The opinion
STATE OF MAINE SUPERIOR COURT
CIVIL ACTION
KENNEBEG, ss. DOCKET NO. AP-00-36
SKS -KEN- VI2/ Qoe/
JAMES L. BROWN, III,
Petitioner
Vv. DECISION ON APPEAL
STATE OF MAINE,
DEPARTMENT OF
HUMAN SERVICES,
Respondent
This matter comes before the court on a petition requesting judicial review of
final agency action pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 80C. The court has reviewed the record
and written and oral arguments of the parties. Concluding that the respondent
Department of Human Services (Department) has given the eerute in question too
constricted an interpretation, the petition will be granted’.
Background
Petitioner James Brown was divorced from Deborah Ann Brown on March
27,1991. Brown was ordered to pay $163 per week for the support of his three minor
children and maintain health insurance coverage. Mrs. Brown was to be
responsible for the first $150 of uninsured medical and expenses each year, with the
1 The decision of the Administrative Hearing Officer does not specifically
refer to the statute in question. The reference to the “Department” here is to the
Division of Support Enforcement and Recovery, which initiated the claim on
behalf of Mr. Brown's ex-wife.
parties to split those expenses in excess of $150, 67% for the petitioner and 33% for
his former wife. On September 21, 1993, a court order resulted in a change of
primary physical residence of one of the children to be with the petitioner and the
petitioner’s obligation was reduced to $97 per week for the two children remaining
with their mother. Sometime in 1994, Brown became disabled and, after a lengthy
delay, he was granted Social Security disability benefits. Because of the delay, Brown
received retroactive benefits to the date of the filing for disability and the former
Mrs. Brown and all three of the children also received dependent benefits directly
from the Social Security Administration. The benefits received by Mrs. Brown and
the two children residing with her exceeded the child support arrears that had
accumulated during the time of Brown’s disability (1994-1998). During this period,
the former Mrs. Brown had paid all the medical treatment expenses for the three
minor children. She now seeks, among other things, establishment of an arrearage
for medical treatment expenses during that period. After hearing, the Department
refused to allow Brown to credit against his accrued medical debt the excess
retroactive Social Security benefits paid to his children. Brown has filed this timely
appeal of that decision.
Discussion
The key to the appeal lies in interpretation of 19-A M.R.S.A. § 2107, titled
“Credit for Dependent Benefits.” That statute reads, in pertinent part:
If a child receives dependent benefits as a result of the obligor parent’s
disability, any tribunal establishing, reviewing or modifying the child
support obligation or debt shall give the obligor parent credit for the
dependent benefits paid to the child. ... The tribunal shall make the
2
following findings: (c) that the obligor must receive credit against the
established obligation for the benefits received. Credit may not exceed
the amount of the current obligation for the period for which the
benefits are paid. Credit may not be given toward a past or future
obligation for dependent benefits that exceed the current obligation.
Despite the apparent applicability of this provision, the Department Administrative
Hearing Officer wrote:
I can find neither promulgated policy, statute, nor case law that grants
me the authority to apply retroactive Social Security benefits paid on
behalf of these children through Mr. Brown’s disability claim, those
amounts in excess of the child support owed for the period of
retroactivity, to any medical expenses Mr. Brown owes for that period.
By implication, the hearing officer determined that the credit provisions of section
2107 did not apply.
In arguing that the hearing officer was correct, the Department points to two
cases from other jurisdictions, Smith v. Smith, 651 P.2d 1290 (Az. App. 1982) and
Hinckley v. Hinckley, 812 P.2d 907 (Wyo. 1991). However, these cases are not
helpful. In Smith, the parties attempted to create an offset for Social Security
benefits through modification of the divorce judgment, but failed to amend an
important part of that judgment. In Hinckley, the court declined to adopt through
its decision a rule that would have allowed the Social Security benefits to be applied
against unpaid medical expenses of minor children in the absence of an amendment
to the support order through the courts. Here in Maine, the legislative enactment of
section 2107 obviates the concerns of the Arizona and Wyoming courts by providing
that benefit payments such as Social Security dependent benefits shall be credited
without the need to amend the underlying order of support. In other words, the
support order does not have to change every time the obligor parent begins
receiving such benefits, ends such benefits, or has a change in such benefits. There
is continuity in what the obligee of the support order receives, with the only change
being accounting for the benefits.
The hearing officer’s decision in somewhat ambiguous in that it simply says
that there is no statutory basis for the credit Brown seeks, without explaining why
section 2107 does not apply. However, it would seem that this decision must be
based on a reading that the medical expenses in question are not part of a “child
support obligation or debt” as that term is used in the statute. There is no specific
statutory definition for the term, but the Department argues that “child support
obligation” must mean it is limited to the basic support entitlement portion of the
calculations under the statuory guidlines used to arrive at a child support order,
rather than the total support obligation.. (19-A M.R.S.A. § 2001(1) & (10)). The court
is persuaded that the term is more generic in application; more akin to the
definition of “support obligations” set forth in 19-A M.R.S.A. § 2103(1)(B). Under
the latter statute, which sets forth the Department’s duty to enforce “support
obligations,” that term is defined as “the amount due to an obligee for support
“a
under an order of support... .”. If the Department interprets its support
enforcement obligations to include all aspects of an order of support (and this would
be a correct interpretation), it offers no persuasive explanation why the term “child
support obligation” in section 2107 should be given any less expansive
interpretation.
The more expansive interpretation of “child support obligation” not only
harmonizes the statutory provisions, but also is consistent with the purpose of the
Social Security disability dependents benefit. It does not require extensive legislative
history to conclude that the federal government’s purpose in providing these
benefits is to assist a disabled individual in supporting himself and in meeting his
obligation to support his dependents while he is-disabled. To the extent that credits
are not allowed for disabled persons who have been meeting their obligations by
paying money to someone else who is caring for the children, the beneficial effect to
this disabled person is reduced and the recipient of the funds gains a windfall.
It should be noted that credit for medical expenses under section 2107 would
be subject to the same limitations as credits for basic support, child care, or any other
component of the total support obligation as set forth in the order of support. In
other words, the credit could not extend back or carry forward, but would have to be
applied on a dollar-for-dollar basis only for those expenses which accrued during the
current period for which the disability dependent support benefit is paid. This also
is consistent with the overall statutory plan. A total child support obligation is
determined using the statutory guidelines and other factors and is set forth in an
order of support. If the obligor becomes disabled and Social Security or other
providers give a dependent suppor! component to disability benefits, the disabled
parent receives relief through the mechanism of a credit against the support
obligation, without the need to have a new support order entered, during the period
that the dependent benefits are paid. The obligee under the order of support is
never harmed and can only benefit from these payments. If the credit is less than
the support obligation, the obligor is still required to make up the difference. If the
benefit payments exceed the payments required under the order of support in any
given payment period, the obligee is entitled to retain that excess without any
reduction to any arrearage or future payments.
Since the court concludes that the Department made an error of law in failing
to apply the credit provided in section 2107, it will be necessary for Mr. Brown’s
remaining obligation to be recomputed giving appropriate credit for each payment
period for the time the payments were received.
The entry will be:
The petition on appeal is GRANTED. This matter is
REMANDED to the Department of Human Services for further
proceedings consistent with this Opinion.
Dated: January [2 , 2001 Md,
S. Kirk Studstrup
Justice, Superior Court
Date Filed 6/2/00 Kennebec Docket No. __AP00-36
County
Action __Petition for review j STUDSTRUP
James L Brown III VS. State, Dept of Human Services
Plaintiff's Attorney Defendant’s Attorney
James L Brown III Pro Se Raymond E Ritchie AAG 6/7/00
; i 6 State House Sta
576 Riverside Dr Apt 16 A ta Me 04333
Augusta Me 04330 EERSEE Ne
Date of
Entry
6/2/00 Petition for review of final agency action filed. s/Brown III Pro Se
6/7/00 Letter entering appearance filed. s/Ritchie AAG
6/26/00 Notice of briefing schedule sent to atty and PIltf.
8/1/00 Reply Brief of Appellant on Appeal from Department of Human Services, filed.
s/Brown.
8/31/00 Respondent's Brief, filed. s/Ritchie, AAG
9/11/00 Appellant's Reply Brief, filed. s/Brown.
11/2/00 Hearing had with Hon. Justice Kirk Studstrup, presiding.
James Brown, Pro Se and Raymond Ritchie, AAG for the State.
Oral arguments made to the court.
Court to take matter under advisement.
Court to issue Order.
1/12/01 DECISION ON APPEAL, Studstrup, J.
The petition on appeal is GRANTED. This matter is REMANDED to the Department
of Human Services for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.
Copies mailed to atty and Pltf.
Copies mailed to Deborah Firestone, Garbrect Library and Goss.
1/16/01 Notice of removal of record mailed.