The opinion
STATE OF MAINE Legge GOES SUPERIOR COURT
CUMBERLAND, ss. oe ne CIVIL ACTION
- ce DOCKET NO. APO} 066
cd
BATH IRON WORKS,
Petitioner
Vv. ORDER ON PETITIONER'S
MAINE UNEMPLOYMENT BOC APPEAL DONALD L. GARBRECHT
INSURANCE COMMISSION, LAW LIBRARY
Respondent FJUL 11 2002
Plaintiff Bath Iron Works (BIW) has appealed, pursuant to MLR. Civ. P. 80C,
Bo aweee
the Maine Unemployment Insurance Commission's (Commission) decision that
former BIW employee, Jeff Sattem, qualified to receive unemployment
compensation benefits. Following hearing, the court affirms the decision of the
Commission.
Factual Background
Jeffrey W. Sattem worked at BIW from 1988 to 2000. R. 20. In August 1996
Sattem suffered a work-related injury to his right shoulder. R. 77, 79, 149. The BIW
health department returned Sattem to work at BIW with "no limits". R. 149. In
May 2000, Sattem reported injury to his right shoulder, aggravating the August 1996
injury, R. 77, and filed for workers’ compensation. R. 150. Sattem's physician
prescribed the following restrictions or "limits": no overhead work; no lifting over
15 pounds with right arm; minimal use of vibratory tools; and Sattem was placed on
leave with workers’ compensation from May 15 to May 25 and from June 12 to June
30, when no work could be found for him at BIW within the "limits". R. 21, 22, 156.
A BIW investigator, following the lead of a BIW supervisor, observed,
photographed and videotaped Sattem, during his leave, doing construction work
allegedly outside of his work limits. R. 23. (Photos, R. 178-180; 187-199.) BIW
concluded that Sattem was working outside of his limits and thereby had committed
fraud. R. 29. On June 30, Sattem returned to work, but was sent home because there
was a labor dispute and work stoppage until November 6. R. 24-5. On November 9,
Sattem was discharged for fraud. R. 25, 26, 154. Sattem applied for unemployment
compensation, but the Deputy disqualified Sattem on the ground that Sattem had
been terminated for cause. R. 142. Sattem appealed. On appeal, the employer took
the position that "the claimant was discharged on the basis that... he presented
himself as having limitations on his work capacity, but was performing activities
outside of work beyond the imposed conditions.” R. 13.
The Administrative Hearing Officer conducted a new hearing and reversed
the Deputy's decision on the ground that "there is insufficient evidence to find that
the claimant violated a reasonable rule, or that he provided false information on his
eligibility to do the work, or false information or dishonesty that jeopardized a
material interest of the employer." R. 14. The Commission affirmed the
Administrative Hearing Officer's decision with modifications.
On January 22, 2002, BIW filed this appeal.
DISCUSSION
Standard of Review
The scope of judicial review of an administrative agency's factfinding is
strictly limited; such a finding may be overturned only upon a showing by a
challenger that it was “unsupported by substantial evidence on the whole record."
Clarke v. Maine Unemployment Insurance Commission et al., 491 A.2d 549, 551
(citing 5 M.R.S.A. § 11007(4)(C)(5) (1979)). This standard of review [of an
administrative finding of fact] is identical to the "clear error" standard used by the
Law Court. Clarke, at 551 (citing Gulick v. Board of Environmental Protection, 452
A.2d 1202, 1207-08 (Me. 1982); see also Field, McKusick & Wroth, Maine Civil
Practice § 52.7 (Supp. 1981)). The reviewing court must examine the entire record to
determine whether on the basis of all the testimony and exhibits before the agency it
could fairly and reasonably find the facts as it did. Clarke, at 552 (citing In re Maine
Clean Fuels, Inc., 310 A.2d 736, 741 (Me. 1973)). The fact that the record contains
inconsistent evidence or that inconsistent conclusions could be drawn from the
record does not prevent the agency's findings from being sustained. Id. The court
will not substitute its judgment for [the Commission's] where there may be a
reasonable difference of opinion. Clarke, at 552 (citing Seven Islands Land Co. v.
Maine Land Use Regulation Commission, 450 A.2d 475, 479 (Me. 1982)).!
1 The rationale for this deferential standard of review is all the more appropriate
where, as here, the Administrative Hearing Officer expressly found as a fact that the
claimant "provided credible and convincing testimony” and "the claimant's
explanation is deemed credible and convincing." R. 13, 14.
3
In an 80C appeal, the court must determine whether the Commission abused
its discretion, committed error of law, or made findings not supported by substantial
evidence in the record. McGhie et al. v. Town of Cutler et al., 202 [sic] ME 62, ¥ 5, 793
A.2d 504, 505. Substantial evidence is evidence that a reasonable mind would accept
as sufficient to support a conclusion. Gagne et al. v. Town of Dresden et al., 2002 WL
273648, AP-99-004 (Me. Super. Ct., Jan. 3, 2002) (Cole, J.).
On this record, the court cannot conclude that the administrative findings are
not supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole.
Therefore the entry is:
Appeal Denied. Decision of the Maine Unemployment Insurance
Commission is AFFIRMED.
Dated: June _/ l , 2002 KML AL.
Robert E. Crowley }
Justice, Superior Court
Date Filed _11-08~01 Cumberland Docket No. __AP-01-066
County
Action RULE 80(C) APPEAL
BATH LRON WORKS CORPORATION s MAINE UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE COMMISSIO
T VS.
Plaintiff’s Attorney Defendant’s Attomey xpyLy TURNER (Student
TRACEY G. BURTON, ESQ. PAMELA W. WAITE AAG Intern)
Thirty Front Street ELIZABETH J. WYMAN AAG
Bath, ME 04530 6 State House Station
(207) 443-5576 Augusta Me 04333-0006
Marcia Cleveland, Esq. (employee 626-8800
Frank Chowdry, Esq. Jeff Sattem)
One Main St. Topsham, ME 04086
721-9737
Date of
Fntrv