Moore v. Lewit

_

STATE OF MAINE SUPERIOR COURT

- ANDROSCOGGIN, ss. [CIVIL ACTION]

. DOCKET NO. AP-01-002

BERYL A. MOORE f/k/a BERYL A. LEWIT,

CODD |

vO

Plaintiff,

ORDER ~~ RECEIVED & FILED

JAMES S. LEWIT, SR., AUG 08 2001

Defendant. ANDROSCOSERT

BACKGROUND

After twenty-two years of marriage, plaintiff Beryl A. Moore f/k/a Beryl] A.

Lewit (hereinafter “Ms. Moore”) divorced defendant James S. Lewit, Sr. on

September 25, 1996 in the 8th District Court (Docket No. LEW-96-DV-193). the

divorce judgment incorporated by reference a Settlement Agreement that included

the following provisions:

6. Alimony. Husband shall pay Wife Two Hundred Dollars ($200.00)

per month in alimony on the first of each month commencing September 1,

1996, and continuing for a period of Five (5) years or until the income of wife

reaches Twenty Five Thousand Dollars ($25,000.00) per year, whichever

comes first.

7. Marital Real Property.

(A) The parties’ marital residence located [in the Town of] Poland . . . is

set apart to Wife as her sole and exclusive property. ... The parties have

agreed that this property shall be sold and that Wife shall be entitled to all

proceeds from the sale. Since Husband will be paying the mortgage, taxes and

insurance on the property pending sale, Wife has agreed that she will accept

any offer of One Hundred Sixty-Five Thousand Dollars ($165,000.00) or above

for the property. Wife shall be responsible for and shall hold the Husband

harmless with respect to any capital gains tax liabilities that may accrue as a

result of the sale.

Pending sale, Husband shall assume and pay the mortgage, taxes and

insurance on the Poland real estate and shall indemnify and hold the Wife

harmless with respect to the same. Since Husband has agreed to assume these

expenses pending sale, the parties have agreed that payment of these expenses

shall be in lieu of a weekly child support payment and that Husband shall not

pay child support according to the Guidelines until the first Friday following.

the sale of the Poland real estate.

7. [sic] Marital Personal Property.

(D) Husband’s baseball card collection shall be sold as soon as

reasonably possible. Husband shall be responsible for arranging the sale. The

parties shall each be entitled to fifty percent (50%) of the profit from the sale.

In the event the cards have not been sold within three (3) years of the date of

divorce, Husband shall pay Wife the sum of Ten Thousand Dollars

($10,000.00) for her marital interest in the collection.

Settlement Agreement 4-5, 8.

Following the divorce, the parties did not comply with the Settlement

Agreement. As a result, Ms. Moore filed a Motion for Contempt on February 28,

2000, and amended it on April 24, 2000. Mr. Lewit filed his own motion entitled,

“Motion for Contempt and/or to Enforce and to Alter and Amend” on April 25,

2000. Because Mr. Lewit’s Motion for Contempt was not properly pleaded, however,

the District Court treated his motion as a Motion to Enforce and/or Amend.

In her motion, Ms. Moore alleged that Mr. Lewit violated the terms of the

Settlement Agreement because he: failed to pay alimony for January through March

of 1997 and since September of 1999; failed to pay taxes, insurance and mortgage

payments on the Poland real estate before its sale; and failed to pay Ms. Moore her

$10,000 marital interest in his baseball card collection.

In his motion, Mr. Lewit alleged that Ms. Moore: arbitrarily withheld at least

2

one half of his baseball card collection; delayed selling the Poland- property in order

fo maximize his liability for the mortgage payments; and “engaged in a course of

conduct that left her voluntarily underemployed so as to intentionally avoid

earning $25,000.00.” Mr. Lewit contended that Ms. Moore’s intentional

underemployment and her intentional delay in selling the marital real estate barred

her from asserting contempt with respect to the unpaid mortgage payments or

unpaid spousal support. In addition, Mr. Lewit argued that he could not be found in

contempt for failing to pay her the $10,000 ordered, because Ms. Moore had refused

to return a portion of his baseball card collection.

Before trial, the District Court (Beliveau, J.) ruled that the Settlement

Agreement obligated Mr. Lewit to pay spousal support to Ms. Moore for five years

unless her actual income was above $25,000. The District Court stated:

I think it is clear {that the $25,000.00 alimony provision] has-- there are no

conditions. It’s a five-year alimony provision. It indicates that [Mr. Lewit is

obligated to pay alimony] only until the income of wife reaches twenty-five

thousand per year, [or upon the expiration of five years], whichever comes.

first. ... There are no conditions. ... So, to me, it’s quite strict until she

earns twenty-five, that’s it.

(Tr. 5). Therefore, the District Court ruled that any evidence of underemployment

was irrelevant. (Tr. 4).

At the trial held on August 18, 2000, Mr. Lewit attempted to establish that Ms.

Moore earned more than $25,000 in 1998. On October 22, 2000, the District Court

issued an Order on the parties’ motions. In its Order, the District Court rejected Mr.

Lewit’s factual claim that Ms. Moore earned more than $25,000 in any year

subsequent to the divorce. In addition, despite its earlier ruling that the issue of

3

underemployment was not relevant, the District Court concluded that “[t]here was

insufficient evidence presented to stipport the defendant’s contention that the

plaintiff is underemployed or most importantly that she is deliberately earning

under $25,000 per year in order to take advantage of the spousal support provision ..

. .” 10/22/00 Order at 5.

Although Mr. Lewit admitted that his failure to make some mortgage

payments resulted in $8,500 in costs to Ms. Moore, the District Court concluded that

he was not in contempt and/or that Ms. Moore could not recover those costs

because she engaged in self-help by selling the property for a price below the

requirement of the Settlement Agreement without seeking an amendment to the

Divorce Judgment. The court determined that the parties’ violations, i.e., Mr.

lewit’s failure to pay and Ms. Moore’s acceptance of a lower sale price, were a

“washout.” Furthermore, the court noted that “[i]Jn the end no one was hurt”

because Mr. Lewit was paying the mortgage, tax and insurance expenses instead of

child support payments. 10/22/00 Order at 5-6.

With respect to Ms. Moore’s interest in Mr. Lewit’s baseball card collection,

the District Court found that there was no depreciation of value in the cards. In

addition, the court found that Mr. Lewit had many opportunities to retrieve his

cards and give Ms. Moore her interest in the cards, despite Ms. Moore’s retention of

approximately 600,000 of the 1.4-1.5 million cards. 10/22/00 Order at 7.

Upon receipt of the Order, Mr. Lewit filed a timely appeal to the Superior

Court and Ms. Moore filed a timely cross-appeal. Those appeals are before this court.

DISCUSSION

In his brief, Mr. Lewit contended that the District Court erred: in finding that

Ms. Moore’s 1998 income did not exceed $25,000; in holding that testimony

regarding Mr. Moore's intentional underemployment was irrelevant; and in finding

Mr. Lewit in contempt for failing to pay Ms. Moore her interest in the baseball card

collection. Ms. Moore contended that the District Court erred in finding that Mr.

Lewit was not in contempt for failing to pay court ordered mortgage, tax and

insurance payments and/or that Ms. Moore was not harmed. These issues are

addressed in turn below.

I. Standard of Review

In order to hold Mr. Lewit in contempt, the District Court must have found

by clear and convincing evidence that: (1) Mr. Lewit failed or refused to perform his

obligations under the Divorce Judgment, and (2) it was within Mr. Lewit’s power to

meet his obligations. M.R. Civ. P. 66(d)(2)(D)(i)-(ii). A judgment of civil contempt is

reviewed for an abuse of discretion. See Weiss v. Brown, 1997 ME 57, q 7, 691 A.2d

1208, 1210. The factual findings underlying the trial court’s judgment are reviewed

for clear error. Id.

II. Spousal Support

A. The Evidence Supports the District Court’s Finding that Ms. Moore’s Actual 1998

Income Did Not Exceed $25,000

Ms. Moore testified at trial that she had earned approximately $18,000-$20,000

in 1998 and had no other sources of income. (Tr. 52-53). The evidence also revealed,

that over $39,000 was deposited into Ms. Moore’s bank account in 1998. (Tr. 54-57).

Mr. Lewit has argued that the deposits must be attributed to income. The court

disagrees.

Although Ms. Moore was not able to account for all of the deposits (Tr. 61-62,

96), the trial court was not required to assume that the additional deposits were due

to nonexempt income. Ms. Moore’s tax return corroborated her testimony

concerning income and employment, and supported the District Court’s finding that

Ms. Moore did not have actual income that exceeded $25,000 in 1998.

The District Court found Ms. Moore’s testimony to be credible. Credibility

determinations are within the sole province of the factfinder. Therefore, the District

Court determination that Ms. Moore’s 1998 actual income did not exceed $25,000 was

not clear erroneous, absent conclusive proof in the record to the contrary.

B. The District Court Erred in Excluding Evidence Relevant to the Issue of Ms.

Moore’s Alleged Deliberate Underemployment

In Maine, courts may not grant a payor spouse’s motion to reduce spousal

support payments if the payor spouse’s “primary purpose” in reducing income was

the avoidance of spousal support obligations. See Smith v. Smith, 419 A.2d 1035,

1038 (Me. 1980)(stating that the “primary purpose” rule allows a more searching

inquiry into the financial circumstances of the payor spouse and makes it more

difficult for a parsimonious payor spouse to disguise his motives); Sherwood v.

Sherwood, 622 A.2d 719, 720 (Me. 1993)(upholding trial court’s determination that

plaintiff’s decision to close store was not made for primary purpose of avoiding

6

spousal support). Although these cases involve payor spouses, the same principle

should be applied to a payee spouse who seeks continued benefits from spousal

support payments by deliberate underemployment. The court concludes that the

Divorce Judgment confers an obligation of good faith on both spouses as a matter of

law.

This obligation does not require Ms. Moore to make every effort to maximize

her income. She is simply obligated to avoid making employment decisions with

the “primary purpose” of extending her spousal support payments. Thus, Mr. Lewit

should have an opportunity to present evidence on Ms. Moore’s refusal to accept an

offer of employment or failure to pursue reasonably attainable employment

opportunities.

The Settlement Agreement required Mr. Lewit to pay $200 per month or

$2,400 per year in spousal support to Ms. Moore. It does not appear that Ms. Moore

would have had a strong incentive to refrain from earning a higher salary.

Nevertheless, this is an issue of fact that requires a new trial.

Ill. The Baseball Card Collection

The evidence supports the finding that Mr. Lewit was in contempt for failing

to pay Ms. Moore her marital interest in the baseball card collection. Mr. Lewit

admitted that he never sold any portion of his card collection (Tr. 125) and the

$10,000 remained unpaid. Mr. Lewit’s contention that Ms. Moore is barred from

challenging his failure to pay because she withheld approximately 600,000 of his 1.4-

1.5 million baseball cards is without merit.

Ms. Moore did initially withhold some of the baseball cards, but she testified

that, in June of 1997, she sent Mr. Lewit a letter telling him he could have _ the cards

at any time. (Tr. 134-35). She also testified that she returned the cards to Mr. Lewit

in summer of 1997. (Tr. 32-33). Mr. Lewit had plenty of opportunities to obtain and

sell the cards.

Even without the entire collection, Mr. Lewit still could have met his

obligation to pay $10,000 to his former wife by selling the portion of the collection he

still had in his possession (roughly 900,000 cards) or by paying Ms. Moore $10,000,

without selling any of the collection. Furthermore, if Mr. Lewit had serious

concerns about his ability to comply with the Settlement Agreement, he could have

sought relief in the District Court at the appropriate time. The District Court did not

abuse its discretion in finding Mr. Lewit in contempt for failing to pay Ms. Moore

her interest in the baseball card collection.

IV. The Mortgage Payments

Mr. Lewit admitted that he stopped making the mortgage payments in the

Fall of 1998, and did not dispute that his failure resulted in $8,500 loss for Ms.

Moore. (Tr. 108-10). The District Court’s Order suggested that her failure to file a

motion to amend before selling the Poland property precluded a finding of

contempt against Mr. Lewit and that her damages were somehow completely offset.

It is not clear, however, how the District Court arrived at this conclusion.

Upon review of the record, this court is unable to ascertain how the District

Court concluded that the parties had offsetting obligations. Ms. Moore’s decision to

8

sell the home for less than the price required under the Settlement Agreement does

not offset or affect Mr. Lewit’s obligation to pay the mortgage, taxes and “insurance.

Only Ms. Moore was injured by the low sales price on the marital home; she was the

only one who was to receive any profit from the sale.

Furthermore, it is not clear why Ms. Moore’s failure to file a motion to

amend should bar her recovery of the $8,500. Mr. Lewit benefitted from the sale of

the home - at any price - when he was relieved from making further mortgage

payments. Therefore, this issue is remanded for further review and clarification.

ORDER

The Order of the District Court is affirmed in part and vacated in

part. Case remanded for hearing on the issue of whether Ms. Moore

engaged in deliberate underemployment to the detriment of Mr. Lewit.

With respect to the unpaid mortgage payments, the Order is remanded

for clarification.

This Order to be incorporated into the docket by reference, in accordance with

MLR. Civ. P. 79(a).

DATED: August 8, 2001

Berbara Ravrmoredt’

9 Miyfericlrn™