Anderson v. Town of Durham

STATE OF MAINE

CUMBERLAND, ss.

SUPERIOR COURT

CIVIL ACTION

DOCKET NO. CV-02-480

wad ua OU 3 UbREC —CUM> 3/4. a00F

JULIA AND KEVIN ANDERSON, mrss

BETHANY AND DALE DANIELS,

JILL AND LIONEL C. GUAY, IIL,

SHARON AND STEPHEN JEROME,

CHRISTINE KOZA, MAY 29 2003

JERILYN AND MICHAEL WARD,

Plaintiffs

ORDER ON DEFENDANTS TOWN OF

DURHAM, DURHAM SCHOOL DEPARTMENT,

Vv. SUPERINTENDENT SHANNON L. WELSH,

MINOT SCHOOL DEPARTMENT,

SUPERINTENDENT ROBERT E. WALL, TOWN

OF RAYMOND, RAYMOND SCHOOL

DEPARTMENT, AND SUPERINTENDENT

SANDRA S. CALDWELL’S MOTION TO

DISMISS

TOWN OF DURHAM,

DURHAM SCHOOL DEPARTMENT,

SUPERINTENDENT SHANNON L. WELSH,

MINOT SCHOOL DEPARTMENT,

SUPERINTENDENT ROBERT E. WALL,

TOWN OF RAYMOND,

RAYMOND SCHOOL DEPARTMENT, «0 <*- =< meter se ues aes

SUPERINTENDENT SANDRA S. CALDWELL,

MAINE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION,

COMMISSIONER J. DUKE ALBANESE,

Defendants

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

This matter comes before the court upon a Motion to Dismiss by the Defendants

Town of Raymond, Town of Durham, and the towns?’ respective school departments and

superintendents pursuant to Maine Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Defendant Minot

School Department and superintendent join in the motion and additionally move for

judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Maine Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c).

Defendant Town of Durham and Defendant Town of Minot are members of

school unions’ and Defendant Town of Raymond operates the Raymond School

Department; the school systems are operated separately from one another. None of the

school administrative units within Defendant towns operate public high schools. Because

state law requires that all municipalities provide education to residents through the

twelfth grade, the Defendant school administrative units must elect either to contract with

a public school outside the municipality or reimburse those students living within the

municipality who choose to attend an approved private school, a public school, or a

school approved for tuition purposes in another state.

In August 2002 Plaintiff Christine Koza requested reimbursement from the

Defendant Raymond School Department for tuition payments made to St. Dominic’s

Regional High School (St. Dominic’s) on behalf of her son. St. Dominic’s is a private

Catholic high school. The Raymond School Department denied her request on the

- ground that her claim was barred by 20-A M-R-S-A. § 2951(2), which exchides the oe

participation of sectarian schools from the state’s tuition reimbursement program.

Plaintiff Koza—joined by the Anderson, Guay, Jerome, Daniels, and Ward

families, who also elected to send their children to private religious institutions not

approved for tuition reimbursement (collectively referred to as Andersons)’—-brought

' Durham is a member of School Union 30 and Minot is a member of School Union 29. Schools unions are

organized according to 20-A M.R.S.A. § 1901-1903 (West 1993).

* Julia and Kevin Anderson reside in Durham and their son David attends Pine Tree Academy, which is a

Seventh Day Adventist academy. The Andersons are practicing Seventh Day Adventists. Jill and Lionel

Guay live in Minot. Their daughter Ashley is a sophomore at St. Dominic’s. They aver that their choice of

St. Dominic’s was based on the excellent academic reputation of St. Dominic’s as well as the Guays’ belief

in the Catholic faith. Sharon and Stephen Jerome live in Raymond. The Jeromes send their son, Matthew,

to St. Dominic’s, because of the excellent academic program and because of their belief in the Catholic

faith. Bethany and Dale Daniels live in Durham and their son Kyle is a sophomore at St. Dominic’s

Regional High School. The Daniels send Kyle to St. Dominic’s because of its academic reputation.

suit against the towns, the towns’ respective school departments and superintendents,.the

Maine Department of Education, and the Commissioner of Education (collectively

referred to as Defendants). The Andersons contend that the Defendants’ refusal to

reimburse them for tuition expenses at the schools of their choice violates their federal

constitutional rights. Specifically, the Andersons contend that the application of Maine

law authorizing tuition reimbursement violates their First Amendment right to Free

Exercise of Religion, the Establishment Clause of the Federal Constitution, the First

Amendment right to Freedom of Speech, and Equal Protection under the Fourteenth

Amendment. (Complaint, {[{] 41, 44, 47, 50; 20-A M.R.S.A. § 295 1(2).)

DISCUSSION

Defendants Town of Raymond, Town of Durham, and their respective school

administrative districts and superintendents (Raymond and Durham)’ now move to

~ dismaiss‘the complaint pursuant to‘ M.-R:Crv:P: 12¢b)(6)- In particular; Raymond and: =< oe se

Durham contend first, that the doctrine of res judicata bars the Andersons from bringing

the case at bar and second, that Raymond and Durham are not civilly liable under § 1983

of the Federal Civil Rights Act.

A civil action may be dismissed when the complaint fails to state a claim upon

which relief can be granted. M.R.CIv. P. 12(b)(6). Such a motion tests the legal

sufficiency of the complaint, Plimpton v. Gerrard, 668 A.2d 882, 885 (Me. 1995), and

Christine Koza resides in Raymond. Her son Brendan is a freshman at St. Dominic’s. Ms. Koza avers that

she sends Brendan to St. Dominic’s because of the excellent reputation. Jerilyn and Michael Ward also live

in Raymond. Their son Lucas also attends St. Dominic’s because of the excellent academic program.

3 Their Motion is joined by the Minot School Department and its superintendent. The Department of

Education and the Commissioner of Education, the remaining defendants, do not join in this motion to

dismiss. oe .

not the sufficiency of the evidence the plaintiff is likely able to present. Barnes v.

McGough, 623 A.2d 144, 146 (Me. 1993). The allegations of the complainant are viewed

as true for the purposes of the motion and cast in a light most favorable to the plaintiff.

In re Wage Payment Litigation, 2000 ME 162, { 3, 752 A.2d 217, 220. Thus, a motion to

dismiss is properly granted when it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff is entitled to

no relief under the facts that might be proved in support of the claim. Dutil v. Burns, 674

A.2d 910, 911 (Me. 1996).

According to Maine law, all municipalities within the state are required to provide

an education to residents from kindergarten through the twelfth grade. 20-A M.R.S.A. §

1001(8) (West 1993). The majority of municipalities meet this requirement by

establishing a school administrative district. A “school administrative unit” is a “state-

approved unit of school administration and includes a municipal school unit, school

administrative district, community school district or any other municipal or quasi-

“ss "+" ~truneipal cerporation responsible for-wperating-or constructing-schools += ."-20-A--~

MLR.S.A. § 1(26) (West 1993). School districts have the power to sue and be sued. See,

e.g., 20-A M.R.S.A. § 3613; 14. M.R.S.A. § 505; School Admin. Dist #3 v. Maine School

Dist., 185 A.2d 744, 746 (Me. 1962) (parties conceding that school districts have the

power to sue and be sued); see generally 14 M.R.S.A. § 8101 et seq. (West 1993). The

Law Court has held that school administrative units authorized by statute are legal

entities distinct from the municipalities from which they are created. Pickering v. Town

of Sedgwick, 628 A.2d 149, 150 (Me. 1993). Local school committees are agents of the

state and are legally distinct from municipalities. Pickering, 628 A.2d at 150; see also

School Comm. of Winslow v. Town of Winslow, 404 A.2d 988, 992 (Me. 1979).

Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel:

Raymond and Durham first contend that the Andersons’ complaint is barred by

the doctrine of res judicata, the principles and application of which are well-settled in

Maine.’ See, e.g., DuMont v. Fleet Bank of Maine, 2000 ME 197, 760 A.2d 1049;

Machias Sav. Bank v. Ramsdell, 1997 ME 20, 41 11, 689 A.2d 595, 599; Johnson v.

Samson Constr. Co, 1997 ME 220, 704 A.2d 866; Connecticut Nat’! Bank v. Kendall,

617 A.2d 544, 547 (Me. 1992); Beegan v. Schmidt, 451 A.2d 642, 643-44 (Me. 1982).

Res judicata is “a court-made collection of rules designed to ensure that the same matter

will not be litigated more than once.” Machias Sav. Bank, 1997 ME 20, 4 11, 689 A.2d

595, 599. To avoid the doctrine of res judicata, a plaintiff

must plead all theories of recovery then available to him; he “cannot splinter his

claim and litigate it separately in a piecemeal fashion by asserting in a subsequent

law suit other grounds of recovery for the same claim when he had reasonable

opportunity to raise and litigate the same grounds in the former action.”

» Barter ve Boothbay/Boothbay-ffarber Community School Dist; 564 822d 766,°768-€Me: - >

1989) (citations omitted). Res judicata functions to bar a plaintiff from relitigation of a

claim “if: (1) the same parties or their privies are involved in both actions; (2) a valid

final judgment was entered in the prior action; and (3) the matters presented for decision

in the second action were, or might have been litigated in the first action.” Machias Sav.

Bank, 1997 ME 20, § 11, 689 A.2d at 599.

* Res judicata is distinguishable from the related doctrine of collateral estoppel, sometimes referred to as

“issue preclusion,” “which merely prevents the reopening in a second action of an issue of fact actually

litigated and decided in an earlier case.” Res judicata, also referred to as “claim preclusion” “prohibits

relitigation of an entire cause of action. ...” Beegan v. Schmidt, 451 A.2d 642, 644 (Me. 1982) (emphasis

added). Although the Towns initially raise the theory of claim preclusion, the brief fails to fully develop

this distinction in its argument.

Laing

Raymond and Durham primarily contend that the Andersons’ Complaint should

be dismissed because the Andersons were “in privity” with the plaintiffs in Bagley v.

Raymond School Dep’t, 1999 ME 60, 728 A.2d 127. See also Bagley v. Raymond School

Dep't, 1997 Me. Super. LEXIS 375, CV-97-484 (Me. Super. Ct., Cum. Cty., Dec. 9,

1997) (Mills, J.). Privity exists where two parties so identify in interest “‘that they

represent one single, legal right.’” Tungate v. Gardner, 2002 ME 85, 49, 797 A.2d 738,

7A] (citing Boulanger v. Comeau, 663 A.2d 46, 48 (Me. 1995). The First Circuit has

held that under certain situations if a party to the second action was not named as a

litigant in the prior suit, the first prong of the res judicata test may still be satisfied.

Gonzalez v. Banco Central Corp., 27 F.3d 751, 758 (Ist Cir. 1994). Such circumstances

arise where “a nonparty either substantially controlled a party’s involvement in the initial

litigation, or, conversely, permitted a party to the initial litigation to function as its de

facto representative.” Id.

wes semen oo me ss Raymond and Durham -contend privity exists+to satisfythe first requirenrent-ot res: *

judicata because first, the plaintiffs in the present action are represented by the same

attorneys who also appeared on behalf of the plaintiffs in Bagley and second, the

plaintiffs in Bagley also challenged the constitutionality of 20-A M.R.S.A. 2951(2) upon

Raymond School Department’s refusal to reimburse tuition expenses to a religious

institution. Raymond and Durham further contend that because some of the plaintiffs in

the case at bar reside in the Defendant Town of Raymond and parties in both actions

possessed similar motivation for challenging the constitutionality of § 2951(2), privity

exists between the Bagley plaintiffs and the Andersons.

Privity cannot exist absent a “special relationship” between two sets of plaintiffs

or absent the failure of a plaintiff to join a class action suit. South Central Bell Ti elephone

Co. v. Alabama, 526 U.S. 160, 167-68 (1999).° The essence of Raymond and Durham’s

res judicata argument is that the Andersons’ attorneys are the same counsel that

represented the Bagley plaintiffs and that alone is not enough to establish a “special

relationship” between two sets of plaintiffs. Because this is a Motion to Dismiss, the

court may look only at the legal sufficiency of the pleadings and take the material

allegations of the complaint as true. Shaw v. Southern Aroostook Community School

Dist., 683 A.2d 502, 503 (Me. 1996). None of the plaintiffs in the case at bar were

litigants in Bagley; in fact the only common party is Raymond, which was a named

defendant in Bagley. Raymond and Durham allege neither that the Bagley plaintiffs

initiated a class suit nor that “the judgment they received . . . purport[ed] to bind any”

nonparties. South Central Bell Telephone Co., 526 U.S. at 167. The Motion to Dismiss

-on-the basts of res judicata is denied. 2 6 ee were ee

Imposition of Federal Civil Liability Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983:

Raymond and Durham next argue that no federal civil liability exists pursuant to §

1983. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2003). The Andersons allege in their complaint that the

enforcement of 20-A M.R.S.A. § 2951 violates their First and Fourteenth Amendment

rights. They seek injunctive relief and damages against all Defendants based upon the

* The facts in South Central Bell involved two different sets of plaintiffs, in two different tax years, each

claiming discrimination on the basis of violation of the Commerce Clause and the Equal Protection Clause.

Neither action was a class action nor was privity found to exist by the Court between the two sets of

plaintiffs.

Dake Do gtr go

extension of § 1983 liability to municipalities by the U.S. Supreme Court in Monell v.

Dept. of Soc. Servs. of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978).

Also known as the Civil Rights Act of 1871, § 1983 provides a civil action for the

deprivation of rights by any person against a citizen of the United States under color of

state law. Jd. A civil action for deprivation of rights is provided to

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or

usage, of any State .. . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the

United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of

any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall

be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper

proceeding for redress... .

42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2003). For purposes of §1983, the definition of “person” includes

“local governments, municipal corporations, and school boards.” 1 US.C.§ 1(10); see

also Monell, 436 U.S. at 688-90. Such “persons” are subject to liability for the violation

of an individual’s constitutionally protected rights. 42 U.S.C. § 1983; see also generally

Monell, 436 U.S. 658. Pursuant to the definition, Raymond and Durham are considered

“persons” for purposes of §1983. Thus, the issue is whether liability may be extended to

Raymond and Durham under this statute.

In 1978, the U.S. Supreme Court overruled Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961),

to the extent that the Court had previously interpreted § 1983 as granting absolute

immunity to local governments.° Monell, 436 U.S. at 663. The Monell Court held that

although “a local government may not be sued under § 1983 for an injury inflicted solely

by its employees or agents” it may be liable “when execution of a government’s policy ..

° The Supreme Court in Monroe held that “Congress did not undertake to bring municipal corporations

within the ambit of [§ 1983].” Monell, 436 U.S. at 664 (citing Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167). The Court

did not overrule the principle that respondeat superior is not grounds for municipal liability under § 1983

for the constitutional torts of their employees. Jd. at 663, n.7; see also McMillian v. Monroe County, 520

U.S. 781 (1997).

. inflicts the injury the government as an entity is responsible under § 1983.” Monell, 436

U.S. at 695. In removing this limitation, the Court declined to address “the full contours

of municipal liability under § 1983.” Id.

The Supreme Court’s declination to define the extent of municipal liability has

generated a progeny of circuit court opinions. These cases address the question of

whether municipal liability rests upon the express adoption or incorporation of local

regulations or policies or whether civil liability may be extended to local actors acting

pursuant to state law. See, e.g., Surplus Store and Exchange, Inc. v. City of Delphi, 928

F.2d 788 (7th Cir. 1991) (imposing no liability upon local officials enforcing state law);

Bigford v. Taylor, 834 F.2d 1213, 1222 (5th Cir. 1988) (the enforcement of state law by

local officials does not give rise to § 1983 liability); cf, Chaloux v. Killeen, 886 F.2d 247,

251 (9 Cir. 1989) (finding that “the Monell doctrine did not intend to limit the reach of

plaintiffs seeking prospective relief under § 1983 .. . under an allegedly unconstitutional

“state statute”). The Seventh-Circuit’s opinion in Surplus Store & Exch: ‘Inc.-v. City of

Delphi enunciated the principles advanced by the Supreme Court’s holding in Monell. In

essence, the Seventh Circuit held that § 1983 liability must be triggered by the adoption

of an unconstitutional policy or regulation by a municipality, not by the enforcement of

state law by local actors.

Although the First Circuit has declined to engage in its own Monell analysis or

specifically address municipal liability under § 1983, at least one opinion from that

circuit has commented on the Seventh Circuit’s interpretation. Yeo v. Town of Lexington,

131 F.3d 241, 257 (1st Cir. 1997).’ In his concurring opinion, Judge Stahl wrote,

7 Judge Lynch, writing for an en banc court, noted that

[t]he Town’s freedom from liability flows less from the fact that the [plaintiffs]

are private actors than from the fact that the [plaintiffs’] actions were not caused

by Town policy or custom . . . it seems obvious that, as an action taken in what

appears to have been good faith reliance upon state law... . cannot give rise to

municipal liability under § 1983.

Yeo v. Town of Lexington, 131 F.3d at 257 (citing Surplus Store & Exch., Inc., 928 F.2d

at 791-92).

Soon after the First Circuit’s decision in Yeo, the District Court of Maine directly

adopted the Seventh Circuit’s rationale. Strout v. Maine Dept. of Education, 97-259-B-H

(Dist. Me., Jan. 26, 1998) (Cohen, M.J.). Magistrate Cohen noted that Monell did not

resolve finally the issue of the applicability of § 1983 liability, but only removed the

shield of absolute immunity for local municipalities. Jd. at 5. The Maine District Court

(Hormby, C.J.), which granted judgment in accordance with the recommendation of

Magistrate Cohen, adopted the view that liability may only be imposed against the

adoption of an unconstitutional local regulation. Jd. at 8. Rejecting the Ninth Circuit’s

~ . position in Chaloux, supra, the-Strout-eourt held that “any municipal liability under

section 1983, regardless of the relief sought, must be premised on some culpable act that

can fairly be attributed to the municipality.” Jd.

Applying the Seventh Circuit’s analysis of the applicability of § 1983 to local

actors acting pursuant to state law, “[w]hile it is true that [Raymond and Durham] did not

enact [the statute], it is equally clear that the city’s policy of enforcing the statute

constitutes state action” and not local action. Surplus Store & Exch., Inc., 928 F.2d at

792. A municipality is not liable under § 1983 unless the municipality itself has been “‘a

Where the statutory and constitutional inquiries are inextricably intertwined, decision of the state

action question is hardly a breach of the obligation to decide cases on statutory grounds in order to

avoid constitutional questions. We do not engage in a separate § 1983 analysis, nor do we reach

the issue of municipal liability, under Monell ....

Yeo v. Town of Lexington, 131 F.3d at 249, n.3.

10

moving force behind the deprivation’ of constitutional rights at issue... .” Strout, 97-

259-B-H, page 8 (Dist. Me., Jan. 26, 1998) (Cohen, M.J .) (citing Kentucky v. Graham,

473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985)). As acknowledged by the Andersons, that is not the case here.

Accordingly, the Andersons have failed to state a claim against Raymond and Durham

pursuant to M.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). Motion to Dismiss is granted.

The entry is:

Defendants Town of Durham, Durham School Department, Superintendent

Shannon L. Welsh, Town of Raymond, Raymond School Department, Superintendent

Sandra S. Caldwell, Minot School Department, and Superintendent Robert E. Wall’s

Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED.

Date at Portland, Maine this [Yarn of , 2003

(Robert E. Crowley

Come mee eee ee te + mm Justice, Superior Court see

11

JULIA ANDERSON - PLAINTIFF

Attorney for: JULIA ANDERSON

JEFFREY EDWARDS

PRETI FLAHERTY BELIVEAU PACHIOS & HALEY

ONE CITY CENTER

PO BOX 9546

PORTLAND ME 04112-9546

KEVIN ANDERSON - PLAINTIFF

Attorney for: KEVIN ANDERSON

JEFFREY EDWARDS

PRETI FLAHERTY BELIVEAU PACHIOS & HALEY

ONE CITY CENTER

PO BOX 9546

PORTLAND ME 04112-9546

JILL GUAY - PLAINTIFF

Attorney for: JILL GUAY

JEFFREY EDWARDS

PRETI FLAHERTY BELIVEAU PACHIOS & HALEY

ONE CITY CENTER

PO BOX 9546

PORTLAND ME 04112-9546

BETHANY DANIELS - PLAINTIFF

Attorney for: BETHANY DANIELS

JEFFREY EDWARDS

PRETI FLAHERTY BELIVEAU PACHIOS & HALEY

ONE CITY CENTER

PO BOX 9546

PORTLAND ME 04112-9546

DALE DANIELS - PLAINTIFF

Attorney for: DALE DANIELS

JEFFREY EDWARDS

PRETI FLAHERTY BELIVEAU PACHIOS & HALEY

ONE CITY CENTER

PO BOX 9546

PORTLAND ME 04112-9546

LIONEL C GUAY III - PLAINTIFF

Attorney for: LIONEL C GUAY III

JEFFREY EDWARDS

PRETI FLAHERTY BELIVEAU PACHTIOS & HALEY

ONE CITY CENTER

PO BOX 9546

PORTLAND ME 04112-9546

SHARON JEROME - PLAINTIFF

Page

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SUPERIOR COURT

CUMBERLAND, ss.

Docket No PORSC-CV-2002-00480

DOCKET RECORD

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Attorney for: SHARON JEROME

JEFFREY EDWARDS

PRETI FLAHERTY BELIVEAU PACHIOS & HALEY

ONE CITY CENTER

PO BOX 9546

PORTLAND ME 04112-9546

STEPHEN JEROME ~- PLAINTIFF

Attorney for: STEPHEN JEROME

JEFFREY EDWARDS

PRETI FLAHERTY BELIVEAU PACHIOS & HALEY

ONE CITY CENTER

PO BOX 9546

PORTLAND ME 04112-9546

CHRISTINE KOZA - PLAINTIFF

Attorney for: CHRISTINE KOZA

JEFFREY EDWARDS

PRETI FLAHERTY BELIVEAU PACHIOS & HALEY

ONE CITY CENTER

PO BOX 9546

PORTLAND ME 04112-9546

JERILYN WARD - PLAINTIFF

Attorney for: JERILYN WARD

JEFFREY EDWARDS

PRETI FLAHERTY BELIVEAU PACHIOS & HALEY

ONE CITY CENTER

PO BOX 9546

PORTLAND ME 04112-9546

MICHAEL WARD - PLAINTIFF

Attorney for: MICHAEL WARD

JEFFREY EDWARDS

PRETI FLAHERTY BELIVEAU PACHIOS & HALEY

ONE CITY CENTER

PO BOX 9546

PORTLAND ME 04112-9546

vs

TOWN OF DURHAM - DEFENDANT

Attorney for: TOWN OF DURHAM

MICHAEL E SAUCIER

THOMPSON & BOWIE

THREE CANAL PLAZA

PO BOX 4630

PORTLAND ME 04112-4630

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PORSC-CV- 2002-00480

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DURHAM SCHOOL DEPT. - DEFENDANT

Attorney for: DURHAM SCHOOL DEPT.

MICHAEL E SAUCIER

THOMPSON & BOWIE

THREE CANAL PLAZA

PO BOX 4630

PORTLAND ME 04112-4630

SHANNON L WELSH (SUPERINTENDENT) - DEFENDANT

Attorney for: SHANNON L WELSH (SUPERINTENDENT)

MICHAEL E SAUCIER

THOMPSON & BOWIE

THREE CANAL PLAZA

PO BOX 4630

PORTLAND ME 04112-4630

MINOT, TOWN OF - DEFENDANT

Attorney for: MINOT, TOWN OF

STEPHEN WADE

SKELTON TAINTOR & ABBOTT

95 MAIN STREET

PO BOX 3200

AUBURN ME 04212-3200

MINOT SCHOOL DEPT. - DEFENDANT

Attorney for: MINOT SCHOOL DEPT.

PETER BRANN

BRANN & ISAACSON

184 MAINE STREET

PO BOX 3070

LEWISTON ME 04243-3070

Attorney for: MINOT SCHOOL DEPT.

TIMOTHY W BLAKELY

BRANN & ISAACSON

184 MAINE STREET

PO BOX 3070

LEWISTON ME 04243-3070

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ROBERT E WALL (SUPERINTENDENT) - DEFENDANT

Attorney for: ROBERT E WALL (SUPERINTENDENT)

PETER BRANN

BRANN & ISAACSON

184 MAINE STREET

PO BOX 3070

LEWISTON ME 04243-3070

Attorney for: ROBERT E WALL (SUPERINTENDENT)

TIMOTHY W BLAKELY

BRANN & ISAACSON

184 MAINE STREET

PO BOX 3070

LEWISTON ME 04243-3070

RAYMOND, TOWN OF - DEFENDANT

Attorney for: RAYMOND, TOWN OF

MICHAEL E SAUCIER

THOMPSON & BOWIE

THREE CANAL PLAZA

PO BOX 4630

PORTLAND ME 04112-4630

RAYMOND SCHOOL DEPT. - DEFENDANT

Attorney for: RAYMOND SCHOOL DEPT.

MICHAEL E SAUCIER

THOMPSON & BOWIE

THREE CANAL PLAZA

PO BOX 4630

PORTLAND ME 04112-4630

SANDRA S CALDWELL (SUPERINTENDENT) ~~ DEFENDANT

Attorney for: SANDRA S CALDWELL (SUPERINTENDENT)

MICHAEL E SAUCIER

THOMPSON & BOWIE

THREE CANAL PLAZA

PO BOX 4630

PORTLAND ME 04112-4630

MAINE DEPT. OF EDUCATION - DEFENDANT

Attorney for: MAINE DEPT. OF EDUCATION

PAUL STERN

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

6 STATE HOUSE STATION

AUGUSTA ME 04333-0006

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J DUKE ALBANES (COMMISSIONER) - DEFENDANT

Attorney for: J DUKE ALBANES (COMMISSIONER)

PAUL STERN

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

6 STATE HOUSE STATION

AUGUSTA ME 04333-0006

MAINE CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION (PARTY W/D) - INTERVENOR

KEN WILLIAMS ~- INTERVENOR

Attorney for: KEN WILLIAMS

JEFFREY THALER

BERNSTEIN SHUR SAWYER & NELSON

100 MIDDLE st

PO BOX 9729

PORTLAND ME 04104-5029

BARBARA WILLIAMS - INTERVENOR

Attorney for: BARBARA WILLIAMS

JEFFREY THALER

BERNSTEIN SHUR SAWYER & NELSON

100 MIDDLE sT ,

PO BOX 9729

PORTLAND ME 04104-5029

TIM MORIN - INTERVENOR

Attorney for: TIM MORIN

JEFFREY THALER

BERNSTEIN SHUR SAWYER & NELSON

100 MIDDLE st

PO BOX 9729

PORTLAND ME 04104-5029

JOAN MORIN - INTERVENOR

Attorney for: JOAN MORIN

JEFFREY THALER

BERNSTEIN SHUR SAWYER & NELSON

100 MIDDLE ST

PO BOX 9729

PORTLAND ME 04104-5029

TIMOTHY FITZGERALD ~- INTERVENOR

Attorney for: TIMOTHY FITZGERALD

JEFFREY THALER

BERNSTEIN SHUR SAWYER & NELSON

100 MIDDLE ST

PO BOX 9729

PORTLAND ME 04104-5029

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LOIS KILBY-CHESLEY - INTERVENOR

Attorney for: LOIS KILBY-CHESLEY

JEFFREY THALER

BERNSTEIN SHUR SAWYER & NELSON

100 MIDDLE ST

PO BOX 9729

PORTLAND ME 04104-5029

W W REILLY,, V - INTERVENOR

Attorney for: W W REILLY,, Vv

JEFFREY THALER

BERNSTEIN SHUR SAWYER & NELSON

100 MIDDLE ST

PO BOX 9729

PORTLAND ME 04104-5029

DAVID E CURRIER - INTERVENOR

Attorney for: DAVID E CURRIER

JEFFREY THALER

BERNSTEIN SHUR SAWYER & NELSON

100 MIDDLE ST

PO BOX 9729

PORTLAND ME 04104-5029

HOWARD T REBEN - INTERVENOR

Attorney for: HOWARD T REBEN

JEFFREY THALER

BERNSTEIN SHUR SAWYER & NELSON

100 MIDDLE ST

PO BOX 9729

PORTLAND ME 04104-5029

Filing Document: COMPLAINT Minor Case Type:

Filing Date: 09/18/2002

Docket Events:

09/18/2002 FILING DOCUMENT - COMPLAINT FILED ON 09/18/2002

WITH EXHIBIT 1

09/18/2002 Party(s): JULIA ANDERSON

ATTORNEY - RETAINED ENTERED ON 09/18/2002

Plaintiff's Attorney: JEFFREY EDWARDS

09/19/2002 Party(s): KEVIN ANDERSON

ATTORNEY - RETAINED ENTERED ON 09/18/2002

Plaintiff's Attorney: JEFFREY EDWARDS

Party(s): JILL GUAY

ATTORNEY ~- RETAINED ENTERED ON 09/18/2002

Page 6 of 16

PORSC-CV-2002-00480

DOCKET RECORD

CONSTITUTIONAL/CIVIL RIGHTS

Printed on: 05/16/2003

09/19/2002

09/19/2002

09/25/2002

09/30/2002

09/30/2002

10/01/2002

PORSC-CV-2002-00480

DOCKET RECORD

Plaintiff's Attorney: JEFFREY EDWARDS

Party(s): BETHANY DANIELS

ATTORNEY - RETAINED ENTERED ON 09/18/2002

Plaintiff's Attorney: JEFFREY EDWARDS

Party(s): DALE DANIELS

ATTORNEY - RETAINED ENTERED ON 09/18/2002

Plaintiff's Attorney: JEFFREY EDWARDS

Party(s): LIONEL C GUAY III

ATTORNEY - RETAINED ENTERED ON 09/18/2002

Plaintiff's Attorney: JEFFREY EDWARDS

Party(s): SHARON JEROME

ATTORNEY - RETAINED ENTERED ON 09/18/2002

Plaintiff's Attorney: JEFFREY EDWARDS

Party(s): STEPHEN JEROME

ATTORNEY - RETAINED ENTERED ON 09/18/2002

Plaintiff's Attorney: JEFFREY EDWARDS

Party(s): CHRISTINE KOZA

ATTORNEY - RETAINED ENTERED ON 09/18/2002

Plaintiff's Attorney: JEFFREY EDWARDS

Party(s): JERILYN WARD

ATTORNEY - RETAINED ENTERED ON 09/18/2002

Plaintiff's Attorney: JEFFREY EDWARDS

ASSIGNMENT - SINGLE JUDGE/JUSTICE ASSIGNED TO JUSTICE ON 09/19/2002

NANCY MILLS , SUPERIOR COURT CHIEF JUSTICE

Party(s): JULIA ANDERSON, KEVIN ANDERSON, JILL GUAY, BETHANY DANIELS,DALE DANIELS, LIONEL C GUAY

III,SHARON JEROME, STEPHEN JEROME, CHRISTINE KOZA, JERILYN WARD

MOTION - MOTION TO ADMIT VISIT. ATTY FILED ON 09/25/2002

PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR ADMISSION TO PRACTICE PURSUANT TO M.R.C.P. 89(B) WITH MEMORANDUM OF

LAW WITH ATTACHMENTS AND PROPOSED ORDER

Party(s): JULIA ANDERSON, KEVIN ANDERSON, JILL GUAY, BETHANY DANTELS,DALE DANIELS, LIONEL C GUAY

III,SHARON JEROME, STEPHEN JEROME , CHRISTINE KOZA, JERILYN WARD

MOTION - MOTION TO ADMIT VISIT. ATTY GRANTED ON 09/30/2002

NANCY MILLS , SUPERIOR COURT CHIEF JUSTICE

ORDER - COURT ORDER ENTERED ON 09/30/2002

NANCY MILLS , SUPERIOR COURT CHIEF JUSTICE

IT IS ORDERED THAT RICHARD D. KOMER, CLARK M. NEILY, AND ROBERT M. FRIEDMANBE ADMITTED TO

PRACTICE IN THIS ACTION. THEY SHALL AT ALL TIMES BE ASSOCIATED WITH ATTORNEY JEFFREY

EDWARDS 9-30-02 COPY MAILED TO JEFFREY EDWARDS

ESQ

Party(s): JULIA ANDERSON, KEVIN ANDERSON, JILL GUAY, BETHANY DANIELS, DALE DANIELS, LIONEL C GUAY

III,SHARON JEROME, STEPHEN JEROME, CHRISTINE KOZA, JERILYN WARD

Page 7 of 16 Printed on: 05/16/2003