The opinion
STATE OF MAINE SUPERIOR COURT
CIVIL ACTION
YORK, ss. DOCKET NO. CV 02-330
DANIEL SANFORD,
Plaintiff
x ORDER
TOWN OF SHAPLEIGH,
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Defendant
Before this court is Defendant Town of Shapleigh’s Motion for Summary
Judgment pursuant to M. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
FACTS
Plaintiff Daniel Sanford resides in York County. Defendant, the Town of
Shapleigh (“Town”), maintains a waste transfer station located in the town of
Shapleigh, York County. This waste transfer station consists of an upper level
containing the trash compressor for household trash and a lower level where free
standing trash bins are located for disposal of demolition and recyclable materials. The
Defendant Town employs an attendant to oversee the operation at the lower level of the
waste transfer station.
On August 3, 2003, Plaintiff Sanford went to the Shapleigh waste transfer station
to dispose of some trash bags and plywood. Plaintiff Sanford initially dumped the
trash bags into the compressor on the upper level and then proceeded to the lower level
to dispose of the plywood. The attendant responsible for the lower level told Plaintiff
Sanford to place his items into the appropriate trash bins. Plaintiff Sanford proceeded
to unload a piece of plywood from his truck and lean it up against one of the free
standing trash bins located on the lower level. After completing this task, the attendant
informed Plaintiff Sanford that it was necessary for him to place the plywood inside the
trash bin. Plaintiff Sanford complied with this request and, without asking for
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assistance, lifted the piece of plywood into the trash bin. While lifting the plywood into
the bin Plaintiff Sanford ripped his bicep muscle. Due to these events, on December 9,
2003, Plaintiff Sanford filed a compliant against the Defendant Town in York County
Superior Court.
DISCUSSION
When reviewing motions for summary judgment this court must take into
account that:
[a] summary judgment is warranted when the statement of material facts
and pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions on file,
and affidavits, if any, cited in the statement of material facts establish that
there is no genuine issue of material fact and that a party is entitled toa
judgment as a matter of law.
Darling’s v. Ford Motor Co., 2003 ME 21, J 4, 817 A.2d 877, 879 (citing M. R. Civ. P.
56(c), (h)). In making this determination, this court will view the facts in a light most
favorable to Plaintiff Sanford, the non-moving party. Mahar v. Stonewood Transp.,
2003 ME 63, J 8, 823 A.2d 540,___. The Law Court has noted that summary judgment
is no longer an extreme remedy. Curtis v. Porter, 2001 ME 158, 7, 784 A.2d 18, 21.
Despite this, “[w]hen facts or reasonable inferences are in dispute on a material point,
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1ay not be entered.” Id. | 9.
The Maine Tort Claims Act (MTCA) provides immunity to governmental entities
from all tort claims seeking damages “[e]xcept as otherwise expressly provided by
statute.” 14 M.R.S.A. § 8103(1) (2003). An exception to this standard is delineated in 14
M.R.S.A. § 8104-A(2) (2003), which provides that “[a] governmental entity is liable for
its negligent acts or omissions in the construction, operation or maintenance of any
public building or the appurtenances to any public building.” Both parties agree that
based on these delineated statutory principles the question presented is whether the
lower level area where Plaintiff Sanford was injured qualified as an appurtenance to the
waste transfer station.
In Adriance v. Town of Standish, 687 A.2d 238 (Me. 1996), the Law Court held
that a transfer station operated by the Town of Standish was a public building for
purposes of the MTCA because it was “permanent, fully enclosed and completely open
to the public...” Id. at 240. Defendant Town attempts to distinguish Adriance from the
facts in the present case by contending that the free standing trash bin in the lower level
area was separate from and outside the actual waste transfer station. Therefore, the
trash bin did not constitute a public building or an appurtenance to a public building.
This court finds that the statements of material facts create a genuine dispute as
to whether the lower level area housing the freestanding trash bin was integral to the
transfer station’s basic purpose. For example, when a patron arrives at the facility, after
disposing of their household trash at the upper level a sign directs the patron to the
lower level to see the attendant and dispose of the rest of their trash. (PMSF { 3.)
Moreover, the scope of the trash bin’s function is significantly connected to the waste
transfer station’s function of processing waste. Hence, this court finds that the function
of the trash bin falls within the narrowly defined statutory concept of an appurtenance’
An ‘appurtenance’ has been defined as ‘that which belongs to something else; an
adjunct; an appendage; something annexed to another thing more worthy as
principal, and which passes as incident to it, as a right of way or other easement
to land; and outhouse, barn, garden, or orchard, to a house or messuage.... An
to a public building (the waste transfer station).
Detendant Town next argues that Plaintiff Sanford failed to allege that it was
actually negligent in the operation of the waste transfer station. The Law Court has
stated that “[t]he public building exception in section 8104-A(2) applies only to the
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State’s acts in the care or operation of its buildings and property, not to the State’s care
building). Notwithstanding, when viewing the facts in a light most favorable to
Plaintiff Sanford, this court finds that the primary focus of this cause of action is not on
the Defendant Town’s “failure to supervise” the attendant, but instead on its negligent
construction, operation or maintenance of the waste transfer station. Hence, this court
finds that a disputed issue of material fact within the purview of the jury exists as to
whether the Defendant Town was negligent in its operation of the waste transfer
station.
WHEREFORE, for reasons mentioned above, this court shall DENY Defendant
Town of Shapleigh’s Motion for Summary Judgment, pursuant to M. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
Dated: September _& _, 2003 Ly
article adapted to the use of the property which it is connected, and which was
intended to be permanent accession to the freehold.’
Fiandaca v. Citv of Bangor, CV-01-136 (Me. Super. Ct., Pen. Cty., Tune 5, 2002) (Hielm,
Opis
J.) (citing BLACK’s LAW DICTIONARY 133 (4th ed. Rev. 1968).
sq. - PL
q. — DEFS 4
Guy D. Loranger, E
s
Mark V. Franco, E