Fogg v. Town of Eddington

STATE OF MAINE SUPERIOR COURT

PENOBSCOT, SS. CIVIL ACTION

eo ge ot

Gary A. Fogg, DONALD L. GA .

Appellant LAW LIBRARY

Vv AUG 18 2002

Order on Motion to Dismiss

Town of Eddington,

Appellee .

FILED & ENTERED

and SUPERIOR COURT

Peter Roderick et al., JUL 31 2002

Intervenors

PENOBSCOT COUNTY

Pending before the court is the intervenors’ motion to dismiss, in which the

intervenors argue that the appellant, Gary A. Fogg, did not file his notice of appeal from

the decision of the Town’s Zoning Board of Appeals in a timely way. The Town has

joined in that motion. Fogg has filed an objection to the motion. The court has

considered the parties’ submissions.

This matter previously has been before the court in the context of Fogg’s first

appeal from the Board’s denial of his application for a building permit. There, the court

concluded that the basis for the Board’s action was not supported by the record evidence,

and, as a result, the court remanded the matter to the Board “for further proceedings

consistent with this opinion.” On February 28, 2002, the Board conducted another

hearing on Fogg’s permit application. The transcript of that meeting has been filed as

part of the record on appeal. At that meeting, the parties and the intervenors agreed to

incorporate by reference the evidence presented at the first hearing, and Fogg and the

intervenors then proceeded to present additional evidence to the Board. The parties and

the intervenors were fully in accord with that procedure. On the basis of those

presentations, at the close of the meeting, the Board again voted to deny Fogg’s permit

application.

Fogg filed his appeal to this court on May 2, 2002. The forty-fifth day after

February 28 was April 14, which was a Sunday. If Fogg was subject to the statutory

forty-five day limitation for filing an appeal from the Board’s February 28 decision, see

30-A MLR.S.A. § 2691(3)(G), then the present appellate action was not commenced in a

timely way and is subject to dismissal.

When an order on appeal vacates a lower decision and remands the case to the

lower adjudicative body, there arises the question of whether that order on appeal

constitutes a final judgment. The answer to this question rests on the nature of the

remand order. Wheeler v. Maine Unemployment Insurance Commission, 477 A.2d 1141,

1145 (Me. 1984). If the remand might generate further proceedings that would affect the

issues reviewed on appeal, then the remand order is viewed as falling short of a final

judgment. Jd. On the other hand, if the purpose of the remand is to allow the lower body

to “address a procedural or ancillary matter distinct from the issue” that was considered

by the appellate court, then the remand order amounts to a final judgment. Id. See also

MacDougal v. MacDougal, 403 A.2d 783, 784 (Me. 1979) (in divorce actions, where

Superior Court remands case to District Court for “further proceedings,” Superior Court’s

order is not a final judgment). Additionally, if the purpose of the remand is to allow the

lower body merely to enter a specific judgment or engage in some other ministerial act,

then the appellate court’s remand order constitutes a final judgment. Zillert v. Zillert, 395

A.2d 1152, 1153 n.2 (Me. 1978).

~The record clearly shows that the parties and the intervenors themselves did not

treat this court’s prior order on appeal as a final judgment. Rather, Fogg and the

intervenors went to the February 28 meeting willing and ready to submit additional

evidence to the Board on the issues raised in this court’s prior order. Further, the

intervenors did not object to the submission of that additional evidence. Indeed, the

record demonstrates that they viewed the February 28 hearing as an opportunity to

supplement the record created prior to the first appeal.

“When the Superior Court remands to an administrative board or agency for the

purpose of having it take further action reviewable by the Superior Court, the court

should retain jurisdiction awaiting the outcome of those further administrative board or

agency proceedings.” Valdastri v. City of Bath, 521 A.2d 691, 692-93 (Me. 1987). That

was the case here, based at least on the manner in which the parties and intervenors

themselves viewed the procedural posture of the case on remand to the Board. At the

February 28 hearing before the Board, the parties continued their presentation of

evidence on the merits and substance of Fogg’s permit application. In its essence, the

parties and intervenors treated the February 28 hearing as an extension of the prior

hearing that led to the first appeal. In that circumstance, because the court retains

jurisdiction, the court “preserves its authority to rule on the appeal,” and a second notice

of appeal becomes “superfluous.” Hanson v. Hanson, 654 A.2d 424, 425 (Me. 1995).

The date when Fogg filed his notice of appeal from the Board’s February 28 decision is

consequently immaterial. Therefore, under the circumstances at bar, the court is deemed

to retain jurisdiction, and the intervenors cannot now be heard to contend that this court’s

order on appeal constituted a final judgment that would trigger a separate appellate

process from any decision made by the Board following remand.

The court acknowledges that the “better practice” would have been to make the

retention of jurisdiction “explicit.” Hanson, 654 A.2d at 425 n.3. However, the parties

also had the opportunity to seek clarification of the status of the court’s role following

remand but did not do so, id., and, in any event, the nature of the February 28 hearing

makes clear that the parties viewed that hearing as the next chapter in a continuous

process.

The entry shall be:

For the foregoing reasons, the intervenors’ motion to dismiss is denied.

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Dated: July 31, 2002 ch! In U/

J ustice, Maine Supefior Court

Date Filed 5/2/02

Penobscot Docket No. AP-2002-9°

Action

County _ AP-00-60 Consolidated

Rule 80B Appeal

ASSIGNED TO JUSTICE JEFFREY L. HJELM

GARY A FOGG Vs.

Peter Roderick and Carol Roderick,

Intervenor 7/8/02

TOWN OF EDDINGTON

Plaintiff's Attorney

Donald Brown Esq

Stillwater Professional Park

36 Penn Plaza

Bangor ME 04401 BY:

Defendant’s Attorney

GILBERT & GREIF, P.A.

82 COLUMBIA ST. - P O BOX 2339

BANGOR, ME 04402 2339

CHARLES E. GILBERT, IIL

FOR: TOWN OF EDDINGTON

RUDMAN & WINCHELL, LLC

84 HARLOW ST - P O BOX 1401

BANGOR, ME ~ 04402-1401

BY: EDMOND J. BEAROR, ESQ.

Date of Luke M. Rossignol, Esq.

Entry FOR: Intervenors, Peter & Carol Roderick

5/2/02 Complaint filed.

5/6/02 Notice and Briefing Schedule (80B Appeal of Governmental Actions)

forwarded to attorney for the Plaintiff and to Town of Eddington, 906

Main Road, Eddington, ME 04428

5/10/02 Letter received by Charles E. Gilbert, III, Esq., entering his appearance

on behalf of the Tow of Eddington.

5/10/02 Copy of Notice and Briefing Schedule (80B Appeal of Governmental Actions)

forwarded to Atty. Charles Gilbert III.

5/15/02 Officer's Return of Service as to Defendant Town of Eddington filed.

(s.d. 5/7/02 to Pamela Violette, Clerk)

5/24/02 Motion to Extend Time to File Appellant's Brief pursuant to Rule 80B(G)

MRCivP. filed.

5/29/02 Amended Motion to Extend Time to file Appellant's Brief pursuant to

Rule 80b(G) MRCivP filed. by Plaintiff/Appellant.

5/30/02 File presented to Justice Hjelm for review.

6/3/02 File returned by Justice Hjelm, order issued.

6/3/02 Order filed. Motion to Extend Time to File Appellant's Brief is hereby:

GRANTED, brief due 6/25/02. Hjelm, J.) Copy forwarded to all attorneys

of record.

5/31/02 | Motion to Intervene (MRCivP 19 and 24(a) & (b) filed. by Peter and

Carol Roderick,

5/31/02 Motion to Dismiss with Memorandum of Law filed by Peter and Carol

Roderick. Attachments attached.

STATE OF MAINE SUPERIOR COURT

PENOBSCOT, SS CIVIL ACTION

Docket No. AP-02-9 :

Gary A. Fogg,

Appellant

mP DONALOL. GARBRECHT

LAW LIBRARY

Vv.

JAN 22 2005

Order on Appeal

Town of Eddington,

Appellee i

and

Peter Roderick et al.,

Intervenors

sags

ta

Pending before the court is the appeal of Gary A. Fogg from a post-remand

decision of the Town of Eddington Zoning Board of Appeals (“the Board”), finding that

the Town’s Code Enforcement Officer erred in issuing him a building permit for the

construction of a 30’ by 100’ metal building. For the reasons set out below, the court

concludes that the Board’s decision is affected by error of law and again remands the

case to the Board for further proceedings.

The procedural and factual background underlying this action is set out in the

court’s December 29, 2001, “Order on Appeal” in Fogg v. Town of Eddington, AP-00-60

(Superior Court, Penobscot County). In short, in September 2000, Fogg applied for the

issuance of a building permit, contending that the proposed structure would be an

accessory use to the residence located on land that is situated on the other side of a road

from the proposed building site. The Town’s CEO approved the application and issued a

building permit. Abutting landowners (the intervenors in this action) appealed to the

Board. The Board held a public hearing in late November 2000, and as a result of that

_ hearing the Board concluded that the proposed structure was not an accessory use and

that consequently the CEO improperly issued the building permit to Fogg. Fogg filed an

appeal from the Board’s decision to the Superior Court. The court remanded the

proceeding to the Board because the record did not contain sufficient evidence to support

the Board’s conclusion that, due to the relative locations of Fogg’s residence and the

proposed structure, the latter could not be viewed as an accessory use to the former.

After remand, the Board held a second hearing, in February 2002. The Board was

constituted identically to the November 2000 hearing. Fogg, one of the intervenors and

several other people made presentations to the Board. The parties to this action agreed

that the record from the first hearing could be used in the Board’s post-remand

assessment of the case. After the Board received additional evidence and evaluated the

record as a whole, it concluded by a 3-2 vote that the situs of the proposed structure was

on a different lot from the parcel where Fogg’s residence is located. By the same vote,

the Board also found that the proposed structure therefore could not be regarded as an

accessory to the residential structure because there were on separate lots. On this basis,

the Board concluded that Fogg was not entitled to the building permit that the CEO had

issued to him. From that decision, Fogg has again appealed to this court.! See 30-A

MLR.S.A. § 2691(3)(G); M.R.Civ.P. 80B.

On an appeal to the Superior Court, the court reviews the Board’s decision “for

abuse of discretion, errors of law, or findings not supported by substantial evidence in the

record.” Kurlanski v. Portland Yacht Club, 2001 ME 147, ] 7, 782 A.2d 783, 785

(citation and internal punctuation omitted). The reviewing court “is not free to substitute

its judgment for the Board’s... .” Leadbetter v. Ferris, 485 A.2d 225, 227 (Me. 1984).

For the reasons set out in the “Order on Appeal” associated with Fogg’s appeal from the

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permit to Fogg rather than the CEO’s decision to grant that permit.

' After Fogg filed his appeal, the intervenors moved to dismiss the appeal on the ground

that the filing was untimely. The motion was denied because the court retained

jurisdiction over the matter during the remand, and a timely notice of appeal was not

required in order to confer this court with jurisdiction over the Board’s 2002 decision.

_ Subsequent to the denial of the motion to dismiss, the Law Court issued an opinion that

may be seen to provide additional support to Fogg’s opposition to the motion to dismiss.

See Doggett v. Town of Gouldsboro, 2002 ME 175, --- A.2d ---.

The ultimate question presented to the Board was whether the proposed structure

constitutes an “accessory use” that would be permitted in the district designated as

“Residential B” within the Town of Eddington.” Under the town’s ordinances, an

“accessory” is something “[c]ommonly associated with or in support of the primary or

principal use of a lot or structure.” TOWN OF EDDINGTON, MAINE ZONING ORDINANCE §

102. In pertinent part, the Town’s ordinance defines a “lot” as “[a]n area of land in one

ownership, or one leasehold, with ascertainable boundaries established by deed or

instrument of record... .” Jd.

The undisputed evidence presented to the Board establishes that Fogg occupies’ a

tract of land that is roughly 100 acres. That tract’s boundaries are described in a deed,

and the deed presents he parcel as a single piece of land. See R. 4. Both the residence,

where is currently stands, and the proposed structure, where Fogg wants to build it,

would be on the same parcel described in the deed. The deed reveals that the Fogg

property as described in that instrument is the same land as was conveyed without any

changes several times as far back as 1911. The parcel, however, is bisected by state route

178, and Fogg receives separate municipal tax bills for the two portions of the parcel.

Relying on the tax treatment of Fogg’s land interests, and referring to statutory provisions

governing subdivisions, the Board concluded that the land where Fogg seeks to erect the

proposed structure is a lot that is separate from a lot where the residence sits. The former

is undeveloped except for a tower used for electronic transmissions and a small

maintenance building associated with the tower. The intended purpose of the proposed

structure is unrelated to the tower facility. Rather, Fogg contends that the proposed

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However, because the Board concluded that route 178 had the effect of creating two

separate lots, it further concluded that the proposed structure could not be an accessory

* At the February 2002 hearing, all parties agreed that the proposed building would not

fall into any of the other uses permitted in Residential B. See TOWN OF EDDINGTON,

MAINE ZONING ORDINANCE § 202.1 (part of the record in Fogg v. Town of Eddington,

AP-00-60).

> The record owner of the property is actually “Elton Darling Fogg as Trustee under

Declaration of Trust.” The appellant, who was the permit applicant, currently is in

possession of the property.

use to the residence because they were on two lots. Therefore, the ultimate basis for

denying the building permit to Fogg (or, putting it more precisely, reversing the CEO’s

issuance of the permit, see TOWN OF EDDINGTON, MAINE ZONING ORDINANCE § 515.2)

flowed directly from its conclusion that the residence sat on a lot that was separate from

the lot where Fogg proposes to build the new structure. Appellate review of this analysis

requires a construction of the word, “lot,” as defined in the Town’s ordinances. The

interpretation of a zoning ordinance is a question of law. See Town of Union v. Strong,

681 A.2d 14, 17 (Me. 1996).

Here, the plain meaning, see Springborn v. Town of Falmouth, 2001 ME 57, { 8,

769 A.2d 852, 855, of the term “lot” as defined in the ordinance required the Board to

treat the land described in the deed as a single and unified parcel. In the circumstances of

this case, the boundaries of a “lot” are established in a deed. The ordinance’s definition

does not allow any other method of establishing the identity of a lot, and indeed the

parties do not argue otherwise here. Rather, the Town and intervenors contend that in

other contexts, a road that runs though a lot has the effect of creating two lots and that

route 178 created that result here. The Board members who voted in the majority

accepted that analysis. However, as a matter of law, this analysis ignores and is

undermined by the ordinance’s own definition of a “lot.” In this way, the Board’s

decision was fatally affected by an error of law and must be vacated.

The entry shall be:

For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the Town of Eddington Zoning Board

of Appeals is vacated. This matter is remanded to the Board for consideration of whether

the proposed structure constitutes an “accessory use,” when the land as described in the

deed is treated as a single lot. The court shall retain jurisdiction over this matter.

ni 1 a

Dated: January 3, 2003 | IVWhe

: re :

JusticeY Maine Superior Court

Jeffrey L. Hjelm

Date Filed 5/2/02 Penobscot

Docket No. AP-2002-9°°

County

Action___ Rule 80B Appeal

ASSIGNED TO JUSTICE JEFFREY L. HJELM

GARY A FOGG

__AP-00-60 Consolidat

Peter Roderick and Carol Roderick,

Intervenor 7/8/02

TOWN OF EDDINGTON

Plaintiff’s Attorney

Donald Brown Esq

Stillwater Professional Park

36 Penn Plaza

Bangor ME 04401

Defendant’s Attorney

GILBERT & GREIF, P.A.

82 COLUMBIA ST. - P O BOX 2339

BANGOR, ME 04402 2339

BY: CHARLES E. GILBERT, III

TAD TALIS AT DNNTNOTAN

vires LUVIN UP bevy AANA

RUDMAN & WINCHELL, LLC

84 HARLOW ST - P O BOX 1401

BANGOR, ME ~ 04402~1461

BY: EDMOND J. BEAROR, ESQ.

Luke M. Rossignol, Esq.

FOR: Intervenors, Peter & Carol Roderick

Letter received by Charles E. Gilbert, III, Esq., entering his appearance

Copy of Notice and Briefing Schedule (80B Appeal of Governmental Actions)

Motion to Extend Time to File Appellant's Brief is hereby:

Copy forwarded to all attorneys

Date of

Entry

5/2/02 Complaint filed.

5/6/02 Notice and Briefing Schedule (80B Appeal of Governmental Actions)

forwarded to attorney for the Plaintiff and to Town of Eddington, 906

Main Road, Eddington, ME 04428

5/10/02

on behalf of the Tow of Eddington.

5/10/02

forwarded to Atty. Charles Gilbert III.

5/15/02 Officer's Return of Service as to Defendant Town of Eddington filed.

(s.d. 5/7/02 to Pamela Violette, Clerk)

5/24/02 Motion to Extend Time to File Appellant's Brief pursuant to Rule 80B(G)

MRCivP. filed.

5/29/02 Amended Motion to Extend Time to file Appellant's Brief pursuant to

Rule 80b(G) MRCivP filed by Plaintiff/Appellant.

5/30/02 File presented to Justice Hjelm for review.

6/3/02 File returned by Justice Hjelm, order issued.

6/3/02 Order filed.

GRANTED, brief due 6/25/02. Hjelm, J.)

of record.

5/31/02 | Motion to Intervene (MRCivP 19 and 24(a) & (b) filed. by Peter and

Carol Roderick.

5/31/02 Motion to Dismiss with Memorandum of Law filed by Peter and Carol

Roderick. Attachments attached.

STATE OF MAINE SUPERIOR COURT

PENOBSCOT, SS CIVIL ACTION

Docket No. AP-02-9 ,

/ : . is / fos :

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Gary A. Fogg,

Appellant

Order on Appeal

Town of Eddington,

Appellee

and DOMALB 1 Goro tenay

LAV. . ‘

Peter Roderick et al.,

Intervenors vas 8 2064

This case is again on appeal from the Town of Eddington’s denial of the Gary A.

Fogg’s application for a permit to construct a storage building. The court has considered

the parties’ submissions on appeal.

The factual and procedural context of this appeal are set out in the court’s prior

orders dated December 28, 2001, in AP-00-60 and the order dated January 3, 2003, in

this case.’ In summary, Fogg filed an application for a building permit to allow him to

construct a metal structure, which would be 100’ by 30’ and up to 18’ in height. The site

of the building would be across the street from Fogg’s residence. The land is in

residential zone B, which is “a zone for residential use of existing housing and new multi-

family housing.” TOWN OF EDDINGTON, MAINE ZONING ORDINANCE § 202 (Ordinance).

The ordinance also permits “accessory uses” within residential zone B. The ordinance

defines an “accessory” as one that is “[c]ommonly associated with or in support of the

' Fogg’s appeal from the Board’s initial decision, resulting in the December 2001 order,

was docketed as AP-00-60. After the case was remanded and Fogg filed an appeal from

the Board’s next order, that appeal was docketed as AP-02-9. This court retained

jurisdiction over the case after it remanded the matter for a third hearing by the Board,

and Fogg’s appeal from that decision is part of the 2002 case.

primary or principal use of a lot or structure.” Id., § 102. The Town’s code enforcement

officer issued the permit sought by Fogg. However, that decision was appealed by the

intervenors at bar, and the appeal was addressed by the Town’s Zoning Board of Appeals

(ZBA). As is discussed in this court’s December 2001 order, the Board was deemed to

have conducted a de novo hearing and vacated the building permit issued by the CEO.

This court in turn vacated that decision and remanded the matter to the ZBA for further

proceedings occasioned by uncertainty in the record regarding the location of the

proposed structure relative to the location of the principal building (namely, the residence

situated on the parcel). On that remand, the ZBA again, in effect, denied the permit

application, this time because it concluded that the metal buildin g would be situated on a

lot different than the lot where the primary structure was located and that, as result, the

proposed building could not be regarded as an accessory to the existing one. On appeal,

this court concluded that under the definitional provisions included in the ordinance, the

buildings in fact would be on the same lot and that basis for the ZBA’s decision was

therefore legally flawed. The case was then remanded for further consideration of Fogg’s

permit application in light of that clarification.

On that remand, at a hearing held on February 10, 2003, see R. 18, the ZBA

incorporated the evidentiary record developed at the prior hearings and accepted

additional evidence, which included testimony from the intervenors and another

neighbor, Gary Poisson, who had testified at the first hearing. Poisson testified on both

occasions that the metal building is not typical in the Town’s residential areas. After

considering and discussing the evidence, the ZBA rejected, by a vote of 3 to 2, a motion

to deny the intervenor’s appeal from the CEO’s decision to issue the building permit.

The ZBA then voted 3 to 2 to grant that appeal and thereby vacate the CEO’s decision.

The ZBA followed up on the action it took at the meeting by issuing a written decision,

which embodied the majority’s conclusion reached at the February 10 hearing. See R.

19. Mirroring the focus of the discussion held at the meeting, the written decision noted

that the decision adverse to the appellant was based on the majority’s conclusion that “the

metal building of that size was [not] commonly associated with, or in support of

residential uses.” Jd.

On this appeal, Fogg argues that the Board’s decision was erroneous. Such factual

findings are reviewed to determine if they are supported by substantial evidence in the

record. Kurlanski v. Portland Yacht Club, 2001 ME 147, 7, 782 A.2d 783, 784. As the

permit applicant, Fogg must demonstrate here that on the hearing record, the ZBA was

compelled to reach a contrary conclusion. Veilleux v. City of Augusta, 684 A.2d 413,

415 (Me. 1996). Here, the record did not require the Board to conclude that the structure

envisioned by Fogg would be an accessory use to the residence located on the same

parcel. As the court noted in the December 2001 order issued in AP-00-60, the Board

was presented with evidence at its first hearing, conducted on a de novo basis, that Fogg’s

proposed building was not of a type commonly used in the Town’s residential zoning

district B. See “Order on Appeal,” December 28, 2001, AP-00-60, Superior Court

(Penobscot Cty.) at 5-6. Similar evidence was presented to the Board at the February

2003 hearing. This evidence included, but was not limited to, the presentation of Gary

Poisson. The majority membership of the Board agreed with this observation.

In Town of Shapleigh v. Shikles, 427 A.2d 460 (Me. 1981), the Law Court

identified several factors germane to the determination of accessory use. Those

considerations include some dependency or relationship of the proposed accessory use to

the primary use, the reasonableness of that relationship, and the existence of custom

under which it is common, habitual and well-established for the proposed use to serve an

accessory to the primary use. Jd. at 465. Here, the record warranted the Board in

concluding that a metal building of the size proposed by Fogg is not typical of accessory

structures that “are in keeping with the traditional pattern of development in residential

neighborhoods in the Town of Eddington.” Ordinance, § 202. Therefore, the Board was

not compelled to reach the contrary conclusion that would have been necessary to deny

the intervenors’ appeal.

Fogg also argues that the Board erred in failing to characterize its decision as one

where it found that the CEO’s decision to grant his permit application was erroneous.

For the reasons noted in the December 2001 order, however, the Board was required to

conduct a de novo hearing on Fogg’s permit application once the matter had been

submitted to it pursuant to the intervenors’ appeal. Accordingly, the Board did not act in

an appellate capacity. The question was not whether the CEO erred in issuing the permit,

but whether the record developed before the Board itself supported its independent

factual and legal analyses. The manner in which the Board framed its decision was

therefore not error.

The docket entry shall be:

For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the Town’s Zoning Board of Appeals is

affirmed.

oy

Dated: November 28, 2003 | 7 [fp

\ . ‘ . —~

J ustice! Maine Shperior Court

Jeffrey L. Hjelm

Date Filed 5/2/02 Penobscot Docket No, AP~2002-9

County AP-00-60 Consolidate

Action Rule 80B Appeal

ASSIGNED TO JUSTICE JEFFREY L. HJELM

Peter Roderick and Carol Roderick,

Intervenor 7/8/02

GARY A FOGG VS. TOWN OF EDDINGTON

Plaintiff’s Attorney Defendant’s Attomey

Donald Brown Esq GILBERT & GREIF, P.A.

Stillwater Professional Park 82 COLUMBIA ST. - P O BOX 2339

36 Penn Plaza BANGOR, ME 04402 2339

Bangor ME 04401 BY: CHARLES E. GILBERT, III

FOR: TOWN OF EDDINGTON

RUDMAN & WINCHELL, LLC

84 HARLOW ST - P O BOX 1401

BANGOR, ME 04402~1401

BY: EDMOND J. BEAROR, ESQ.

Date of Luke M. Rossignol, Esq.

Entry FOR: Intervenors, Peter & Carol Roderick

5/2/02 Complaint filed.

5/6/02 Notice and Briefing Schedule (80B Appeal of Governmental Actions)

forwarded to attorney for the Plaintiff and to Town of Eddington, 906

Main Road, Eddington, ME 04428

5/10/02 Letter received by Charles E. Gilbert, III, Esq., entering his appearance

on behalf of the Tomof Eddington.

5/10/02 Copy of Notice and Briefing Schedule (80B Appeal of Governmental Actions)

forwarded to Atty. Charles Gilbert III.

5/15/02 Officer's Return of Service as to Defendant Town of Eddington filed.

(s.d. 5/7/02 to Pamela Violette, Clerk)

5/24/02 Motion to Extend Time to File Appellant's Brief pursuant to Rule 80B(G)

MRCivP. filed.

5/29/02 Amended Motion to Extend Time to file Appellant's Brief pursuant to

Rule 80b(G) MRCivP filed by Plaintiff/Appellant.

5/30/02 File presented to Justice Hjelm for review.

6/3/02 File returned by Justice Hjelm, order issued.

6/3/02 Order filed. Motion to Extend Time to File Appellant's Brief is hereby:

GRANTED, brief due 6/25/02. Hjelm, J.) Copy forwarded to all attorneys

of record.

5/31/02 Motion to Intervene (MRCivP 19 and 24(a) & (b) filed by Peter and

Carol Roderick,

5/31/02 | Motion to Dismiss with Memorandum of Law filed by Peter and Carol

Roderick. Attachments attached.