The opinion
STATE OF MAINE SUPERIOR COURT
CIVIL ACTION
KENNEBEC, ss. DOCKET NO. AP-00-53
SKS- KEv/ - \/2 7/2000
STATE OF MAINE and
MAINE BOARD OF PHARMACY,
Appellants
v. . DECISION ON APPEAL
CHRISTY C. ADAMS,
Appellee
This matter came before the court on appeal pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 76D
from the decision of the Administrative Court dismissing due to lack of subject
matter jurisdiction a complaint for enforcement of a consent agreement. The
appellants claim that the Administrative Court made an error of law when it
decided that the enforcement complaint was beyond that court’s jurisdiction.
Finding no error, the appeal will be denied.
The background for this matter is not disputed. In 1992, the parties entered a
consent agreement based primarily on Adams’ addiction to various substances
including prescription drugs. In August, 1999, the plaintiffs/appellants filed a
complaint with the Administrative Court alleging that Adams had violated the
conditions of the consent agreement and had performed other independent acts
which constitute grounds for revocation of his license to practice pharmacy. The
complaint was scheduled for hearing before the Administrative Court on May 15,
2000, at which time the court raised sua sponte whether that court had subject
1
matter jurisdiction to consider enforcement of the consent agreement. In light of
the court’s statements on the jurisdictional issue and facing the prospect of dividing
their causes of action between two courts, the appellants declined the opportunity to
present evidence on allegations which did not assert violation of the consent
agreement. The Administrative Court subsequently issued its order dated May 23,
2000, dismissing that portion of the complaint seeking enforcement of the consent
agreement for lack of jurisdiction and granting judgment to the defendant with
regard to allegations of misconduct other than violation of the consent agreement.
The plaintiffs have appealed the first portion of the Administrative Court’s decision
dealing with the dismissal.
The sole issue presented on appeal concerns the Administrative Court’s
interpretation of the last sentence of 10 M.R.S.A. § 8003(5)(B) which states: “A
consent agreement is enforceable by an action in Superior Court.” Paragraph B in
general authorizes the various bureaus, offices, boards and commissions within or
affiliated with the Department of Professional and Financial Regulation to execute
consent agreements resolving complaints or investigations without further
proceedings. The paragraph then ends with the sentence quoted above, which
appears to vest jurisdiction for enforcement of these agreements in the Superior
Court. The question is whether this jurisdiction is exclusive, as held by the
Administrative Court, or whether it is to be exercised concurrently with the
Administrative Court, as argued by the plaintiffs /appellants.
The plain language of the statute would appear to support exclusive
jurisdiction since there is no mention of the Administrative Court nor is there
mention of enforcement of consent decrees under the Administrative Court’s
general jurisdiction. This failure to mention jurisdiction of the Administrative
Court is important to interpreting the statute since the Legislature clearly had the
vocabulary to vest that jurisdiction as they did later in the same section, “Any
nonconsensual disciplinary action . . . is subject to judicial review exclusively in the
Administrative Court ...”. 10 M.R.S.A. § 8003(5)(D). It is clear that the Legislature
distinguished between the jurisdiction of the two courts within the same statutory
framework.!
The plaintiffs raise excellent policy arguments for why they should be allowed
to pursue both enforcement of the consent agreement and other separate violations
in one forum. Judicial economy, unity of actions, and other points are well taken,
but are more appropriately addressed to the Legislature.”
The entry will be:
Appeal DENIED. REMANDED to the Administrative Court.
Dated: November Zz 7 , 2000
S. Kirk Studstrup
Justice, Superior Court
1 Tt occurs to the court that the legislative distinction may be the result of the different
procedures in the two courts. If the Legislature intended that parties to a consent agreement should
have the right to a jury trial as part of an enforcement action, then the action would have to be brought
in the Superior Court since there are no juries in the Administrative Court.
2 It is unclear whether recent legislation abolishing the Administrative Court would have any
effect upon the issue raised by this appeal.
8/7/00
Date Filed Kennebec
Docket No. AP00-53
County
Appeal from Administrative Court
Request to Revoke License
Action
State of Maine & Maine Board of Pharmacy’Ys.
J. STUDSTRUP
Christy. C. Adams
Plaintiff's Attorney
James Bowie,AAG
State House Station #6
Augusta, Maine 04333-0006
Defendant’s Attorney
Robert C. Brooks,Esq.
‘One Portland Square
P.O. Box 586
Portland, Maine 0411
-0586
F eps Al r
2
&
DEC 4 OF
Date of 2008
Entry
8/8/00 Appeal from Administrative Court with all papers, filed.
8/9/00 Notice of briefing schedule mailed to attys of record.
9/11/00 Brief in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion to Alter, Amend, Vacate or Set Aside
the Administrative Court's Decision and Order of May 23, 2000, filed on
9/7/00. s/Bowie, AAG. (attached exhibits)
10/10/00 Defendant/Appellee's Brief in Response to Plaintiff/Appellants' Brief in
Support of Motion to Alter, Amend, Vacate or Set Aside the Administrative
Court's Decision and Order of May 23, 2000, filed. s/Brooks, Esq.
Affidavit of Robert Brooks, Esq., filed.
------- Reply Brief in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion to Alter, Amend,Vacate or Set
Aside the Adminstrative Court's Decision and Order on May 23, 2000 (M.R.Civ.
P. 76D; M.Admin.Ct.R.60(c)), filed. s/Bowie, AAG
Notice of setting fer 1/200
sent to attorneys of record.
10/19/00 Motion for Continuance, filed. s/Brooks, Esq.
11/1/00 MOTION FOR CONTINUANCE, Studstrup, J.
Motion granted. -
Copies mailed to attys of record.
11/6/00 Notice of setting of oral arguments on 11/21/00 at 8:15 a.m. sent to attys
of record.
x’