holding “subdivision ordinances are not zoning ordinances.”
How later courts described this case
- holding “subdivision ordinances are not zoning ordinances.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
STATE OF MAINE SUPERIOR COURT
HANCOCK, ss CIVIL ACTION
DOCKET # AP-03-11
SUSAN COVINO BUELL, )
)
Plaintiff )
)
v. ) DECISION AND
) ORDER
TOWN OF SOUTHWEST HARBOR, _ )
)
and ) POET en penne a oe
) ay
EDMUND S.B. GILLESPIE )
) cp
Defendants ) SEF aus
Defendants Town of Southwest Harbor (herein, “the Town’) and Edmund S.B.
Gillespie (herein, “Gillespie”) move to dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint pursuant to Rule
12(b)(6) of the Maine Rules of Civil Procedure.
Background
On January 30, 2003, Gillespie received approval for a subdivision from the
Town’s Planning Board. Pursuant to the Town’s Subdivision Ordinance, Plaintiff
appealed the Planning Board’s decision to the Town’s Board of Appeals. On April 15,
2003, the Town’s Board of Appeals acting in an appellate capacity affirmed the Planning
Board’s decision approving Gillespie’s subdivision. On May 30, 2003, Plaintiff appealed
the Town’s Board of Appeals decision to the Superior Court pursuant to M.R.Civ.P. 80B.
On appeal, Plaintiff argues that the Town’s Subdivision Ordinance entitled her to
a de novo review. Plaintiff asserts that the Town’s Board of Appeal’s decision to conduct
an appellate review rather than a de novo review constitutes an abuse of discretion and
error of law. Plaintiff requests this court to vacate the decision of the Town’s Board of
Appeals and to remand the matter for a de novo hearing. In response, on June 20, 2003,
Gillespie and the Town’ moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint pursuant to M.R.Civ.P.
12(b)(6), arguing Plaintiff’ s Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted because the Town’s ordinances authorized the Board of Appeals to conduct a
purely appellate review in this particular proceeding.
Discussion
A. Standard of Review.
A motion to dismiss pursuant to M.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), tests the legal sufficiency of
Plaintiff’s Complaint. Thompson v. Department of Inland Fisheries and Wildlife, 2002
ME 78, § 4, 796 A.2d 674. The Court accepts the plaintiff’s material allegations as
admitted and examines the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. _Id. A
dismissal for failure to state a claim is proper only when it appears beyond doubt that any
set of facts a plaintiff might prove at trial would not entitle her to relief. Id. The legal
sufficiency of a complaint is a question of law. Id.
M.R.Civ.P. 80B provides for review of governmental action. Appeals to the
Superior Court pursuant to Rule 80B must be “provided by statute or otherwise.” Rule
80B(a). Section XII of the Town’s Board of Appeals Ordinance provides that a “decision
of the Board of Appeals may be taken . . . by any party to the Superior Court in
accordance with [Rule 80B].” Southwest Harbor, Me., Board of Appeals Ordinance for
the Town of Southwest Harbor, § XII (May 8, 1990). Review is limited to the record
below unless a motion for trial of facts is granted. Rule 80B(d) & (f).
‘The Town actually joined Gillespie’s Motion to Dismiss in June 25, 2003.
Courts review a municipality’s decision for errors of law, abuse of discretion, or
findings not supported by substantial evidence in the record. Griffen v. Town of
Dedham, 2002 ME 105, § 6, 799 A.2d 1239. “Courts review the Operative municipality
decision.” Drinkwater v. Town of Milford, Penobscot Superior Court docket no. AP-02-
08, entered April 18, 2003 (citing Stewart v. Town of Sedgwick, 2000 ME 157, § 4, 757
A.2d 773). If the Town’s Board of Appeals acted in an appellate capacity, this court
would examine the decision of the previous tribunal, the Town’s Planning Board. See id.
If however, the Town’s Board of Appeals had conducted a de novo review, this court
would examine the Board of Appeals’ decision. Id.
However, this court must first determine whether it was proper in light of the
applicable law for the Town’s Board of Appeals to act in an appellate capacity rather than
conduct a de novo review regarding Plaintiff’s appeal from the Planning Board’s decision
to approve Gillespie’s subdivision. The answer to this question will determine whether
the court should address the merits of Plaintiff's appeal and review the decision of the
Town’s Planning Board or remand this case to the Town’s Board of Appeals with orders
for it to conduct a hearing de novo.
B. Applicable Statutory Law
To determine the proper role of a municipal board of appeals, a court must look at
the statute authorizing municipalities to establish a board of appeals and to the
municipalities own ordinances. Stewart, 2000 ME 157, $6, 757 A.2d at 775; see also
* To be clear, we note that conducting a de novo hearing or review means “a new
presentation of facts for consideration by a tribunal independent of any prior decision.”
Stewart, 2000 ME 157, 97, n2, 757 A.2d at 776. “On hearing de novo court hears matter
as Court of original and not appellate Jurisdiction.” Blacks Law Dictionary 721 (6" ed.
1990).
Yates v. Town of Southwest Harbor, 2001 ME 2, 911, 763 A.2d 1168, 1171. Title 30-A
M.R.S.A. § 2691 establishes hearing procedures to be followed by a municipal board of
appeals. This statute provides:
[t]he [board of appeals] may receive any oral or documentary evidence but
shall provide as a matter of policy for the exclusion of irrelevant,
immaterial or unduly repetitious evidence. Every party has the right to
present the party’s case or defense by oral or documentary evidence, to
submit rebuttal evidence and to conduct any cross-examination that is
required for a full and true disclosure of the facts.
30-A M.R.S.A. § 2691(3)(D). These procedures are characteristic of a fact-finding entity
and the Courts have made it clear that § 2691(3)(D) requires boards of appeals to conduct
hearings de novo, unless the municipal ordinance “explicitly directs otherwise.” Stewart,
2000 ME 157, 97, 757 A.2d at 776: Yates 2001 ME 2,911, 763 A.2d at 1171.
A municipality may create an appellate role for its board of appeals though an
ordinance which establishes the appellate function of the board of appeals in “explicit
terms.” Id. Therefore, this court must examine the Town’s ordinances that apply to the
proceedings before the Town’s Board of Appeals to determine its proper role in
Plaintiff's appeal.
C. Role of the Town’s Board of Appeals.
The Town’s Subdivision Ordinance governs the subdivision application and
approval process. Southwest Harbor, Me., Subdivision Ordinance of Southwest Harbor,
(May 8, 1990). It is Separate and distinct from the Town’s Land Use Ordinance, which is
not applicable to Plaintiff’s appeal. See Thompson v. Town of Casco, Cumberland
Superior Court docket no. AP-02-09, entered Feb. 10, 2003 (citing Levesque v.
Inhabitants of Town of Eliot, 448 A.2d 876, 877 (Me. 1982) (holding “subdivision
ordinances are not zoning ordinances.”)). The Town also has enacted an ordinance
governing the procedures to be followed by the Board of Appeals. Southwest Harbor,
Me., Board of Appeals Ordinance for the Town of Southwest Harbor (May 8, 1990).
Therefore, this court must look to the terms of the Town’s Subdivision Ordinance and the
Town’s Board of Appeals Ordinance to determine whether the Town “explicitly” created
an appellate role for its Board of Appeals, which apply to the proceedings before this
court.
The Town’s Subdivision Ordinance permits an aggrieved party to appeal any
decision of the Planning Board made pursuant to the Subdivision Ordinance to the Board
of Appeals within thirty days. Southwest Harbor, Me., Subdivision Ordinance of the
Town of Southwest Harbor, § XII (May 8, 1990). This is the only provision in the
Subdivision Ordinance regarding appeals.
The Town’s Board of Appeals Ordinance contains provisions regarding appeals
which are almost identical to those analyzed by the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine in
Stewart and Yates. See Stewart, 2000 ME 157,97, n5-6, 757 A.2d at 777; Yates 2001
ME 2, 9 12, 763 A.2d at 1172. Like the ordinances in Stewart and Yates, the Town’s
Board of Appeals Ordinance provides:
[t]he [Board of Appeals] may reverse the decision of the .. . Planning
Board or direct the Planning Board .. . to act, only upon finding that the
decision, or failure to act, was clearly contrary to specific provisions of the
ordinance in question or unsupported by substantial evidence in the
record.
Southwest Harbor, Me., Board of Appeals Ordinance for the Town of Southwest Harbor,
§ X(E) (May 8, 1990). The Court in Stewart stated that this provision implies that the
Board of Appeals is to act as an appellate body. Stewart, 2000 ME 157,911, 757 A.2d at
777. The Town’s Board of Appeals Ordinance also provides that:
[a]ll decisions shall become a part of the record and must include a
statement of the Findings of Fact and Conclusions, upon all the material
issues of fact, law or discretion presented and the appropriate order, relief
or denial [of] relief.
Southwest Harbor, Me., Board of Appeals Ordinance for the Town of Southwest Harbor,
§ X(B) (May 8, 1990). The Court in Stewart stated that this provision implies that the
Board of Appeals is to conduct a de novo hearing. Id. Therefore, the Court in Stewart
concluded that “[b]ecause the ordinance fails to provide explicit guidance, 30-A
M.R.S.A. § 2691 applies to require that the [Board of Appeals] undertake a de novo
review of the application.’”
Neither the Town’s Subdivision Ordinance nor the Town’s Board of Appeals
Ordinance explicitly provides for the Board of Appeals to hear appeals regarding
approvals or denials of subdivisions in an appellate capacity. Therefore § 2691(3)(D)
applies and the Board of Appeals should have heard Plaintiff’s appeal de novo.
Conclusion
In the absence of an “explicit” provision in the Town’s Subdivision Ordinance or
the Town’s Board of Appeals Ordinance creating a purely appellate review by the Board
of Appeals, “the function of the [Board of Appeals] is to take evidence, make factual
findings, and apply the laws and ordinances to the petition or application at issue, and to
* The Town and Gillespie rely on Yates in asserting that the Town’s Board of Appeals
was correct in conducting a purely appellate review of Plaintiff’ s appeal. It should be
noted that the legal analysis in Yates remains unchanged from the legal analysis in
Stewart. Although the Court in Yates also analyzes the Town’s Board of Appeals
Ordinance, the Yates decision can be distinguished because it turned on a key provision
in the Town’s Land Use Ordinance, which as discussed supra, is not applicable here. See
Yates, 2001 ME 2, 913, 763 A.2d at 1172. This provision allowed the Yates Court to
conclude that the municipal ordinance “explicitly” provided for the Board of Appeals to
act as an appellate body in reviewing the Planning Board’s denial of an application for a
Flood Hazard Development Permit.
do so independently” of the Planning Board’s decision to approve Gillespie’s
subdivision. Stewart, 2000 ME 157, $7,757 A.2d at 776. The review conducted by the
Town’s Board of Appeals did not meet either the statutory or the ordinance requirements.
The Board of Appeals committed an error of law by acting as an appellate body in
reviewing Plaintiff's appeal, rather then conducting a hearing de novo. Accordingly, the
matter is remanded to the Board of Appeals for proceedings consistent with this Decision
and Order.
The Clerk may incorporate this Decision and Order into the docket by reference.
paver 24 2aE \ ty Md ag
- ,
Justice, Maine Superior’ Court
FILED & |
ENTERED
SEP 03 2003
RIOR COURT