Opinion

Manougian v. Ejdys

Court
Superior Court of Maine
Filed
Jan 6, 2003
Status
Unpublished
On the bench
G. Arthur Brennan
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 34.1%

The opinion

STATE OF MAINE . SUPERIOR COURT

CIVIL ACTION

DOCKET NO. RE-01-56

YORK, ss.

ARA MANOUGIAN and

TONI MANOUGIAN,

Plaintiffs

FINDINGS OF FACT -

“ AND

CONCLUSIONS.

DONALD L. GARBRESAT-

LAW LIBRARY

GAIL M. EJDYS,

JAN 9 2003

Defendant

This case involves claims and counterclaims relating to a disputed area of land

AO Bae *

along the common boundary between the Manougian and Ejdys properties. At

parties stipulated that the Manougians were the legal owners of the disputed area and

Ms. Ejdys’ counterclaim for adverse possession was tried. For reasons stated below, I

find and conclude that her claim should succeed.

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. The Plaintiffs, Ara and Toni Manougian (hereinafter “Manougian”) purchased

their summer home on the Nubble Road in York, Maine on July 2, 1994. At the

time, the abutting property to the west was owned by Julie and George Powell.

The Powells subsequently sold their property to the United States of America in

1995, and the USA sold the property to the Defendant and Counterclaim

Plaintiff, Gail Ejdys (hereinafter “Ejdys”), on March 19, 1996.

2. By Stipulation, the parties agreed that the boundary line running between their

properties from the ocean side to Nubble Road, as is stated in Ejdys deed and in

the Manougians’ deed, is correctly depicted in the 1976 Pappas /Houliares

survey, obtained by a Manougians’ predecessor in interest, and in the 1985

Powell/Moran survey, obtained by an Ejdys’ predecessor in interest. By so

stipulating, the parties agreed that the Manougians had met their burden by

establishing legal title to the triangular parcel. What remains to be decided is

whether or not Ejdys has met her burden of proving she has now established

superior title to the same triangular parcel by meeting the elements of either

adverse possession or title by acquiescence as asserted in her Counterclaim.

. The Manougians commenced this action after Ejdys removed two standing

sections of existing split rail fencing on Manougian property, and some aged

shrubbery on the westerly side of that fencing, and replaced same with chain link

fencing and new plantings. Ejdys also closed off access to the triangle parcel by

the new fen cing at a right angle to her home. Ejdys testified that the

chain link fence is located in the same position as the old split rail fencing.

Ms. Ejdys argues that the present location of a fence situated between the parties

at the adjoining southerly corners is now the actual boundary. With regard to

these contentions, the Court finds as follows:

a. Anne E. Brown purchased the Ejdys’ property in May of 1962. At the time

~of ther purchase, a wooden fence of a distinctive “Y-shape” design existed

along the entire southerly (Ocean) side of the property, as well as up the

westerly side. In addition, the same fence turned and ran approximately

16 to 17 feet along the easterly (Manougian) side.

b. At that time, and until the Manougians installed a split rail fence in 2000,

the remaining area between the two houses was marked with shrubbery,

by a staircase installed by Ms. Brown, and otherwise by lawn area.

c. Anne Brown’s testimony was credible. She testified that she believed the

fence on both the easterly and westerly side of her property marked the

true boundaries. When she testified that she intended to occupy the

property described in her deed, I find that she meant the property that she

and her family actually used and not simply what a survey would reveal

was described in the deed. She and her family occupied the premises, and

she personally provided lawn care. She mowed the lawn area to the

inside of the fence, weeded the area and maintained it. At no time did

anyone attempt to interrupt her possession of the property. Anne Brown

sold the property to George and Julie Powell in October of 1975.

d. George Powell testified’ that the same fence existed when he bought the

975. Mr. Powell’s testimony concerning the fence was

credible. He indicated that a “Mugo pine” was situated in the corner of

the fenced area, inside the fence. Mr. Powell replaced the “Y-shaped”

fence with 1) a split rail fence on the easterly and southerly sides, and 2) a

stockade fence along the westerly side. He did the work himself over

time. The new fence was located in the same place as the old one. Mr.

Pappas, the former owner of the Manougian property, at one point

disputed the location of some portion of the common bound. However

the fence was not moved and Powell continued to maintain the new fence

without interference. He mowed the grass between the houses. He

believed he owned all of the property lying to the west of the 16 feet of

fence between the two properties. The Powells sold the property to the

United States of America in November of 1995. The fence between the

* Mr. Powell’s deposition was admitted over objection.

two properties was part of a larger “fencing scheme” of enclosure, and

clearly designated a line of occupation to all the world. Adverse

possession of the corner in question was established no later than 1982.

The area possessed included land lying westerly of and adjacent to the

fence that had existed between the two properties since at least 1962.

e. Possession of the area established by Brown and Powell has not been

abandoned by later owners. Ejdys bought the property with the Powell

fence intact. Her testimony and photographs are credible. They show the

split rail fence described by Powell and the new chain link fence she

installed in 1999. Although there was differing testimony concerning the

location of the new fence compared with the old fence along the common

bound, I find the new fence to be in the same location as the old fence.

Ms. Ejdys was on site when the new fence was installed; the fence

company used the old post holes. Both Brown and Powell have seen the

new fence and believe it to be in the same location as the old fences.

Although Mr. Manougian believes that the new fence encroaches further

on his property, the weight of the evidence suggests otherwise.

__ CONCLUSIONS

I conclude that Ms. Ejdys is entitled to a declaratory judgment to the effect

that she has acquired title to the disputed “Y-shaped” area by adverse

possession.

The fair preponderance of evidence demonstrates that at least since Ms.

Brown bought the property in 1962, Ms. Ejdys, or her predecessor in title,

have been in possession of the disputed area and their possession has been

actual, open, visible, notorious, hostile, under claim of right and exclusive.

Striefel v. Charles-Keyte-Leaman Partnership, et al.. 733 A.2d 984 (Me. 1999).

The Manougians seriously dispute three of the necessary elements of an

adverse possession claim, whether Ms. Ejdys has proven that her property

was held: (1) under claim of right, (2) continuous, and (3) exclusively.

The Manougians argue that Ms. Brown, when questioned by earlier

owners in the Manougian chain, asserted that she owned exactly what the

deed described. Since the parties have stipulated that legal title to the

disputed area is with the Manougians, they argue that Ms. Brown has

disclaimed any right to this area. However, as fact, I have found that Ms.

Brown was not referring simply to a deed description but rather to the actual

use of the area in question, and that she used and maintained it as her own.

Further, the Powells, Ms. Ejdys’ predecessors, were questioned by the

Pappases, the Manougians’ predecessors, about a survey showing that the

Powells were encroaching. Mr. Powell ignored this and continued to use and

maintain the disputed area as before.

The Manougians dispute that Ms. Ejdys and her predecessors

continuously occupied the disputed area. However, at various times from

1962 on both properties were used as seasonal residences. Neither was

continuously occupied throughout the period. However, occupation is

“continuous” within the context of adverse possession when it involves “the

kind and degree of occupancy (i.e. use and enjoyment) that an average owner

would make of the property”, Striefel, supra at 993. Both properties were

seasonal residences, occasionally occupied on a full-time basis. The fact that

from time to time the properties were unoccupied during the off-season does

break this continuity; nor does the several months hiatus between the Powell

and Ejdys occupancy, while the property was owned by the USA. Ms. Ejdys’

predecessors, Mrs. Brown and Mr. Powell occupied the property

“continuously”, both as a full-time and a seasonal residence for well over 20

years.

The Manougians argue that the disputed area was never closed off from

use. While true that the old fences did not run the entire length of the

disputed boundary, it is also true that Ms. Ejdys’ predecessors consistently

maintained (mowed, planted, weeded) the disputed area and that the

Manougian predecessors ignored it. “Exclusive” does not mean that others

were not permitted entry, but rather that the property was not shared with

The evidence shows that Ms. Ejdys’ predecessors exclu ively used

and maintained the disputed area.

Thus, on her counterclaim, I find and conclude that a declaratory

judgment should be entered for Ms. Ejdys on her claims to the disputed area

on the basis of adverse possession. Counsel will prepare a judgment suitable

for recording to effectuate this decision.

oLAINTIFFS:

JEFENDANT:

Dated: January bo , 2003

Paul Cadigan, Esq. i LW 2.

PO Box 116 . Arthdir Brennan

Kennebunk Me 04043 . :

Justice, Superior Court

John Kugler, Esq.

1662 Post Rd #A-5

Wells Me 04090

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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