Quintal v. Maine State Ret. Sys.

STATE OF MAINE SUPERIOR COURT

CIVIL ACTION.

KENNEBEC, ss. DOCKET NO. P-O4 - of

GARY QUINTAL,

Petitioner

v. DECISION AND ORDER

MAINE STATE RETIREMENT

SYSTEM, cops : bet ge

ders

Respondent

SEP 2 5 N04

This matter is before the court on petition by petitioner for review under MR.

Civ. P. 80C of a December 22,2003 Decision of the Board of Trustees of the Maine State

Retirement System.

This case concerns termination of disability retirement benefits and the definition

of “employed” and the “substantial gainful activity amount” (“SGA”) under the Maine

State Retirement System (”“MSRS”). Petitioner is seeking reversal of a decision by MSRS

denying disability retirement benefits from June 17, 2003 to January 2, 2003. Petitioner

also seeks costs and attorney fees. Petitioner, as a result of a back injury sustained while

employed by the Maine Department of Transportation was found to be disabled and

granted disability retirement benefits by the MSRS in July of 1986. In October of 1991,

the MSRS recommended petitioner as a candidate for rehabilitation. In June of 1997 the

petitioner stipulated that he was no longer disabled. Pursuant to 5 M.RS.A.

§ 17929(2)(B)(1) petitioner was required to “actively seek work.”

On June 17, 2002, petitioner was scheduled to begin full time employment with

the City of Hallowell as a code enforcement officer and building inspector earning

$27,748.00 annually. On June 20, 2002, petitioner’s disability retirement benefits were

discontinued via a decision by the Executive Director of MSRS. Petitioner informed the

Director he was appealing this decision in a letter dated June 22, 2002. A subsequent

hearing denied benefits pending appeal on the discontinuance issue and there were

hearings on petitioner’s appeal in April and May of 2003.

A final decision on petitioner’s appeal, dated December 22, 2003, was issues by

the MSRS Board of Trustees affirming the June 20, 2002 decision of the Executive

Director denying benefits. Petitioner filed a petition with this court on January 26, 2004,

seeking review pursuant to M. R. Civ. P. 80C.

When the decision of an administrative agency is appealed pursuant to M.R. Civ.

P. 80C, this Court reviews the agency’s decision directly for abuse of discretion, errors

of law, or findings not supported by the evidence. Centamore v. Dep't of Human Services,

664 A.2d 369, 370 (Me. 1995). “An administrative decision will be sustained if, on the

basis of the entire record before it, the agency could have fairly and reasonably found

the facts as it did.” Seider v. Board of Exam’ of Psychologists, 2000 ME 206 {| 9, 762 A.2d

551, 555 (Me. 2000) (citing CWCO, Inc. v. Superintendent of Ins., 1997 ME 226, { 6, 703

A.2d 1258, 1261 (Me. 1997)). In reviewing the decisions of an administrative agency, the

Court should “not attempt to second-guess the agency on matters falling within its

realm of expertise” and the Court’s review is limited to “determining whether the

agency’s conclusions are unreasonable, unjust or unlawful in light of the record.”

Imagineering v. Superintendent of Ins., 593 A.2d 1050, 1053 (Me. 1991). The focus on

appeal is not whether the Court would have reached the same conclusion as the agency,

but whether the record contains competent and substantial evidence that supports the

result reached by the agency. CWCO, Inc., 1997 ME 226, 703 A.2d 1258, 1261.

“Inconsistent evidence will not render an agency decision unsupported.” Seider, 762

A.2d 551 (citations omitted). The burden of proof rests with the party seeking to

overturn the agency’s decision, and that party must prove that no competent evidence

supports the Board’s decision. Id. “[Petitioner] must prove that no competent evidence

supports the Board's decision and that the record compels a contrary conclusion.”

Bischoff v. Board of Trustees, 661 A.2d 167, 170 (Me. 1995).

Factual determinations must be sustained unless shown to be clearly erroneous.

Imagineering, 593 A.2d at 1053 (noting that the Court recognizes no distinction between

the clearly erroneous and substantial evidence in the record standards of review for

factual determinations made by administrative agencies). “A party seeking review of

an agency's findings must prove they are unsupported by any competent evidence.”

Maine Bankers Ass’n v. Bureau, 684 A.2d 1304, 1306 (Me. 1996) (emphasis added).

“When the dispute involves an agency’s interpretation of a statute administered

by it, the agency’s interpretation, although not conclusive on the Court, is accorded

great deference and will be upheld unless the statute plainly compels a contrary result.”

Maine Bankers Ass’n, 684 A.2d at 1306 (citing Centamore v. Department of Human Services,

664 A.2d 369, 370 (Me. 1995)).

Petitioner is arguing that his disability benefits! should not have been

discontinued as of June 17, 2002, for two basic reasons. First, petitioner asserts, his

employment with the City of Hallowell was probationary and hence he was ina type of

apprenticeship situation’ and that he continued to seek work and that therefore his

benefits should not have been discontinued. Second, petitioner argues that the

calculation of his earnings by the MSRS was incorrect in that they calculated what he

would earn in a year and compared it to the amount (the “SGA” explained below) he

} According to petitioner’s “actively seeking work” file his “current yearly benefit’ was $18,476.16.

* Petitioner also asserts that he continued to actively seek employment during his tenure with the City of Hallowell.

would need to exceed annually under MSRS regulations to have his benefits

terminated.’

Some background on how the “substantial gainful activity” (“SGA”) number is

determined is appropriate at this point. The relevant statute states:

1) After the disability has continued for 2 years, the disability must

render the person unable to engage in any substantially gainful activity

that is consistent with the person's training, education or experience and

average final compensation adjusted by the same percentage adjustment

as has been received under section 17806. The disability retirement benefit

continues if the person can effectively demonstrate to the executive

director that the person is actively seeking work.

5 M.RS.A. § 17929((2)(B)(1).

The Code of Maine Regulations defines “substantial gainful activity” for the

purposes of the above statute as “tasks or efforts that are or could be performed in sucha

manner as to generate remuneration in an amount which is consistent with average final

compensation.” CMR 94-411-507. Further on, the same regulation defines “consistent

with average final compensation” as “an amount that, on an annual basis, is at least 80%

of the person’s average final compensation.” Petitioner’s SGA number, determined by

multiplying his final average inflation adjusted compensation before his injury of $30,637

by 80% is $24,637 according to the December 22, 2003 Decision of the MSRS Board?

Addressing petitioner’s second major argument first, petitioner asserts that

comparisons of earning for SGA must be done for a calendar year. In brief, petitioner is

arguing that since he did not begin work until June 17 of 2002, his earnings for that year

(effectively half a year’s earnings) only amounted to $14,421,14. Therefore, petitioner

argues, he did not exceed his SGA amount for 2002 or a lesser earnings limit of $20,000

_* Petitioner also argues that in any case his disability benefits should have continued until July 1, 2002, because his

service retirement benefits did not begin until then and he was left with a gap. This gap, however, was self-created,

as he did not request that his service retirement benefits begin until August 1, 2002.

* This number appears incorrect by $127.40. 80% of $30,637.00 is $24,509.60.

applicable to all beneficiaries under a related statute governing reduction in amount of

benefits. See, 5 M.R.S.A. § 17930. Petitioner asserts that since section 17930 anticipates

looking back over the entire previous year to see if the $20,000 amount has been

exceeded, section 17929 should be read the same way.

Petitioner also points to 5 M.R.S.A. § 17909, which directs that, “[t]he executive

director shall require each beneficiary of a disability retirement benefit to submit, each

calendar year, a statement of his compensation received from engaging in any gainful

occupation during that year.” Petitioner is arguing that section 17929, dealing with

cessation of a disability retirement benefits, section 17930, dealing with reduction of

benefits and section 17909, mandating an annual statement of compensation by disability

retirement beneficiaries: should be read in pari materia as establishing a retrospective. - -

review and regulation system.

Respondent replies to petitioner’s argument by asserting that petitioner is

ignoring the plain meaning of the word “annual” as applied to salary and advocates that

the court see the relevant statutes and regulations as taking an immediate and a

prospective view of compensation when a beneficiary becomes employed. Respondent

distinguishes section 17909(1) as related to a distinct event, that is, “each calendar year”

as meaning once a year. Respondent distinguishes section 17930 as applying only to still

disabled individuals and notes that the SGA number is not a factor in this statute.

Respondent directs the court’s attention to the relevant regulation, which states that the

SGA is calculated “on an annual basis.” CMR 94-411-507(1)(A)(1). Respondent notes that

the City of Hallowell indicated that petitioner’s pay would be “$27,748 annually.”

Respondent cites an Internet dictionary definition of “annual” as “covering a

year.” The definition of “annual” contained in a standard dictionary consulted by the

In fact, the same letter stated that petitioner’s salary would increase to $28,445 annually after six months.

court is “1. Recurring, done, or performed every year: YEARLY; 2. Determined by a year’s

time.” WEBSTER’S II NEW RIVERSIDE UNIVERSITY DICTIONARY, 110 (Riverside Publishing

1988). None of these definitions directly address the question at hand dispositively.

Common sense, the plain meaning of the statute and the standard of review under which

this court reviews agency action are, however, of great assistance.

In determining the plain meaning of a statute we are guided by a recent Law

Court decision stating, “[w]hen we construe a statute, we first look to the plain meaning

of the language to determine legislative intent.” Brent Leasing Co., v. State Tax Assessor,

2001 ME 90, 773 A.2d 457, 459. "When interpreting statutes, [the Court seeks to discern

from the plain language the real purpose of the legislation, avoiding results that are

absurd, inconsistent, unreasonable, or illogical: Wood v. Supt.-of Insurance, 638 A2d 67, ..-

70 (citations omitted).

To find petitioner’s definition in the legislature’s intent we would have to assume

that the common understanding of an annual salary as a unit of measurement did not

prevail in the legislature. We would also have to disregard the standard of review

provided by the Law Court in exactly this sort of situation: “When the dispute involves

an agency’s interpretation of a statute administered by it, the agency’s interpretation,

although not conclusive on the Court, is accorded great deference and will be upheld

unless the statute plainly compels a contrary result.” Maine Bankers Ass’n, 684 A.2d at

1306 (citing Centamore v. Department of Human Services, 664 A.2d 369, 370 (Me. 1995)).

This court understands, as we are sure the legislature does, that someone who is

paid $500.00 a week has a $26,000 annual salary whether it is viewed from January 1* or

July 1“ or December 31st.

Addressing petitioner’s other principal argument, namely that the probationary

nature of his employment meant that he was not truly employed in a legal sense and was

The entry will be:

The decision of the State of Maine Retirement System Board of

Trustees Appeal No. 027-02 dated December 22, 2003, in the matter of

Gary Quintal is AFFIRMED.

Dated: August_/%, 2004 Lo alr

Donald H. Marden

Justice, Superior Court

Date Filed __1/26/04 Kennebec Docket No. _ AP04-04

County

Action Petition for Review

80C

. “ARDEN

Gary Quintal VS. Maine State Retirement System

Plaintiff's Attorney Defendant’s Attorney

Patricia McDonough Dunn, Esq. James M. Bowie, AAG

Ten Free Street

6 State House Station

P.O. Box 4510 Augusta, Maine 04333-0006

PORTLAND MAINE 04112

Date of

Entry

1/26/04 Petition for Review of Fianl Agency Action, filed. s/Dunn, Esq.

2/2/04 Letter entering appearance, field. s/Bowie, AAG

2/9/04 Affidavit of Service, filed. s/Dunn. Esq.

2/27/04 Certified Record, filed. (Table of contents attached)

IN VAULT DRAWER

3/3/04 NOTICE OF BRIEFING SCHEDULE MAILED TO ATTYS.

3/11/04 Minutes of the Board of Trustees, Maine State Retirement, filed. s/Bowie,

3/19/04 Motion for Enlargment of Time to File Brief, filed. s/Dunn, Esq.

Certificate of Service, filed. s/Dunn, Esq.

3/25/04 MOTION FOR ENLARGEMENT OF TIME, Marden, J. (dated 3/22/04)

Without objection motion GRANTED; enlarged to May 7, 2004.

Copies mailed to attys of record.

5/7/04 Brief of Petitioner Gary Quintal, filed. s/P. Dunn, Esq.

aaa Notification of Discovery Service, filed. s/Webber, Esq.

Plaintiff's First Request for Production of Documents served on Edward

Benjamin, Jr., Esq. on 5/5/04.

5/17/04 Letter, filed. s/Bowie, AAG

6/1/04 Respondent's Memorandum of Law in Opposition to the Petition for Review,

filed. s/J. Bowie, AAG

6/2/04 Notice of setting of hearing on oral arguments on 7/1/04 at 9:00am sent

to attys of record.

eALO/O4 Peply Bricf cf Petitioners Gary Gulets!, Filed. o/Minn, Esq.