President and Trustees of Bates College v. Congregation Beth Abraham

STATE OF MAINE RECEIVED & FILED SUPERIOR COURT

ANDROSCOGGIN Docket No. ~ als}

DRO: Pocket No. CV-0}-2

SUPERIOR COURT Tem “AND 213} 200)

PRESIDENT AND TRUSTEES

OF BATES COLLEGE,

Plaintiffs

v. DECISION AND ORDER

CONGREGATION BETH ABRAHAM,

ARNOLD LEAVITT,

MICHAEL SHAPIRO and

MARTIN SHORR,

Defendants

I. STATUS OF CASE

This matter was initiated by plaintiff President and Trustees of Bates College

(Bates) as the overseers and administrators of Bates College, a Maine corporation

existing as a private educational institution at Lewiston, Maine.

Defendant Congregation Beth Abraham (Congregation) is a legal entity under

the laws of the State of Maine which operates a Synagogue for members of the

Jewish faith in Auburn, Maine.

Arnold Leavitt and Michael Shapiro are officers in the Congregation serving

as president and as a member of the Board of Directors respectively.

Martin Shorr at times relevant to this action has served as the spiritual leader

of the Congregation and has acted as cantor and rabbi.

Bates brings this action seeking injunctive relief to prevent Leavitt and

Shapiro from any disclosure and the return of certain information given to them by

Steven Hochstadt a professor at Bates who serves as the faculty advisor to the Jewish

Cultural Community (JCC) at Bates. The JCC is a recognized and sanctioned campus

activity for students and receives some funding from the college.

Il. BACKGROUND

After hearing, the court finds the following facts.

Congregation Beth Abraham serves the spiritual needs of persons of the

Jewish faith in the greater Lewiston-Auburn area. As part of its role it has

traditionally opened its doors and welcomed area students at Bates College and

other schools.

As the spiritual leader of the Congregation, Martin Shorr was expected to

interact with the students, invite them to participate in services and functions of the

congregation and make them feel welcome.

As a member of the Bates faculty, Steven Hochstadt is expected to offer service

to the college community over and above his teaching requirements. Part of this

function is fulfilled by his appointment by the college president as the faculty

advisor to the JCC. In this role his is expected to interact with the students, to assist

them in participating in their faith and to act as liaison with Congregation Beth

Abraham.

During October of 2000, it came to Hochstadt’s attention that there was an

uneasiness and tension between the Jewish students on campus and Shorr. He was

concerned that Shorr’s conduct was interfering with the relationships of Bates’

students and the Congregation and the practice of their faith. Hochstadt sent a letter

to Shorr and talked with several students. As a result of his talking with the

students, one person (Student A) sent an e-mail (Pl. ex. 1a) over Bates’ on-campus e-

mail system complaining about Shorr’s inappropriate conduct and detailing certain

examples and named other students to whom he could speak.

Student A also forwarded to Hochstadt a copy of an e-mail that Student A had

received from Student B in March of 2000 (Pl. ex. 1b). This e-mail contained

additional names and facts about specific instances of misconduct. When the e-mail

messages were sent to Hochstadt, Student A specifically requested that the e-mail

from Student B remain confidential and that Hochstadt not reveal its contents to

any other person.

On the same day that he received the e-mails, Hochstadt met with Leavitt and

Shapiro to bring the issue of Shorr’s conduct with students to their attention. It was

his purpose to alert them to the deteriorating relationship of the congregation

because of Shorr’s conduct in the hope that they could take some action to repair

relationships with Bates students.

In order to reinforce the seriousness of the situation and to lend credibility to

the students’ claims, Hochstadt provided copies of the e-mails to Leavitt and

Shapiro only with the understanding that they would not disclose any of the

student’s names. No other restrictions were asked or agreed to at that time.

1. Plaintiffs exhibits la and 1b have been impounded and sealed upon the agreement of

all parties for the personal protection and confidentiality of the students.

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On the next day, Hochstadt mailed a letter to Leavitt (Pl. ex. 2) asking that the

letters (Pl. ex. la and 1b) not be shown to Shorr. He further added that:

I really didn’t have permission to give copies of those letters away, but I

thought they were important for you both to know about. So please

keep them in your possession, or destroy them when you are finished

with them.

Leavitt never responded to the letter and Hochstadt never made any follow-up

contact to confirm an understanding of conditions from Leavitt or Shapiro;

consequently, the court finds there was no agreement upon the terms of the October

31st letter. (PI. ex. 2).

The letter and the testimony at the hearing is at odds with Hochstadt’s

affidavit submitted in support of the request for the injunction. In the affidavit he

said the e-mail communications were given to him “with the understanding that

[he] would ... maintain them in my capacity as Advisor to the [JCC] and that I

would not disclose ... these .. . to any third party.” His disclosure has resulted in

this litigation.

Hochstadt further stated in his affidavit that the letters were given to Leavitt

and Shapiro for the purpose of reviewing Shorr’s relationship with students and

staff at Bates; that there was an “express understanding” that the documents would

not be released to Shorr or any other third party; that the documents “would not be

relied upon or used as the basis for any personnel action or decision as to Rabbi

Shorr; “and, that Leavitt and Shapiro agreed to these conditions.”

The court finds specifically that no conditions as recited in the affidavit were

demanded or agreed to.

' The Board of Directors of the Congregation subsequently initiated proceedings

to dismiss Shorr from his position. The students’ allegations as set out in the letters

have played a substantial role.

Pursuant to 13 M.R.S.A. § 2985 (records of a parish are open to inspection by

members), and 26 M.R.S.A. § 631 (employee’s right to inspect personnel file), Shorr

has demanded that copies of all material in his personnel file be made available to

him. Notwithstanding Leavitt’s testimony that the Congregation does not maintain

a “personnel file,” it does possess records and information, including the subject

documents, which pertain to Shorr’s employment status and performance that are

covered by section 631.

It is the policy of Bates to vigorously guard and protect the confidentiality of

all student records in accordance with the Family Educational and Privacy Rights

Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1232g, et seq. (FERPA). In order to comply with FERPA and protect

student’s privacy Bates has enacted written policies and procedures regarding

admission, academic, disciplinary and similar records. A separate policy exists

regarding computer use by students and faculty using the college’s internet and e-

mail systems from which the e-mails in question were generated; however, no

evidence has been offered concerning these standards.

It is common practice for faculty advisors for campus organizations to create

and maintain records of activities and concerning students which may be kept in

their campus offices or files separate and apart from other student records

traditionally maintained by the administration. Testimony at the hearing shows

that there is substantial question in the Bates community as to whether the college’s

policies and procedures on privacy and confidentiality apply to the records regarding

student activities.

At the time that Hochstadt provided the documents to Leavitt and Shapiro,

he did not notify or seek the advice or authorization of the Bates administration.

When Bates learned of the disclosure it initiated this action.

Ill. FAMILY EDUCATIONAL AND PRIVACY RIGHTS ACT

The Family Educational and Privacy Rights Act, 20 U.S.C § 1232g, exists “to

provide greater privacy safe-guards to parents and students through the application

of fair information practice.” 41 F.R., no. 188, p. 89. To enforce the privacy

regulations and discourage improper disclosure of student information, educational

institutions that receive federal funds, of which Bates College is one, may have

federal funds withheld which undoubtedly would have a substantial impact upon

the students and college operations and programs.” Exceptions to the privacy

requirements are not applicable in the present case. See 20 U.S.C. § 1232(a)(5)(A)

(Release of “directory information); and 34 C.F.R. § 99.30 et seq.

A breach of the confidentiality requirements by an unauthorized disclosure

may be enforced by the Secretary of the Department of Education.

2. 20U.S.C. § 1232g

(b)(1) “No funds shall be made available under any applicable program to any

educational agency or institution which has a policy or practice of permitting

the release of education records (or personally identifiable information . . .) of

students without the written consent of [the student] to any individual, agency or

organization,” other than in several situations not relevant here.

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20 U.S.C. 1232¢(f)

“The Secretary shall take appropriate actions to enforce this section and

to deal with violations of this section, in accordance with this chapter,

except that action to terminate assistance may be taken only if the

Secretary finds there has been a failure to comply with this section, and

he has determined that compliance cannot be secured by voluntary

means.”

IV. EDUCATIONAL RECORDS

Key to the determination of the present case is whether the documents

furnished by Hochstadt are records within the meaning of FERPA. Even though

they are documents generated by students outside normal academic exercises, the

court concludes they are records covered by the Act.

20 U.S.C. 1232g(a)(4)(A)

“For the purpose of this section, the term ‘educational records’ means,

except [certain documents: not applicable here], those records, files,

documents, and other materials which--

(i) contain information directly related to a student; and

(ii) are maintained by an educational agency or institution or by a person

acting for such agency or institutuion.

The e-mail messages here were generated by students and directed to the

faculty advisor assigned by the college president to assist and guide students in the

interaction of their academic lives and practice and maintenance of their faith.

Although the messages were directed at the conduct of a person outside the college

community, they named several students and their involvement with a spiritual

leader (Shorr) whose duty it was to interact with them and assist in the spiritual

enrichment of their lives. The records directly related to the named students and

sought the advice and assistance of a person acting for the college.

Although the e-mail correspondence may be of a different character than

most records, files and documents maintained by an educational institution, the

Statute, § 1232g(a)(4)(A) does not limit the definition of “other materials.” As such

that term ought to be liberally construed to be inclusive rather than exclusive to

carry out the Act’s purpose and intent for the protection of the students.

Having concluded that the documents released by Hochstadt are “educational

records” subject to the rules of privacy and confidentiality, it was a violation to

disclose the information to Leavitt and Shapiro that was compounded by giving

them copies. There is no evidence of any authorized consent to their release even if

it was done for the limited purpose of improving the relationship among students

with Shorr and the Congregation.

The obligation to protect student’s privacy is placed squarely upon Bates. The

expected confidentiality was unquestionably and unjustifiably broken by Hochstadt,

who received the information in his role as a college official and student advisor.

V. STANDING TO BRING ACTION

As a statute that proscribes certain conduct, enforcement and remedies must

follow the legislative form. The only sanction for violation is action by the

Secretary. 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(f). All federal courts that have addressed the issue have

concluded or acknowledged that there is no private right of action unless it is

coupled with an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (civil rights) or some other actionable

right. See e.g., Doe v. Harvard University, 56 F.3d 59 (1st Cir. 1995);Tarka v.

Franklin, C.A. 5 (Tex.) 1989, 891 F.2d 102 (stating that FERPA does not explicitly

provide for a private cause of action and that its legislative history does not indicate

that the drafters of the legislation intended for there to be one), cert. denied 110 S.Ct.

1809, 494 U.S. 1080, 108 L.Ed.2d 941; Langston v. ACT, 890 F.2d 380, 387 n.12 (11th Cir.

1989) (noting other courts have decided that no private right of action is created); Fay

v. South Colonie Central School District, 802 F.2d 21, 33 (2nd Cir. 1986) (stating that

FERPA, by itself does not give rise to a private cause of action); Girardier v. Webster

College, 563 F.2d 1267, 176-77 (8th Cir. 1977) (stating that enforcement is solely in the

hands of the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare and that, under such

circumstances, no private cause of action arises by inference).

The Second Circuit, in Fay, held that, although FERPA does not create a

private right of action by itself, FERPA creates an interest that may be vindicated in a

section 1983 action because “Congress did not create so comprehensive a system of

enforcing the statute as to demonstrate an intention to preclude a remedy under

section 1983.” Fay, 802 F.2d at 33. The United States District Court for the District of

New Hampshire has held similarly. See Belanger v. Nashua, New Hampshire,

School District, 856 F.Supp. 40, 42-46 (D.N.H. 1994). Even if this court were to

recognize a cause of action under § 1983, however, the Plaintiff has not sought relief

pursuant to § 1983 in this case. In addition, Bates College, as a private institution,

does not act under the color of state law. Therefore, any claim under FERPA must

be dismissed. Fay v. South Colonie Cent. School Dist., C.A. 2 (N.Y.) 1986, 802 F.2d 21.

Bates College cannot bring a § 1983 or other action against itself.

FERPA is enforceable by the Secretary only to educational institutions

receiving federal funds. None of the defendants are subject to the Act.

V. CONTRACT

At oral argument, Bates acknowledged its difficult position as a third party

seeking to enforce the statute that its agent violated. It now offers the theory that a

contract existed placing obligations and limitations upon the Congregation to

preserve the confidentiality of the documents.

In order to establish a contract the plaintiff must establish certain criteria.

First, there must be a meeting of the minds of the parties to a contract; that is, a

mutual assent to be bound by its terms. This is essential to the formation of the

contract. See Zamore v. Whitten, 395 A.2d 435, 439-40 (Me. 1978). An

uncommunicated intention is insufficient to constitute an acceptance. See id. at 439.

Having found that there was no agreement or meeting of the minds as to the

use or release of any information therein, the court finds there is no contract.

Further infirmities apply to the contract theory. Every contract requires

consideration to support it. Any promise not supported by consideration is

unenforceable. There is a lack of consideration here for any contract to exist between

Bates and the Congredgation. See id. at 440 (citing Congregation Beth Abraham v.

People’s Savings Bank, 113 A. 53 (1921)).

A contract here would cause the Congregation to violate the state statute

requiring them to release personnel file information 36 M.R.S.A. § 631. A contract

that calls for a violation of law is void as against public policy. “It is a fundamental

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and elementary rule that the courts will not enforce illegal contracts, or contracts

which are contrary to public policy, or which are in contravention of the positive

legislation of the state.” Pringle v. Gibson, 195 A. 695, 698 (Me. 1937); see also Allstate

Ins. Co. v. Elwell, 513 A.2d 269, 272 (Me. 1986) (stating that a contract is against public

policy if it “clearly appears to be in violation of some well established rule of law”).

And finally, the existence of a contract was never advanced in the complaint.

VI. INJUNCTION

Maine law authorizing equitable injunctive relief is clear and well

established. The plaintiff must show:

1. The applicant will suffer irreparable injury if the injunction is

not granted;

2. that the injury outweighs any harm that the injunction would

inflict on the defending party;

3. the plaintiff has exhibited a likelihood of success on the merits;

and,

4, the public interest will not be adversely affected by granting the

injunction.

Ingraham v. University of Maine at Orono, 441 A.2d 691, 693 (Me. 1982).

The plaintiff has not demonstrated it “will suffer” irreparable harm. Should

the Secretary invoke sanctions against Bates, it is reasonable to assume the loss of

federal funds would have significant adverse affect on the students and college

programs; but given the contingent nature of the enforcement section, (g 1232g(f)

(“[Alction to terminate assistance may be taken only if the Secretary has determined

that compliance cannot be secured by voluntary means.”), the liklihood of such

harm is at best uncertain. A violation leading to loss of funds occurs when an

institution “has a policy or practice of permitting [unauthorized] release of records . .

.-” 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(f). Hochstadt’s action was a one-time incident, unlikely to be

repeated given Bates’ vigilant conduct in preserving privacy. “Irreparable harm” to

the college is contingent and speculative.

If an injunction is granted the Congregation will lack substantial evidence in

its proceedings to terminate Shorr and protect its members from inappropriate

conduct and to preserve the integrity of the position of its spiritual leader. In turn,

Martin Shorr would be denied access to key information used as the basis of his

termination proceedings. On balance, Bates has not demonstrated that its potential

injury outwieghs “any harm” that would be incurred by the Congregation or Shorr.

Because Bates has no private right of action and no contract exists to prevent

further disclosure of information, there is little likelihood that plaintiff will

ultimately prevail on the merits.

Bates has failed to meet the standard required for injunctive relief.

VU. STUDENT PRIVACY RIGHTS

Whereas FERPA exists for the protection of students and parents, and because

Hochstadt did give the documents to Leavitt and Shapiro with at least an

understanding that they would protect the identity of the students named there, the

Congregation shall redact the documents to strike the names of any student and any

student address mentioned, including electronic addresses or e-mail identifiers.

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Any additional copies may be made only in compliance with 26 M.RS.A. §

631. If a meeting is held with Congregation members relative to termination

proceedings, the unredacted information within the documents may be recited

orally to the members but only to the extent necessary and relevant to the

proceedings. At the final conclusion of the proceedings, all copies in the possession

of any defendant shall be returned to plaintiff’s counsel and destroyed.°

VII. DECISION

The clerk shall make the following entries as the Order of the court.

1. The findings of the court shall be incorporated into the docket by reference

pursuant to MLR. Civ. P. 79(a).

2. Plaintiffs Motion for a Preliminary Injunctions is DENIED.

3. Further disclosure of the documents in question shall be governed by Part VII

as set forth above.

4, Further proceedings may be heard by any justice pursuant to M_R. Civ. P. 65(f

subject to the provision of the Administrative Order regarding assignment of

cases to individual justices.

So ordered.

DATED: February 13, 2001 IS

42\——$ 7

Thomas X Dela} anty II

Justice, Supértor Court

3. Although evidence was offered at the hearing on the preliminary injunction

concerning proceedings for termination of Shorr, the court offers no opinion nor advice as to

an appropriate procedure to be followed.

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