Opinion

Greene v. Maine State Ret. Sys.

Court
Superior Court of Maine
Filed
Aug 16, 2002
Status
Unpublished
On the bench
Donald H. Marden
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 34.1%

The opinion

STATE OF MAINE SUPERIOR COURT

CIVIL ACTION

KENNEBEC, ss. DOCKET NO. AP-01-65

“DY A. “ Fo = y h z N Ro,

JOHN E. GREENE, .

Petitioner

Vv. DECISION ON 80C REVIEW

MAINE STATE RETIREMENT DONALD L. GARBRECHT

SYSTEM, et al., LAW LIBRARY

Respondents SEP 4 2002

This matter is before the court on petitioner's petition for review of final agency

action under M.R. Civ. P. 80C. In his petition, the petitioner asks the court to vacate a

decision of the Board of Trustees of the Maine State Retirement System and to remand

the matter to said Board for a determination that the petitioner is eligible for disability

benefits and to allow his application for disability retirement to be considered and

approved.

John E. Greene was born June 24, 1937. For purposes of retirement, he had 22

creditable years employment with the State of Maine, 18 years of service and 4 years

credit for military service. On June 24, 1997, petitioner became 60 years old, the normal

retirement age as defined by the Maine State Retirement System statutes, 5 M.R.S.A.

§ 17001(23). Quoting facts from petitioner's brief, which are undisputed:

In 1994, the plaintiff experienced congestive heart failure in late March and

underwent quadruple bypass surgery shortly after that. Plaintiff returned

to work in October, 1994, without restrictions. He worked in a stressful

environment at the Augusta Mental Health Institute (AMHI). Although

plaintiff took part in a regiment of diet, exercise and a stress management

program, his condition worsened. In the Spring of 1998, he was

hospitalized for atrial fibrillation. Upon his release from the hospital, he

contacted the System by telephone to enquire (sic) about a possible

disability pension. ...

On August 25, 1999, the petitioner applied to the respondent System for

retirement benefits. He retired from State service effective August 31, 1999. The first

payment of Mr. Greene's monthly service retirement benefit was made on September

29, 1999. On August 31, 1999, the petitioner filed an application for Maine State

Retirement System Disability Benefits on the basis of chronic heart failure/ syndrome X.

On September 3, 1999, without making a determination as to whether or not Mr.

Greene became disabled while in the service, the Executive Director of respondent

denied Mr. Greene's application for disability retirement benefits. The basis of the

denial was 5 M.R.S.A. § 17924. That section provides that a member qualifies for

disability retirement benefits if he becomes disabled while in service for the State and, if

a member of the Maine State Retirement System is covered under the law as written

prior to the amendment by P.L. 1991, ch. 887, § 7, is before normal retirement age.

Inasmuch as Mr. Greene had not applied for disability benefits prior to his normal

retirement age and he was a person covered under the law prior to the 1991

amendment, he did not qualify for a disability retirement. In addition, under 5 M.RS.A.

§ 17654, Mr. Greene had ceased to be a member of the Retirement System once he

became a beneficiary as the result of his own retirement. Therefore, the date he applied

for disability benefits was also the effective date of his retirement and removal as a

member of the Retirement System.

Also relevant to the decision of the respondent is 5 M.R.S.A. § 17812 which

provides that a beneficiary may select only one benefit and the beneficiary's election of

benefits is final and may not be changed or revoked at a later date. Contained within

section 17812 is language which, although not directly relevant to the issues in this case,

provides due process language indicative of the frustrations experienced by the

petitioner. The statute requires that the beneficiary's election of benefits is final and

may not be changed, "...if a beneficiary elects a benefit after receiving reasonable

notification of available options from the Retirement System, . . ."

Upon the petitioner's appeal of the decision of the Executive Director with

respect to his disability application, a prehearing conference in accordance with

procedural rules was held on May 31, 2000. The hearing officer bifurcated the appeal

and determined that a final decision would be made on the issue of whether Mr.

Greene's appeal was moot, as argued by the respondent, and that decision would be

made before considering Mr. Greene's attempts to obtain and provide evidence relating

to the “election” issue which is the gravamen of the petitioner's request for relief before

this court.

In 1990, the U.S. Government enacted The Older Workers Benefit Protection Act,

104 Stat. 978, 981-982, P.L. 101-433, § 105(c)(2)(A), October 16, 1990, resulting in Maine

legislative action 1991 P.L. Ch. 887, § 10 (5 M.RS.A. § 17941(1)(B)). Because the

Retirement System law prior to that date had limited eligibility for disability benefits

prior to normal retirement age, age 60, and were only available for 10 years or when

those benefits equaled to the normal retirement benefits, they were age-based

provisions in violation of the new federal law. However, the federal law allowed

employees to make an election as to whether to remain under such a law or to be

covered by a non-age-limit disability retirement provision. The Maine Legislature then

created such a disability provision not dependent upon age, but the election by the

employees contained deadlines. If the employee did not affirmatively elect to move

from the age-limit plan to the no-age-limit plan by the April 14, 1993 deadline, the

employee remained covered by the age-limit plan. P.L. Ch. 887, § 10 (5 M.R.S.A.

§ 17941(1)(E) & (2) and section 20). There was no statutory requirement that the

employee sign an election form indicating that they chose to remain in the age-limit

plan.

This election is the essence of petitioner's request for review because he insists

he was not made aware of such an election, he did not participate in such an election,

and that by failing to do so and electing the no-age-limit plan, he is statutorily

prohibited from having a consideration of his disability retirement application after

normal retirement age and after he had selected normal retirement benefits. While, pro

se in his petition, he does not articulate the point, he essentially is suggesting that he has

been denied a property right without due process of law as he was not given an

opportunity to make the election notwithstanding his disability occurring before his

normal retirement age. Further, the inability to make an election would violate federal

and state law.

The recommended decision of the Board of Trustees was submitted to the Maine

State Retirement System Board of Trustees under date of August 18, 2000. In the

recommendation, the hearing officer recommended that the Board of Trustees conclude

that Mr. Greene's appeal is moot, citing 5 M.R.S.A. § 17803(4), Mr. Greene could not

revoke an election of the method of payment of his benefit after payment of the first

benefit. In addition, relying upon sections 17654(2) and 17924, once Mr. Greene became

a service retiree, he was no longer a member of the System and only members of the

System could qualify for disability benefits. The conclusion recommended was that

even if the petitioner should prevail on his complaint of his inability to make a timely

election of the no-age-limit plan, his election of service retirement is final and therefore

the mootness conclusion prevails.

The proceedings after the issuance of the recommended decision become

important from a due process viewpoint. By letter August 31, 2000, petitioner asked

the respondent to stay further proceedings. The hearing officer responded on

September 5, 2000, that, understanding that Mr. Greene sought an opportunity to have

his attorney provide input, and because the Board of Trustees would not be able to

consider the matter until its October meeting, she would permit Mr. Greene an

extension until September 22, 2000, to file comments. By letter dated September 22,

2000, the petitioner requested an additional extension of time. By letter dated

September 26, 2000, Mr. Greene was notified by the respondent that the recommended

decision was expected to be presented to the Board of Trustees at its meeting on

October 12, 2000. He was invited to make a presentation of his position at that time. By

letter of October 12, 2000, the secretary to the Board of Trustees of the Maine State

Retirement System advised the hearing officer that "at its meeting on October 12, 2000,

the Board of Trustees remanded the case of John E. Greene to the Hearing Officer for a

hearing on the issue before the Board on the Recommended Decision in this matter

dated August 18, 2000. Mr. Greene had requested such a hearing and the staff did not

object.” It should also be noted that Mr. Greene did not attend the Board of Trustees

meeting on October 12 but sent an e-mail message requesting further hearing. On

November 7, 2000, the Chair of the Board of Trustees of the respondent issued an order

remanding the matter to the hearing officer "for the limited purpose of giving

Appellant the opportunity to state on the record why he believes his election of service

retirement should not make him ineligible to apply for disability retirement." This is

precisely the due process argument which petitioner has propounded throughout this

process, including oral argument on this petition.

A case management conference was scheduled for March 20, 2001, on the

remand. The meeting was rescheduled for March 22, 2001, both dates having been

provided in notices to the petitioner. After multiple e-mails, petitioner wrote to the

Board of Trustees a two-page letter under date of May 4, 2001, complaining about the

election process, the legislation, the paperwork, and the operation of the Maine State

Retirement System. He advised the Board that he was submitting the letter "in lieu of a

hearing on this matter and am waiving my right to have a hearing on the issue I am

appealing.” The Board accepted the letter in lieu of the hearing, ruled that it was in

compliance with the order on remand, and requested the hearing officer prepare a

revised recommended decision. The hearing officer did so under date of June 18, 2001,

again concluding that his appeal is moot. In addition to previous conclusions, the

hearing officer provides the following language:

In addition, when given the opportunity to readdress this issue when the

case was remanded to the hearing officer, Mr. Greene did not offer any

further arguments on why his election of service retirement should not

make him ineligible for disability retirement.

On July 23, 2001, the Board of Trustees of the Maine State Retirement System

dismissed Mr. Greene's appeal. In its decision, the Board noted that the issue raised by

the petitioner in his written statement submitted after the remand raised a second issue

challenging the fairness of the appeal process.

It is undisputable, and the petitioner does not provide a credible argument

otherwise, that the statutes prohibit a person in Mr. Greene's position to make

application for disability benefits after he has applied for and received normal

retirement benefits and therefore no longer becomes a member of the system.

However, the real issue before this court is whether the effect of those statutes should

be negated in the present case because of actions by the respondent Maine State

Retirement System violating the constitutional rights of the petitioner such that he was

denied the ability to participate, “elect,” the no-age-limit system and therefore not be

prohibited by law from making the disability application. The respondent argues that

even if petitioner should prevail on the issue of his failure to participate in the election,

he had removed himself from membership in the System and therefore not eligible to

make the application by his own acceptance of retirement benefits.

Considering the undisputed evidence before this court, was petitioner placed in

this untenable position in June of 1997, his normal retirement age, by his failure to have

an opportunity to make an election? In other words, even though it is clearly a moot

question at this time by operation of statute, is it because of wrongful actions by the

respondent affecting the constitutional rights of the petitioner that cause the issue to be

moot? Regardless of the fundamental constitutional question, the petitioner's petition

must fail for two reasons. First, the court is fully satisfied that the respondent provided

the necessary tools to the petitioner's employer to enable him to exercise that election.

The record clearly indicates the information and documentation provided to the Bureau

of Mental Health, petitioner's employer, including election forms and informational

sheets. It was the responsibility of the respondent to notify the employers of the

election opportunity and the responsibility of the employers to effectuate the process

with their employees. Therefore, the respondent is not the proper party to petitioner's

claim for denial of due process.!

1The court notes LOVELY-BELYEA v. MSRS, 2002 ME 138, published this date.

Since Greene claims he got no notice, he can’t claim late notice with prejudice.

7

Secondly, the petitioner was given explicit opportunity by a vote of the Board of

Trustees of the Maine State Retirement System to present his evidence at a hearing

called for that purpose before the hearing officer. Mr. Greene not only failed to present

such evidence but specifically waived his opportunity to do so. There is no evidence

produced by the petitioner to suggest he would not have had an opportunity and the

means to obtain the information and evidence necessary to present his point of view at

hearing. If there was a flaw in the notification system, and there is some evidence to

suggest that the State has acknowledged some employers did not provide full

opportunity for election, petitioner was given an opportunity to present it to the Board

and to establish a factual record.

There is a presumption of regularity of the acts of public officers implied in these

facts. Such a presumption is a disputable mandatory presumption. Hann v. Merrill, 305

A.2d 545 (1973) citing Kellar v. Savage, 20 Me. 199 (1841). This presumption would

require that the burden of going forward with evidence as to regularity falls upon the

party claiming irregularity, ie, Mr. Greene. Numerous e-mails and letters are in the

record suggesting that during a period of time when Mr. Greene was given the

opportunity to prepare for a hearing, he was in communication with an attorney or

attorneys. Any one of those persons would have been in a position to explain how he

could acquire the necessary information and evidence to meet his burden of going

forward. His failure to participate in the hearing and his failure to present evidence of

lack of regularity by the State of Maine, in addition to the waiver as explicitly stated, has

put this court in a position where it has no evidence to support Mr. Greene that he was

denied an election to change his disability retirement plan. He can only offer hearsay

comments from others that they, too, were not able to participate in the election.

Therefore, the opportunity to present a record to the Board of Trustees of the Maine

State Retirement System to overcome the effect of the statute prohibiting his

application for disability retirement prevails and the matter of his appeal before the

Board of Trustees is moot.

The entry will be:

Decision of the Board of Trustees of the Maine State Retirement

System under Appeal #023-99, John E. Greene, dated July 23, 2001, is

AFFIRMED.

Dated: August_/¢_, 2002 xe.

Donald H. Marden

Justice, Superior Court

Date Filed 9/4/01 Kennebec Docket No. AP01-65

County

Action Petition for Review

John E. Greene YS. Maine State Retirement System

Plaintiff’s Attorney Defendant’s Attorney

John E. Greene, Pro Se James Bowie, AAG

P.O. Box 129 6 State House Station

Townhouse Road Augusta ME 04333-0006

Lincoln, Maine 04353

Date of

Entry

9/4/01 Petition for Review of Final Agency Action(M.R.Civ.P. 80C), filed.

s/Greene, Pro Se

12/5/01 Appearance of James Bowie, AAG on behalf of Respondent, filed.

s/J. Bowie, AAG

12/14/01 Certified mail receipt upon Maine State Retirement, filed.

12/17/01 Certificate of Administrative Record, filed. s/Evans, Executive Director.

conc Notice of briefing schedule mailed to pltf. and atty of record.

1/17/02 Motion to Extend Time for Filing Brief, filed. s/J. Green, Pro se

Petitioner.

2/28/02 Plaintiff's Brief with attachments, filed. s/J. Green, Pro se

3/28/02 Respondent's Memorandum in Opposition to the Petition for Review, filed.

s/Bowie, AAG.

4/11/02 Plaintiff's Request for Extension for Reply Brief, filed. s/ J. Greene,

Pro se Petitioner.

4/30/02 Plaintiff's Request for a Second Extension for Reply Brief, filed.

s/J.Greene, Pro Se

5/3/02 PLAINTIFF'S SECOND REQUEST FOR EXTENSION, Marden, J.

Motion granted. Time extended to 5/10/02.

Copies mailed to Pltf. and atty of record.

5/13/02 Plaintiff's Reply Brief, filed. s/Greene, Pro Se (filed 5/10/02)

Notice of satting for ax a 3/0 A.

sent to attorneys of record:

7/3/02 Hearing had, Hon. Donald Marden Presiding.

No courtroom clerk. Case under advisement.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

A word about cookies

We need a few to keep you signed in and the library working. The rest help us see which pages people use and where they get stuck. They stay off unless you say yes.