Neal v. Fryer

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND

CHRISTOPHER NEAL, ET AL.,

* . ,

Plaintiffs, oo

: +

vO

* Civil No. 22-1919-BAH

ROBERT CAPLAN, ET AL.,

. *

Defendants. _

x,

* * * * & * * * * * * * *

MEMORANDUM OPINION .

Plaintiffs Christopher Neal‘ (“Neal”) and Andre. Linthicum (“Linthicum”) (collectively,

“Plaintiffs”) brought suit against Officer Robert Caplan (“Caplan”), the City of Mount Rainier,

Maryland (“Mount Rainier”), and several unknown officers (collectively, “Defendants”),' alleging

excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment, false imprisonment, assault and battery,

‘and violations of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. ECF 1. Pending before the Court are

Defendants’ motions-for summary judgement. ECFs 34 (Caplan’s) and 37 (Mount Rainier’s).

Plaintiffs filed a consolidated opposition, ECF 40, and Defendant Caplan filed a reply, ECF 43.

All filings include memoranda of law and exhibits.? The Court has reviewed all relevant filings

! Plaintiffs originally filed suit against an additional defendant, Officer Frayer (“Frayer”) of the |

Mount Rainier Police Department. ECF 1, at 1. Due to issues effectuating service on Frayer, he

was dismissed from the instant action without prejudice. See ECF 33. Plaintiffs re-filed a separate

case against Frayer and others on March 15, 2024. See Neal, et al. v. Frayer, et al., No. 8:24-

00778-BAH.

2 The Court references all filings by their respective ECF numbers and page numbers by the ECF-_ -

generated page numbers at the top of the page.

4 .

and finds that nothearing is necessary. See Loc. R. 105.6 (D. Md. 2023). Accordingly, for the

reasons stated below, Defendants’ Motions are GRANTED. .

Ok BACKGROUND

This case arises out of an encounter between Plaintiffs and officers of the Mount Rainier

police department on August 2,.2021. ECF 1, at 1. Just after 10 p.m., officers were dispatched to

the 2300 block of Varnum Street in Mount Rainier to investigate reports of a woman screaming

from inside a vehicle marked as “Special Police” and parked next to a gas station. ECF 34-2, at 2

3 (Caplan affidavit). What happened next is largely captured on body camera. Plaintiffs and

Defendant Caplan both filed a copy of the same footage from the camera. See ECF 36 (granting

Caplan’s motion to file a copy of his body camera footage) and ECF 41 (granting Plaintiffs’ motion

to file same). As the Court has reviewed the video in both exhibits and concluded that they are □

identical, it will refer to the footage in general as “Video Exhibit.”

When Caplan arrived on the scene, several other Mount Rainier police officers were

present and facing a car marked with the words, “Special Police.” Video Exhibit, 00:30. The

doors of the car were closed and two men, later identified as Linthicum and Neal, were standing

on the driver’s side and near the trunk, respectively. Jd. Officer Frayer approached Linthicum,

asked for identification, . and explained: that the police were investigating reports of someone |

screaming. id. at 0:55-1:05. Linthicum stated that he did not have any identification. Jd. at 1:06.

Frayer then advisel Linthicum that he was not sure what was going on and would be detaining

Linthicum while he continued the investigation. Jd. at 1:07-1:11. Frayer then placed Linthicum’s

arms behind his back and began handcuffing him. /d@. at 1:11-1:25. As he was handcuffing

Linthicum, Frayer questioned him as to whether there.was a woman in the car, which Linthicum

denied. /d. at 1:18-1:20. After Linthicum was handcuffed, Frayer asked Linthicum who owned □

the vehicle with the “Special Police” markings and Linthicum advised that it was his car, Jd. at □

|

1:30-1:33. Frayer asked Linthicum if he had a special police license, to which Linthicum

responded that he did not. /d. at 1:33-1:36. Frayer then asked Linthicum, “you know you can’t

be driving a car around like this, right?” and advised Linthicum that the car would be impounded.

at 1:37-1:46.

While Frayer was in the process of handcuffing Linthicum and speaking to him about

car, Caplan approached Neal, who was still standing near the rear of the vehicle and holdingacell □□

phone up to his ear. Video Exhibit, at 1:26. Caplan asked Neal for his identification and Neal □

responded, “my cousin’s a cop, I’m about to call him right now.” Jd. at 1:27-30. Caplan replied,

“okay,” and stood to the side for approximately thirty seconds while Neal held his phone to his ear

but did not appear to speak to anyone. Jd. at 1:30-1:59. Caplan again approached the rear of the

car where Neal was standing, tapped Neal on the back, and asked for Neal’s identification. □□□ at

1:59. Almost simultaneously, Caplan picked up two open containers of alcoho! that were resting

on the trunk, within arm’s reach of Neal. Jd, at 2:04. Neal, still holding his cell phone to his ear

but not appearing to be talking to anyone, turned to Neal and asked, “what do you need my ID

Id, at 2:00-2:05 . Caplan replied, “because we’re doing an investigation, and I asked for

your ID” and again repeated his request to see Neal’s ID. Jd. at 2:05-2:07. Neal then asked again,

“what do you need my ID for?” and said, “you have to tell me.” Jd. at 2:09-2:12. Throughout the .

exchange, Neal continued to hold his phone up to his ear and did not produce his identification.

fd. at 2:00-2:15. Caplan then picked up the alcohol containers, walked toward the-front of the car,

and placed them on the hood of the car. /d. at 2:11-2:20.

When Neal asked why Caplan needed to see his identification for the second time, Frayer

interjected and said, “because he’s a law enforcement officer and he asked for it.” Video Exhibit,

at 2:12-14. Neal then reiterated that he was calling a cousin on the police force. /d. at 2:15—2: 17.

. As Caplan turned back to the rear of the car where Neal and Frayer were still standing, Frayer told

Neal to put his hands behind his back. Jd, at 2:22. Frayer began moving Neal’s left hand behind

his body while Neal continued to hold his cell phone with his right hand. Jd. at 2:23. Neal’s arm

appeared to stiffen in response as he failed to comply with the order to put his hands behind his

back. Id. at 2:24. ,

Frayer then turned Neal to face the car and twisted his left arm behind his back, prompting

Neal to briefly yell. Video Exhibit, at 2:24-9:26, Caplan then approached both men saying, “calm

down, calm down,” placed handcuffs on Neal’s right wrist, took the phone out of Neal’s hands,

and placed Neal’s bight arm behind his back. /d. at 2:27-2:34. Frayer raised his voice at Neal and

remarked that Caplan had “every lawful right” to ask for Neal*s identification and that Neal was

obligated “by law? to produce it. Id. at 2:34-2:38. Neal quietly responded by saying, “that’s

cool.” Id. at 2:33-2:40. Once Neal was in handcuffs, Caplan told him, “it wasn’t that hard, sir,” .

and Neal again responded several times by saying, “that’s cool.” Jd. at 2:41-2:44. Neal then faced

Frayer and advised that when his cousin called back, he wanted Frayer’s badge number, which

Frayer provided. la at 2:47~2:51,

With both Neal and Linthicum detained in handcuffs, the two officers began going through

both men’s pockets. Video Exhibit, at 2:49-3:05. As Caplan pulled a water bottle out of Neal’s

"pocket; Neal said, “that was excessive force.” /d. at 3:05-3:11. Neal then said to Caplan, “T don’t

have nothing on me, man,” to which Caplan responded; “well I’m going to find out, alright?” and

Neal replied, “go ahead, do your job.” /d. at 3:12-3:17. While Frayer and Caplan continued to

search Neal and Linthicum, both detainees told Frayer, “you must be new around here.” Jd. at

3:18-3:27. Frayer asked the two men, “why do you say that? Because I’m not afraid of you?” Id.

at 3:27-3:29. !

After the officers finished searching Neal and Linthicum, the officers reiterated that they

had received reports of a woman screaming inside the car, which Neal and Linthicum responded

was untrue. Video Exhibit, at 3:46-3:50. Officers then opened the doors to the vehicle to search

for any occupants. /d. at 3:51. Meanwhile, Neal inquired into why Caplan had gone through

Neal’s wallet,.and when Caplan responded loudly that he was looking for Neal’s ID, Neal asked

why Caplan was yelling. Jd. at 3:52-3:58. Caplan then replied, “you keep asking the same

question,” and continued, “it’s not hard, sir, ] asked you for your ID when [first came in; you don’t

want to give me your ID, not a problem, so I had to find your ID because you wouldn’t give it to

me.” fd. at 3:58-4:10. While speaking, Caplan walked Neal to the front of the vehicle and sat

him down on the hood. Jd. at 4:10. Upon reaching the front of the car, Neal repeated that his □

cousin worked for Prince George’s County Police and claimed that he had told his cousin that he

being harassed. Jd. at 4:21-4:28. Neal denied that the officers had reason to detain him, to

which Caplan responded that he had been drinking an alcoholic beverage in public. /d. at 4:31-

4:35. Neal then asked Caplan if he had seen him drinking and Caplan responded, “yes, sir.” Jd.

at 4:38-4:40,

Caplan then walked back to the rear of the vehicle where he had left Neal’s belongings and

returned with them to the front of the car, where he began to place them back in Neal’s pockets.

Video Exhibit, at 4:41-5:07. Neal asked Caplan what he was doing and, when Caplan informed

him that he was returning his belongings, Neal requested Caplan’s card. /d. at 5:08-5:17. Caplan

then retrieved his card, placed it in Neal’s pocket, and then asked Neal if there was anything else

he wanted. Jd. at 5:30-5:31. Neal twice called Caplan an expletive and Caplan responded, “you

asked for my card, I gave it to you.” Jd. at 5:32-5:35. At this point, Frayer approached again and

asked Caplan if the alcoholic beverages belonged to Neal. Id. at 5:43, When Caplan responded

.

__ affirmatively, Neal again asked if Caplan had seen him drinking, and Caplan again responded yes,

whereupon Neal ple that he knew Caplan was not telling the truth because Neal does not “drink

sweet” drinks. Ia! at 5:45-5:56. Caplan then returned to his cruiser to look up Neal’s information.

Id. at 6:01. The Body camera footage then ends. Jd. at 6:23, Caplan’s affidavit further notes that

Linthicum was issued a citation for drinking in public and both men were released, ECF 34-2, at:

Il. LEGAL STAN DARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) provides that summary.judgment should be granted

“af the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is

entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The relevant inquiry is “whether

the evidence presehts a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a [trier of fact] or whether

it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, □□□□□

US. 242, 251-52 (1986).

“Once a motion for summary judgment is properly made and supported, the opposing party

has the burden of showing that a genuine factual dispute exists.” Progressive Am. Ins. Co. v. Jireh

House, Inc. , 603 Supp. 3d 369, 373 (E.D. Va. 2022) (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith

Radio Corp., 475 US. 574, 585-86 (1986). “A dispute is genuine if ‘a reasonable. jury could □

return a verdict fot the nonmoving party.” Libertarian Party of Va. y. Judd, 718 F.3d 308, 313

(4th Cir. 2013) (quoting Dulaney v. Packaging Corp, of Am., 673 F.3d 323, 330 (4th Cir. 2012)).

“A fact is material if it ‘might affect the outcome of the suit under the goveming law.’” fd. (quoting

Anderson, 477 US. at 248). Accordingly, “the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute

between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment

....” Anderson, 477 US. at 247-48 (emphasis in original). The Court must view the evidence in

the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and draw all reasonable inferences in that party’s

_ favor, Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650, 657 (2014) (per curiam); Scott v. Harris, 530 US. 372,378

(2007), and the Court “may not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence,”

Progressive Am. Ins. Co., 603 F. Supp. 3d at 373 (citing Holland v. Wash. Homes, Inc., 487 F.3d

208, 213 (4th Cir. 2007)). For this reason, summary judgment ordinarily is inappropriate □□□□

there is conflicting evidence because it is the function of the factfinder to resolve factual disputes,

including matters of witness credibility. See Black & Decker Corp. v. United States, 436 F.3d 431,

442 (4th Cir. 2006): Dennis v. Columbia Colleton Med Ctr., Inc., 290 F.3d 639, 644-45 (4th Cir. .

2002). □□

At the same time, the Court must “prevent factually unsupported claims and defenses from

proceeding to trial.” Bouchat v. Balt. Ravens Football Club, Inc., 346 F.3d 514, 526 (4th Cir.

2003) (quoting Drewitt v. Pratt, 999 F.2d 774, 778-79 (4th Cir. 2003)). “The existence of a mere

scintilla of evidence in support of the nonmoving party as well as conclusory allegations ordenials, □

without more, are insufficient to withstand a summary judgment motion.” Progressive Am, Ins.

Co,, 603 F. Supp. 3d at 373 (citing Tom v. Hosp. Ventures LLC, 980 F.3d 1027, 1037 (4th Cir. □□

2020)).

Il, ANALYSIS

. A. Federal Claims against Caplan □

_ Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Plaintiffs bring a claim alleging “excessive force” in

violation of the Fourth Amendment against Caplan. ECF 1, at 8 (Count I). Plaintiffs also allege

“false imprisonment.” Jd. at 11-12 (Count IID?

3 Plaintiffs fail to specify if they are bringing their claim of false imprisonment as a violation of

federal or state law. See ECF 1, at 12. However, since false imprisonment can serve as a basis for

a claim under section 1983, see Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 388 (2007), the Court considers

this claim, along with Plaintiffs’ excessive force claim, under the Fourth Amendment, and

construes it as a claim for unlawful detention, see Unus v. Kane, 565 F.3d 103, 119 (4th Cir. 2009).

‘ 7 .

1. "Claims for Unlawful Detention in Violation of the Fourth Amendment

The Fourth Amendment protects the “right of the people to be secure in their persons...

against unreasonable searches and seizures.” US. Const. amend. IV. To that end, Ma brief

investigatory stop? of a citizen by police, also known as a Terry stop, “is impermissible unless the

officer’s action is supported by a reasonable and articulable suspicion, under all the circumstances,

that criminal activity “may be afoot.’” United States v. Bumpers, 705 F.3d 168, 171 (4th Cir. 20 13)

(quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968)).4 In determining whether an officer had reasonable

suspicion to effectuate-a stop, courts look to “the totality of the circumstances.” United States v.

Slecumb, 804 F.3d 677, 682 (4th Cir. 2015). Though a mere “hunch” does not amount to

reasonable suspicion, the standard is less demanding than probable cause. United States v.

Massenburg, 654 F.3d 480, 485 (4th Cir 2011). However, the existence of reasonable suspicion

isa “commonsensical proposition, [and] courts are not remiss in crediting the practical experience

of officers who observe on a daily basis what transpires on the street.” United States y Foreman,

369 F.3d 776, 782 \ath Cir, 2004) (internal quotation marks omitted),

The Court! finds that, in the instant case and construing all evidence in favor of the

Plaintiffs, there was reasonable suspicion to justify the detention of both Neal and Linthicum. As

noted, the encounter at issue began when officers responded toa 911 call alleging that a screaming

woman was locked inside a car marked “Special Police.” ECF 34-2, at 2. While a “bare-boned, □

anonymous tip, standing alone, is insufficient to justify a Terry stop ... the policy may rely on an °

anonymous tip to establish reasonable suspicion if it is suitably corroborated so as to exhibit

* There is no debate between the parties that the encounter between Caplan and the Plaintiffs

implicates the Fourth Amendment and that the encounter is best analyzed under Terry v: Ohio.

See ECF 34-1, at 5 (arguing that officers had “reasonable articulable suspicion” to briefly detain

Plaintiffs); ECF 40-1, at 3 (arguing that they did not).

| 8

sufficient indicia of reliability.” United States v. Foster, 824 F.3d 84, 92 (4th Cir. 2016) (cleaned .

up). Even an anonymous call may be deemed reliable if, among other elements, “it provides

substantial detail about the individuals and the alleged criminal activity it describes.” United States

v. Elston, 479 F.3d 314, 318 (4th Cir. 2007). Moreover, the Supreme Court has found: that a 911

call, even one placed anonymously, has greater inherent reliability than an anonymous tip made

by other means. See Navarette v. California, 572 U.S. 393, 400 (2014). Because the 911

emergency system “has some features that allow for identifying and tracing callers” and the calls

“can be recorded,” it “provides some safeguards against making false reports with immunity.” Jd.

at 400-01.

Here, not only were officers responding to a 911 call, but they were also alerted to, and

looking for, a specific vehicle with identifiable “Special Police” markings, parked in a particular -

lot on Varnum Street in Mount Rainier. ECF 34-2, at2. When Caplan and other officers arrived,

undisputed video evidence reflects that they found a car that matched that description in the exact

- location-as detailed in the 911 call. Moreover, when police officers initially arrived, Neal and

Linthicum exited the vehicle and locked and closed the doors, prohibiting the officers from seeing,

inside the darkly tinted windows. See ECF 34-4 (Linthicum Deposition) at 6, 22:6. The caller’s

use of the 911 emergency system, coupled with the amount of verifiable—and-quickly verified—

detail provided a sufficient basis for Caplan and other officers to permissibly conduct a Terry stop.

ven if the 911 call alone had not provided sufficient justification for the investigatory

stop, the existence of other factors, considered in conjunction with the 911 call, established

> Plaintiffs’ exit from the “Special Police” car is not depicted on the video. However, Plaintiffs do

not contest that they were initially seated in the vehicle but.then exited when police first arrived.

ECF 40-1, at 1. Also, the video reflects that Frayer had to unlock the car to access it. Video

Exhibit, at 3:51: □□

. 5

reasonable suspicion. Neal and Linthicum were arguably loitering-in a public parking lot,®

indicated that they were not licensed to drive the “Special Police” vehicle, and had open containers

of alcohol in a public place.”. Indeed, the quick admission that neither had lawful authority to

perform the duties of a “Special Police” officer, at minimum, justified their continued detention

under Terry. See MD Code, Public Safety § 3-315 (a) and (d) (providing that it is a misdemeanor

offense “subject to imprisonment. not exceeding.6 months” for “[a]n individual [to] exercise or

attempt to exercise any of the powers of a special police officer . . . without a commission.”); see

also Sizer v, State, 174 A.3d 326, 329, 338 (Md. 2017) (finding that “under the totality of

circumstances, [] officers had reasonable suspicion to stop [a group of suspects] to investigatea

possible open container violation” when officers observed a group “play fighting and passing

around an alcoholic beverage back and forth”).® More broadly, these facts substantiate the officers’

6 See Mount Rainier, Md., Ordinances § 8-104 (2024) (“It shall be unlawful for any person □□

loiter ... at a public place or place open to the public. and to fail to obey the direction of a

uniformed police officer or the direction of a properly identified police officer not in uniform to

move on, when not to obey such direction shall endanger the public peace.”).

□

7 It bears noting that the video reflects that Linthicum was already detained pursuant to Terry at

the time police learned that Linthicum lacked a “Special Police” license-and perhaps before officers

observed the openicontainers of alcohol on the trunk of their car. It is also clear.from the video |

that at the time officers arrived, no woman could be heard “screaming from the inside of the

vehicle,” as the 9-11 caller had alleged. ECF 34-2, at 2. However, the windows of the vehicle

were darkly tinted! and the car was locked, thus officers had reasonable suspicion to investigate

the claims made in'the 911 call.

§ While Caplan told Neal he had seen Neal consuming the alcoholic beverage, the video does not.

support this allegation and Caplan does not reiterate this claim in his affidavit. See ECF 34-2, at

3. However, the video does reflect. that at least one of the open containers found near Neal

contained alcohol. Video Exhibit, at 2:20; see also ECF 34-2, at 3. These observations established

probable cause that a violation of Section 10-118-of the Code of the City of Mount Rainier, which

makes it “unlawful for any person to ... possess any alcoholic beverage in an open container

while... in any parking area or other outside area or any combination of privately owned retail

establishments, like a shopping center, where the general public is invited for business purposes,”

was occurring in the officer’s presence. Thus, though not explicitly offered as a basis for their

10 .

perception that something was amiss. See United States vy. Coleman, 18 F.4th 131, 137 (4th Cir-

2021) (finding that even ifa report alone would not support a Terry stop, finding “unusual activity”

upon artival at the scene reinforces reasonable suspicion). The officers’ detention of Neal and

Linthicum was therefore lawful and did not constitute a violation of the Fourth Amendment. -

To the extent that Plaintiffs allege a Fourth Amendment violation based on a false:arrest,

this claim is also unavailing. Though the probable cause standard required to effectuate an arrest

. differs from that of reasonable suspicion, the record suggests that Plaintiffs were not arrested. “A

Terry or investigative stop can cross the line and turn into an arrest under certain circumstances.

The test for determining whether an individual is in custody or under arrest is whether, under the

totality of the circumstances, the ‘suspect’s freedom of action is curtailed to a degree associated

with formal arrest.’” Park v. Shiflett, 250 F.3d 843, 850 (4th Cir. 2001) (quoting Berkemer v.

McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 440 (1984)). Even if a suspect feels that they are not free.to leave, that is

“insufficient to convert a Terry stop into an arrest.” United States v. Moore, 817 F.2d 1105, 1108

(4th Cir. 1987), “A brief but complete restriction of liberty is valid under Terry,” even if

effectuated: through “use of force” or “handcuffling] suspects.” Id. (citing United States v.

Bautista, 684 F.2d 1286, 1289 (9th Cir. 1987)). Thus, the fact that the Plaintiffs were handcuffed

during the detention is not a sufficient basis on which to argue that the investigatory stop turned

into a full-blown arrest.”

claims, the prolonged detention of both men as that offense was investigated (and in Linthicum’s

case, ultimately charged) is justified.

° Of course, the brief detention and investigation of the alleged person in distress immediately

yielded evidence of new offenses, namely, operating a “Special Police” vehicle without a license

and possessing an open container of alcohol. As such, officers had the right to prolong the

encounter to address these violations and may have had the right to effectuate an arrest despite the

fact that these violations were not as comparatively serious as the allegations that drew officers to

Neal and Linthicum in the first place. See Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318,354 (2001)

. 11

‘In fact, more extreme showings of force have not transformed a Terry stop into a full-blown

arrest. See, e.g., United States v. Perate, 719 F.2d 706, 709 (4th Cir. 1983) (blocking a limousine

with police vehicles and drawing weapons deemed a Terry stop, not an arrest); United States v.

Leshuk, 65 F.3d 1105, 1109-10 (4th Cir. 1995) (“[D]rawing weapons, handeuffing a suspect,

placing a suspect in a patrol car for. questioning, or using or threatening to use force does not

necessarily elevate a lawful stop into a custodial arrest for Miranda purposes.”). Moreover; the

video of the encounter reflects that the officers “diligently pursued a means of investigation that

was likely to confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly.” United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675,

686 (1985). □□

The Court has little doubt that Neal was handcuffed, at least in part, because he refused to

comply with the roquest to present his identification and was generally non-compliant when

Caplan asked him! questions. The Court gives this fact less weight in the reasonable suspicion

analysis because Neal’s “hesitations veered toward invoking rights he thought he might have rather

than toward full defiance.” United States v. Johnson, No. 21-cr-29, 2022 WL 2373700, at *16

(E.D. Va. June 30, 2022). However, Neal’s assertion of his perceived rights does not change the

fact that before he ivas handcuffed, officers already had reasonable suspicion to believe something

was amiss based on the 911 call and what they observed immediately upon their arrival. Further,

‘ at the time Neal was handcuffed, officers had also developed additional reasonable suspicion □□□□

both men were drinking alcohol in public and that a “Special Police” car was being unlawfully

operated without the proper license. Since officers had the right to detain (and handcuff) Neal,

their subjective motivations for doing’so are irrelevant to the Court’s analysis. See Whren v. United

(“If an officer has brobable cause to believe that an individual has committed even a very minor

criminal offense in his presence, he may, without violating the Fourth Amendment, arrest the

offender.”).

12

States, 517 U.S. .806, 813 (1996) (holding that “[s]ubjective intentions play no role in ordinary,

probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis”).

2. Claims for Excessive Force in Violation of the Fourth Amendment

. Plaintiffs also allege that Caplan used excessive force in effectuating the Terry stop. ECF

40-1, at 3-5. In considering an excessive force claim, the Court “employ[s] a standard of objective

“reasonableness, testing whether the officer’s actions are objectively reasonable in light of the facts

and circumstances confronting him.” Thomas v. Holly, 533 F, App’x 208, 215 (4th Cir. 2013)

(citing Scott, 550 U.S. at 381). “This standard mandates ‘a careful balancing’ of Fourth

Amendment rights ‘against the countervailing governmental interests at stake.’” Wilson v. Flynn,

429 F.3d 465, 467-68 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Graham vy. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989)).

This analysis must be conducted in light of the “totality of the circumstances” surrounding the

incident, including ““the severity of the crime at-issue,” whether the “suspect poses an immediate

threat to the safety of the officers or others,’ and whether the suspect ‘is actively resisting arrest or

attempting to evade arrest by flight’” as well as “[t]he extent of the plaintiffs injury.” Jones v.

Buchanan, 325 F.3d 520, 527 (4th Cir. 2003) (first quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 397, then □□□□□□

Rowland vy. Perry, 41 F.3d 167, 174 (4th Cir. 1994) and Pressly v. Gregory, 831 F.2d 514, 517

(4th Cir. 1987)). Plus, the Court is obliged to evaluate the use of force “from the perspective ofa □

reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.” Graham, 490 U.S.

at 396.

' Plaintiffs do not challenge their frisk and subsequent search of their pockets and instead focus

their claims on their handcuffing and detention. See ECF 1, at 10 (alleging excessive force through

the restraint of Plaintiffs); id at 12 (alleging false imprisonment because Plaintiffs were

“unlawfully and forcefully detain[ed]”); ECF 40-1; at 2-3 (arguing only that Defendants lacked

reasonable articulable suspicion to seize Plaintiffs and employed excessive force).

13

rd Excessive Force as to Neal

Plaintiffs argue that “neither [Linthicum nor Neal] resisted the arrest [e}ffected by the

Defendant Officers” and further allege that “[t]he fashion in which Officer Caplan handcuffed and

twisted the arm of Defendant Neal was objectively unreasonable and was excessive given the

presentation of both Plaintiffs in this matter.” ECF 40-1, at 5. Defendants dispute that Caplan

used excessive force. ECF 34-1, at 7-9. The Court has already established that the stop and

detention of Linthicum and Neal was justified as a Terry stop... “It is well established in this circuit

that “handcuffing a suspect . . . does not necessarily elevate a lawful [Terry] stop into a custodial

arrest.’” United States v. Ruffin, 81 4 F. App’x 741, 749 (4th Cir. 2020) (quoting Alston, 479 F.3d

at 320). “This is because * [b]rief, even if complete, deprivations of a suspect’s liberty do not

convert a stop and frisk into an arrest so long as the methods of restraint used are reasonable to the

circumstances.” Id. (quoting United States v. Crittendon, 883 F.2d 326, 329 (4th Cir. 1989)). The

Fourth Circuit has explained that “the reasonableness of handcuffing a suspect during a Terry stop

depends on whether doing so is ‘necessary to maintain the status quo and protect [officer] safety.’”

id. (citing Crittendon, 883 F. 2d at 329). Regardless; the Court may consider that the encounter

occurred without probable cause as it evaluates the overall reasonableness of the force used. Hupp

v. Cook, 931 F.3d 307, 322 (4th Cir. 2019) (“But we consider the crime that is alleged to have been

committed in connection with our overall analysis of all of the circumstances surrounding the use

of force.) (emphasis added).

The Court has thoroughly reviewed the body camera footage of this incident and finds that

is.no dispute. of material fact and the encounter between Caplan and Neal did not offend the

Fourth Amendment. As noted, under the specific facts presented here, officers had the right to

temporarily detain Neal and Linthicum. Authorities were investigating a possible abduction □□□□

14 □

encountered someone potentially impersonating law enforcement, a combination of ‘undisputed

facts that weigh against Plaintiffs.!! Whether an immediate threat was posed by. Neal and

Linthicum is a slightly closer call as neither, at least initially, exhibited threatening behavior. Still,

the nature of the alleged offense at issue coupled with the fact that one (or both) may have been

impersonating law enforcement renders this factor, at best, equivocal.

As to the third Graham factor, concerning whether a suspect is “actively resisting arrest,”

Jones, 325 F.3d at 527, the video reflects that while neither suspect attempted to flee, neither did

they cooperate with police, with both refusing to provide their names or identification. The

undisputed video reflects that Neal actively resisted the handcuffing, a fact that, standing alone,

weighs against Neal. See Wilson, 429 F.3d at 468 (finding third Graham factor weighed in □

arresting officer’s favor when the plaintiff “still disobeyed [the arresting officer’s] orders and

physically resisted when [the officer] attempted to put [the plaintiff] in handcuffs”). The Fourth

Circuit addressed a similar situation in United States v. Ruffin.'* There, a suspect was detained

pursuant to erry and refused to allow officers to place him in handcuffs by “straighten[ing] his

_ arm out” and-“pulling away.” Rujffin, 814 F. App’x at 744. Likening the order to submit to

handcuffs to “a lawful order from a public officer with which [the detainee] was required to comply

under” the relevant North Carolina state Jaw, the Fourth Circuit noted that the detainee’s

'! The Fourth Circuit has ruled that this first Graham factor regarding severity of the crime weighs

in favor of law enforcement when even the slightest use of force is employed against an alleged

victim. See Wilson, 429 F.3d at 468 (finding that the alleged crime at issue, placing “[a] hand on

[the alleged.victim’s] face” failed to result “in any significant physical harm, it still constitutes

criminal activity”).

- "2 The basis for the trial court’s finding that reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal activity

existed in Ruffin differs from the basis presented here. The Court cites Ruffin solely for its

discussion about a detainee’s rights affer he is lawfully detained, not for its determination on the

question of reasonable articulable suspicion. . □

15

noncompliance pave officers “probable cause to arrest him for violation of N.C. Gen, Stat. § 14-

223, which: make’ it unlawful to ‘resist, delay, or obstruct a public officer in discharging or

. attempting to discharge a duty of his office.’” Jd. at 750 (citations omitted).

. I

Here, the undisputed video evidence reflects that when Caplan attempted to place Neal in

handcuffs—as the Court has already determined he was lawfully permitted to do—Neal’s arm

stiffened and he Tesisted the effort to handcuff him. Similar to the situation in Ruffin, Neal’s

| . -

resistance arguably constitutes'a violation of the relevant Maryland law against disobeying a lawful

| . ' !

order, which holds that “[a] person may not willfully disobey any lawful order or direction of any

police officer.” See Md. Code Ann., Transp. § 21-103 (a)(1); Cleary v. Green, Civ. No, CCB-07-

1202, 2008 WL 4900548, at-*3 (D. Md. Nov. 6, 2008) (finding that a refusal to obey lawful □□□□□

by a police officer “alone would warrant a reasonable officer to believe [a suspect was] violating

Maryland law”). - Of course, the video reflects that while Neal ‘did, in fact, resist the efforts to

handcuff him, his resistance was brief and largely ineffectual. Regardless, the fact remains that

Neal did resist, thus the third Graham factor weighs against him, even if only slightly so.

It bears nofing that Caplan’s efforts to subdue Neal are similar in nature to the practice

endorsed by the Fourth Circuit in Pegg v. Herrnberger, 845 F.3d 112, 120 (4th Cir. 2017). There,

!

the court evaluated the reasonableness of an.officer’s efforts to handcuff a person being arrested

for driving with an expired registration sticker. Jd. at 118. In finding that the resistance of the

suspect (Pegg) rendered the measured but forceful response of the arresting officer (Herrnberger) _

. ,reasonable, the Fourth Circuit observed:

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Pegg, after Pegg placed his left hand

behind his back he failed to interlock his hands as Herrnberger had just demonstrated to

him seconds earlier. Pegg then attempted to withdraw his right arm from Herrnberger’s

grasp. Herrnberger then briskly, but safely, took Pegg to the ground. Pegg remained on

the ground; for less than a minute and no longer than the time Herrnberger needed to

handcuff him. According to.Pegg’s own statements, Herrnberger did not strike, kick, or

44

{ . :

\

16

1 | .

verbally abuse him. Instead, Hermberger performed a simple maneuver to ensure Pegg’s

compliance. Once Pegg was handcuffed, Herrnberger assisted Pegg back to a standing

position and refrained from any further physical contact. As a result of the encounter, Pegg

claims abrasions minor enough that he treated them at home with Neosporin and peroxide _

and did not seek medical assistance. An efficient, lawful arrest of a resisting suspect that

causes the suspect to suffer only de minimis injuries does not constitute excessive force.

Herrnberger’s actions were objectively reasonable and he is entitled to qualified immunity

__asaresult. The district court erred in holding to the contrary. -

Id. Here, the video evidence reveals that'Caplan reacted swiftly and appropriately to Neal’s non-

compliance. Neal himself acknowledged that Caplan’s efforts to handcuff him involved minimal

force. See ECF 34-5, at 6 (admitting that Caplan “didn’t do nothing,” “just grabbed [Neal’s] arm,”

and “didn’t try to put force on [Neal]” but asserting that Frayer “ripped [Neal’s] arm up hard and

fast and pretty bad”). Indeed, courts have found far more significant use of force to be reasonable

when a detained suspect refuses to comply. See, e.g., Hayat v. Diaz, et al., Civ. No. 20-02994-

LKG, 2025 WL 475329, at *14 . Md. Feb. 12, 2025) (finding no excessive force when officers

entered the plaintiffs home without authorization pursuant to a Terry stop, handcuffed the □

plaintiff, and took him “to the ground” when he resisted, resulting in the plaintiff suffering a bloody

lip). □

Finally, though the “severity of the physical injury resulting from the force used is but one

‘consideration in determining whether force was excessive,’” by & through T.W. v. Dolgos,

884 F.3d 172, 185 (4th Cir. 2018) (citing Jones, 325 F.3d at 528), Neal fails to point to any

evidence suggesting any injury was more than de minimis, As in Pegg, the lawful detention of

Neal, who was actively resisting and suffered only de minimis injury does not constitute excessive

force, 845 F.3d at 120.

Of course, the Court can certainly envision a scenario where the interaction between the

officers and Plaintiffs unfolds differently and with no physical confrontation. However, the

Supreme Court has reminded ‘trial courts that “[a] creative judge engaged in post hoc evaluation

17

of police conduct can almost always imagine some alternative means by which the objectives of

the police might Have been accomplished.” Sharpe, 470 U.S, at 686-87. “But the fact that the

protection of the public might, in the abstract, have been accomplished by less intrusive means .

does not, by itself” render the challenged conduct unreasonable. Id. “The question,” the Supreme

Court-has reiterated, “4s not simply whether some other alternative was available, but whether the □

police acted unreasonably in failing to recognize or to pursue it.” /d Having fully reviewed the

parties’ arguments and viewed the exhibits, most notably the undisputed video recording of the .

encounter, the Court cannot conclude that Caplan was unreasonable in his application of force. As

such, summary judgment is appropriate on Neal’s claims of excessive force.

ii. Qualified Immunity as to Caplan

Even if there existed a dispute over the propriety of Caplan’s actions, summary judgment

would nonetheless be in order because Caplan is entitled to qualified immunity. “The doctrine of

qualified immunity protects government officials ‘from liability for civil damages ‘insofar as their

conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable

person would have known.”” Pearson vy. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (quoting Harlow vy.

itzgerald, 457 US. 800, 818 (1982)). “The immunity [inquiry] balances two important interests:

‘the need to hold public officials accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and the need

to shield officials from harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their duties

reasonably.’” Atkinson yv. Godfrey, 100 F.4th 498, 504 (4th Cir. 2024) (quoting Pearson, 555 USS. □

at 231). “The protection applies regardless of whether the government official’s error is a mistake

of law, a mistake of fact or a mistake based on mixed questions of law and fact.” Id. (citing

Pearson, 555.US, at 231). “It gives ‘government officials breathing room to make reasonable but

18 .

mistaken judgments, and protects all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate.

the law.” Jd. (citing Stanton v, Sims, 571 U.S. 3, 6.2013) (per curiam).

Qualified immunity “typically involves two inquiries: (1) whether the plaintiff has

established the violation of a constitutional right, and (2) whether that right was clearly established

at the time of the alleged violation.” Estate of Armstrong ex rel. Armstrong v. Village of Pinehurst,

810 F.3d 892, 898 (4th Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks omitted). The second step of the

analysis. acknowledges that even officers who violate a plaintiffs constitutional rights: may be

entitled to qualified immunity, provided that the right in question is not so clearly established “that~ .

every reasonable official would have understood that what he is doing violates that right.” Reichle

v. Howards, 566 US. 658, 664 (2012) (cleaned up) (citation omitted). “‘Clearly established’

means that, at the time of the officer’s conduct, the law was sufficiently clear that every reasonable

official would understand what he is doing is unlawful.” Garrett v. Clarke, 74 F.4th 579, 584 (4th .

Cir, 2023) (quoting District of Columbia Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 63 (2018)). os

“To determine whether a right is clearly established, [the Court must] assess whether the

law has ‘been authoritatively decided by the Supreme Court, the appropriate United States Court .

of Appeals, or the highest court of the state.”” Wilson v. Prince George ’s Cuty., Maryland, 893

F.3d 213, 221 (4th Cir. 2018) (citing. Wilson v. Layne, 141 F.3d 111, 114 (4th Cir. 1998)). “Aright

need not be recognized by a court in a specific factual context before such right may be considered

‘clearly established’ for purposes of qualified immunity.” /d:-(citations omitted). However, courts.

are “not to define clearly established law at a high level of generality,” as “[s]pecificity is

especially important in the Fourth Amendment context.” Kisela v. Hughes, 584 U.S. 100, 104

(2018) (internal citations omitted). “Defining the right at a high level of generality ‘avoids the

crucial question whether the offic[er] acted reasonably in the particular circumstances that he or

19 □

. she faced.”” Atkinson,,100 F.4th at 505 (citing Wesby, 583 U.S. at 63) (alteration in Atkinson).

other words, existing precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional question

beyond debate.” ‘Reichle, 566 U.S. at 664 (internal quotation marks omitted).

Here, Caplan is entitled to qualified immunity not only because his actions failed to violate

a constitutional right, but also because it is not clearly established that forceful handcuffing of a

suspect offering resistance, albeit minimally so, necessarily violates the Fourth Amendment.

Though the Supreme Court has not directly addressed whether the Fourth Amendment

"encompasses the right to be free from forceful handcuffing under: circumstances analogous to the

ones at issue here, it has acknowledged that “the right to make an arrest or investigatory stop

necessarily carries with it the right to use some degree of physical coercion or threat thereof to

effect it.” Graham, 490 U.S. at.396 (citing Terry, 392.U.S. at 22-27). Moreover, “[nJot □□□□□□

push or shove” vidlates the Fourth Amendment, even if it may later seem to have been unnecessary.

Id. □□ .

Courts iniother circuits have found that forceful handcuffing does, in some instances,

support an excessive force claim, at least when handeutts are applied in an unreasonable manner.

See, e.g., Martin ¥. Heideman, 106 F.3d 1308, 1313 (6th Cir. 1997) (finding it “clearly established”

that the “tight application of handcuffs was a violation of an arrestee’s constitutional right not to

have excessive force applied during an arrest”); Kopec v. Tate, 361 F.3d 772, 777 Gd Cir. 2004)

(placing handouts on a suspect that were excessively tight and failing to respond repeated requests

for them to be loosened, resulting in severe pain, were found to be excessive). However, the Fourth

Circuit has found an officer’s actions to be reasonable even when the officer handcuffed a _

generally compliant suspect and “dragged [her] into a [police] cruiser.” See:-Brown v. Gilmore,

oa

278 F.3d 362, 366 (4th Cir. 2002).'? Plus, as noted, supra, Pegg v. Hernnberger arguably endorses

the conduct at issue here, 845 F.3d at 120. “Officials are not liable for bad guesses in gray areas; □

they are, liable for transgressing bright lines.” Maciariello v. Sumner, 973 F.2d 295, 298 (4th Cir.

1992). ‘Having found that no “bright lines” were transgressed, Caplan is entitled to qualified

immunity even if the Court were to find that his actions violated the Fourth Amendment. □

ii. Excéssive Force as to Linthicum

Caplan argues that he cannot be liable for any claims as to Linthicum “because he did not

handcuff or assist in handcuffing [] Linthicum.” ECF 34-1, at 8. First, qualified immunity would

apply to any claims asserted by Linthicum against Caplan for the same reasons noted above. □

Regardless, Plaintiffs fail to address arguments related to Linthicum in their response. “See ECF

40-1, at 5 (arguing Caplan has “bystander and supervisory liability” over Officer Frayer with

respect to his interactions with Neal, not Linthicum). Defendants assert that Plaintiffs have thereby

“conceded the point” and aver that “Officer Caplan is entitled to summary judgment” as to all of

Linthicum’s claims. See ECF 43, at 3 (citing Pa. Nat’l Mut. Cas, Ins. Co. v. Kirson, 525 F. Supp.

3d 628, 634 (D. Md. 2021)). The Court agrees. “A plaintiff who fails to respond to an arguinent

for summary judgment is deemed to have abandoned the claim.” See Rodgers v. Eagle All., 586

F. Supp. 3d 398, 448-49 (D. Md. 2022) (citing Mentch VE Sav. Bank, FSB, 949 F. Supp. 1236,

1247 (D.. Md. 1997)). As Plaintiffs have failed to address the appropriateness of summary

judgment with respect to claims by Linthicum against Caplan, they have abandoned them. □

'3 The Fourth Circuit has extended qualified immunity to officers in'an instance where the court

found the underlying handeuffing to be excessively forceful. See E.W. v. Dolgos, 884 F.3d 172,

184, 187 (4th Cir. 2018) (finding it unreasonable to place a “calm and compliant” ten-year-old girl

handcuffs following an earlier school fight but finding that qualified immunity was warranted

because the student’s right not to be handcuffed “was not clearly established at the time of her

seizure”). The facts of Dolgos, however, differ greatly from those here and thus do not clearly

establish that forcibly handcuffing a detainee who offers minimal resistance is unlawful.. □ □

21

B. Federal Claims against Mount Rainier

. Plaintiffs bring their Fourth Amendment excessive force claim against Caplan alone, not

the city of Mount Rainier. See ECF 1, at 8. Plaintiffs likewise specify that their false imprisonment

claim, whether raised under the Fourth Amendment or state tort law,.is against “Defendant

Officers” and not ‘Mount Rainier. fd. at 11. Count IV, however, purports to bring a “respondeat

superior” claim ageinst “Defendants. MRPD [Mount Rainier Police Department], City of Mount

Rainier” for “comimon law claims against Defendant Officers.”!* /d. at 12-13.

Read plainly, the Complaint appears to bring Fourth Amendment claims solely against-the

Defendant Officers and state tort or constitutional claims. against all Defendants. However,

inasmuch as Count IV encompasses a claim for Mount Rainier’s vicarious liability for Fourth

Amendment violations, this putative “respondeat superior” count cannot move forward. A

municipality “cannot be held liable in a § 1983 action under a theory of respondeat superior.” Lee

O'Malley, 533 F. Supp. 2d 548, 553 (D. Ma. 2007) (citing Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436

U.S. 658, 694 (1978)). Liability attaches to a municipality in a § 1983 action “only where the

municipality itself causes the constitutional violation at issue,” such as if it causes a deprivation

through an official custom, practice, or policy. City of Canton vy. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385 (1989) □

(emphasis in original) Though Plaintiffs’ complaint avers that.the officers were “acting pursuant

_. to the City of Mount Rainier, and MRPD custom, policy, decision, ordinance, regulation,

widespread habit, ‘usage, or practice in their actions,” they offer no facts to support such a claim.

ECF l, at 10 54. This “conclusory statement” is “insufficient” to lend credence to Plaintiffs’

allegations. Lee, 533 F. Supp. 2d at 553. Plaintiffs thus have no viable theory of liability against

_ Mount Rainier for:Plaintiffs* federal claims.

4 MRPD was terminated as a party to this action on April 20, 2023. □

220

Cc. Remaining State Claims

As summary judgment is granted on Plaintiffs’ federal claims, the only remaining claims

are state constitutional and tort claims. Specifically, Plaintiffs’ remaining claims are state common

law assault and battery (Count ID, common law false imprisonment (Count IID), and.an alleged

violation of Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights (Count V).

As to Plaintiffs’ Article 24 claim, the Court notes that Article 24 contains the State. of

Maryland’s constitutional guarantee of due process and equal. protection of the law. Town of

‘Easton v. Pub, Serv. Comm ‘A, 838 A.2d 1225, 1237 n.11 (Md. 2003)... Article 24 is “the state law .

equivalent of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States.” Hawkins v. Leggett, 955 F. Supp.

-2d 474, 496 (D. Md. 2013) (quotation marks omitted). Article 26, by contrast, is the Maryland

analogue to the Fourth Amendment. Padilla v. State, 949 A.2d 68, 77 (Md. App. 2008);.see also

Dent v. Montgomery Cnty. Police Dep’t, 745 F, Supp. 2d 648, 661 (D. Md. 2010) (“Article 26 □

protects the same rights as those protected under the Fourth Amendment to the United States

Constitution ....”). Though Plaintiffs’ response to both motions for summary judgment contains

no mention of either Article 24'° or Article 26, the Court has previously held that an “excessive

force” allegation outside of pre-trial detention must be raised under Article 26.'° See Graham □□

15 To the extent Plaintiffs alleged a “due process” claim under Article 24, the complaint later

clarifies that their allegations sound in Article 26. See ECF 1, at 14 (alleging Caplan “engaged in

intentional acts of misconduct, including excessive force, and false imprisonment which violated

Mr. Neal’s and Mr. Linthicum’s civil rights”). □□

6 Plaintiffs’ complaint makes reference to the “deprivation of liberty and property” in'violation of

Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. ECF 1, at 13. It later references “excessive - _

force” in violation of Article 24. Jd. In Graham, the Court summarized the apparent dispute of

whether an excessive force allegation in a non-prisoner context can even be raised under Article

24. Graham, 738 F. Supp. 3d at 654-55 (collecting cases). Though the Court ultimately concluded

‘that an “excessive force claim ‘can only be brought under Article 26—the Fourth Amendment

-equivalent—and not Article 24,’” id. (citing Nicholson v. Bait. Police Dep’t, Civ. No. DKC 20-

3146, 2023 WL 4549741, at *8 (D. Md. July 14, 2023), the Court need not get bogged-down in

this debate again as there is no doubt that whether Plaintiffs’ claims originate in Article, □□ or

23

Maryland, 738 F. Supp. 3d 644, 655~56 (D. Md. 2024). However, “[rJegardless of whether

Plaintiffs’ excessive force claims rest in Article 24 or 26, both articles will require the application □□

of the Fourth Amendment.” /d. In determining whether a police officer has used excessive force

under Maryland law, courts mist look to “whether the officers’ actions were ‘objectively.

reasonable’ in light of the facts and circumstances confronting them.” Cunningham y Balt. Cnty.,

232 A.3d 278, 3 14-15 (Md. App. 2020) (citing Graham, 490 U.S. at 397; Estate of Blair ex rel.

Blair vy. Austin, 228 A.3d 1094, 1105-1 107 (Md. 2020) (plurality opinion):

Article 26 is interpreted in pari materia with its federal analogue. See Stutzman v. Krenik,

350 F. Supp. 3d 366, 377 (D. Md. 2018) (“Maryland courts construe Article 26 in pari materia

with the Fourth Amendment, Such that its comparable provisions are essentially equated to the

Fourth Amendment’s protections against unreasonable searches and seizures.””). Thus, the Court’s

analysis of Plaintiffs? federal constitutional claim controls the disposition of Plaintiffs’ clatm under

the Maryland Declaration of Rights. See Middleton v. Koushall, Civ. No. ELH-20-3536, 2024 WL

1967816, at *38 (D. Md. May 3, 2024). Accordingly, for the reasons articulated above, see supra,

Plaintiffs’ claims are dismissed. - ,

Further, Plaintifts common law state tort claims “‘tise[ ] and fall” with Plaintiffs’ Fourth

Amendment claims. Titus v. Town of Nantucket, 840 F. Supp. 2d 404, 417 (D. Mass. 2011); see

also Stutzman, 350 F. Supp. 3d at 383 (holding in the context of gross negligence claims alleging

excessive force that the principle of objective reasonableness articulated in Graham v. Connor

controls); Johnson v. City of Fayetteville, 91 F. Supp. 3d 75, 815 (E.D.N.C. 2015) (noting “assault

Article 26, they “stem from identical allegations, that are decided under identical legal standards,

and for which identical relief is available.” Waltz v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 755 F. Supp. 2d 1,

81 (D.D.C. 2010) (citing McGee v. District of Columbia, 646 F. Supp. 2d 115, 121-22 (D.D.C. □

2009)).

i □

and battery by a law enforcement office may provide the basis for a civil action for damages so

long as the plaintiff can show that the force used was excessive under the circumstances”); Main

v. Wingler, Civ. No. 22-157, 2024 WL 871384, at *9 (W.D.N.C. Feb. 29, 2024) (“The Fourth

Circuit has recognized that [] ‘the jurisprudence governing Fourth Amendment excessive force

actions also controls a party’s actions for battery and gross negligence.’” (quoting Njang v.

Monigomery Cuty., 279 F. App’x 209, 216 (4th Cir. 2008) and citing Sigman v. 1 own of Chapel

Hill, 161 F.3d 782, 789 (4th Cir. 1998))); Bell Dawson, 144 F. Supp. 2d 454, 464 (W.D.N.C.

2001); Wilcoxson vy, Painter, Civ. No. 13-732, 2016 WL. 866327, *10 (EDN. March 3, 2016)

(“Where a law enforcement officer’s use of force was reasonable for the purposes of finding □

qualified immunity to a § 1983 excessive force claim, it is fatal to the Plaintiffs state law tort

claims.”); Holman v. Wiggs, Civ. No. 23-618, 2024 WL 2784919, at *7 (M.D.N.C. May 30, 2024)

(Thus, “[wjhere a plaintiff brings both a § 1983 excessive force claim and a common law claim ©

for assault and battery, the court's determination of the reasonableness of the force used with

respect to the § 1983 claim controls its assault and battery -analysis,’ at least insofar as ©

constitutionally excessive force will be deemed to constitute a battery.’’) (citation omitted); Rovin

v. State, 321 A.3d 201, 227 (Md. 2024) (“Stated another way, we apply the same principles of .

fobjective reasonableness’ underlying the application of-a Section 1983 qualified immunity.

determination when considering whether a plaintiff's arrest was objectively reasonable, which

would defeat the common law claims and constitutional claims arising from the same conduct as

. a matter of law.”). Having found Caplan’s conduct to be objectively reasonable, see supra,

Plaintiffs’ common law tort claims are dismissed.

As the’ Court has determined that Caplan’s conduct was objectively reasonable, it is not

necessary for the Court to reach the issue of whether Defendants are entitled to immunity for □□□□□

tort law claims. However, the Court will discuss the issue briefly for the purposes of

comprehensiveness and clarity. “In Maryland, public official immunity applies to torts consisting

of ‘negligence actions or defamation actions based on allegedly negligent conduct.’” Phelan vy.

Atack, Civ. No. TDC-19-1867, 2020 WL. 7043931, at *3 (D. Md. Dec. 1, 2020) (citing Lee □□

Cline, 863 A.2d 297, 305 (Md. 2004)). “Police officers are deemed to be public officials for

purposes of public official immunity.” /d. (citations omitted). However, public official immunity

is not available inlactions alleging intentional torts such as false imprisonment, assault, or battery,

Thomas y. City of Annapolis, 688 A.2d 448, 454 (Md. App. 1997) (citing Ashton v. Brown, 660 ~

A.2d 447, 470 (Md. 1995)); see also Houghton v. Forrest, 989 A.2d 223, 229 (Md. 2010).

Moreover, the applicable statute, Section 5-507 of the Maryland Courts & Judicial Proceedings

Article, merely “codif[ies] existing public official immunity and [does] not [] extend the scope of

qualified immunity beyond its Maryland common law boundaries.” Lovelace v. Anderson, 785

A2d 726, 734 (Md. 2001) (citing Ashton, 660°A.2d at 470 n.23 and Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud.

Proc. § 5-507(a)(1)).

Though the Maryland public official immunity doctrine is “quite limited” and applicable

“in negligence actions or defamation actions based on allegedly negligent conduct,” Lee, 863

A.2d at 305, this does not mean that Plaintiffs have viable tort claims against Defendants. Under

Maryland law, “false imprisonment, false arrest, and assault and battery ‘can only occur when

there is no legal authority or justification for the arresting officer’s actions.’” Hines v. French,

852 A.2d 1047, 1055 (Md. App. 2004) (quoting Williams v. Prince George’s Cnty., 685 A.2d 884,

898 (Md. App. 1996}). Legal justification is understood to be “equivalent to legal authority.” Ia.

(quoting Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Paul, 26] Ad 731, 738 (Md. 1970)). As detailed supra,

26

Caplan acted with legal authority. Therefore, Plaintiffs do not have colorable tort claims against

Defendants, regardless of the applicability of state public official immunity.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Defendant Caplan and Defendant Mount Rainier’s Motions for

Summary Judgement are GRANTED as to Plaintiffs’ federal and state claims.

A separate implementing Order will issue.

Dated: February 25, 2025 /s/

: Brendan A. Hurson

United States District Judge

. 27