The opinion
STATE OF MAINE SUPERIOR COURT
PENOBSCOT, ss. CIVIL ACTION
Docket No. AP-03-030
TAMMY DOYLE, )
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Plaintiff )
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V. ) OPINION
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FiiED & E N T E R ~ ~ ~
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STATE OF MAINE, i
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SUPERIOR C O U R T !i
Defendant i
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! SEP 2 2 2605
This matter is before the Court on appeal pursuant to 5 N1.R.S.A. $ 5 1100 1-11008
(2004) and Rule 80C of the Maine Rules of Civil Procedure from a decision of the
Respondents, State of Maine, Department of the Secretary of State (herein "Secretary")
. - suspending-the Petitioner's license for refusing to submit to a blood-alcohol test.pursuant
to 29-A M.R.S.A. 5 2521 (1996 and Supp. 2004).
BACKGROUND
Petitioner, Tammy Doyle, does not contest the hearing officer's finding on the
record that there was probable cause to believe she was operating her truck while under
the influence of intoxicants or that she was informed of the consequences for failing to
submit to a blood-alcohol test. The only issue before the Court is whether or not
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Petitioner failed to submit to a blood-alcohol test within the meaning of 29-A M.R.S.A. 5
2521(1) and (2).
Petitioner refused several times to submit to field sobriety tests after being pulled
over by Officer Fletcher. (R. at 60.) Later, at the police station, Petitioner refused to
submit to field sobriety tests. (R. at 63-64.) There were some discussions at the station
about whether Petitioner would submit to a blood test. (R. at 64.) Despite having agreed
at the police station to submit to a blood test, Petitioner refused upon arriving at the
hospital. (R. at 64.) After repeated attempts to get Petitioner to sign the implied consent
form, both at the station and the hospital, Petitioner finally signed the consent form. (R.
at 9,64.) After Sergeant Stewart, Petitioner's supervisor, arrived at the hospital and
entered Petitioner's room, Petitioner finally submitted to a blood test. (R. at 64-65.)
A hearing was held on August 8,2003, and the Hearing Officer determined that,
by a preponderance of the evidence, Petitioner "clearly failed to submit to a chemical test
at the direction of the law enforcement officer who informed her of the consequences of
that refusal." (BMV Decision at 2.). This appeal followed.
. . &.
DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
The Court's review of the Respondents' determination is very limited. Agency
rulings maypbe reversed or modified on appeal only if the Court determines that they are:
(I) in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions, (2) in excess of the statutory
authority of the agency, (3) made upon unlawful procedure, (4) affected by bias or error
of law, (5) unsupported by substantial evidence on the whole record or (6) arbitrary or - -
capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion. 5 M.R.S.A $ 11007(4)(C) (2004).
Substantial evidence is defined as "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support the resulting conclusion." Lewiston Daily Sun v.
Maine Unem~lovmentIns. Comm'n, 1999 NIE 90,g 7 , 7 3 3 A.2d 344, 346. The Court
may not substitute its judgment for that of the agency merely because the evidence could
give rise to more than one result. Dodd v. Sec'y of State, 526 A.2d 583, 584 (Me. 1987).
"The burden of proof clearly rests with the party seeking to overturn the decision of an
administrative agency." Seven Islands Land Co. v. Maine Land Use Regulation Comm'n.,
450 A.2d 475,479 (Me. 1982). In cases where conflicting evidence is presented, the Law
Court has repeatedly held that such conflicts are for the fact finder to resolve. Bean v.
Maine Unemployment Ins. Comm'n, 485 A.2d 630. 634 (Me. 1984). Finally, the remedy
available to the court when the record is insufficient for judicial review is a remand to the
agency for further findings or conclusions. 5 M.R.S.A. 5 11007(4)(B). See also Gashgai
v. Board of Registration in Medicine, 390 A.2d 1080, 1085 (Me. 1978). The statute
leaves it to the discretion of the court to determine whether additional evidence is
necessary to decide the petition for review. 5 M.R.S.A. 5 11006(1)(B).
B. Applicable Law.
1. Implied Consent to Chemical Tests
29-A M.R.S.A. 5 2521 (1996 and Supp. 2003) states, in relevant part:
1. Mandatory submission to test. If there is probable cause to
believe a person has operated a motor vehicle while under the
influence of intoxicants, that person shall submit to and
complete a test to determine blood-alcohol level and drug
concentration by analysis of blood, breath or urine.
2. Type of test. A law enforcement officer shall administer a
breath test unless, in that officer's determination, a breath test
is unreasonable. The law enforcement officer may determine
which type of breath test is to be administered. Another
chemical test must be administered in place of a breath test.
5. Suspension for refusal. The Secretary of State shall
immediately suspend the license of a person who fails to
submit to and complete a test.
6. Period of Suspension. Except when a longer period of
suspension is otherwise provided by law, the suspension is for
a period of 275 days for the first refusal, 18 months for a 2nd
refusal, 4 years for a 3'd refusal and 6 years for a 4threfusal.
2. Analysis
Petitioner argues that "the hearing examiner's finding that the Petitioner
failed to submit to a test was unsupported by substantial evidence on the whole
record and was arbitrary, capricious and characterized by abuse of discretion." 5
M.R.S.A. § 11007(4)(C)(5)(6). Petitioner admits that she indicated a refusal at
the hospital, but contends that because she shortly thereafter submitted to a blood
test, her conduct should not be considered a refusal. In State v. Doughty, the Law
Court noted:
The manifest intent of the implied consent law is to provide reliable
evidence to aid in determining whether a person suspected of operating
under the influence has in fact commi.tted Lhat crime against public safety,
The aim is the prompt resolution of the key factual question at the time
when the meaningful objective information is available through testing
under controlled conditions. If that aim is frustrated by the defendant's
refusal to submit to testing when the officer so requests, the statute
expressly authorizes the fact finder to consider the logical implication of
that refusal. 554 A.2d 1189, 1192 (Me. 1989).
Essentially, Petitioner argues that because she submitted to a blood test at the
hospital soon after her verbal refusal, the aim of the implied consent law was not
frustrated.
Even though Officer Fletcher stated that, in his mind, the first refusal did
not exist because he gave the Petitioner an opportunity to take a blood test, (R. at
96-97.), it is undisputed that the Petitioner refused the breath test several times,
and then refused the blood test at the hospital. Approximately, one and a half
hours elapsed from Petitioner first refusal of an intoxilyzer test until arrival at the
hospital. (R. at 107-108.) The aim of the implied consent law-prompt
resolution of a key factual question-indeed seemed frustrated in this case.
Additionally, in State v. Butler, 667 A.2d 108, 110 (Me. 1995), a motorist's
failure to take a breath test constituted refusal to submit to chemical testing under
implied consent law, regardless of his willingness to submit to a blood test. The
Hearing Officer's determination that Petitioner refused to take the statutorily-
required blood-alcohol test was supported by substantial evidence on the record
and does not constitute abuse of discretion. Even without applying the mandated
deferential standard, the relevant authority illustrates that the Hearing Officer's
determination was correct.
CONCLUSION --... - - . -. --- ..
Accordingly, the entry shall be:
The Respondents' decision to uphold the mandatory license suspension is
AFFlRMED. The Clerk may incorporate this Decision and Order into the docket by
reference.
Dated: GbzZ ,2005
lushce, Maine Superior Court
Date Filed 9/26/03 PENOBSCOT Docket No. AP-2003-30
County
Action RLTLE 80C APPEAL
ASSIGNED TO JUSTICE ANDREW M. MEAD
T A M m DOYLE VS. SECRETARY OF STATEFOR THE STATE OF MAINE
Plaintiff's Attorney Defendant's Attorney
Leonard I. Sharon, Esq Gwendolyn D. Thomas, Assistant Attorney
90 Main St. 6 State House Station General
P 0 Box 3130 Augusta, Maine 04333-0006
Auburn ME 04212-3130
Date of
Entry
Notice of Appeal to the Superior Court under Rule 80(C) filed by Plaintizf.
Notice of Assigned Justice filed. Pursuant to Administrative Order,
Single Justice Assignment of Civil Cases, Docket No. SJC-323, the above
referenced case is specially assigned to .Justice Andrew M. Mead.
/s/Margaret Gardner Copy forwarded to attorney for Plaintiff.
Entry of Appearance of Gwendolyn D. Thomas, Assistant Attorney General
on behalf of Defendant Filed.
copy of notice of assignment forwarded to defendants attorney.
Petition For Review 5 M.R.S.A. 511001 et seq. M.R.Civ.P. Rule 80C filed
by Petitioner. (Attachment attached)
Certified Record filed by Respondent.
Notice and Briefing Schedule 80C Appeal of Final Agency Actions filed.
Copy forwarded to attorneys of record.
Motion to Extend Time for Filing Brief filed by Petitioner.
Order filed. The above motion (Petitioner's Motion to Extend Time for
Filing Brief) is hereby granted for the reasons set forth therein.
(Time extended to 2/16/04) (Mead, J.) Copy forwarded to attorneys of record.
Motion to Extend Time for Filing Brief filed by Petitioner.
Court's ruling on Petitioner's Motion to Extend Time for Filing Brief
filed 2/2/04; The above motion is hereby granted for the reasons set forth
therein. (Mead, J.) (extended until 2/23/04) Copy forwarded to all
attorneys of record.