The opinion
STATE OF MAINE SUPERIOR COURT
ANDROSCOGGIN, ss. CIVIL ACTION
Erect No. CV- Is Jo
-AND
THOMAS M. MANGAN,
Plaintiff
ORDER ON DEFENDANT
Vv. MATHIS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
SAMMUEL M. MATHIS, ESQ.
and Q DONALD L. GARBRECHT
DAWN M. LAPIERRE, LAW LIBRARY
Defendants
FEB 26 2003
PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND BACKGROUND
Dawn LaPierre is the biological daughter of Angela LaPierre and the step-
daughter of Robert LaPierre. Two months before her death in April 1995, Angela
LaPierre transferred to her daughter income-producing real property in Mechanic Falls.
On April 25, 1995, Dawn LaPierre purchased additional real property in Auburn,
Maine, but transferred that property to her stepfather, Robert LaPierre, the following
day. In May 1995, she assigned her right to the Mechanic Falls real property to her
father. At the time of these transactions, Dawn LaPierre was still a minor. Thomas
Mangan, who was then licensed to practice law, represented Robert LaPierre.’
In June 1997, Attorney Samuel Mathis filed suit on behalf of Dawn LaPierre
against her stepfather and Mangan, alleging fraud, conversion and unjust enrichment
(AND-RE-97-054). With his Answer, Mangan filed a cross-claim for fraud, defamation,
malpractice, and abuse of process against Mathis. In October 1997, Mangan withdrew
‘In 2001, Mangan was disbarred for misconduct. Board of Overseers of the Bar v. Mangan, 2001 ME 7, 763
A.2d 1189.
his cross claim and, in February 1998, Justice Delahanty dismissed that cross claim,
without prejudice.
In an Order dated March 27, 1998, Justice Delahanty found that the claims
against Mangan and Robert LaPierre had been settled, and ordered that the case would
be dismissed without prejudice unless documents showing final disposition were filed
within thirty days. Attorneys for Dawn and Robert LaPierre filed a Stipulation of
Dismissal on April 27, 1998. Although that Stipulation failed to refer to the claim
against Mangan, Justice Delahanty’s March 27, 1998 Order dismissed any claims against
him, effective April 27, 1998.
In a complaint filed March 28, 2002, Mangan, representing himself, resurrected
the claims he made against Mathis in the cross-claim mentioned above, and added
Dawn LaPierre as a defendant. On August 1, 2002, Mathis filed a motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to M.R. Civ-P.
12(b)(6). In an Order dated October 11, 2002, this court dismissed Counts I and III of
plaintiff's complaint against Mathis, and dismissed the claims of fraud and abuse of
process raised in Count Il. The only remaining claims, therefore, are the claim of
“malicious prosecution” contained in Count II of plaintiff’s complaint, and the claim of
abuse of process contained in Count IV.
On January 10, 2003, Mathis filed a motion for summary judgment, including a
Statement of Material Facts containing 13 paragraphs and 17 subparagraphs, and
statements’ from himself and from Attorney Harvey Weiner, both dated January 8,
2003. Mangan responded on January 31, 2003 by filing an “Opposition to Motion,” an
“Opposition to Material Facts,” and two of his own, notarized affidavits. He also filed a
motion to dismiss the motion for summary judgment, based upon the flawed
* Although captioned “affidavits,” neither document contains a Jurat.
“affidavits.” In response, on February 7, 2003, Attorney Weiner filed a photocopy of
Mathis’s January 8, 2003 statement stapled to a separate piece of paper containing the
following language:
Before me appeared Samuel Mathis to me personally known
and stated that the above affidavit is based on personal
knowledge unless otherwise stated and to matters stated on
information and belief he believes them to be true.
Below that language is an illegible signature of someone identified as ” Attorney at
Law.” No attorney registration number has been included, and it is not clear where this
person is authorized to practice law. This paragraph is also not dated.
In addition, Attorney Weiner filed his own affidavit, dated February 6, 2003,
containing an appropriate Jurat, and witnessed by a Notary Public. On February 18,
2003, Mangan filed a motion to exclude the documents filed on February 7.
DISCUSSION
In Count II of his Complaint, Mangan claimed that Mathis lacked probable cause
to file LaPierre’s original suit against him, alleged that the suit was filed with a primary
purpose other than that of securing the proper adjudication of the claim upon which the
proceedings were based, and alleged that the suit was terminated in his favor. In Count
IV, he alleged that Mathis had abused legal process by failing to dismiss an attachment.
As was previously found, the pleadings were sufficient to withstand dismissal under
MLR. Civ. P. 12. That is, the pleadings alleged all of the required elements to allege
cognizable claims of wrongful use of civil proceedings and abuse of process.
The issue now before the court is whether Mangan’s claims can withstand a
summary judgment attack. The standards for decision on motions for summary
judgment have been addressed in many cases, including Champagne v. Mid-Maine Med.
Ctr., 1998 ME 87, 15, 711 A.2d 842, 844. There, the Law Court stated:
15 In reviewing a summary judgment, we
examine the evidence in the light most favorable to the
nonprevailing party to determine whether the record
supports the conclusion that there is no genuine issue of
material fact and that the prevailing party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law. See Petillo v. City of Portland,
657 A.2d 325, 326 (Me. 1995). In testing the propriety of a
summary judgment, we accept as true the uncontroverted
facts properly appearing in the record. See Gerber v. Peters,
584 A.2d 605, 607 (Me. 1990) (citing Field, McKusick &
Wroth, Maine Civil Practice § 56.4 at 357 (2d ed. Supp. 1981).
In reviewing the defendant’s motion, the court must first assure itself that the
alleged statements of material fact are supported by the record. Here, the court must
disregard all statements that refer to either Mathis’s “affidavit,” or Weiner’s “affidavit”
as the record citation. Neither “affidavit,” as originally filed, was in a form that could be
considered by the court. Mangan’s motion correctly noted that there is no basis for
allowing the defendant to correct such an error. In addition, even if the affidavits filed
on February 7, 2003 were accepted, the Mathis affidavit is still completely unacceptable.
First, M.R. Civ. P. 56(e) allows only those affidavits that are made on personal
knowledge.’ Mathis’s “affidavit” contains numerous statements with information he
attributes to others. Second, a photocopied document, stapled to an insufficient Jurat, is
legally insufficient for any purpose.
That leaves only paragraphs 10 and 11 of the statement of material facts with
citations to the record. Because Mangan did not deny the facts asserted in either
paragraph 10 or paragraph 11, those paragraphs, have been admitted. It has now been
established, therefore, that the attachment in question expired by operation of law on
September 2, 1998, and that property at 8 Dion Street was sold on March 21, 2002.
Those matters will not have to be established at trial. However, this information is
° The affidavits filed by Mangan are, for the same reason, legally insufficient for summary
judgment practice.
insufficient to provide the court with a basis for determining that Mathis is entitled to
summary judgment on either of the remaining claims.
ORDER
For the reasons stated above, defendant Mathis’s
motion for summary judgment is denied.
The clerk is directed to incorporate this order by reference in the docket for this
case.
Dated: Enacy (i 2004,
Ll —-
Ellen A. Goxeman
‘Thomas M. Mangan
Dawn M. Lapierre
Samuel M. Mathis
_Pro Se
Matthew S. Keegan, Esq.
‘John J. Q' Connor, Esq.
Harvey Weiner, Esq. "aan,
SUPERIOR COURT
CIVIL ACTION
Docket No. CV-02-047 _
EAC” AND~ &fya jerry
STATE OF MAINE
ANDROSCOGGIN, ss.
THOMAS M. MANGAN,
Plaintiff
ORDER ON DEFENDANT
v. LAPIERRE’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
SAMMUEL M. MATHIS, ESQ.
and
DAWN M. LAPIERRE, DONALD 1. ¢
Defendants LAW
FEB 26 sigs
PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND BACKGROUND .
Dawn LaPierre is the biological daughter of Angela LaPierre and the step-
daughter of Robert LaPierre. Two months before her death in April 1995, Angela
LaPierre transferred to her daughter income-producing real property in Mechanic Falls.
On April 25, 1995, Dawn LaPierre purchased additional real property in Auburn, Maine,
but transferred that property to her father, Robert LaPierre, the following day. In May
1995, she assigned her right to the Mechanic Falls real property to her stepfather. At
the time of these transactions, Dawn LaPierre was still a minor. Thomas Mangan, who
was then licensed to practice law, represented Robert LaPierre.’
In June 1997, Attorney Samuel Mathis filed suit on behalf of Dawn LaPierre
against her stepfather and Mangan, alleging fraud, conversion and unjust enrichment
(AND-RE-97-054). With his Answer, Mangan filed a cross-claim for fraud, defamation,
malpractice, and abuse of process against Mathis. In October 1997, Mangan withdrew
his cross claim and, in February 1998, Justice Delahanty dismissed that cross claim,
without prejudice.
‘In 2001, Mangan was disbarred for misconduct. Board of Overseers of the Bar v. Mangan, 2001 ME 7,
763 A.2d 1189.
In an Order dated March 27, 1998, Justice Delahanty found that the claims against
Mangan and Robert LaPierre had been settled, and ordered that the case would be
dismissed without prejudice unless documents showing final disposition were filed
within thirty days. Attorneys for Dawn and Robert LaPierre filed a Stipulation of
Dismissal on April 27, 1998. Although that Stipulation failed to refer to the claim against
Mangan, Justice Delahanty’s March 27, 1998 Order dismissed any claims against him,
effective April 27, 1998.
In a complaint filed March 28, 2002, Mangan, representing himself, resurrected
the claims he made against Mathis in the cross-claim mentioned above, and added
Dawn LaPierre as a defendant. On December 16, 2002, LaPierre filed a motion to
dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to MR.
Civ.P. 12(b)(6). In an Order dated February 12, 2002, this court dismissed Counts I, II,
and IV of plaintiff’s complaint against LaPierre, and dismissed the claims of fraud and
abuse of process raised in Count II. The only remaining claim, therefore, is the claim of
malicious prosecution contained in Count II of plaintiff’s complaint.
On January 10, 2003, LaPierre filed a motion for summary judgment, including a
Statement of Material Facts containing 101 paragraphs. Mangan responded on January
31, 2003 by filing one document entitled “Stated Opposition,” and another “Response.”
LaPierre filed a timely reply memorandum to Mangan’s opposition on February 7,
2003, along with one alleged uncontested fact, i.e., that Mangan had been sent the
Request for Admission. Because Mangan admitted that he received the Request for
Admission on November 12, 2002, that issue is not contested. Mangan’s motion to
exclude the reply memorandum is denied; reply pleadings are allowed under M.R. Civ.
P: 7.
DISCUSSION
In Count II of his Complaint, Mangan claimed that LaPierre lacked probable
cause to file her original suit against him, alleged that the suit was filed with a primary
purpose other than that of securing the proper adjudication of the claim upon which the
proceedings were based, and alleged that the suit was terminated in his favor. As was
previously found, the pleading was sufficient to withstand dismissal under MLR. Civ. P.
12. That is, the pleading alleged all of the required elements to allege a cognizable
claim:
The tort of wrongful use of civil proceedings exists
where (1) one initiates, continues, or procures civil
proceedings without probable cause, (2) with a primary
purpose other than that of securing the proper adjudication
of the claim upon which the proceedings are based, and (3)
the proceedings have terminated in favor of the person
against whom they were brought.
Pepperell Trust v. Mountain Heir Fin. Corp., 1998 ME 46, [J 14-16, 708 A.2d 651, 656.
The issue now before the court is whether Mangan’s claim for wrongful use of
civil proceedings can withstand a summary judgment attack. The standards for decision
on motions for summary judgment have been addressed in many cases, including
Champagne v. Mid-Maine Med. Ctr., 1998 ME 87, [] 5 & 9, 711 A.2d 842, 844-45. There,
the Law Court stated: °
75 In reviewing a summary judgment, we
examine the evidence in the light most favorable to the
nonprevailing party to determine whether the record
supports the conclusion that there is no genuine issue of
material fact and that the prevailing party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law. See Petillo v. City of Portland,
657 A.2d 325, 326 (Me. 1995). In testing the propriety of a
summary judgment, we accept as true the uncontroverted
facts properly appearing in the record. See Gerber v. Peters,
584 A.2d 605, 607 (Me. 1990) (citing Field, McKusick &
Wroth, Maine Civil Practice § 56.4 at 357 (2d ed. Supp. 1981).
7 9 Where a plaintiff will have the burden of proof
on an essential issue at trial, and it is clear that the defendant
would be entitled to a judgment as a matter of law at trial if
the plaintiff presented nothing more than was before the
court at the hearing on the motion for a summary
judgment, the court may properly grant a defendant’s
motion for a summary judgment. See Town of Lisbon v.
Thayer Corp., 675 A.2d 514, 517 (Me. 1996); Gerber, 584 A.2d
at 607; see also MLR. Civ. P. 50(a). To avoid a judgment as a
matter of law for a defendant, a plaintiff must establish a
prima facie case for each element of her cause of action. See
Fleming v. Gardner, 658 A.2d 1074, 1076 (Me. 1995). A
judgment as a matter of law in a defendant’s favor is proper
when any jury verdict for the plaintiff would be based on
conjecture or speculation. See id.; Barnes v. Zappia, 658 A.2d
1086, 1089 (Me. 1995).
Initially, the court is compelled to find that Mangan’s opposition to many of the
assertions contained in LaPierre’s statement of material facts is both untimely and
unacceptable. Although he filed a timely response to this motion, Mangan failed to file
a timely response to LaPierre’s Request for Admissions. Pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 36,
the matters contained in that Request were all admitted when Mangan failed to serve a
written answer or objection within thirty (30) days after service.
LaPierre’s Request to Admit was filed with the court on November 12, 2002.
Mangan’s response was filed with the court on December 18, 2002. Thirty days from the
date of service was December 12, 2002, a Thursday. Even applying the 3-day mail
“grace period” allowed by M.R. Civ. P. 6(c), and allowing for Sunday, Mangan’s
response was due by December 16, 2002, a Monday.’ By failing to file a timely
objection, Mangan admitted that he never asked LaPierre to discharge the attachment,
and never asked her to provide a certificate of discharge. He also admitted that
LaPierre had probable cause to make the allegations contained in her June 10, 1997
complaint against him, and that he suffered no harm to his reputation as a result of her
Complaint or the resulting Attachment.
An issue is “genuine” and can survive summary judgment if the evidence about
the fact is such that a reasonable jury could resolve the point in favor of the nonmoving
party. See Kenny v. Dep’t of Human Servs., 1999 ME 158, J 3, 740 A.2d 560, 562; Prescott v.
State Tax Assessor, 1998 ME 250, J 5, 721 A.2d 169, 171-72 (issue is “genuine” when facts
require a choice between the parties’ differing versions of the truth); Roche v. John
Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 81 F.3d 249, 253 (1st Cir. 1996). With the uncontested
admissions mentioned above, Mangan provided LaPierre with all of the undisputed
facts she needed to establish summary judgment.
However, even if Mangan’s failure to object to the request for admissions is
excluded or ignored, LaPierre is still entitled to judgment on the remaining claim
against her, because Mangan has failed to properly controvert her Statement of
Material Facts. Opposing statements of fact must “admit, deny or. qualify” facts by
reference to each numbered paragraph of the other party’s statement. In addition, a
denial or qualification must be supported by a record citation. Unsupported denials do
not satisfy the admissibility standard of Rule 56(e). In his response to LaPierre’s
Statement of Material Facts, Mangan did not once refer to a portion of the record that
might support his denials or qualifications.
Once LaPierre presented materials in her statement of material facts indicating
that no genuine issue of material fact existed, the burden shifted to Mangan to point to
specific facts demonstrating that a disputed fact for trial does exist. See Nat’
Amusements, Inc. v. Town of Dedham, 43 F.3d 731, 735 (1st Cir. 1995); Champagne v. Mid-
? Although both Rule 6 and Rule 36 permit the court to grant extensions of time, Mangan made no request
Maine Med. Cir., 1998 ME 87, J 9, 711 A.2d 842, 845. As the party with the burden of
proof on the remaining claim against LaPierre, Mangan’s obligation to come forward
with appropriate evidence of a disputed fact through a proper statement of material
facts was particularly important. See Int’l Ass’n of Machinists and Aerospace Workers,
AFL-CIO v. Winship Green Nursing Ctr., 103 F.3d 196, 200 (1st Cir. 1996); Champagne,
1998 ME 87, 79, 711 A.2d at 845. His failure to do so leaves the court no option but to
grant summary judgment to LaPierre.
Mangan also filed another document on February 18, 2003, entitled
“Memorandum of Law in Opposition” to LaPierre’s motion. That document has not
been considered by the court, as it does not fall within any of the pleadings allowed by
MLR. Civ. P. 7.
ORDER
For the reasons stated above, defendant LaPierre’s
motion for summary judgment is granted.
The clerk is directed to incorporate this order by reference in the docket for this
case.
Dated: loner (4, 2063
(ee A Obrman
for an extension. In addition, the 3-day grace period is available once, not twice, as asserted by Mangan.