
any new siding used as replacement would not be weathered or faded in order to match
the siding color. Accordingly, plaintiff seeks new siding for the entire home as part of
her damages. It appears to be defendant's position that reinstallation of a new roof in
accordance with the contract would provide for appropriate repair to the siding and to
flashng surrounding the chimney.
Plaintiff's expert had not been disclosed to be prepared to testify as to the cost to
plaintiff resulting from a new roof. The plaintiff was allowed to testify that her
understanding from hearsay with other contractors was a cost of approximately $1,000
to $2,000 to remove the existing deficient roof and $8,000 to replace the siding on her
house. Obviously, these amounts are not subject to cross-examination and the plaintiff
does not qualify as an expert to render such an opinion. Therefore, there is no evidence
presented by the plaintiff as to these costs. However, it is clear that replacing the roof,
even under the terms of the original contract, will require some repair to the siding of
the existing structure.
Because of defendant's negligence, plaintiff has been deprived of the use of her
funds since November of 2001 in the amount of $1,530 and since February of 2002 in the
amount of $3,800 to whch she is entitled to compensation. In addition, in order to have
reinstalled the roof represented, she will need to remove the existing roof. Further, the
fair market value of $7,650 as of November of 2001 is affected by the passage of time.
Finally, from all the testimony in the case, it appears that some repairs will be necessary
for the interfacing of a roof with the siding of the dormers as well as the chmney
flashng. For all those elements, the court finds the sum of $4,000 to be appropriate
damages accruing from the negligence.
The entry will be:
Judgment for plaintiff in the amount of $11,650 on her complaint;
judgment for plaintiff on defendant's counterclaim; judgment for plaintiff
for pre-judgment interest at the rate of 2.41%; post-judgment interest to
run at the rate of 8.477%.
Dated: August (2,2005
Donald H. Marden
Justice, Superior Court
LINDA J VOSS - PLAINTIFF DISTRICT COURT
25 HIGHLAND AVE AUGUSTA
WATERVILLE ME 04901 Docket No AUGDC-CV-2003-00137
Attorney for: LINDA J VOSS
JED DAVIS - RETAINED 05/05/2003
MITCHELL & DAVIS DOCKET RECORD
86 WINTHROP STREET
AUGUSTA ME 04330
VS
WOODMASTER OF MAINE INC - DEFENDANT
Attorney for: WOODMASTER OF MAINE INC
RICHARD FOLEY - RETAINED
FARRIS FOLEY & DICK
88 WINTHROP STREET
AUGUSTA ME 04330
Attorney for: WOODMASTER OF MAINE INC
WADE A RILEY - LIMITED
FARRIS FOLEY & DICK
88 WINTHROP STREET
AUGUSTA ME 04330
Filing Document : COMPLAINT Minor Case Type: CONTRACT
Filing Date: 05/05/2003
Docket Events:
05/06/2003 FILING DOCUMENT - COMPLAINT FILED ON 05/05/2003
CASE TRANSFERRED FROM KENNEBEC SUPERIOR COURT
05/06/2003 Party(s) : LINDA J VOSS
ATTORNEY - RETAINED ENTERED ON 05/05/2003
Plaintiff's Attorney: JED DAVIS
05/06/2003 Party(s) : WOODMASTER OF MAINE INC
ATTORNEY - RETAINED ENTERED ON 04/23/2003
Defendant's Attorney: RICHARD FOLEY
05/06/2003 Party(s): WOODMASTER OF MAINE INC
SUMMONS/SERVICE - ACCEPTANCE OF SERVICE FILED ON 04/11/2003
Defendant's Attorney: RICHARD FOLEY
05/06/2003 Party (s): WOODMASTER OF MAINE INC
RESPONSIVE PLEADING - ANSWER & COUNTERCLAIM FILED ON 04/23/2003
Defendant's Attorney: RICHARD FOLEY
05/06/2003 Party(s): LINDA J VOSS
RESPONSIVE PLEADING - REPLY/ANSWER TO COUNTERCLAIM FILED ON 05/02/2003
Plaintiff's Attorney: JED DAVIS
05/12/2003 Party(s): WOODMASTER OF MAINE INC
ATTORNEY - LIMITED ENTERED ON 04/28/2003
Defendant's Attorney: WADE A RILEY
Page 1 of 5 Printed on: 08/17/2005