Stockly v. Doil

STATE OF MAINE SUPERIOR COURT

CUMBERLAND, ss. CIVIL ACTION \

DOCKET NO. CV-02-453

Gaga na po

A. HOLMES STOCKLY and

DORIS STOCKLY,

Plaintiffs

V. DECISION AND ORDER

ANNE M. DOIL and

MCCOURT LOGGING COMPANY,

Defendants

The parties have submitted the jury-waived trial of this matter to

the Court on written stipulated facts.

Pending is the plaintiffs’ complaint alleging a violation-of 14 M.R.S.A. §

7552 (Count I); a violation of 14 M.R.S.A. § 7552-A, against the defendant Anne

M. Doil, only (Count II); negligence (Count III); and nuisance (Count IV).! On

January 30, 2003, a default was entered against the defendant McCourt

Logging Company. Summary judgment on the issue of liability was entered in

favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendant Doil on Count II of the

complaint. See June 18, 2003 Order on Mot. for Summ. J. at 8.

BACKGROUND

Since 1966, the plaintiffs, Holmes and Doris Stockly, have owned

approximately twenty (20) acres of undeveloped land on Falmouth Road in

Falmouth, Maine, identified as Lot 14 on Falmouth Tax Map Ré4 (“the Stockly

’ The-complaint also alleged negligent infliction of emotional distress in Count V.

However, that claim is deemed subsumed into the general negligence claim in Count

Ill. See June 18, 2003 Order on Mot. for Summ. J. at 3.

Property”). SF 2. They also owna nearby second parcel, approximately six

(6) acres in size, identified as Lot 15 on the tax map. SF f 4. Doil owns

property adjacent to the Stockly Property, identified as Lot 19 on the tax map

R4 (“the Doil Property”). SF 15. The Doil Property shares a common boundary

with both of the Stockly parcels. SF 1 8. Before the spring of 2001,

approximately thirty (30) acres of the Doil Property was undeveloped and

naturally forested with a mix of mature hardwoods, softwoods and evergreens.

SF 113. The adjacent Stockly Property was similarly forested. SF { 14.

The Stocklys considered the trees on their property to be of tremendous

personal value. SF 115. Since 1966, they have maintained, cultivated and

used the Stockly Property as a passive recreational area for activities such as

hiking, walking and cross-country skiing. SF 116. They never harvested the

trees or managed the property for any commercial value, and removed only

fallen trees and cut brush as necessary to maintain trails. SF 116. The

Stockly’s sole goal in owning and maintaining the property was to maximize its

beauty, aesthetic value, environmental benefits, and non-motorized

recreational use for themselves and their family. SF 1 16.

Sometime before April 2001, Doil contacted Robert Tibbets of Timberland

Management about harvesting timber from her land. SF f 18. Tibbetts

recommended Mathew McCourt. SF 99 19-21. In April 2001, Doil and

McCourt met to discuss the selective cutting of trees on the Doil Property. SF 1

24. Doil had no experience with timber harvesting or surveying. SF { 27.

McCourt asked Doil for a copy of a tax map. SF { 29. It was her

understanding that he wanted it to determine where her property lines were.

SF1 28. However, Doil does not know whether McCourt used, or even could

have used, the tax map for that purpose. SF { 30.

On April 26, 2001, Doil signed a Timber Sales Agreement on a form

provided by McCourt. SF 1 31, 37. One of its terms required McCourt to

indemnify Doil in the event that his harvesting operation resulted in a trespass

to abutting land. SF 1 34. This provision was important to Doil because she

was concerned about the possibility that trees might be removed from property

she did not own. SF 91 35, 49. It was her understanding that McCourt would

be responsible if he cleared trees on someone else’s land. SF 150. She

specifically discussed with McCourt that the selective cutting should be done

well within the boundaries of her property. SF 162. She did not authorize or

direct McCourt to cut any timber on the Stockly Property. SF { 43.

Although there are stone walls located along the western and southern

boundaries of the Stockly Property and along the eastern edge of the Doil

Property, there are no monuments or other indicators of the common boundary

between them. SF 11 44-46. The Stocklys had also surveyed and flagged the

northern, eastern and southern edges of their Lot 15. SF {1 47-48.

Prior to the cutting, Doil never had her property or the common

boundary line surveyed or marked in any way, and at the time the timber

harvesting occurred that boundary was not flagged. SF 151. In addition,

other than the tax map, Doil did not give McCourt a description of her property

or the common property line; or any information on the dimensions of her lot;

or a metes and bounds description of her property: or a copy of her deed. SF 1

92. Further, Doil did not ask or require McCourt to identify or locate the

boundaries of her property. SF 1 53.

Although Doil never walked her property with McCourt prior to the

cutting, she understood that he had walked it and had identified some old

stone walls on at least one of her boundaries. SF 19 57-58. She also

understood that McCourt had whatever information he needed to be able to

locate the boundaries of her property, and she never asked whether he needed

any additional information. SF 11 60, 63.

Sometime during the spring and summer of 2001, McCourt cut down

and removed trees from approximately 30 acres of the Doil Property. SF { 66.

He also cut down or destroyed over 725 trees on approximately 20 acres of the

Stockly Property. Id. The majority of those trees were larger, older hardwoods

and softwoods. SF § 69. The Stocklys did not authorize the harvesting on

their property and did not know about it until all of the cutting was done. SF

I 64,70.

Although the Stocklys claim to have suffered emotional distress asa

result of the trespass, neither of them sought or received any treatment,

evaluation or medication for emotional distress. SF 19 75-77. While Mr.

Stockly lost some sleep and felt like he had been “hit in the stomach” after

learning of the cutting, Mrs. Stockly had no physical reaction to the loss of the

trees. SF 91 78-80.

The stumpage value of the trees on the Stockly Property that were cut

down or destroyed by McCourt is $14,127.30. SF 181. The forfeiture value of

those trees is $59,525.00.49. SF 9 82; see 17 M.R.S. § 2510(2) (2003). The

cost to restore the Stockly Property, as near as practicable, to its pre-casualty

condition is approximately $370,000, comprised of (a) $35,750 to clean up the

debris and slash left behind from the timber harvesting, (b) $330,000 to replant

600 2 to 2 1/2 inch diameter trees in a mix of species similar to those cut and

destroyed, and (c) $4,000 to water and maintain the replanted trees. SF 83.

The removal of trees from the Stockly Property had no significant impact

on its fair market value. SF 1 88. Neither the Stocklys, nor Doil have obtained

an expert opinion as to the fair market value of the Stockly Property. SF 1 93.

The Town of Falmouth’s assessed value of the property prior to the tree clearing

was $34,700, which did not reflect 100% market value. SF 7 93.

The personal value of the property to the Stocklys was dependent upon

its mature forest and is of little or no value to them in its current condition. SF

1.90. As a result of the tree harvesting, the Stocklys no longer use their

property for walking, hiking or recreational purposes. SF 1 91. They believe

that the best use of the cleared property is for passive recreational,

environmental or conservation purposes. SF {7 92.

DISCUSSION

Doil's liability with respect to Count II (14 M.R.S.A. § 7552-A) has already

been established by summary judgment, and McCourt’s liability with respect to

Counts I (14 M.R.S.A. § 7552-A), III (negligence) and IV (nuisance) has already

been established by his default. Accordingly, the court is left to consider the

issues of Doil’s liability with respect to Counts I, III and IV, and to determine

what damages, if any, are to be awarded.

Because a consideration of Doil’s liability for negligence will be

instructive in analyzing the plaintiffs’ Title 14 claim in Count I, the court elects

to address the plaintiffs’ negligence claim in Count III first.

Negligence (Count III)

This claim requires the Stocklys to show that Doil owed them a duty,

that she breached that duty, and that the breach was the proximate cause of

their injuries. See Mastriano v. Blyer, 2001 ME 134, 9 11, 779 A.2d 951, 954;

Stanton v. Univ. of Maine Sys., 2001 ME 96, 1 7, 773 A.2d 1045, 1049.

“Proximate cause is that cause which, in natural and continuous sequence,

unbroken by an efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without

which the result would not have occurred.” Merriam v. Wanger, 2000 ME 159,

8, 757 A.2d 778, 780 (citation and quotation omitted). Evidence is sufficient to

demonstrate proximate cause where the evidence and any reasonably drawn

inference indicate that the defendant's negligence played a substantial part in

bringing about the plaintiffs’ injury and the injury was either a direct result or

a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the negligence. See Crowe v. Shaw,

2000 ME 136, 1 10, 755 A.2d 509, 512: see also generally Simmons, Zillman

and Gregory, Maine Tort Law § 7.12 at 167-169 (1999).

Doil asserts that she is not liable for negligence or for a violation of 14

M.R.S.A. § 7552 because her conduct was not the proximate cause of the

Stockly’s harm. See Def.’s Br. at 7-8. However, the evidence demonstrates

that she was negligent, that her negligence played a substantial part in the

cutting on the Stockly Property, and that the harm suffered by the Stockleys

was the direct and proximate result, and a reasonably foreseeable

consequence, of her acts. See e.g. SF 11 51, 52, 53 (evidencing the defendant’s

failure to have her property marked in any way before cutting began, or provide

the defendant with a verbal or written description of the property boundaries,

or ask or require Mr. McCourt to take any particular steps to locate the

boundaries of her property); SF 11 66, 75, 78, 81-83, 91 (evidencing reasonably

foreseeable harms resulting from the defendant's failure to take necessary

precautions). The nature and location of McCourt’s cutting supports the

conclusion that Doil’s failure to mark her property boundaries proximately

resulted in the plaintiffs’ injuries. McCourt did not cut over the boundary of

Lot 15 that had been previously flagged by the Stocklys. SF 172. The fact

that he observed that boundary and then harvested trees to the stone wall

located at the western edge of the Stockly Property, SF 1 68, isa strong

indication that he believed that wall represented the western edge of the Doil

Property. Indeed, Doil has admitted that before cutting, McCourt walked the

property and observed old stone walls to determine the location of at least one

of her property lines. SF 1 60.

Accordingly, Doil’s failure to have her boundaries marked was a

contributory cause of the wrongful cutting and the court finds Doil liable for

negligence.

Violation of Title 14 M.R.S.A. § 7552 (Count J)

Title 14 M.R.S.A. § 7552 prohibits the cutting, destroying, damaging and

carrying away of trees from land without the property owner’s permission. In

the present case, Doil asserts that because she did not personally remove the

trees from the Stockly Property, she is not liable under section 7552. See

Def.’s Br. at 4. In contrast, the plaintiffs argue that Doil is liable for the actions

of her independent contractor. See Pls.’ Br. at 5.

The Restatement (Second) of Torts sets forth several grounds on which an

employer may be held liable for the actions of her independent contractor. See

e.g., Restatement (Second) of Torts, 88 411, 413, 416, 427 (1965). Although the

Law Court has expressly adopted section 411 of the Restatement as setting

forth a valid claim for negligent selection of a contractor, it has not had

occasion to decide whether and under what circumstances it would adopt the

other grounds, and section 413 in particular. See Dexter v. Town of Norway,

1998 ME 195, 9 10, 715 A.2d 169, 171-72 & n.4; see also Simmons, Zillman

and Gregory, Maine Tort Law § 16.03 at 532.

This court has previously determined in its earlier summary judgment

order that the rationale of section 413 seems applicable to the particular

circumstances of the undisputed facts in this case. See June 18, 2003 Order

on Mot. for Summ. J. at 8. The selective cutting of timber on a large parcel of

undeveloped and forested land abutting similarly forested and undeveloped

* The Restatement provides in relevant part:

§ 411. Negligence in Selection of Contractor An employer is subject to

liability for physical harm to third persons caused by his failure to

exercise reasonable care to employ a competent and careful

contractor

(a) to do work which will involve a risk of physical harm

unless it is skillfully and carefully done, or

(b) to perform any duty which the employer owes to third

persons.

§ 413. Duty to Provide for Taking of Precautions Against Dangers

Involved in Work Entrusted to Contractor One who employs an

independent contractor to do work which the employer should

recognize as likely to create, during its progress, a peculiar

unreasonable risk of physical harm to others unless special

precautions are taken, is subject to liability for physical harm caused

to them by the absence of such precautions if the employer

(a) fails to provide in the contract that the contractor shall

take such precautions, or

(b) fails to exercise reasonable care to provide in some other

manner for the taking of such precautions.

Restatement (Second) of Torts, §§ 411, 413. In these sections, “physical

harm” includes “the physical impairment” of land. Id., § 7.

land, SF 17 13-14, created a “peculiar unreasonable risk” of physical harm to

the Stockly’s property, viz: the risk of mistakingly harvesting trees on their

land.

Here, the risk was notably grand. Prior to the cutting, the Stockly and

Doil Properties were Strikingly similar and there were no indicators of the

common boundary between them. The risk of cutting on the Stockly Property

was heightened by Doil’s failure to have her either her property or the common

property line surveyed or marked in any way. SF 151. Moreover, other than

the tax map, Doil did not give McCourt a copy of her deed or any other

information regarding the description of her property. SF 7 52.

Doil asserts that section 413 requires the court to make its

determination of her liability in light of her lack of knowledge and experience in

the field. See Restatement (Second) Torts, § 413, cmt.f.2 The parties agree that

before meeting with McCourt, Doil had no experience with timber harvesting or

Surveying. However, at the time that she contracted with McCourt, Doil was

aware of the particular unreasonable risk presented by the work she was hiring

him to do, and she was specifically concerned about the risks of cutting trees

on adjacent parcels. Yet, instead of taking steps to reduce that risk, she

sought only to protect herself by contractually requiring McCourt to indemnify

her in the event of a trespass. SF 1 34-36, 49-50. Accordingly, the court is

* Comment f to §413 explains that

the extent of the employer's knowledge and experience in the field of

work to be done is to be taken into account; and an inexperienced

widow employing a contractor to build a house is not to be expected .

. to require special precautions, as is the real estate development

company employing a contractor to build the same house.

Restatement (Second) of Torts, 8 413, cmt.f.

not persuaded by her argument that her inexperience with timber harvesting

exempted her from the need to take precautions to protect the Stockly

Property.*

‘Doil also argues that her liability under section 7552-A shields her from

liability under section 7552. However, a landowner may be liable under section

7552-A for failing to mark property lines, and under section 7552 for the

resulting trespass committed by their contractor. See Fraser v. Barton, 628

A.2d 146 (Me. 1993) (holding defendant landowners liable under both statutes).

Based on the foregoing analysis, the court finds Doil liable for a negligent

violation of 14 M.R.S.A § 7552.5 Compare Mudgett v. Marshall, 574 A.2d 867,

870 (Me. 1990) (holding that the arithmetical] calculations conducted by an

architect did not constitute peculiar danger because there was no danger to

anyone when the architect made his calculations).

Nuisance (Count IV)

The plaintiffs’ nuisance claim requires a showing that

(1) the defendant acted with the intent of interfering with the

use and enjoyment of the land by those entitled to that use:

(2) there was some interference with the use and enjoyment

of the land intended, although the amount and the extent of

that interference may not have been anticipated or intended;

(3) the interference that resulted and the physical harm, if

any, from that interference proved to be substantial (the

substantial interference requirement is to Satisfy the need for

a showing that the land is reduced in value because of the

defendant’s conduct); and (4) the interference that came

about under such circumstances was of such a nature,

* See also Restatement (Second) Torts, § 413, cmt.b (“This section is concerned with

special risks, peculiar to the work to be done, and arising out of the character, or the

place where it is to be done, against which a reasonable man would recognize the

necessity of taking special precautions’).

° The court has already determined that there was no knowing or intentional violation

of the statute. See June 18, 2003 Order on Mot. for Summ. J. at 4-6.

10

duration, or amount as to constitute unreasonable

interference with the use and enjoyment of the land.

Charlton v. Town of Oxford, 2001 ME 104, 36, 774 A.2d 366, 377 (quoting W.

Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 87 at 622-23 (5

ed. 1984) (emphasis added). In addition, a landowner is liable for nuisance

created by a third party on his land if “(1) the possessor knows or has reason to

know that the activity is being carried on and that it is Causing or will involve

an unreasonable risk of Causing the nuisance, and (2) the possessor consents

to the activity or fails to exercise reasonable care to prevent the nuisance. See

Eaton v. Cormier, 2000 ME 4 7, 748 A.2d 1006, 1008 (citations omitted).

In this case, to find Doil liable for nuisance, the court must first find

McCourt “acted with the intent of interfering with” the Stockly’s use and

enjoyment of their land. The stipulated facts clearly establish that the cutting

has interfered with the plaintiffs’ use and enjoyment of their land. SF 11 90-

91. However, there are no facts evidencing that McCourt acted intentionally.

See Charlton, 2001 ME 104, 1 36, 774 A.2d at 377. Accordingly, under the

circumstances of this case, Doil is not liable for the alleged nuisance.

Damages

In Count I, the plaintiffs seek recovery of forfeiture amounts, restoration

costs and attorney's fees and other professional services fees against both

defendants pursuant to 14 M.R.S.A. § 7552. In Count II, they seek restoration

costs against Doil pursuant to 14 M.R.S.A. § 7552-A. In the alternative, they

seek restoration costs against both defendants based on their negligence claim

in Count III, and against McCourt based on their nuisance claim in Count IV.

In this part of the analysis, the court begins with a determination of

damages with respect to Count II.

il

(a) Count II ~ Violation of 14 M.R.S.A. § 7552-A

Section 7552-A, which allows for the recovery of double damages,® does

not specify how damages are to be measured. However, the Law Court has

recognized that either the diminution in the value of the plaintiffs’ land or the

value of the trees as personalty detached from the realty — stumpage value —

are appropriate measures of damages under section 7552-A. See Leavitt v.

Cont’ Tel. Co. of Maine, 559 A.2d 786 (Me. 1989). The Law Court has also

explicitly approved of the formulation set forth in the Restatement (Second) of

Torts, § 929. See Leavitt, 559 A.2d at 788. Where a plaintiff is entitled to

judgment for harm resulting from a past invasion that does not amount toa

total destruction of value, the recoverable damages include compensation for

“the difference between the value of the land before the harm and the value

after the harm, or at [the plaintiffs] election in an appropriate case, the cost of

restoration that has been or may be reasonably incurred.” Restatement

(Second) of Torts, § 929. The Restatement defines “value” as an “exchange value

or the value to the owner if this is greater than the exchange value.” Id., § 911.

Further, the Law Court has determined that compensatory damages include

° Section 7552-A provides:

Any person who authorizes the cutting of timber or wood on the person's

own property, when the cutting involves an area of 10 or more acres,

shall clearly mark any property lines that are within 200 feet of the area

to be cut. If any such person fails to clearly mark such property lines and

if the person or persons who are authorized to cut then cut timber or

wood on abutting land without the authorization of the owner of that

land, the person who failed to mark the person's property lines is liable

in a civil action, in double damages, to that owner of the abutting land.

These damages are in addition to any damages to which the owner of the

abutting land may be entitled under section 7552.

14 M.R.S. § 7552-A (2003).

12

“reasonable value to the Owner, but not sentimental value.” Leavitt, 559 A.2d

at 788 (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 911, cmt.e).

The plaintiffs assert that restoration costs are appropriate where, as

here, the destroyed property has personal value to them that is not reflected in

its exchange value or the value placed on it by the market. In contrast, Doil

asserts that the plaintiffs should be limited to recovering either the diminution

in the value of their land or the stumpage value of the trees.

The parties agree that the cost to restore the Stockly Property as near as

practicable to its pre-casualty condition is approximately $370,000. SF 7 83.

Given that section 7552-A allows for double damages, the plaintiffs seek an

award of $740,000. They also agree that the removal of trees from the Stockly

Property had no significant impact on its fair market value.

The court concludes that an award of damages based upon restoration

costs would not be appropriate in this case. Where the cost of restoration “is

disproportionate to the diminution in the value of the land caused by the

trespass, unless there is a reason personal to the owner for restoring the

original condition, damages are measured only by the difference between the

value of the land before and after the harm.” Restatement (Second) of Torts, §

929, cmt.b.” Under the circumstances of this case, the restoration costs

requested by the plaintiffs are unreasonable and disproportionate to any

diminution in the value of the property. In addition, although there are

’ See also North East Ins. Group v. Arbo, CV-97-434, (Me. Super. Cum. Cty. Aug. 19,

1998) (Caulkins, J.) (explicitly following Leavitt and the Restatement and measuring

damages by the cost of rebuilding a home that had been unintentionally leveled by a

bulldozer). However, it is noteworthy that the Arbo decision was premised on the fact

that the damages for restoration were reasonable. See id. (expressly acknowledging

that while the damages for restoration in that case were high in comparison to the

diminished value, they were not so high as to be unreasonable).

13

reasons personal to the Stocklys for restoring their property to its original

condition, which are related to their use and enjoyment of the property, those

reasons do not support an award of the full amount of restoration costs in this

case.

Based upon all of the foregoing, the court finds that in this case the

proper measure of damages for which Doil is liable under § 7552-A is double

the stumpage value of the lost trees, or $28,254.60.

(b) Count I ~ Violation of 14 M.R.S.A. § 7552 (Count 1)

Pursuant to section 7552, the plaintiffs seek forfeiture amounts® based

on the number and size of the trees removed, the costs to regenerate the

stand’, and their legal and other professional costs, including surveyor and

arborist costs. See 14 M.R.S. 8§ 7552(3)(B) & (5). They also seek an award for

double damages. See 14 M.RS. § 7552(4)(A). The parties agree that the

forfeiture value of the lost trees is $59,525.00. They also agree that the cost to

restore the Stockly Property as near as practicable to its pre-casualty condition

is approximately $370,000. SF 1 83. Although an award for the forfeiture

amount is appropriate in this case, an award for the costs of regeneration

cannot be made because the court cannot conclude that the restoration

amounts agreed to by the parties are regeneration costs within the meaning of

* Forfeiture amounts are based upon the diameter of each tree and determined

according to 17 M.R.S. § 2510(2).

* Section 7552(3)(B) provides:

For lost trees, the owner may claim in lieu of market value the forfeiture

amounts determined in Title 17 , Section 2510, subsections 2 and 3. In

addition, the owner's damages may include the costs for regeneration of

the stand in accordance with Title 12, section 8869.

14 M.R.S. § 7552(3)(B).

14

section 7552(3)(B), as determined by 12 M.R.S. § 8869 (2003). There is no

evidence that the proposed restoration work meets or is consistent with the

rules and standards for regeneration promulgated by the Commissioner of

Inland Fisheries and Wildlife. Id. Under the circumstances, the court

concludes that imposition of double the forfeiture amount, or $1 19,050.00,

would be appropriate. 14 M.R.S. 8§ 7552(3)(B) & (4)(A).

The defendant Doil asks the court to exercise its discretion under section

7552(3)(B) and reduce her liability for damages on this claim. See 14 M.R.S.A.

§ 7552(3)(B) (authorizing the court to reduce damages awarded for good cause

shown when the cutting of trees was done negligently or without fault). The

court finds good cause to reduce her liability. Doil’s negligence was the

product of her inexperience and ignorance of the circumstances. Although she

was concerned that McCourt not intrude upon her neighbor's property, her

reliance upon his expertise and the fact that he was recommended to her by

someone in the timber-harvesting business is a significant mitigating factor. In

addition, Doil is already liable for twice the actual value of the timber under

section 7552-A, and a further award of double forfeiture damages pursuant to

section 7552 would bring her total liability to over $147,304.00, more than four

times the value at which the Town of Falmouth has assessed the property.

Based upon the foregoing, the court determines that, as to Count I, the

defendant McCourt is liable to the plaintiffs for $119,050.00, being double the

forfeiture damages and that, of this amount, the defendant Doil is jointly and

severally liable for $35,750. Both defendants are also liable, jointly and

severally, for the reasonable costs of professional services, including attorney’s

fees, incurred by the plaintiffs in connection with this claim. Finally, the court

15

also finds that any recovery under the plaintiffs’ negligence and nuisance

claims in Counts III and IV are subsumed in the foregoing award of damages.

DECISION

Pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 79(a), the Clerk is directed to enter this Decision

" and Order on the Civil Docket by a notation incorporating it by reference, and

the entry is

A. As to Counts I, III and IV, Judgment for Plaintiffs and against

Defendant McCourt Logging Company in the amount of

$88,300.00, together with prejudgment interest at the rate of

2.70%, and post-judgment interest at the rate of 7.28%;

B. As to Counts I and II, Judgment for Plaintiffs and against

Defendants McCourt Logging Company and Anne M. Doil, jointly

and severally, in the amount of $35,750.00, together with

prejudgment interest at the rate of 2.70%, and post-judgment

interest at the rate of 7.28%:

C. As to Count I, Defendants McCourt Logging Company and Anne M.

Doil are jointly and severally liable for Plaintiffs’ reasonable costs of

professional services, including attorney’s fees, as follows:

(i) Plaintiffs shall have until May 21, 2004, to file and exchange

appropriate affidavits regarding their costs of professional

services;

(ii) Defendants shall have until June 11, 2004, to file and

exchange an objection to the reasonableness of such costs;

(iii) Thereafter, the court shall determine the amount of such

costs and, unless otherwise ordered, such determination

shall be made without further notice or hearing.

D. As to Count II, Judgment for Plaintiffs and against Defendant Anne

M. Doil in the amount of $28,254.60, together with prejudgment

interest at the rate of 2.70%, and post-judgment interest at the

rate of 7.28%, costs, fees and interest:

E. Plaintiffs are awarded their costs of this action.

Dated: April 30, 2004 LYS

Justice, Siperior Court

16

A HOLMES STOCKLY - PLAINTIFF

Attorney for: A HOLMES STOCKLY

HOPE CREAL

VERRILL & DANA

ONE PORTLAND SQUARE

PO BOX 586

PORTLAND ME 04112-0586

Attorney for: A HOLMES STOCKLY

JULIET BROWNE

VERRILL & DANA

ONE PORTLAND SQUARE

PO BOX 586

PORTLAND ME 04112-0586

DORIS STOCKLY - PLAINTIFF

Attorney for: DORIS STOCKLY

HOPE CREAL

VERRILL & DANA

ONE PORTLAND SQUARE

PO BOX 586

PORTLAND ME 04112-0586

Attorney for: DORIS STOCKLY

JULIET BROWNE

VERRILL & DANA

ONE PORTLAND SQUARE

PO BOX 586

PORTLAND ME 04112-0586

vs

AYNNE M. DOIL - DEFENDANT

Attorney for: AYNNE M. DOIL

JAMES HADDOW

PETRUCCELLI, MARTIN & HADDOW, LLP

50 MONUMENT SQUARE

PO BOX 17555

PORTLAND ME 04112-8555

MCCOURT LOGGING COMPANY - DEFENDANT

Filing Document: COMPLAINT Minor Case Type:

Filing Date: 09/06/2002

Docket Events:

09/09/2002 FILING DOCUMENT - COMPLAINT FILED ON 09/06/2002

WITH EXHIBIT A

09/09/2002 Party(s): A HOLMES STOCKLY

ATTORNEY - RETAINED ENTERED ON 09/06/2002

Plaintiff's Attorney: HOPE CREAL

Page 1 of 9

SUPERIOR COURT

CUMBERLAND, ss.

Docket No PORSC-CV-2002-00453

DOCKET RECORD

OTHER STATUTORY ACTIONS

Printed on: 05/03/2004

PORSC-CV-2002-00453

DOCKET RECORD

Party(s): DORIS STOCKLY

ATTORNEY - RETAINED ENTERED ON 09/06/2002

Plaintiff's Attorney: HOPE CREAL

09/09/2002 Party(s): A HOLMES STOCKLY

ATTORNEY - RETAINED ENTERED ON 09/06/2002

Plaintiff's Attorney: JULIET BROWNE

Party(s): DORIS STOCKLY

ATTORNEY - RETAINED ENTERED ON 09/06/2002

Plaintiff's Attorney: JULIET BROWNE

09/17/2002 Party(s): AYNNE M. DOIL

SUMMONS/SERVICE - ACK OF RECEIPT OF SUMM/COMP FILED ON 09/17/2002

09/17/2002 Party(s): AYNNE M. DOIL

SUMMONS/SERVICE - ACK OF RECEIPT OF SUMM/COMP SERVED ON 09/12/2002

UPON DEFENDANT MATTHEW MCCOURT TO JAMES B. HADDOW ESQ. WITH ATTACHMENT

10/04/2002 Party(s): AYNNE M. DOIL

RESPONSIVE PLEADING - ANSWER AND CROSSCLAIM FILED ON 10/04/2002

OF AYNNE M. DOIL WITH SUMMARY SHEET

10/04/2002 Party(s): AYNNE M. DOIL

MOTION - MOTION SUMMARY JUDGMENT FILED ON 10/04/2002

OF DEFENDANT, DOIL, WITH INCORPORATED MEMORANDUM OF LAW AND STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS

10/04/2002 Party(s): AYNNE M. DOIL

OTHER FILING - AFFIDAVIT FILED ON 10/04/2002

OF AYNNE M. DOIL WITH ATTACHMENT

10/04/2002 Party(s): AYNNE M. DOIL

DISCOVERY FILING - NOTIFICATION DISCOVERY SERVICE FILED ON 10/04/2002

NOTICES OF DEPOSITIONS OF DORIS STOCKLY AND A. HOLMES STOCKLY SERVED ON HOPE CRAL JACOBSEN

ESQ. ON 10-3-02.

10/04/2002 Party(s): AYNNE M. DOIL

ATTORNEY - RETAINED ENTERED ON 10/04/2002

Defendant's Attorney: JAMES HADDOW

10/04/2002 ASSIGNMENT - SINGLE JUDGE/JUSTICE ASSIGNED TO JUSTICE ON 10/04/2002

THOMAS E HUMPHREY , JUSTICE

10/21/2002 ORDER - SCHEDULING ORDER ENTERED ON 10/21/2002

THOMAS E HUMPHREY , JUSTICE

DISCOVERY DEADLINE IS JUNE 21, 2003. (PARTIES TO SELECT ADR PROCESS AND NEUTRAL) ON 10-21-

02 COPIES MAILED TO HOPE JACOBSEN, ESQ. AND JAMES HADDOW, ESQ.

10/24/2002 Party(s): A HOLMES STOCKLY,DORIS STOCKLY

OTHER FILING ~ OPPOSING MEMORANDUM FILED ON 10/23/2002

PLAINTIFFS' OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT, DOTL'S, MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT PURSUANT TO

M.R.CIV.P. 56(F) WITH INCORPORATED MEMORANDUM OF LAW

Page 2 of 9 Printed on: 05/03/2004

10/24/2002

10/31/2002

11/07/2002

11/12/2002

12/04/2002

12/20/2002

12/31/2002

01/15/2003

01/15/2003

01/15/2003

PORSC-CV-2002-00453

DOCKET RECORD

Party(s): A HOLMES STOCKLY,DORIS STOCKLY

OTHER FILING - AFFIDAVIT FILED ON 10/23/2002

OF HOPE CRAL JACOBSEN ESQ. IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS' OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT, DOIL'S,

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT PURSUANT TO M.R.CIV.P. 56 (F)

Party(s): AYNNE M. DOIL

OTHER FILING - REPLY MEMORANDUM FILED ON 10/30/2002

DEFENDANT'S REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Party(s): A HOLMES STOCKLY,DORIS STOCKLY

DISCOVERY FILING - NOTIFICATION DISCOVERY SERVICE FILED ON 11/07/2002

AMENDED NOTICE TO TAKE ORAL DEPOSITION OF DEEFNDANT MATTHEW MCCOURT PURSUANT TO M.R.CIV.P.

30 SERVED ON JAMES B. HADDOW, ESQ. AND MATTHEW MCCOURT ON 11-6-02.

Party(s): AYNNE M. DOIL,MCCOURT LOGGING COMPANY

DISCOVERY FILING - NOTIFICATION DISCOVERY SERVICE FILED ON 11/08/2002

AMENDED NOTICES OF DEPOSITIONS OF DORIS AND A. HOLMES STOCKLY, SERVED ON HOPE CREAL

JACOBSON, ESQ. ON 11-7-02

Party(s): A HOLMES STOCKLY, DORIS STOCKLY

LETTER - FROM PARTY FILED ON 12/03/2002

STATING THAT ANN DOIL IS THE SAME PERSON AS AYNNE M. DOIL

Party(s): A HOLMES STOCKLY,DORIS STOCKLY

ADR - NOTICE OF ADR PROCESS/NEUTRAL FILED ON 12/20/2002

ORDER - COURT ORDER ENTERED ON 12/30/2002

THOMAS E HUMPHREY , JUSTICE

PURSUANT TO M.R.CIV.P. 79(A), THE CLERK ISDIRECTED TOENTER THIS ORDER ON THE CIVIL DOCKET

BY A NOTATION INCORPORATING IT BY REFERENCE AND THE ENTRY IS PLAINTIFFS! SHALL HAVE UNTIL

JANUARY 13, 2003, TO FILE AN OPPOSITION TO THE MOTION, INCLUDING ANY OPPOSITON OR

ADDITIONAL STATEMENTS OF MATERIAL FACTS, AND DEFENDANT DOIL MAY FILE A REPLY WITHIN 10

DAYS OF THE FILING OF AN OPPOSITION BY PLAINTIFFS; AND THIS ORDER SHALL NOT ALTER OR

AFFECT THE CONSEQUENCES, IF ANY, TO DEFENDANT, MCCOURT LOGGING BASED UPON ITS LACK OF A

TIMELY RESPONSE TO THE COMPLAINT OR TO DEFENDANT DOIL'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. ON

12-31-02 COPIES MAILED TO JULIET T. BROWNE, HOPE C. JACOBSEN, JAMES HADDOW, ESQS.

Party(s): A HOLMES STOCKLY,DORIS STOCKLY

MOTION - MOTION FOR ENLARGEMENT OF TIME FILED ON 01/09/2003

PLAINTIFFS, HOLMES AND DORIS STOCKLY

Party(s): A HOLMES STOCKLY,DORIS STOCKLY

MOTION - MOTION FOR ENLARGEMENT OF TIME GRANTED ON 01/14/2003

THOMAS E HUMPHREY , JUSTICE

FOR GOOD CAUSE APPEARING, THE DEADLINE FOR PLAINTIFFS TO FILE AN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT

AYNNE DOIL'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS ENLARGED FROM JANUARY 13, 2003, THROUGH AND

INCLUDING JANUARY 17, 2003.

ORDER - COURT ORDER ENTERED ON 01/14/2003

THOMAS E HUMPHREY , JUSTICE

FOR GOOD CAUSE APPEARING, THE DEADLINE FOR PLAINTIFF TO FILE AN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT

AYNNE DOIL'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS ENLARGED FROM JANUARY 13, 2003, THROUGH AND

INCLUDING JANUARY 17, 2003. ON 01-15-03 COPIES MAILED TO JULIET BROWNE, HOPE JACOBSEN AND

Page 3 of 9 Printed on: 05/03/2004

01/21/2003

01/21/2003

01/23/2003

01/23/2003

01/23/2003

01/30/2003

01/30/2003

02/07/2003

02/10/2003

02/10/2003

02/10/2003

02/10/2003

PORSC-CV-2002-0.0453

DOCKET RECORD

JAMES HADDOW, ESQS.

Party(s): A HOLMES STOCKLY,DORIS STOCKLY

OTHER FILING - OPPOSING MEMORANDUM FILED ON 01/17/2003

PLAINTIFFS' OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT DOIL'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT.

Party(s): A HOLMES STOCKLY,DORIS STOCKLY

OTHER FILING - AFFIDAVIT FILED ON 01/17/2003

OF A. HOLMES STOCKLY.

Party(s): A HOLMES STOCKLY,DORIS STOCKLY

MOTION - MOTION FOR ENLARGEMENT OF TIME FILED ON 01/22/2003

DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR ENLARGEMENT OF TIME TO FILE REPLY MEMORANDUM.

ORDER - COURT ORDER ENTERED ON 01/23/2003

THOMAS E HUMPHREY , JUSTICE

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT DEFENDANT DOIL'S TIME FOR FILING A REPLY TO PLAINTIFFS!

OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT DOIL'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS EXTENDED THROUGH JANUARY 31,

2003, AND DEFENDANT DOIL'S REPLY FILED ON THAT DATE IS DEEMED TIMELY. ON 01-23-03 COPIES

MAILED TO JAMES HADDOW AND JULIET BROWNE, ESOS.

Party(s): A HOLMES STOCKLY, DORIS STOCKLY

MOTION - MOTION FOR ENLARGEMENT OF TIME GRANTED ON 01/23/2003

THOMAS E HUMPHREY , JUSTICE

COPIES TO PARTIES/COUNSEL

Party(s): MCCOURT LOGGING COMPANY

MOTION - AFFID & REQUEST DEFAULT/JUDG FILED ON 01/28/2003

AGAINST MCCOURT LOGGING COMPANY

ORDER - DEFAULT ENTERED ON 01/30/2003

AGAINST MCCOURT LOGGING COMPANY. COPIES MAILED TO HOPE CREAL JACOBSEN ESQ& MCCOURT

LOGGING COMPANY @ 282 MACOMBER HILL ROAD JAY,ME. 04239

Party(s): AYNNE M. DOIL

MOTION - OTHER MOTION FILED ON 02/05/2003

DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE COMBINED REPLY MEMORANDUM AND OPPOSITOIN TO

PLAINTIFFS' CROSS MOTION.FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT.

Party(s): AYNNE M. DOIL

OTHER FILING - REPLY MEMORANDUM FILED ON 02/07/2003

DEFENDANT, AYNNE M. DOIL'S REPLY/OPPOSING STATEMETN OF MATERIAL FACTS WITH ATTACHMENTS.

Party(s): AYNNE M. DOIL

OTHER FILING - REPLY MEMORANDUM FILED ON 02/07/2003

DEFENDANT'S SUPPLEMENTAL REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND

MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' CROSS-MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT.

Party(s): AYNNE M. DOIL

NOTE - OTHER CASE NOTE ENTERED ON 02/07/2003

ORIGINAL DEPOSITION OF DORIS S STOCKLY,

Party(s): AYNNE M. DOIL

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02/12/2003

02/13/2003

02/13/2003

02/19/2003

02/20/2003

02/20/2003

02/26/2003

02/28/2003

03/17/2003

PORSC-CV-2002-00453

DOCKET RECORD

NOTE - OTHER CASE NOTE ENTERED ON 02/07/2003

DEPOSITION OF A. HOLMES STOCKLY.

ORDER - COURT ORDER ENTERED ON 02/10/2003

THOMAS E HUMPHREY , JUSTICE

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT DEFENDANT, DOIL MAY FILED A COMBINED REPLY TO PLAINTIFFS '

OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT DOIL'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND OPPOSITION TO PLIANTIFFS'

CROSS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON OR BEFORE FEBRUARY 7, 2003.ON 02-11-03 COPIES MAILED

TO JAMES HADDOW, ESQ. AND JULIET BROWN, ESQ.

Party(s): A HOLMES STOCKLY,DORIS STOCKLY

MOTION - MOTION FOR ENLARGEMENT oF TIME FILED ON 02/11/2003

PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR ENLARCMENT OF TIME TO FILE REPLY MEMORANDUM.

ORDER - COURT ORDER ENTERED ON 02/13/2003

THOMAS E HUMPHREY , JUSTICE

IT IS HERERBY ORDERED THAT PLAINTIFFS! TIME FOR FILING A REPLY MEMORANDUM TO DEFENDANT'S

OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' CROSS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS EXTENDED THROUGH AND

INCLUDING FEBRUARY 21, 2003. ON 02-13-03 COPIE MAILED TO JAMES HADDOW, ESQ., JULIET BROWNE

AND HOPE CREAL, ESOS.

Party(s): A HOLMES STOCKLY,DORIS STOCKLY

MOTION - MOTION FOR ENLARGEMENT oF TIME GRANTED ON 02/13/2003

THOMAS E HUMPHREY , JUSTICE

COPIES TO PARTIES / COUNSEL

Party(s): A HOLMES STOCKLY,DORIS STOCKLY

MOTION - MOTION FOR ENLARGEMENT oF TIME FILED ON 02/18/2003

PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR ENLARGEMENT OF TIME TO FILE REPLY MEMORANDUM .

ORDER - COURT ORDER ENTERED ON 02/20/2003

THOMAS E HUMPHREY , JUSTICE

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT PLAINTIFFS' TIME FOR FILING A REPLY BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF THEIR

CROSS-MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS ENLARGED THROUGH AND INCLUDING FEBRUARY 28, 2003. ON

02-20-03 COPIES MAILED TO JAMES HADDOW, HOPE CREAL AND JULIET BROWNE, ESQS.

Party(s): A HOLMES STOCKLY,DORIS STOCKLY

MOTION - MOTION FOR ENLARGEMENT OF TIME GRANTED ON 02/20/2003

THOMAS E HUMPHREY , JUSTICE

COPIES TO PARTIES/COUNSEL

ORDER - REPORT OF ADR CONF/ORDER UNRESOLVED ON 02/24/2003

THOMAS E HUMPHREY , JUSTICE

CASE IS UNRESOLVED. ORDER ENTERED. ON 02-26-03 COPIES MAILED TO HOPE CREALJULIET BROWNE

AND JAMES HADDOW, ESOS.

Party(s): A HOLMES STOCKLY,DORIS STOCKLY

MOTION - MOTION FOR ENLARGEMENT OF TIME FILED ON 02/28/2003

THOMAS E HUMPHREY , JUSTICE

PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR ENLARGEMENT OF TIME TO FILE REPLY MEMORANDUM.

Party(s): A HOLMES STOCKLY,DORIS STOCKLY

OTHER FILING - REPLY MEMORANDUM FILED ON 03/14/2003

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03/17/2003

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03/31/2003

05/09/2003

05/20/2003

05/20/2003

05/22/2003

06/18/2003

06/18/2003

06/18/2003

PORSC-CV~2002-00453

DOCKET RECORD

PLAINTIFF'S REPLY BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF THEIR CROSS-MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT.

Party(s): A HOLMES STOCKLY,DORIS STOCKLY

OTHER FILING - REPLY MEMORANDUM FILED ON 03/14/2003

PLAINTIFF'S REPLY STATEMENT OF MATERIAL PACTS

Party(s): A HOLMES STOCKLY,DORIS STOCKLY

MOTION - MOTION FOR ENLARGEMENT OF TIME GRANTED ON 03/14/2003

THOMAS E HUMPHREY , JUSTICE

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT PLAINTIFFS' TIME FOR FILING A REPLY BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF THEIR

CROSS-MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS ENLARGED THROUGH AND INCLUDING MARCH 14, 2003. ON 03-

17-03 COPIES MAILED TO JAMES HADDOW, HOPE CREALAND JULIET BROWNE, ESQS.

Party(s): AYNNE M. DOIL

DISCOVERY FILING - NOTIFICATION DISCOVERY SERVICE FILED ON 03/24/2003

DEFENDANT, AYNNE M. DOIL'S EXPERT DESIGNATION LETTER WAS SERVED ON JULIET TBROWNE, ESQ.,

COUNSEL FOR THE PLAINTIFFS ON MARCH 21, 2003.

Party(s): AYNNE M. DOIL

JURY FILING - DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL FILED ON 03/28/2003

BY LETTER FROM PLAINTIFF AYNNE M. DOIL. $300.00 FEE PAID.

HEARING - MOTION SUMMARY JUDGMENT HELD ON 05/08/2003

THOMAS E HUMPHREY , JUSTICE

ON DEFENDANT, AYNNE DOIL'S MOT FOR SJ AND PLS!

ADVISEMENT. NO RECORD MADE.

CROSS-MOT FOR SJ. COURT TAKES MATTER UNDER

Party(s): AYNNE M. DOIL

MOTION - OTHER MOTION GRANTED ON 02/11/2003

THOMAS E HUMPHREY , JUSTICE

DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE COMBINED REPLY MEMORANDUM AND OPPOSITOIN TO

PLAINTIFFS' CROSS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT .

Party(s): AYNNE M. DOIL

MOTION - MOTION SUMMARY JUDGMENT UNDER ADVISEMENT ON. 05/08/2003

THOMAS E HUMPHREY , JUSTICE

Party(s): AYNNE M. DOIL,MCCOURT LOGGING COMPANY

DISCOVERY FILING - NOTIFICATION DISCOVERY SERVICE FILED ON 05/21/2003

PLAINTIFFS FIRST SET OF INTERROGATORIES AND REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS TO

DEFENDANT AYNNE DOIL SERVED ON JAMES HADDOW ON 5-21-03.

Party(s): A HOLMES STOCKLY,DORIS STOCKLY

MOTION - MOTION SUMMARY JUDGMENT FILED ON 01/17/2003

PLAINTIFFS' CROSS-MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT WIHT INCORPORATED MEMORANDUM OF LAW.

Party(s): A HOLMES STOCKLY,DORIS STOCKLY

MOTION - MOTION SUMMARY JUDGMENT GRANTED ON 06/17/2003

THOMAS E HUMPHREY , JUSTICE

PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS GRANTED AS TO COUNT II OF THE

ISSUE OF LIABILITY, BUT THE MOTION IS DENIED IN ALL OTHER RESPECTS.

COMPLAINT ON THE

A HOLMES STOCKLY,DORIS STOCKLY

Page 6 of 9

Party(s) :

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06/18/2003

07/07/2003

07/07/2003

07/17/2003

08/14/2003

09/02/2003

09/03/2003

09/11/2003

10/14/2003

PORSC-CV-2002-00453

DOCKET RECORD

MOTION - MOTION SUMMARY JUDGMENT DENIED ON 06/18/2003

THOMAS E HUMPHREY , JUSTICE

PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS GRANTED AS TO COUNT IIT OF THE COMPLIANT ON THE

ISSUE OF LIABILITY, BUT THE MOTION IS DENIED IN ALL OTHER RESPECTS:

Party(s): AYNNE M. DOIL

MOTION - MOTION SUMMARY JUDGMENT DENIED ON 06/17/2003

THOMAS E HUMPHREY , JUSTICE

DEFENDANT DOIL'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS DENIED.

Party(s): A HOLMES STOCKLY, DORIS STOCKLY

DISCOVERY FILING ~- NOTIFICATION DISCOVERY SERVICE FILED ON 07/07/2003

PLAINTIFF'S

Party(s): A HOLMES STOCKLY,DORIS STOCKLY

LETTER - FROM PARTY FILED ON 07/07/2003

LETTER FROM JULIET T. BROWNE ESQ. STATING THAT HE HAS CONFERRED WITH COUNSEL FOR

DEFENDANT, AYNNE DOIL, AND BELIEVES THAT THE NUMBER OF DAYS REQUIRED FOR TRIAL IS

APPROXIMATELY TWO.

Party(s): AYNNE M. DOIL

DISCOVERY FILING - NOTIFICATION DISCOVERY SERVICE FILED ON 07/17/2003

DEFENDANT, AYNNE M.DOIL'S ANSWERS TO INTERROGATORIES WAS SERVED JULIET T. BROWNE, ESQ.

COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF ON JULY 7, 2003; AND AYNNE M. DOIL'S RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR

PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS WAS SERVED JULIET T. BROWNE, ESQ., COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF ON JULY

7, 2003.

ORDER - CONFERENCE REPORT & ORDER ENTERED ON 08/11/2003

THOMAS E HUMPHREY , JUSTICE

TRIAL MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE (RULE 16(B): PURSUANT TO RULE 79(A), M.R.CIV.P. THE CLERK Is

DIRECTED TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING ENTRY IN THE CIVIL DOCKET: CASE SET FOR TRIAL ON SEPTEMBER

- OCTOBER 2003 TRIAL LIST. CASE ORDERED PLACED ON THE JURY TRIAL LIST. THIS ORDER IS

INCORPORATED INTO THE DOCKET BY REFERENCE AT THE SPECIFIC DIRECTION OF THE COURT. ON 08-

11-03 COPIES GIVEN IN HAND TO JAMES HADDOW, ESQ. AND JULIET BROWNE, ESQ.

Party(s): A HOLMES STOCKLY,DORIS STOCKLY

MOTION - MOTION IN LIMINE FILED ON 08/29/2003

LILLY LAVOIE-SIROIS , ASSOCIATE CLERK

PLAINTIFFS' MOTION IN LIMINE TO EXCLUDE ALL EVIDENCE RELATING TO STUMPAGE VALUE AND

DIMINUTION IN MARKET VALUE OF THE PROPERTY WITH INCORPORATED MEMORANDUM. OF LAW WITH

EXHIBIT'S A THRU Cc.

Party(s): AYNNE M. DOIL

MOTION - MOTION IN LIMINE FILED ON 08/29/2003

DEFENDANT, AYNNE M. DOIL MOTION IN LIMINE AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE ON THE ONLY

REMAINING ISSUE IN COUNT II OF THE COMPLAINT DAMAGES.

HEARING - SETTLEMENT CONFERENCE HELD ON 09/10/2003

ROBERT E CROWLEY , JUSTICE

ON SEPTEMBER 10, 2003. CASE NOT SETTLED. JUSTICE CROWLEY MEET WITH JULIET BROWN AND JAMES

HADDOW, ESQS.

Party(s): A HOLMES STOCKLY,DORIS STOCKLY

Page 7 of 9 Printed on: 05/03/2004

10/30/2003

11/07/2003

11/14/2003

11/17/2003

11/17/2003

11/24/2003

12/02/2003

04/30/2004

PORSC-CV-2002-00453

DOCKET RECORD

LETTER - FROM PARTY FILED ON 10/14/2003

LETTER FROM JULIET T. BROWNE ESQ. REGARDING TRIAL IN THIS MATTER. JIM HADDOW, COUNSEL FOR

MS. DOIL, AND I PROPOSE SUBMITTING THE CASE TO THE COURT BASED ON STIPULATED FACTS AND

LEGAL BRIEFING. HAVE AGREED To STIPULATED FACTSAND PROPOSE SIMULTANEOUS FILING OF BRIEFS

WITH THECOURT BY OCTOBER 31, 2003, AND FILING OF REPLY BRIEFS BY NOVEMBER 14, 2003.

Party(s): A HOLMES STOCKLY, DORIS STOCKLY

LETTER - FROM PARTY FILED ON 10/29/2003

LETTER FROM HOPE CREAL JACOBSEN ESQ., STATING THAT BOTH PARTIES HAVE AGREEDTO EXTEND THE

TIME IN WHICH TO FILE BRIEFS IN THIS MATTER TO NOVEMBER 7, 2003. (LLS)

Party(s): AYNNE M. DOIL

LETTER - FROM PARTY FILED ON 11/07/2003

FROM JAMES HADDOW, ESQ. STATING THIS LETTER WILL SERVE TO CONFIRM THAT THE PARTIES HAVE

AGREED THAT THEY WILL REQUIRE ADDITIONAL TIME TO COMPLETE AND FILE THEIR STIPULATED FACTS

AND INITIAL BRIEFS.

Party(s): AYNNE M. DOIL

OTHER FILING - TRIAL BRIEF FILED ON 11/14/2003

OF AYNNE M. DOIL (GA)

Party(s): A HOLMES STOCKLY,DORIS STOCKLY

OTHER FILING - TRIAL BRIEF FILED ON 11/14/2003

PLAINTIFF'S WITH EXHIBIT'S A & B. (LLS)

Party(s): A HOLMES STOCKLY,DORIS STOCKLY

OTHER FILING - STIPULATION FILED ON 11/14/2003

PLAINTIFF'S STIPULATED FACTS' WITH EXHIBITS A THRU E. (LLS)

Party(s): A HOLMES STOCKLY,DORIS STOCKLY

RESPONSIVE PLEADING - RESPONSE FILED ON 11/21/2003

PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT DOIL'S TRIAL BRIEF WITH EXHIBIT A. (LLS)

Party(s): A HOLMES STOCKLY,DORIS STOCKLY

RESPONSIVE PLEADING - RESPONSE FILED ON 12/01/2003

DEFENDANT'S RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS! TRIAL BRIEF. (AD).

FINDING - JUDGMENT DETERMINATION ENTERED ON 04/30/2004

THOMAS E HUMPHREY , JUSTICE

PURSUANT TO M.R.CIV.P.79(A), THE CLERK IS DIRECTED TO ENTER THIS DECISION AND ORDER ON THE

CIVIL DOCKET BY A NOTATION INCORPORATING IT BY REFERENCE, AND THE ENTRY IS A. AS TO

COUNTS I, III AND IV, JUDGMENT FOR PLAINTIFFS AND AGAINST DEFENDANT MCCOURT LOGGING

COMPANY IN THE AMOUNT OF $88,300.00, TOGETHER WITH PREJUDGMENT INTEREST AT THE RATE OF

2.70%, AND POST-JUDGMENT INTEREST AT TH ERATE OF 7.28%; B. AS TO COUNTS I AND III,

JUDGMENT FOR PLAINTIFFS AND AGAINST DEFENDANTS, MCOURT LOGGING COMPANY

ORDER - COURT JUDGMENT ENTERED ON 04/30/2004

THOMAS E HUMPHREY , JUSTICE

PURSUANT TO M.R.CIV.P.79(A), THE CLERK IS DIRECTED TO ENTER THIS DECISION AND ORDER ON THE

CIVIL DOCKET BY A NOTATION INCORPORATING IT BY REFERENCE, AND THE ENTRY IS A. AS TO

COUNTS I, III AND IV, JUDGMENT FOR PLAINTIFFS AND AGAINST DEFENDANT MCCOURT LOGGING

COMPANY IN THE AMOUNT OF $88,300.00, TOGETHER WITH PREJUDGMENT INTEREST AT THE RATE OF

2.70%, AND POST-JUDGMENT INTEREST AT TH ERATE OF 7.28%; B. AS TO COUNTS I AND IIt,

Page 8 of 9 Printed on: 05/03/2004

A TRUE COPY

ATTEST:

PORSC-CV-2002-00453

DOCKET RECORD

JUDGMENT FOR PLAINTIFFS AND AGAINST DEFENDANTS, MCOURT LOGGING COMPANY AND ANNE M. BOIL,

JOINTLYU KAND SEVERALLY, IN THE AMOUNT OF $35,750.00, TOGETHER WITH PREJUDGMENT INTEREST

AT THE RATE OF 2.70%, AND POST-JUDGMENT INTEREST AT TH ERATE OF 7.28%; C. AS TO COUNT I,

DEFENDANTS MCCOURT LOGGING COMPANY AND ANNE M. DOIL ARE JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY LIABLE FOR

PLAINTIFFS' REASONABLE COSTS OF PROFESSIONAL SERVICES, INCLUDING ATTORNEY'S FEES, AS

FOLLOWS: (I) PLAINTIFFS SHALL HAVE UNTIL MAY 21, 2004, TO FILE AND EXCHANGE APPROPRIATE

AFFIDAVITS REGARDING THEIR COSTS OF PROFESSIONAL SERV ICES; (II) DEFENDANTS SHALL HAVE

UNTIL JUNE 11, 2004, TO FILE AND EXCHANGE AN OBJECTION TO THE REASONABLENESS OF SUCH

COSTS; (III) THEREAFTER, THE COURT SHALL DETERMINE THE AMONT OF SUCH COSTS AND, UNLESS

OTHERWISE ORDREED, SUCH DETERMINATION SHALL BE MADE WITHOUT FURTHER NOTICE OR HEARING. D.

AS TO COUNT II, JUDGMENT FOR PLAINTIFFS AND AGAINST DEFENDANT ANNE M. DOIL IN THE AMONT OF

$28,254.60, TOGETHER WITH PREJUDGMENT INTEREST AT THE RATE OF 2.70%, AND POST-JUDGMENT

INTERESST AT THE RATE OF 7.28%, COSTS, FEE AND INTEREST; E. PLAINTIFFS ARE AWARDED THEIR

COSTS OF THIS ACTION. ON 05-03 03-04 COPIES MAILED TO HOPE CREAL, ESQ. JULIET BROWNE, ESQ.

AND JAMES HADDOW, ESQ, MS. DEBORAH FIRESTONE, THE DONALD GARBRECHT LAW LIBRARY, GOSS

MIMEOGRAPH AND LOISLAW.COM, INC. AD

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