The opinion
STATE OF MAINE: SUPERIOR COURT
CIVIL ACTION
KENNEBEC, ss. DOCKET NO. AP-02-17
SKS ~kKENV~ |3 3/a003
MICHAEL A. ROCQUE,
et al.,
Plaintiffs
v. DECISION AND PARTIAL
JUDGMENT
TOE TE reo a
Defendant
This matter comes before the court on an appeal of consolidated decisions of the
Town of China Board of Appeals (Board) and accompanying independent claims. The
underlying question for all of the administrative appeals and hearings concerns
whether plaintiff / appellant Michael Rocque and his wife Julie will be allowed to build
a house on a lot on the shore of Three Mile Pond. The answer to this question depends
in large part on whether the property at issue is completely within the Resource
Protection District (where no building of residential structures is allowed) or partially
within the Shoreland District wherein residential construction is allowed with a permit
from the Code Enforcement Officer (CEO). The CEO initially issued a building permit,
but later reversed himself and ordered the Rocques to stop construction. Mr. Rocque
appealed this decision to the Board and then appealed the Board’s own decisions to this
court. The procedural history is obviously quite complex, but the court has determined
that both the Rule 80B appeal.and the plaintiffs’ independent claims are properly before
it.
Factual Background (
Michael A. Rocque, Sr. and his wife, Julie E. Rocque, appeal a January 23, 2002
decision by the Board revoking a building permit previously issued by the CEO on June
5, 2001.. According to the Board, between these dates, the CEO discovered that the
China Land Use District Map which had originally been relied upon in issuing the
permit, contained errors inserted by the mapmaker and did not accurately reflect the
vote of the citizens at town meeting. As a result, the Board concluded that the lot in
question falls completely in a resource protection district and is unbuildable.
Furthermore, the Board agreed with the CEO’s rejection of both the first and second
phosphorous control plans presented by the Rocques.
Standard of Review
On appeal, this court independently examines the record and reviews the
decision of the municipality for “error of law, abuse of discretion, or findings not
supported by substantial evidence in the record.” Yates v. Town of Southwest Harbor,
2001 ME 2, { 10, 763 A.2d 1168, 1171. A substantial evidence standard requires the
court to examine the entire record “to determine whether on the basis of all the
testimony and exhibits before the [board] it could fairly and reasonably find the facts as
it did.” Ryan v. Town of Camden, 582 A.2d 973, 975 (Me. 1990). “The board’s decision is
not wrong because the record is inconsistent or a different conclusion could be drawn
from it.” Twigg v. Town of Kennebunk, 662 A.2d 914, 916 (Me. 1995). To prevail, the
plaintiff must show “not only the board’s findings are unsupported by record
evidence, but also that the record compels contrary findings.” Total Quality v. Town of
Scarborough, 588 A.2d 283, 284 (Me. 1991).
It is also necessary to consider exactly what decision is being reviewed by the
court. This is important because it determines what constitutes the record should be
reviewed by the court. As noted in Stewart v. Sedgwick, 2000 ME 157, 757 A.2d 773, the
statute creating municipal boards of appeals (30-A M.R.S.A. § 2691) provides that a
board usually will conduct a hearing de novo unless the municipal ordinance explicitly
directs otherwise. The Town of China ordinance creates a seven-member board of
appeals. Chapter 9, section 1, China Me., Land Development Code. That ordinance
makes it clear that unlike the usual case, the China Board is limited to acting in an
appellate capacity and normally the court’s review on appeal from the Board would be
a direct review of the decision of the previous tribunal. However, in the present case,
the previous decision was the CEO’s, and not a decision of a tribunal, e. g. the Planning
Board, which makes a decision after an opportunity for hearing and presentation of
evidence by all parties. Therefore, the Board appropriately conducted a de novo hearing
rather than thr usual appellate review in light of the nature of the previous decision,
and the court will now review the full record of the Board rather than the abbreviated
findings of the CEO.
' Standing
Also prior to discussion of the merits, it is necessary to address the respondent’s
argument that petitioner Michael Rocque lacked standing to apply for a permit from the
town. The basis for this argument is that less than six months after Michael Rocque
purchased the property in his name from Clarice Robideau, he conveyed the property
to his wife Julie solely in her name. Therefore, when Mr. Rocque applied for the
building permit in May of 2001, he was not the owner of the property and it is argued
that he lacked the necessary interest to make the application. The ownership is not
contested, indeed Mr. Rocque indicated on the application itself that Julie Rocque was
the “property owner.” Ordinarily, applications are limited to individuals who have a
direct interest in the property. However, the China Code specifically provides that
4
applications “shall be submitted by the owner or his authorized agent . . .” (section
6(2)(b)). In this case, the Board itself found that Michael Rocque was acting as an
authorized agent for Julie when he made the application, and there is sufficient
evidence of record to support that conclusion. Therefore, the court agrees with the
Board that Michael Rocque had standing to apply for the permit and to appeal decisions
of the CEO to the Board and from the Board to this court.
Appeal - Vagueness
The petitioners’ argue first on appeal that the Board’s finding that their
application to show how they would comply with the Phosphorous Standard Section 3
of the Ordinance, is void for vagueness. Petitioners maintain that the ordinance
standard “. . . to the maximum extent possible . . .” does not give sufficient notice and
creates such a subjective standard that it denies applicants equal protection of the law
and calls upon the CEO essentially to legislate the standard. The respondent replies
that this issue was not raised before the Board and is not preserved for appeal. Oliver v.
‘City of Rockland, 710 A.2d 905, 907 (Me. 1998). The court agrees with the Town and finds
that the issue of vagueness has not been preserved for this Rule 80B appeal.
Appeal - Res Judicata
The petitioners also argue that the first suggestion of the Board in its August 16,
2001 findings - that the property in question was in both zones - was never appealed by
either party and became a final ruling, which cannot be reversed as a matter of res
judicata. This argument fails to recognize that the August 16, 2001 order merely found
that the application was incomplete and remanded the matter to the CEO. Therefore,
this order was never a final judgment and the Board was completely within its
authority to further review the issue itself after the CEO had discovered the mistake on
the map that had been used.
Appeal — Appropriate Map
The issue of the land use map gets to the heart of the matter. The findings of the
Board, for which there is abundant support in the record, indicate that the map which
was on display in the Town Offices in May 2001, and to which the participants referred,
was mistaken concerning the classification of the property in question. In a nutshell,
the map indicated some proposed changes to the classification, including the Rocque
property, which were defeated by vote at town meeting. Some how this proposed map
became accepted as the map showing the true classifications of town property. The
Board found, and the court agrees, that the controlling classification is what was voted
by the Town rather than what may have mistakenly been placed on the map (unless the
Town is equitably estopped, discussed below). Therefore, the correct classification of
the property would render it unbuildable and the correct map is the one marked as the
Town’s Exhibit 2.
Independent Claim — Due Process
The petitioners argue that the correspondence and statements by Town of China
officials evidence “clandestine” meetings of the Board of Selectmen and CEO which
had a “chilling effect” on the Board hearings. The respondent asserts that the claims are
false and argues that in any event it is too late to raise these issues now, again citing
Oliver v. City of Rockland. The court agrees that no evidence of violation of due process
exists in the record and the issue was not preserved for appellate review.
Independent Claim — Equitable Estoppel
Finally, the plaintiffs make an independent claim that even if the map displayed
in the town offices in May 2001 was incorrect and the property was actually
unbuildable under the ordinance, the Town should be estopped from rejecting a
building permit under the theory of equitable estoppel. In other words, if the Town has
made a representation upon which a citizen applicant has reasonably relied to his
detriment, the Town should be equitably estopped from revoking any. decision, such as
a building permit, based upon that mistake. This argument presents at the same time
both the plaintiffs’ last, best chance of prevailing and some troubling questions.
For decades, the operative theory of law was that government cannot be
estopped due to a citizen’s detrimental reliance on its mistaken directives. See, Federal
Crop Ins. Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380 (1947). However, since 1990 the theory of
application of principles of equitable estoppel to government agencies in Maine has
been controlled by City of Auburn v. Desgrosseilliers, 578 A.2d 712 (Me. 1990). In that
case, the Law Court held:
The law of Maine is rather, that depending on the totality of the particular
circumstances involved, which will include the nature of the particular
governmental official or agency acting and of the particular governmental
function being discharged as precipitating particular considerations of
public policy, equitable estoppel may be applied to activities of a
governmental official or agency in the discharge of its governmental
functions.
Id. at 714.
In essence, the plaintiffs are arguing that even if the map was wrong and the
decision of the Board was correct and otherwise-upheld, they should still be permitted
to build the residence for which they thought they had a permit, because they
reasonably relied on the information and permit, and began the construction to their
detriment. According to the record, the plaintiffs began construction very shortly after
7
the permit was issued on June 5, 2001. However, the argument is weakened by the fact
that the concrete basement that the Rocques poured exceeded the dimensions of the
basement allowed in the permit. In other words, the plaintiffs had violated the permit
even before its validity was questioned. The argument is weakened further by the fact
that much of the construction appears to have occurred after the initial appeal of the
building permit was made by neighbors on June 25, 2001. Troubling as these factors are
- in the context of the equitable estoppel claim, there is yet another factor which is more
deeply troubling to the court.
The added factor is one upon which the Board did not rely, but which is a matter
of record and of concern to the court. Exhibit 25 of the record is a letter dated July 31,
2001, from the attorney of the previous owner of the property, Clarice Robideau, to Mr.
Rocque concerning the circumstances under which the property had been purchased.
Simply stated, that correspondence suggests that Mr. Rocque, who was the chairman
Town of China Planning Board at the time of the purchase, spoke with Mrs. Robideau at
the town office about her unpaid property taxes and suggested that he might purchase
the property from her. It further alleges that in that conversation Mr. Rocque
represented that the property was unbuildable, showing her the lot on a map to
illustrate his point. As a result, it was suggested by the attorney that Mr. Rocque was
able to purchase for $6,000 a property that was valued for tax purposes at $36,000 or
more. These allegations were made right after the first appeal of the building permit by
neighbors on June 25, 2001, and just before the first hearing on that appeal on August 6.
There is no indication from the record that any further action was taken with regard to
this issue, but it was one of the bases referred to obliquely by the CEO as the reason for
his decision to revoke the building permit.
8
If these allegations were true - if Mr. Rocque told the previous property owner
that the lot was unbuildable - it would raise two questions. First, the representation
would be proof that Mr. Rocque already knew that the lot was unbuildable so that he
could not be considered to reasonably rely on the incorrect zoning map at the time that
he applied for the building permit. Second, there is a question of the cleanliness of Mr.
Rocque’s hands in approaching the court for relief in equity. If it were true that Mr.
Rocque informed the previous property owner that the lot was unbuildable, and as a
result acquired the property for a sixth of its price, he would be hard pressed to present
himself before the court with the type of innocence required to trigger the court's
equitable jurisdiction.
Although the CEO referred obliquely to title questions in his decision, the Board
did not make specific findings in that regard. Nevertheless, since the petitioners’
independent claim requests the court to exercise its equitable jurisdiction, and the court
is concerned on its own about the plaintiffs’ entitlement to the requested relief, further
fact finding proceedings may be necessary. This court previously denied requests for
evidentiary proceedings on the independent claims presented by the plaintiffs.
Flowever, after a closer review of the record, the court realizes such investigation may
be necessary. There is no indication in the record that the complaints of the attorney of
the previous owner were ever resolved. However, since these issues have caused
sufficient concern to the court, there should be adequate opportunity for the parties to
develop these factual matters. Although denying the petitioners’ Rule 80B appeal and
their independent due process claim, the court will retain jurisdiction with regard to
their equitable estoppel claim until the circumstances of the transfer of ownership of the
property from Ms. Robideau to Mr. Rocque can be more fully determined.
Therefore, the entry will be:
(1) Petitioners’ appeal pursuant to Rule 80B is DENIED.
(2) _ Plaintiffs’ independent claim for relief for violation of due
process is DENIED.
(3) Plaintiffs’ independent claim for relief as a matter of
equitable estoppel is RESERVED and the court retains jurisdiction. The
parties will have sixty (60) days from the date of this order to conduct
any necessary discovery. The matter will then be scheduled for an
evidentiary hearing, as necessary, on the sole issue of whether the
plaintiffs are entitled to relief as a matter of equitable estoppel.
Dated: December s 2003 f
S. Kirk Studstrup 7
Justice, Superior Court
Date Filed
3/1/02 Kennebec Docket No. __AP02-17
County
Action _Complaint for Review of Governmental Action
sB : J. STUDSTRUP
|_ Michael A. Rocque.Sr. & Julie E, Rocque YS: Inhabitants of the Town of China
Plaintiff’s Attorney Defendant’s Attorney
Ronald W. Bourget, Esq. Alton C.Stevens, Esq.
64 State Street 44 Elm Street
Augusta, Maine 04330-5149 P.O. Box 708
Waterville, Maine 04903-708
~Michael A. Hadgins, Es.
160 Capitol Street
P.O. Box 5057
Augusta, Maine 04332-5057
Date of
Entry
3/1/02 Complaint‘for Review of Governmental Action, filed. s/Bourget, Esq.
3/8/02 Original Summons with return service made upon Inhabitants of the Town
of China, filed. :
Acknowledgment of Receipt of Summons and Complaint, filed. s/Stevens, Esq.
3/25/02 Plaintiffs' Motion for Trial of the Facts, filed. s/Bourget, Esq.
(filed 3/22/02)
Plaintiffs' Statement of Nature of an Offer of Proof, filed. s/Bourget, Es
Plaintiffs' Motion for Extension of Time to File Record on Appeal and
Briefs, filed. s/Bourget, Esq.
Proposed Order, fihed. s/Bourget, Esq.
3/26/02 Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Independent Claims with Incorporated
Memorandum, filed. s/Stevens, Esq.
Defendant's Motion for More Definite Statement with Incorporated
Memorandum, filed. s/Stevens, Esq.
Request for Hearing, filed. s/Stevens, Esq.
Proposed Order, filed.
Proposed Order, filed.
3/28/02 Motion to Allow Late Motion to Specify Further Proceedings Pursuant to
ME.R.CIV.P.80B(i), filed. s/Bourget, Esq.
Proposed Order, filed.
Request for Hearing, filed. s/Bourget, Esq.
Motion for the Coiirt=to Specify the Future Course of Proceedings, filed.
s/Bourget, Esq. .
Request for Hearing, filed. s/Bourget, Esq.
Proposed Order, filed,
3/29/02 ~-Defendant's Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Trial of
the Facts, filed. s/Stevens, Esq. (attached exhibit :A)
4/2/02 Amended Motion to Allow Late Motion to Specify Further Proceedings
Pursuant to ME.R.CIV.P.80B(i), filed. s/Bourget, Esq.
Proposed Order, filed.
Request for Hearing, filed. s/Bourget, Esq.
STATE OF MAINE SUPERIOR COURT
CIVIL ACTION
KENNEBEC ss. DOCKET NO. AP-02-17
MICHAEL A. ROCQUE, et al.,
Plaintiffs
Vv. DECISION AND JUDGMENT
INHABITANTS OF THE
TOWN OF CHINA,
Defendant
JUN 322005
This matter comes on again before the court on the plaintiffs’ appeal of
consolidated decisions of the Town of China Board of Appeals (“Board”) and
accompanying independent claims. More precisely, in light of this court’s decision and
partial judgment dated December 3, 2003, the only issue before the court is the
plaintiffs’ independent claim for relief as a matter of equitable estoppel, as will be seen.
This relief will be denied for the reasons stated below.
Procedural and Factual Background
As previously noted in the court’s December 3, 2003 decision and partial
judgment, the crux of the issues before the court concern whether the Rocques will be
allowed to build a house on a lot they own on the shore of Three Mile Pond. After the
Rocques had purchased the property from Clarice Robideau, they applied for and
received a building permit to construct a residence on the property. The Code
Enforcement Officer (“CEO”) initially issued the building permit as the result of his
understanding from a map located in the town offices that this property was partially
within the shoreland district where building would be permissible. Later, after the
Rocques had begun their construction — construction which violated the permit
No
construction. Rocque appealed this decision to the Town of China Board of Appeals
which upheld the CEO due to an error in the map and rescinded the building permit.
Rocque then appealed the Board’s decision to this court pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 80D,
and included with the appeal independent claims of equitable estoppel and due
process.
Following briefing and oral argument, the court reached its decision with regard
to the Rule 80B appeal and the due process independent claim in its December 3, 2003
decision. The court concluded that the Board was correct in its interpretation and use of
the corrected map designation for the property and that the independent due process
issue was not previously raised before the Board and was not preserved either for
appellate review or independent claim. However, with regard to the plaintiffs’
independent claim of equitable estoppel on the part of the town, the court found that
further factual development was necessary in light of some indication of the
circumstances of the acquisition of the property.
An evidentiary hearing was conducted on January 28, 2005, at which testimonial
and other evidence was presented relating to the equitable estoppel issue. The Rocques
claim is that the issuance of the permit and statements by the CEO led them to believe
that the property was buildable and that they began construction in reliance on this
representation. The argument is that the town should now be estopped from taking a
different position, i.e, that the lot is unbuildable and denying the plaintiffs the building
permit they at one time had been issued. The additional evidentiary development was
necessary in light of a previous indication concerning the circumstances of Mr. Rocque’s
purchase of the property and his knowledge at that time.
At the evidentiary hearing, Rocque testified as to his recollection of the events
surrounding the purchase of the property. That version was not consistent with the
version of events testified to by the abutting property owner, the town manager, the
deputy town clerk and the CEO. The court finds the testimony of these latter witnesses
to be more candid and persuasive, and based on that testimony, makes the following
findings of fact.
Prior to early 2000, the property in question had been owned by one Clarice
Robideau. In the Fall of 1999, Mrs. Robideau had called on the abutting property
owner, Tom Whittiker, to ask whether he wished to purchase the property for $35,000.
Mr. Whittiker offered $20,000, although he was of the opinion that the property was
unbuildable. Ms. Robideau turned down the Whittiker offer indicating that she did not
know the value of the property.
In February of 2000, Mrs. Robideau went to the South China Town Office to
make a partial payment on her town taxes which were in arrears. In the process, Mrs.
Robideau made a comment about being interested in selling the property because of her
belief that the lot was unbuildable. At that point, Rocque entered the room and
introduced herself at the counter as a member of the Planning Board. Standing next to
the zoning map, Rocque several times said to Robideau that the lot was unbuildable
and expressed interest in purchasing the lot himself. The tax valuation of the property
is $36,000; the discussed purchase price would have a net cost to Rocque of
approximately $7,000 - $8,000.
Having witnessed Rocque’s approach to Ms. Robideau, the CEO reported to the
town manager his concern that a member of the Planning Board was conducting
business at the town office counter and concern about the price that was being offered.
When confronted by the town manager, Rocque responded there was no problem and
that he was not getting a preferential price in light of the fact that the lot was
unbuildable. The purchase was quickly consummated.
In late Winter 2001, Rocque approached CEO Pierz to discuss a building permit
for the property. Pierz had previously thought the property to be unbuildable, but
when asked by Rocque to check the zoning map, it looked as if the property were split
between shoreland and resource protection zones, thereby allowing building with
certain conditions. The CEO issued a building permit based upon his reading of the
map, but later, after an appeal by abutting landowners, it was found that the map was
incorrect and the property is unbuildable. At this point, the CEO rescinded the
building permit, leading to the appeals presently before the court. .
Other key findings include the following: Although it is contrary to Rocque’s
testimony, CEO Pierz talked with Rocque about the property prior to its purchase, but
did not discuss its buildability until late Winter of 2001 after the sale had taken place.
The town tax card for the property shows the property as being buildable, but that was
because a camp had previously been located on the property. The characterization of
Rocque’s lot on the zoning map in February 2001 was erroneous, based upon a mistake
made by the mapping company. After discovery of the error in late 2001, a corrected
map was sent to the town and placed on display. The present map accurately shows
that the Rocque property is not buildable.
Discussion
As explained in the court’s order of December 3, 2003, the plaintiffs’ appeal of the
Town of China Board of Appeals and the petitioners’ independent claim for relief for
violation of due process have been denied. The only remaining issue for review is the
plaintiffs’ independent claim for relief on a theory of equitable estoppel As also
explained in the December 2003 order, if the Town of China had made a representation
which a citizen applicant has reasonably relied to his detriment, there may be
circumstances in which the town should be equitably estopped from revoking a
building permit claiming the permit was based upon a mistake. City of Auburn v.
Desgrosseilliers, 578 A.2d 712 (Me. 1990). In the present case, the CEO erroneously
issued a building permit and the town’s tax cards erroneously showed the property in
question as buildable. Therefore, the decision of the Board of Appeals denying the
building permit should stand unless Rocque can sustain his burden of proving that he
reasonably relied on the advice of the CEO and the tax records to his detriment in
beginning and continuing construction work until the permit was rescinded.
The defendant presents several arguments based essentially on the same facts as
those found by the court. The primary arguments is that in order to find equitable
estoppel, the individual who has relied to his detriment on the town’s representation
must have done so “reasonably.” Given Rocque’s representations at the time that he
purchased the property, he either (1) sincerely believed that the property was
unbuildable and could not reasonably rely on subsequent review of the map without
further investigation, or (2) told Ms. Robideau that the property was unbuildable in
order to get a reduced price, while hoping that he would be able to get a building
permit based upon the incorrect map. In neither situation is there any evidence that
town officials, either the CEO or keepers of the tax records, knowingly misled Rocque.
Rather, it appears that Rocque argued the mistake in the map for his own benefit. In
any event, whatever reliance Rocque placed upon the map, the building permit and the
tax records, it cannot be considered “reasonable” reliance.
Further, equitable estoppel by definition is a remedy utilizing the court’s
equitable jurisdiction. It is a long held maxim of equity that he who seeks equitable
relief must come to court with “clean hands.” Hamm v, Hamm, 584 A.2d 59 (Me. 1990);
1g Conners v. Conners Bros.Co. 110 Me 428, 434, 86 A. 843 (1913). In the present case, it
means that if Rocque seeks relief based upon a misrepresentation by municipal officials,
he himself must not be guilty of misrepresentation. Looking at the entire series of
events and representations made by all parties, the representation by Rocque to the
former owner of the property concerning its buildability was sufficiently muddied in
purpose, though ultimately true, that Rocque is not entitled to equitable consideration
of the subsequent building permit question.
For the reasons cited above, the entry will be:
Judgment for defendant on the plaintiffs’ independent claim of
equitable estoppel. Remanded to the China Board of Appeals.
Dated: March [A , 2005 Widely
S. Kirk Studstrup
Justice, Superior Court
Date Filed 3/1/02 Kennebec Docket No. __APO2-17
County
Action Complaint for Review of Governmental Action
205 J. STUDSTRUP
Michael A. Rocque Sr. & Julie E. Rocque YS: Inhabitants of the Town of China
Plaintiff’s Attorney Defendant’s Attorney
Ronald W. Bourget, Esq. Alton C.Stevens, Esq.
64 State Street 44 Elm Street
Augusta, Maine 04330-5149 P.O. Box 708
Waterville, Maine 04903-708
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Date of
Entry
3/1/02 Complaint for Review of Governmental Action, filed. s/Bourget, Esq.
3/8/02 Original Summons with return service made upon Inhabitants of the Town
of China, filed.
Acknowledgment of Receipt of Summons and Complaint, filed. s/Stevens, Es
3/25/02 Plaintiffs' Motion for Trial of the Facts, filed. s/Bourget, Esq.
(filed 3/22/02)
Plaintiffs' Statement of Nature of an Offer of Proof, filed. s/Bourget,
Plaintiffs’ Motion for Extension of Time to File Record on Appeal and
Briefs, filed. s/Bourget, Esq.
Proposed Order, filed. s/Bourget, Esq.
3/26/02 Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Independent Claims with Incorporated
Memorandum, filed. s/Stevens, Esq.
Defendant's Motion for More Definite Statement with Incorporated
Memorandum, filed. s/Stevens, Esq.
Request for Hearing, filed. s/Stevens, Esq.
Proposed Order, filed.
Proposed Order, filed.
3/28/02 Motion to Allow Late Motion to Specify Further Proceedings Pursuant to
ME.R.CIV.P.80B(i), filed. s/Bourget, Esq.
Proposed Order, filed.
Request for Hearing, filed. s/Bourget, Esq.
Motion for the Courtto Specify the Future Course of Proceedings, filed.
s/Bourget, Esq.
Request for Hearing, filed. s/Bourget, Esq.
Proposed Order, filed.
3/29/02 Defendant's Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Trial of
the Facts, filed. s/Stevens, Esq. (attached exhibit A)
4/2/02 Amended Motion to Allow Late Motion to Specify Further Proceedings
Pursuant to ME.R.CIV.P.80B(i), filed. s/Bourget, Esq.
Proposed Order, filed.
Request for Hearing, filed. s/Bourget, Esq.