Opinion

Beote v. Town of Kennebunkport

Court
Superior Court of Maine
Filed
Jun 9, 2000
Status
Unpublished
On the bench
G. Arthur Brennan
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 34.1%

The opinion

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Up TORR

STATE OF MAINE CLEAKIS HEFICE SUPERIOR COURT

YORK, ss. RECENED CIVIL ACTION

DOCKET NO. AP-99-047

Jun 9 li 45 Ai ‘00 GhR-yofe -b/4 |aece

BONALD L. GAR AR

RICHARD A. BEOTE, et al AR BRECHT

LACATE aha 2 ey

JUN 13 opnf

Petitioners um

v. DECISION AND ORDER

THE TOWN OF KENNEBUNKPORT,

Respondent

This appeal pertains to the Town of Kennebunkport Planning Board’s

approval of a Site Plan Application submitted by the Town of Kennebunkport. On

June 16, 1999 the Board approved the Town’s application to locate a new town hall,

fire station, along with a public parking lot and public restrooms at 30 North Street

in Kennebunkport (“the Property”). The proposed structures and parking lot would

be located in the Village Residential Zone as set out in the Kennebunkport Zoning

Ordinance.

Section 2B of the Ordinance lists the permitted uses in the Village

Residential Zone. Among those listed are single family residences, churches and

community uses. From 1964 to 1995, the Property was used as a church. In the mid-

1980’s the Town reached an agreement with the church to allow transient vehicles

and buses to use the church parking lot when not being utilized by the church.

In May of 1997 the Roman Catholic Diocese of Maine sold the Property to the

Town. Shortly thereafter the Town began to hold municipal meetings in the former

church building. In June of 1997 it sought and later obtained approval from the

Planning Board to utilize the Property as a Community Use, including handicapped

toilets. The Town however failed to comply with the Ordinance by obtaining the

required use permit from the Code Enforcement Officer. On March 31, 1999 the

Town submitted a Site Plan Application to the Board to build a new town hall and

fire station at the Property. Public parking and restroom-facilities were also part of

the plan. The proposal was vigorously opposed by Petitioners, whose residences abut

the Property at 30 North Street. Petitioners expressed concern that the proposed uses

of the Property would adversely affect the use and enjoyment of their residences as

well as result in a devaluation of their properties.

Following several hearings on the application, the Planning Board voted 4 to

0 to approve the Site Plan Application with certain qualifications. The Board’s

decision was signed on June 23, 1999. It approved the use of the Property for a town

hall and fire station. Additionally, the Board’s decision authorized transient parking

for 73 vehicles, including eight spaces for buses and RVs. Public restrooms,

technically located within the town hall but intended primarily for transient use,

were also approved. Petitioners subsequently filed this Rule 80B appeal, requesting

the Court to vacate and remand the Board’s decision.

DISCUSSION

The Standard of Review

Pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 80B, this Court has authority to hear appeals from a

municipality’s zoning board. The Court reviews the Board’s decision for abuse of

discretion, errors of law, or findings unsupported by substantial evidence. See

Turbat Creek Preservation, LLC v. Town of Kennebunkport, 2000 ME 109, { 11, --

A.2d ----,---. The substantial evidence standard requires the Court to examine the

entire record “to determine whether on the basis of all the testimony and exhibits

before the [board] it could fairly and reasonably find the facts as it-did.” Ryan v.

Town of Camden, 582 A.2d 973, 975 (Me. 1990). To prevail, Petitioners must show

“not only that the Board’s findings are unsupported by record evidence, but also that

the record compels contrary findings.” Total Quality v. Town of Scarborough, 588.

A.2d 283, 284 (Me. 1991).

Did the Board err when it determined that transient and bus parking are

grandfathered uses?

Commercial and transient parking are not listed in Section 2B of the

Ordinance as permitted uses in the Village Residential Zone. Such uses are

permitted only in the Dock Square and Free Enterprise Zones. Accordingly, the use

of the Property for transient or bus parking is valid only to the extent that such uses

are grandfathered or accessory to a legally permitted use.

With respect to the grandfathering issue, Section 8.1 of the Ordinance applies.

It states that “[a] nonconforming structure, use or lot is permitted to continue as it

existed prior to the date such structure, use or lot became nonconforming under the

3

Provisions of this Ordinance, as amended.” To qualify asa grandfathered use, “it

must be shown that the use existed prior to the enactment of the zoning provisions

prohibiting it and that the use was ‘actual and substantial.”’ Turbat Creek

Preservation LLC v Town of Kennebunkport., 2000 ME 109, ¥ 13, ----A2d. --, --,

citing Town of Orono v. LaPointe, 1997 ME 185, ¥ 13, 698 A.2d 1059, 1062.

Did the Board err when it found that non-conforming uses were in fact

occurring prior to 1972, the effective date of the Ordinance? The evidence of pre-

ordinance usage of the Property for transient and bus parking initially appears

conflicting. What is clearly undisputed is the fact that prior to 1972 the Property was

used first as a seasonal opera house, then later as a church. During its days as an

opera house, shuttle buses were parked at the Property during performances. When

the Property was purchased by the Roman Catholic Diocese, parking was permitted

in conjunction with church functions.

The Court finds no substantial evidence in the record of transient or

commercial parking taking place at the Property prior to 1972. Rather, the evidence

merely demonstrates that the pre-ordinance parking of vehicles was either accessory

to the church or the opera house. Testimony and letters contained in the record,

including that of Father Steven Mulkern, pastor of the church from 1970 to 1986,

strongly suggests that transient and bus parking occurred only after 1972. The Court

concludes that the proposed use of the parking lot for transient vehicles and

commercial parking does not “reflect the nature and purpose of the use prevailing

when the zoning legislation took effect.” Id.

The Town argues that the proposed use of the Property for transient and

commercial parking is grandfathered because it will not change its essential nature

or purpose. The Town's argument is similar to that of the petitioner who

unsuccessfully appealed the Kennebunkport Zoning Board of Appeals’ decision in

Turbat Creek Preservation, LLC v. Town of Kennebunkport.. In Turbat Creek, the

Law Court affirmed the Board of Appeal’s decision that a boathouse used as a

residential unit violated the Town’s Land Use Ordinance. Before the Ordinance

went into effect, the boathouse had been used for occasional overnight stays. Turbat

Creek argued that using the property for an unlimited number of overnight stays

should be recognized as grandfathered because the existing use was merely an

expansion of the previous nonconforming use. Id.

The Law Court rejected Turbat Creek’s argument, finding that the existing use

of the boathouse effected more than a mere increase in the frequency or usage.

Turbat Creek had used the property so “far in excess of the previous occasional

overnight stays” that it had in essence converted the boathouse to a new,

fundamentally different use. Id. ¥ 15,----- , A2d. ----,------. In the instant case, the

approved use of the Property for transient parking greatly expands the level and

intensity from any use in effect prior to the implementation of the Ordinance. The

proposed use is of such a fundamentally different character as to be ineligible for

grandfathering.

Additionally, the Court finds that the Board erred as a matter of law when it

considered the character and intensity of the existing parking situation in

determining the impact of the proposed use of the Property on the abutting property

owners.! The current use of the Property is of questionable legal validity. Although

the Town reached an agreement with the church in the mid-eighties to allow public

parking at the Property, such agreement was not in compliance with the procedural

requirements of the Ordinance. It is doubtful whether such a use would comply

with the Ordinance’s restriction of commercial and transient parking to the Dock

Square and Free Enterprise Zones.

Furthermore, when the Town submitted the 1999-Site Plan Application, the

Property was no longer even being used as a church. No existing use, church or

otherwise is cited in the designated section of the Town’s application; the space in

the application in which the Town is supposed to list the current use is simply left

blank. Accordingly, the Board was bound to consider the proposed uses of the

Property as new conditional uses, unrelated to the church use which had ended in

1995.2

Did the Board abuse its discretion when it determined that the proposed parking

facilities are accessory to the Town Hall, and not prohibited as a commercial parking

in the Residential Zone?

1 Throughout its findings of facts, the Board finds that the proposed uses will have no adverse

effect on the value or use and enjoyment of the abutters property.

2 When the Board approved the Property for Community Uses in 1997, such approval was

invalidated by the Town’s subsequent failure to obtain the mandated use permit authorizing the

change. This procedural omission caused the new use to expire. Consequently, the Board should have

found that no legally cognizable uses existed and the Property should have been deemed vacant when it

considered the 1999 Site Plan Application.

The Town argues that even if public parking is not a grandfathered use, it is

still permitted as an accessory use to the Town Hall. The Ordinance defines an

accessory use as one which is “customarily incidental to..the principal use.. [and

which] ..shall not subordinate the principal use.” See Record at 8.

Construing similar language in an ordinance in Boivin v. Town of Sanford,

588 A. 2d 1197, 1200 (Me.1991), the Law Court noted that it had previously observed

in Town of Shapleigh v. Shikles, 427 A.2d. 460, 465 (Me. 1981) “ that an accessory use

may be lawful if it is dependant on a principal use, has a reasonable relationship

with that primary uses, and is by custom ‘commonly habitually and by long practice

established as reasonably associated with the primary use.”Id.

This is a closer question than the issue of whether public parking is a

grandfathered use. The Board approved public parking as an accessory use to the

town hall and the fire station. The record indicates however that the principal use of

the parking lot is for transients and buses. For example, the traffic study submitted

by the Town as part of its 1999 application stated that in addition to the 26 spaces

required for the town hall and the 11 required for fire station parking, the numerous

remaining spaces were for transient and tourist parking that had been occurring

since 1984.° During the public hearings, the Town repeatedly distinguished the

proposed uses of the parking lot, including transient and commercial parking. The

Court finds that tourist and transient parking cannot reasonably be construed as

accessory to the town hall and fire station.

3 Such parking would have occurred 12 years after the 1972 effective date of the Ordinance,

which prohibits such parking in the Village Residential Zone.

7

Did the Board abuse its discretion when it determined that the proposed public

restrooms are permitted in the Village Residential Zone?

The proposed town hall will have four restroom facilities. Two of the

bathroom facilities will be located inside the town hall, with one designated for

municipal employees, and the other for patrons conducting municipal business.

These uses are accessory in nature, subordinated and related to the use of the

proposed town hall.

The remaining restrooms will also be technically located within the town

hall, by virtue of the fact that they are structured as enclosed hallways a attached to the

main building. In contrast to the other facilities, however, they will not t be accessible

from the interior of the town hall. The record shows that these restroom facilities,

which will be situated next to the parking lot, are structurally designed to limit town

hall access by transients and tourists. ‘Comments made by members of the Board

also compel the finding that the bathrooms are intended as a public hospitality

facility, and not an accessory use.

The Court finds that the Board erred as a matter of law when it concluded

that the proposed toilet facilities are permitted within the Village Residential Zone.

Public hospitality facilities, including public restroom facilities* are not allowed

within the Village Residential Zone. The Ordinance effectively prohibits public

hospitality facilities by not specifically including them as either permitted or

conditional uses in the Village Residential Zone. The Ordinance’s prohibition is not

4 Public restrooms are encompassed within the definition of a Public Hospitality Facility. See

Article 2 of the Ordinance.

*

ambiguous; it may not be circumvented by categorizing the restrooms as an

accessory use.

Wherefore, the entry shall be:

Rule 80B appeal granted; Planning Board decision vacated,

case remanded.

Date: June 9, 2000 4 Dip

Arthur Bren han

Cae Superior Court

PLAINTIFFS:

DAVID P SILK ESQ .

CURTIS THAXTER STEVENS BRODER & MICOLEAU

PO BOX 7320

PORTLAND ME 04112-7320

GORDON C AYER, ESQ

90 SPENCER DR

WELLS ME 04090

DEFENDANTS:

WILLIAM H DALE ESQ

JENSEN BAIRD GARDNER & HENRY

PO BOX 4510

PORTLAND ME 04112-4510

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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