Taylor v. Philip Morris Inc.

STATE OF MAINE Repl anh, $5.

CUMBERLAND, ss

JULIE TAYLOR, et al.

Plaintiffs

PHILIP MORRIS INCORPORATED,

RJ. REYNOLDS TOBACCO COMPANY,

BROWN & WILLIAMSON TOBACCO CORP.,

LORILLARD TOBACCO CO.,

LIGGETT GROUP, INC., and

BROOKE GROUP, LTD.

Defendants

FACTS

SUPERIOR COURT

CIVIL ACTION

DOCKET NO. CV;00-303 a

RAC ~ CUA @ 5/89 fe i

-

DECISION

This is a class action lawsuit brought under Maine’s antitrust and consumer

protection laws. Plaintiffs are Maine consumers who bought cigarettes

manufactured by Defendants. Plaintiffs allege that from at least January 1, 1988 to

the present, Defendants have participated in a systematic series of agreements to fix

cigarette prices above competitive levels in violation of 10 M.R-S.A. § 1101 et seq.

and 5 M.RS.A. § 205-A et seg.. Complaint {I 2-3, 101-114.

The crux of Plaintiffs’ claims concerns an alleged agreement among

Defendants to engage in lockstep, or parallel, pricing. Plaintiffs allege that the

Defendants, through their directors, officers, employees and agents, participated in

meetings at various times during the class period at which time future price

increases for cigarettes were discussed, agreed upon and implemented. According to

Plaintiffs, these meetings included meetings of the Committee of Council, a group

of high-level, in-house counsel employed by the Defendants. Id. 57. It is alleged

that the Committee of Council held “executive sessions,” at which time agreements

were discussed and reached regarding future price increases for cigarettes for the

United States as well as abroad. Id. With regard to the United States’ cigarette

market, the price increases were allegedly accomplished through the use of signals

that would trigger a previously agreed upon increase. These signals allegedly came

in the form of one of the Defendants announcing to their distributors that the

distributors were restricted from purchasing cigarettes until further notice. Id. { 58.

After such a signal it is alleged that the other Defendants would raise the prices of

their cigarettes. Id.

According to Plaintiffs, throughout the class period, Defendants’ distributors

routinely received notification from each Defendant of a impending price increase

within hours - and often within minutes - of each of the other Defendants’ price

increase notification. Id. I 78. Moreover, Defendants allegedly created programs in

which distributors received incentives to report to each respective Defendant the

actual discounts and product promotions for all cigarette products sold, including

those of competitors. Id. { 79. The Complaint alleges this pricing and discounting

information was forwarded to an electronic database clearinghouse in Pittsburgh,

Pennsylvania, which Defendants accessed to monitor the actions of the other

Defendants and ensured that all Defendants were honoring the mutually-agreed

price levels. Id.

Plaintiffs allege dates and amounts of price increases during the class period.

Id. TJ 41, 44, 48, 50-54, 59, 60, 62, 63, 65-74, 76,77. In addition, it is alleged that

although the Defendants often cited increasing taxes as the basis for price increases,

between 1980 and the mid-1990s, cigarette price increases were three times the

amount of cigarette tax increases. Id. {| 48. .

The Complaint further alleges that until recently, Plaintiffs had no

knowledge of the alleged conspiracy “or of any facts that might have lead to the

discovery thereof in the exercise of due diligence.” Id. { 88. Plaintiffs allege that they

could not have discovered the conspiracy at an earlier date by the exercise of due

diligence because of “the deceptive practices and techniques of secrecy employed by

Defendants and their co-conspirators to avoid detection of, and to fraudulently

conceal their contracts, combinations, and conspiracies.” Id. Plaintiffs additionally

allege that the conspiracy was, by its nature, self-concealing and they assert that

Defendants’ fraudulent concealment of the conspiracy tolls the statute of

limitations. Id. [J 90-91.

DISCUSSION

1. Failure to State a Claim under the Maine Antitrust Act

Defendants first argue that Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim under the

Maine Antitrust Act because Plaintiffs’ allegedly vague and conclusory allegations of

price-fixing are not supported by any factual allegations that, if true, would support a

conclusion that Defendants conspired to fix prices. They argue that the Complaint

alleges merely that Defendants’ prices rose at approximately the same time and that

allegations of parallel price increases are insufficient because such conduct, without

more, does not exclude the possibility that the alleged conspirators acted

independently and lawfully. Defendants also argue ‘that although the Complaint

alleges in conclusory terms an “agreement” to fix prices it does not contain a single

fact concerning the time or place of the alleged conspiracy.

Modern notice pleading practice requires “a short and plain statement of the

claim to provide notice of the cause of action. .. . The function of the complaint is to

provide fair notice of a claim... It must sufficiently apprise defendants of the nature

of the claim against them.” Town of Stonington V. Galilean Gospel Temple, 1999

ME 2, { 14, 722 A.2d 1269, 1272 (citations omitted). A complaint “should not be

dismissed unless it is beyond doubt that no relief can be granted under any facts that

might be proved to support the plaintiff's claim.” Munjov Sporting & Athletic Club

y. Dow, 2000 ME 141, ¥ 16, 755 A.2d 531, 539. There are no Maine cases addressing

the sufficiency of a complaint in an antitrust action. A review of federal law

indicates that antitrust complaints are not subject to especially stringent or

heightened pleading requirements. Mountain View Pharmacy v. Abbott

Laboratories, 630 F.2d 1383, 1386 (10th Cir. 1980)([T]he liberal rules of pleading are as

applicable to antitrust cases as any other case.”). However, while the pleading

standard does not vary, what constitutes sufficient notice to enable a defendant to

formulate a responsive pleading does change from case to case. Id. A complaintina

complex, multi-party suit may require more information than a simple single party

case. Id. at 1386-87.

Moreover, in the context of alleged price-fixing conspiracies, plaintiffs must

plead more than mere parallel price increases. Theatre Enterprises v. Paramount

Film Distributing Corp., 346 U.S. 537, 541 (1954)(“[T]his Court has never held that

proof of parallel business behavior conclusively establishes agreement or . . . that

such behavior itself constitutes a Sherman Act offense.”). “The fact that competitors

may see proper, in the exercise of their own judgment, to follow the prices of

another manufacturer, does not establish any suppression of competition or show

any sinister domination.” United States v. International Harvester Co., 274 U.S. 693,

708-09 (1927). However, although parallel behavior alone does not set out a claim of

an antitrust conspiracy, “parallel behavior may support such a claim when

augmented by ‘additional evidence from which an understanding among the parties

may be inferred.’” Monument Builders of Greater Kansas City, Inc. v. American

Cemetery Ass‘n of Kansas, 891 F.2d 1473, 1481 (10 Cir. 1989).

Based on the aforementioned principles of pleading, the Complaint

sufficiently and adequately gives fair notice to Defendants of what the Plaintiffs’

claim is and the grounds upon which it rests. In addition to parallel price increases,

the Plaintiffs have alleged the methodology, mechanisms and motives behind the

price increases. More specifically, the pleadings specify that a series of meetings took

place, the persons in attendance, the topics discussed and the impact of the meetings

on the alleged conspiracy. The pleadings also specify how a previously agreed upon

price increase was signalled to other Defendants and monitored. “[T]he pleadings

are sufficient if they set forth facts from which an inference of unlawful agreement

can be drawn.” Brett v. First Federal Savings & Loan Ass’n, 461 F.2d 1155, 1158 (Sth

Cir. 1972). Plaintiffs have set forth ample information from which an unlawful

agreement could be inferred.

Furthermore, the cases cited by the Defendants can be distinguished from the

present case. In Mountain View Pharmacy v. Abbott Laboratories, 630 F.2d 1383

(10th Cir. 1980), “the original complaint used statutory language to describe the

alleged antitrust violations without including any factual allegations whatsoever. . . -

. the [amended] complaint was longer and better organized, but aside from

allegations relating to one specific drug and one specific manufacturer, no facts had

been added to support the alleged statutory violations.” Id. at 1385. In

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Pepsico, Inc., 836 F.2d 173, 181 (3rd Cir. 1988),

the Third Circuit found it significant that “Pennsylvania did not allege any meetings

between [the defendants], any communications between them, or any other means

by which their alleged conspiracy came about.” As well, in Pepsico, the Court noted

that because the soft drink industry was involved, and hence the Soft Drink Act, the

plaintiffs had a pleading burden “much higher than that in a mine-run antitrust

complaint.” Id. The complaint in Estate Construction Co. v. Miller & Smith

Holding Co. Inc. 14 F.3d 213, 221 (4th Cir. 1994) “lack[ed] completely any allegations

of communications, meetings, or other means through which one might infer the

existence of a conspiracy.” In Estate Construction, the plaintiffs “merely reiterat[ed]

mechanically the words of the Sherman Act. . .” Id. at 222.

In short, the present case is not analogous to the cases cited by the Defendants

and the Complaint sufficiently alleges facts from which an unlawful agreement can —

be inferred and provides fair notice of the claim to Defendants. For these reasons,

Defendants’ motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under the Maine

Antitrust Act is: DENIED.

2. Fraudulent Concealment

Both the Maine Antitrust Act and the Unfair Trade Practices Act are governed

by a six year of statute of limitations. 14 M.R.S.A. § 752.. The cause of action accrues

when the plaintiff “receive[s] a judicially recognizable injury”. Bozzuto v. Ouellette

408 A.2d 697, 699 (Me. 1979). Defendants argue that because Plaintiffs’ Complaint

was filed on March 24, 2000, claims arising before March 24, 1994 are barred.

The statute of limitations is tolled, however, if the defendant fraudulently

conceals the violative conduct. 14. M.RS.A. § 859. Section 859 offers two separate

bases for tolling the statute of limitations. A plaintiff may invoke § 859 if either the

defendant has fraudulently concealed from the plaintiff the existence of a cause of

action or the plaintiff’s claim itself is grounded on fraud. Chiapetta v. Clark

Associates, 521 A.2d 697, 700 (Me. 1987). Plaintiffs do not argue that the antitrust

action is grounded in fraud, but rather that the Defendants fraudulently concealed

the existence of a cause of action. Regardless, in either instance, the statute starts to

run only when the plaintiff discovers or in the exercise of due diligence and

ordinary prudence should have discovered the existence of the cause of action or

fraud. Id.

Plaintiffs argue that they have properly alleged both a self-concealing price-

fixing conspiracy and affirmative conduct on the part of Defendants to conceal this

conspiracy. Plaintiffs also allege that “until recently” they had no knowledge of the

conspiracy, or any facts that might have lead to the discovery of the conspiracy.

Complaint [ 88. The plaintiffs argue that they have plead, with the requisite

particularity, that they could not have discovered the existence of their cause of

action through a reasonable exercise of due diligence.

Self-Concealing Conspiracy

Plaintiffs argue that a self-concealing conspiracy negates the need for

allegations of affirmative conduct independent of the conspiracy. Several courts

6

have recognized the “self-concealing conspiracy” doctrine, which allows plaintiffs to

satisfy the “concealment” prong of fraudulent concealment by showing that the

conspiracy was inherently self-concealing. Under this doctrine, there is no need to

require the pleading of affirmative actions taken by defendants to prevent the

plaintiff's discovery of its claim. As one court stated: “[I]f the conspiracy conceals

itself, it would be anomalous to require plaintiff to allege affirmative acts by

defendants to conceal the conspiracy because such acts would be unnecessary and

therefore never performed . . . defendants would be rewarded for engaging ina

successful conspiracy; because no affirmative acts independent of the conspiracy

would be necessary to maintain concealment. . .” Bethlehem Steel Corporation v

Fischbach and Moore, Inc. 641 F. Supp 271, 274 (E.D. Pa 1986); see also State of New

York v. Hendrickson Brothers, Inc., 840 F.2d 1065, 1083 (2nd Cir. 1988); In Re Nine

West Shoes Antitrust Litigation, 80 F. Supp.2d 181, 192 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).

The Maine Law Court has not addressed the issue of whether or not the self-

concealing conspiracy theory is viable in Maine. At this time, this Court declines to

adopt this theory.

Affirmative Acts

Several courts have ruled that “affirmative acts” in furtherance of a

conspiracy must be plead to establish fraudulent concealment. For example, in

Supermarket of Marlinton, Inc. v. Meadow Gold Dairies, Inc., 71 F.3d 119, 124-25 (4th

Cir. 1995), the Fourth Circuit adopted the affirmative act standard in a case

involving allegations of price-fixing.! See also Phinney Dock & Transport Co. v.

Penn Central Corp., 838 F.2d 1445, 1472 (6th Cir. 1988)(“A plaintiff should be required

lThe Fourth Circuit did not rule out the possibility of adopting the self-concealing standard in

certain cases. However, Meadow Gold Dairies involved allegations of price-fixing and the Court found

that price-fixing is not inevitably deceptive or concealing. Su arket of Marlinton, Inc.

Gold Dairies, Inc., 71 F.3d at 123. The Court stated, however, that “[IJf an antitrust violation were

demonstrated to be in its very nature deceptive, i.e., concealment was an element of the offense rather

than merely a method of hiding it, then application of the self-concealing standard might well be

appropriate. Id. at 123 & n.1.

to prove affirmative acts of concealment, particularly in light of the strong policy in

favor Of statute of limitations.”); Berkson v. Del Monte Corp., 743 F.2d 53, 56 (1st Cir.

1984)(stating that affirmative acts were necessary to establish fraudulent

concealment). There is no requirement that these affirmative acts of concealment be

independent of the antitrust conspiracy.2 State of Texas v. Allan Construction Co.,

851 F.2d at 1532, 1534; Supermarket of Marlinton, Inc. v. Meadow Gold Dairies, Inc.,

71 F.3d at 124-126.

The Plaintiffs argue that even if the conspiracy was not “self-concealing,” they

have alleged sufficient affirmative acts of concealment to toll the statute of

limitations. Plaintiffs allege the Defendants employed techniques of secrecy such as:

(1) secret meetings; (2) the limitation of price-fixing information only to high-level

corporate officials at each Defendant; (3) the use of Previously-agreed signals as

triggers of price increases; and (4) misrepresentations to the public and customers

concerning the reasons for the timing and amount of price increases, such as, for

example, stating the price increases were necessary solely as a result of tax increases

or input costs.

There are no Maine cases involving the application of fraudulent

concealment to a cause of action alleging price-fixing. The Law Court has stated that _

in order for a plaintiff to establish fraudulent concealment they must establish that

defendants actively concealed material facts from the plaintiff and that the plaintiff

relied on their acts and statements to their detriment3 Harkness v. Fitzgerald, 1997

2Defendants seem to argue that fraudulent concealment consists of affirmative acts independent

of the underlying conspiracy. However, the weight of authority has adopted the view that a plaintiff

must prove that the defendants affirmatively acted to conceal their antitrust violations, but the

plaintiff's proof may include acts of concealment involved in the antitrust violation itself. As the

Fourth Circuit explained, this standard permits courts to “avoid the difficult, if not impossible, task of

deciding which acts are in furtherance of conspiracies and which acts are separate and apart from

conspiracies.” Supermarket of Marlinton, Inc. v. Meadow Gold Dairies, Inc. 71 F.3d 119, 125 (4th Cir.

1995).

3Fraudulent concealment may also be establish by showing that a special relationship existed

between the parties that imposed a duty to disclose the cause of action, and the failure of defendants to

honor that duty. Harkness v. Fitzgerald, 1997 ME 207, J 6, 701 A.2d at 372. Plaintiffs do not argue

8

ME 207, { 6, 701 A.2d 370, 372. Because a claim of fraudulent concealment

necessarily includes allegations of fraud, it must be plead with particularity.

M.R.Civ. P. 9(b); Barnes v. McGough, 623 A.2d 144, 146 (Me. 1993).

In the present case, Plaintiffs have not plead with sufficient particularity the

details of the Defendants concealing acts. As well, the Plaintiffs’ reliance on alleged

secrét meetings, misrepresentations regarding price increases and price signalling to

establish fraudulent concealment seems to be misplaced. First, failing to disclose is

not an affirmative act unless the parties share a fiduciary relationship, which is not

the case here. See Harkness v. Fitzgerald, 1997 ME 207, J 6, 701 A.2d 370, 372; see also

Pinney Dock and Transport Co. v. Penn Central Corp., 838 F.2d 1445, 1472 (6th Cir.

1988)(“Mere silence, or one’s unwillingness to divulge one’s allegedly wrongful

activities, is not sufficient.”).

Second, Plaintiffs’ argument that the Defendants’ alleged misrepresentation

regarding the reasons for the price increases constitutes affirmative acts of

concealment also fails. In Meadow Gold Dairies, the Fourth Circuit stated that

“failing to admit to illegal conduct upon general inquiry could not constitute ‘a

ree

claim of fraudulent concealment.’” Supermarket of Marlinton, Inc. v. Meadow Gold

Dairies, Inc., 71 F.3d at 123 (citing Pocahon reme Coal Co. v. Bethlehem Steel

Corp., 828 F.2d 211, 218 (4th Cir. 1987)); see also In re Milk Products Antitrust

Litigation, 84 F.Supp.2d 1016, 1023 (D. Minn. 1997)(“Simply denying the existence of

an antitrust violation does not constitute fraudulent concealment, and to hold

otherwise ‘would effectively nullify the statute of limitations in [antitrust

actions].’”). Finally, the allegations of price signalling do not constitute concealment

or misrepresentation of material fact. See Harkness v. Fitzgerald, 1997 ME 207, T 7,

701 A.2d 370, 372. Therefore, Plaintiffs’ allegations of secret meetings, use of signals

and misrepresentation to the public regarding the reason for price increases are

insufficient to satisfy the affirmative act requirement of fraudulent concealment.

Furthermore, Maine law requires that plaintiffs allege detrimental reliance in

that a special relationship exist between the parties.

9

order to invoke the fraudulent concealment doctrine. Harkness v. Fitzgerald, 1997

ME 207, 1 7, 701 A.2d 370,372. Plaintiffs do not allege that they relied on

representations by the Defendants regarding price increases.

Finally, the statute of limitations starts to run when the plaintiff discovers “or

in the exercise of due diligence and ordinary prudence should have discovered the

existence of the cause of action.” Chiapetta v. Clark Associates, 521 A.2d at 700. A

plaintiff pleading fraudulent concealment must state facts showing that they

exercised due diligence in trying to uncover the facts. Gonzalez-Bernal v. United

States, 907 F.2d 246, 250 (1st Cir. 1990).4 Plaintiffs’ conclusory allegations that they

“had no knowledge of the contract, combination or conspiracy ... or of any facts

that might have lead to the discovery thereof in the exercise of reasonable diligence”

does not meet the requisite pleading standard.

Plaintiffs’ allegations of fraudulent concealment are not plead with the

particularity required by M.R.Civ. P. 9(b) and relevant caselaw. Because of these

pleading defects, Plaintiffs’ claims which depend on allegations that fall outside the

applicable limitations period are dismissed.

Defendants’ motion to dismiss claims arising before March 24, 1994 is:

GRANTED.

3. Punitive Damages

Plaintiffs are seeking to recover punitive damages in addition to treble

damages and attorney fees. Plaintiffs argue that punitive damages are recoverable

in all actions based upon tortious acts in which the Defendant acted with malice.

See C.N. Brown Co. v. Gillen, 569 A. 2d 1206, 1213-14 (Me. 1990}. The Plaintiffs argue

that their statutory claims are linked with the doctrine of fraudulent concealment

4There are no Maine cases discussing the requirements for pleading due diligence. However,

the First Circuit’s pleading standard would appear to represent the majority view. See e.g., Lanza v.

Merrill Lynch & Company [nc., 154 F.3d 56, 60 (2nd Cir. 1998); Scherer v. Balkema, 840 F.2d 437, 441 n.8

(7th Cir. 1988).

10

and are therefore akin to tort-based claims. Plaintiffs further argue that although

they do not specifically allege malice in their complaint, the complaint has

sufficiently alleged a conspiracy in violation of Maine antitrust law that it can be |

inferred that Defendants have acted “maliciously and in reckless disregard of

Plaintiffs’ rights by violating these statutes.”

Neither Maine’s Antittrust Act nor the UTPA permit a plaintiff to recover

punitive damages. Both statutes set forth a comprehensive enforcement

framework. Under the UPTA, a private action may be brought for “actual damages,

restitution and for such other equitable relief, including an injunction.” 5 M.RS.A.

§ 213 (1). Under the Antitrust Act, if the court finds for the plaintiff, the plaintiff

“shall recover 3 times the amount of damages sustained and cost of suit, including

necessary and reasonable investigative costs, reasonable experts’ fee and reasonable

attorney's fees.” 10 M.R.S.A. § 1104(1). Because both of these statutes “fully

regulate[] the procedures for relief, [the court] must assume the Legislature intended

the same to be exclusive and not cumulative.” King Resources Company_y.

Environmental Improvement Commission et al., 270 A.2d 863, 866 (Me. 1970); see

also Fleischmann v. Maier Brewing Col, 386 U.S. 714, 720 (1967)(“When a cause of

action has been created by a statute which expressly provides the remedies for

vindication of the cause, other remedies should not readily be implied.”).

Furthermore, the Law Court has held that punitive damages are not available

under the UTPA. In Beaulieu_v. Dorsey, 562 A.2d 678 (Me. 1989), the Law Court

discussed the award of attorney fees in the context of the UTPA. The Court noted

that the party seeking costs should provide affidavits and bills which separate the

costs of pursuing the UPTA claim from those incurred in pursuing a remedy not

available under the Act. Id. at 679. The Law Court held that the “cost of bringing a

claim for punitive damages ... is not recoverable under the [UTPA].” Id.

As well, a substantial body of federal case law supports the view that punitive

damages are not available to a plaintiff in an antitrust action. Seee.g., Perez v. Z

Frank Oldsmobile, Inc., 223 F.3d 617, 621 (7th Cir. 2000)(“When a federal statute

11

provides for treble damages (or some other multiplier), judges regularly conclude

that punitive damages may not be added.”); Brown v. Presbyterian Healthcare

Services, 101 F.3d 1324, 1332 (10th Cir. 1996)("[I]t is clearly improper to allow a

plaintiff to recover punitive damages along with trebled damages on an antitrust

claim.”); Fineman y, Armstrong World Industries, Inc., 980 F.2d 171, 218 (3rd Cir.

1992) (a plaintiff “must elect between recovering under either tort law with any

punitive damages or under its antitrust claim with its treble damages.”); McDonald

y. Johnson & Johnson, 722 F.2d 1370, 1381 (8th Cir. 1984)(“Punitive damages beyond

the statutory trebled damages cannot be awarded for an antitrust violation.”);

Spence v. Southeastern Alaska Pilots’ Association, 789 F. Supp. 1014, 1029 (D. Alaska

1992)(“punitive damages are not available on federal anti-trust claims”); Central

Telecommunications Inc. v. TCI Cablevision Inc. 610 F. Supp. 891, 910 (W.D.

Missouri, 1985)(“it would be inappropriate to allow plaintiff to recover both treble

damages and punitive damages.”); Hometowne Builders, Inc. v. Atlantic Nat'l Bank

477 F. Supp 717, 720 (E.D. Virginia, 1979)(“both treble damages and punitive

damages are not recoverable under the antitrust laws. The combination of treble

damages and punitive damages is necessarily duplicative as a punitive element is

inherent in the trebling of actual damages.”); Hansen Packing Co. v. Armour & Co.,

16 F. Supp. 784, 789 (S. D. N. Y., 1936)(“[i]n trebling the amount of actual damages, it

seems indisputable that the statutes carry their own symbol of punishment).

For the above reasons, Plaintiffs are not entitled to puniti

Defendants’ motion to dismiss the claim for punitive da

Date:May 29,2001 2h NA eee

Jusfice Roland Cole

Superior Court

12

wt

Date Filed 03-24-00 __ CIIMBERLAND .. —s—<isé«~étckeett NN. LC 00-7203

County

Action _ STATUTORY ACTIONS

gust- 7% COLZ SPECIALLY ASSIGRETY

PHILTP-MORRIS COMPANIES, NT, dismiveed 10-

oe” PHILIP MORRIS INCORPORATED

JULIE TAYLOR RICHARD DRAKE

LESLIE ST. LEWIS SUSAN RAWSTRON

BILL MCGRATH MARY FITZGERALD

JOHN DAVIS. CLIFFORD SAUCTER

ROBERT FAHERTY DONALD RIOUX

‘RUT REYNOLDS TOBACCO HOLDINGS, ine, dismicse

wr R.J. REYNOLDS TOBACCO oo.

“PATINTINDUSTRIESS PLO ismissed 10-3-00

BAtRE-HeIBSHES;—ENe. dismissed 10-3-00

ww BROWN & WILLIAMSON TOBACCO CORP.

LORILLARD TOBACCO CO.

-LoEW-conperntion dicmissed 6-26-00

we” LIGGETT GROUP, INC.

« we BROOKE GROUP, LTD

VS.

Plaintiff's Attorney

JAMES T. KILBRETH ESQ 774-4000

PO BOX 586, PORTLAND ME 04112

SEAN MAHONEY, ESQ. 774-4000

P. 0. BOX 586, PORTLAND, MAINE 04112

SEE ATTACHED LIST

Defendant’s Attorney

JOHN LAMBERT, ESQ. (DEF. ALL BUT

P. O. BOX 15215 BAT INDUSTRIES)

PORTLAND, MAINE 04112-5215

871-7033

SEE ATTACHED LIST

-GHARBES-ABBOPE;-ES@G7-CB ATES -ENB>)

J4MES-BEELEAYUs -ESQ@ > - (BAT E--ED-)

Date of PO-BOK-3200

ate 0 AUBURN 5 -HE-04212-3200---

Entry

2000

Mar. 27 Received 03-24-00:

April 4 Received 4-4-00.

J. Gallo, Esq.

April 12 Received 04/11/00:

Jr., Esq.

April 19 Received 04/19/00:

Complaint Sumamry Sheet filed.

Jury Trial Demanded Class Action Complaint filed.

Acceptance of Service of Process filed showing service on 3~31-00

upon Defendants’ Liggett Group, Inc. and Brooke Group, Ltd. to Robert

-

Acceptance of Service of process filed showing service upon Defendants

Philip Morris Companies, Inc., Philip Morris, Inc., R.J. Reynolds

Tobacco Holdings, Inc., R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company, BATUS Holdings,

Inc. and Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. on 04/11/00 to John F. Lambert,

Motion for Admission of Gordon Ball Pro Hac Vice filed.

_ " Affidavit of Gordon Ball for Admission Pro Hac Vice filed.

April 19 Received 04/19/00:

April 24 Received 04/21/00:

ORDER filed. (Perkins, J.)

Upon Motion fo the Plaintiffs and Philip Morris Companies, Inc. and

Philip Morris Incorporated, this Court orders: 1. that the Defendants

(with the exception of B.A.T. Industries, ple which does not seek the

benefit of this Motion) have until May 30, 2000 to respond to the

Complaint of the Plaintiffs dated March 24, 2000 with the understand-

yg

Joint Motion for Leave to Respond to Complaint filed.

Ta med ODA PF aemecac