The opinion
STATE OF MAINE SUPERIOR COURT
CIVIL ACTION
WALDO, ss. DOCKET NO. CV-98-005
DAM -lWwAL- 6/4 /aceo
SADIE KENDALL, et al.,
Plaintiffs
. STATE OF MAINE
v. HECRTON ANBORDER"
CHARLES L. BOYNTON, JUN - 8 2090
REC'D AND FILED
Defendant Joyce M. Page, Clerk
This matter is before the court after bench trial with both parties present and
represented by counsel. Plaintiffs’ complaint seeks money damages for breach of
fiduciary duties and fraud. There is very little dispute of fact.
Plaintiffs, Sadie Kendall, Virginia Lautieri, Benjamin Kendall, and June
Hobbs are children of Mary Kendall. Mary Kendall was a foster child to Oscar
Boynton and Jennie Boynton. In 1948, when Sadie Kendall was three years old, she
remembers visiting with Oscar and Jennie Boynton. Sadie Kendall’s father died in
1949 at which time Sadie, her brothers, sister and mother were living in Appleton in
a garage as they had no other place to live. Their sole source of income was State
Aid to Dependent Children. Consequently, the family went to live with Jennie
Boynton and, although subject to some dispute, they stayed until after Jennie died.
On or about the Thanksgiving holiday after Jennie’s death, some men came to the
Boynton home and told the Kendalls to leave.
At the time of her death, Jennie was old, feeble and essentially stayed in bed as
she was 80 or 82 years of age. The plaintiff, Sadie Kendall, was five years old. Jennie
Boynton needed help to move around. On occasion, the children walked to the
store for food.
In 1995, Sadie Kendall was diagnosed with breast cancer. As a result, she
developed a serious interest to research her mother’s family history. As a result of
consultation with a genealogist and conversations with the Probate Court staff, she
hired a title abstractor to research disposition of the property of Oscar Boynton, who
died in 1948. As a result of her findings, this action was commenced.
The defendant, Charles L. Boynton, is the son of John L. Boynton, who was
nephew to Oscar I. Boynton as son of Charles A. Boynton, Oscar Boynton’s deceased
brother. Charles, a man of 87 years of age, had been a farmer since 1915.:
Commencing in 1941 and through the 40’s, 50’s, and 60’s, he operated a dance
pavilion and sold some parcels of land around Sanborn Pond. The defendant
testified that Oscar and Jennie were his aunt and uncle and that he lived six to seven
miles away from their farm. Mr. Boynton testified that on occasion he would assist
Oscar and Jennie by shingling their roof, assisting with the haying, and other
maintenance and farming activities. Since Oscar and Jennie had no transportation,
he would occasionally drive them back and forth to town. He distinctly remembers
the death of Oscar in 1948 and the death of Jennie in 1951. After Oscar died, the
defendant testified he provided transportation for Jennie. He did not have a close
personal relationship, he did not know her family, and he conducted no business
for or with her. Charles Boynton testified that he did not see her often in the
months just before she died as she did not go to town nor request assistance. He did
admit that occasionally he and his wife would visit with her but he did nothing
further for her as there were no chores to do, they only had a minimum number of
cattle. He did remember that Oscar had a hard time paying his taxes.
Charles Boynton testified that he was not aware of anyone living with Jennie
during the last year of her life and he did visit with her every month or so.
However, he was aware that Oscar and Jennie had two “State” children with them at
different times. When Oscar died, Charles testified he was closest blood relative as
Oscar and Jennie had no children of their own. Soon after Oscar’s death, Jennie
called Charles and advised him that she was having him appointed administrator.
When he went to visit with her, she already had a deed prepared and signed
conveying land to him. He testified he advised Jennie he did not want the land, he
could not pay the taxes on it but she insisted that he take it as it was “family land.”
Charles testified he had no idea what the responsibilities of an administrator were as
Jennie and lawyer Morse did all of the work and he simply signed papers. He does
not recall ever going to the Probate Court. The defendant testified the land had very
little value, there was no sentimental attachment, it was mostly bushes and rough
fields, it was difficult for him to pay the taxes and he sold the land for $2,000 after
acquiring the other interest from Nellie Jackson, Oscar’s niece.
From the testimony and the exhibits, the history of relevant events starts
with the death of Oscar Boynton on September 26, 1948. On October 1, 1948, Jennie
Boynton applied for the administration of the intestate affairs of Oscar I. Boynton
alleging as heirs-at-law, herself as widow, John L. Boynton as nephew, and Nellie
Jackson as niece. She asked that Charles L. Boynton, the defendant, be appointed
administrator. Assent to the petition for administration was signed by Jennie M.
Boynton, John L. Boynton, and Mrs. Nellie M. Jackson. On October 5, 1948, Jennie
M. Boynton conveyed to defendant by quit claim deed all her right, title and interest
in and to the Charles Banks farm, so-called, situated in Searsmont. The deed recites
that the farm was owned by her late husband Oscar I. Boynton. She also conveyed
all of her interest in the former homestead farm of her husband Oscar I. Boynton,
formerly owned by his father, Albion Boynton, and “in fact all my right, title and
interest in and to any and all other real estate.” Charles L. Boynton was appointed
administrator of the estate on October 7, 1948. On September 6, 1950, Nellie Jackson
conveyed her right, title and interest to the Charles Banks farm to Charles L.
Boynton. On September 15, 1950, the Will of John L. Boynton was approved by the
Probate Court which Will gave to Charles L. Boynton all residue and remainder of
his estate. On December 9, 1960, Charles L. Boynton conveyed the Charles Banks
farm to Walter and Mary C. Calderwood reciting as source of deeds of Nellie Jackson
and Jennie M. Boynton. This deed was recorded December 14, 1960, as Book 583,
Page 383. At the same time, the deed of Jennie M. Boynton to Charles L. Boynton,
having never previously been recorded, was filed with the Registry and recorded at
Book 583, Page 414. On the same date, the deed of Nellie Jackson to Charles L.
Boynton was recorded at Book 583, Page 416.
Jennie Boynton died on January 23, 1951, testate. In her Will, signed
September 27, 1950, she left the remainder of her estate to Mary I. Kendall “who has
lived in my family for many years.” The only real estate appearing in the probate
estate of Jennie M. Boynton is the “homestead farm situated in Morrill, Maine,”
with a valuation of $1,000.
The essence of plaintiffs’ complaint is that as heirs-at-law of Mary Kendall,
remainderman under the Will of Jennie Boynton, they are entitled to the value of
the real estate conveyed by Jennie M. Boynton to the defendant Charles L. Boynton
on the grounds that Charles breached his fiduciary duty as administrator of the
estate of Oscar Boynton by accepting from Jennie Boynton a deed of the Banks farm
two days before his appointment as administrator of the Oscar Boynton estate.
Secondly, they allege that Charles Boynton has engaged in fraudulent concealment
of that conveyance by failing to record the deed of 1948 until 1960, failing to provide
any basis for discovery of the deed on the part of the plaintiffs and thereby causing
the plaintiffs to be unaware of the transaction until title examination in 1995.
Further, to the defendant's assertion of the limitation of action having expired, at
the very least, six years from the recording in 1960, the plaintiffs allege they are
entitled to the benefit of the discovery rule. -
The fundamental factual dispute in this matter concerns the relationship
between the defendant Charles L. Boynton and the decedent Jennie Boynton.
Plaintiffs do not assert any affirmative evidence of undue influence on the part of
the defendant in acquiring the Charles Banks farm but argues that there was a
personal and confidential relationship in fact at the time of the transfer and a
fiduciary relationship in fact and law created by his appointment as administrator
some two days hence. Furthermore, the plaintiffs believe they should not be bound
by the six-year statute of limitations commencing at the time of the recording of the
deed in 1960 because of fraudulent concealment or fraud in fact committed by the
defendant preventing the discovery of the transaction until 1995.
When did the statute of limitations commence to run under these
circumstances? This is a claim for money damages rather than recovery of real
estate. “All civil actions shall be commenced within six years after the cause of
action accrues...” 14 M.R.S.A. § 752. The cause of action, if any, accrued on October
5, 1948. However, “if a person, .. . liable to any action mentioned, fraudulently
conceals the cause thereof from the person entitled thereto, or if. a fraud is
committed which entitles any person to an action, the action may be commenced at
any time within six years after the person entitled thereto discovers that he has just
cause of action. . .” 14 M.R.S.A. § 859. In a matter involving fraudulent
concealment of the existence of a cause of action or a claim which is founded upon
fraud, the statute of limitations starts to run when the existence of the cause of
action or fraud is discovered or should have been discovered by the plaintiff in the
exercise of due diligence and ordinary prudence. Westman v. Armitage, 215 A.2d
919 (Me. 1966). Mere constructive notice of a deed by reason of its being filed for
record is not notice of facts constituting fraud, but where all circumstances are such
that plaintiff should have discovered conveyance and its fraudulent character more
than six years before bringing of the action, it will be barred. Ibid. Fraud is a
knowing misrepresentation of the truth or concealment of a material fact to induce
another to act to his or her detriment. It may be a misrepresentation made
recklessly without belief in its truth to induce another person to act or it may be an
unconscionable dealing such as the unconscientious use of the power arising out of
the parties’ relative positions and resulting in an unconscionable bargain.
Concealment is the act of refraining from disclosure, usually an act by which one
prevents or hinders the discovery of something. It is the act of removing from sight
or notice as in hiding. Fraudulent concealment is the affirmative suppression or
hiding, with the intent to deceive or defraud, of a material fact or circumstance that
one is legally bound to reveal. BLACK’s LAW DICTIONARY, 7th Ed. (1999).
Plaintiffs present no substantive evidence as to the circumstances under
which Jennie Boynton conveyed the property to the defendant. Instead, they rely
upon circumstantial evidence to establish that the defendant was a neighbor and
relative of Jennie, two days before he was appointed administrator upon the petition
of Jennie she conveyed the Charles Banks farm to him without consideration, the
deed was not recorded in the Registry of Deeds for 12 years, the defendant purchased
the interest of Nellie Jackson in the property and acquired her deed, and the
defendant has had some experience in buying and selling real estate
notwithstanding his occupation as a dairy farmer. The defendant, called as a witness
by the plaintiffs, explains that he was a relative, neighbor and friend to Jennie and
Oscar Boynton, that he assisted them in doing manual labor on their farm and
provided transportation for them, that upon Oscar’s death, Jennie gave him a bull to
board which she soon thereafter sold, that he continued to assist Jennie with
transportation but throughout their relationship he never engaged in any business
matters with them, performed any business functions for them, or in any way
became involved in their business activities. He did not solicit nor negotiate for the
acquisition of any real estate and, indeed, was not in a financial position to
comfortably acquire the Banks farm with its liability for taxes. He avowed that the
farm was worth little but did admit that he paid Nellie Jackson consideration for her
interest and that he received $2,000 for the farm some years later. While his name
appears on the final account of the Boynton estate as entitled to compensation for
his activities as administrator, there is no evidence that the amount was ever paid
nor an invoice issued for that purpose. Boynton testified that he would not have
accepted any money from Jennie for his time or his expenses because of her serious
financial position. In its totality, there is no evidence presented by the plaintiffs that
the defendant, as a matter of fact, enjoyed a relationship of trust and confidence with
Oscar or Jennie Boynton or that he was in such a disparate position of power or
influence over Jennie such as to give rise to a violation of that confidential
relationship or commit undue influence in accepting the deed. -
Plaintiffs argue that even if such evidence is not present, the defendant's
position as a fiduciary allows a presumption of undue influence under these
circumstances. Such presumption is rebutted by the evidence submitted that the
property was conveyed at the urging of Jennie Boynton in order to preserve it as
“family land.” Further, if there was a presumed breach of a duty, two and half years
later, what was the responsibility of the executor of the Jennie Boynton estate with
respect to the real estate she had conveyed? As executor of a Will in which Mary
Kendall was sole devise, is there evidence of fraudulent concealment of the transfer
of the Charles Banks farm to the defendant as to him? There was no evidence of
any concealment by the defendant as to the estate of Jennie Boynton unless this
court can find that the simple failure to record a deed constitutes concealment and
the relationship is such as to cause the court to presume that it is fraudulent. This
court declines to so find.
The plaintiffs’ mother was a foster child to Jennie Boynton. As such, she bore
no legal relationship nor was entitled to any legal duty on the part of Jennie to
convey property to her. At the time of the conveyance which plaintiffs now allege
was a breach of a duty, the fiduciary duty of the defendant was to the intestate estate
and heirs of Oscar. Therefore, his duty ran to Jennie, Nellie Jackson, and John
Boynton. John Boynton died on June 15, 1950, testate leaving the residue of the
estate to his son, Charles L. Boynton. Since the conveyance was not concealed as a
matter of fact as to those heirs-at-law, the cause of action must have accrued at a
time when he probably was aware that he was going to be appointed administrator
to the Oscar Boynton estate. There is no reason to believe that the death of Jennie
Boynton within six years of the accrual of the cause of action would create a
fraudulent concealment, a new breach of fiduciary duty, and therefore toll the
running of the statute of limitations.
In substance, to the extent the plaintiffs’ complaint is founded upon fraud, the
court finds they have not met their burden of submitting sufficient evidence to
make it more likely than not that the defendant engaged in fraud in the acquisition
of the real estate. To the extent the plaintiffs allege a breach of fiduciary duty, the
court is satisfied that the statute of limitations has run and the court has no
jurisdiction to consider it.
For all the reasons stated above, the entry will be:
Judgment for the defendant; defendant to recover costs.
Dated: June_ 2? _, 2000
Donald H. Marden
Justice, Superior Court
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