Parrish v. Attorney General of Pennsylvania

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

DANTE PARRISH,

Plaintiff, CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:24-cv-01805

v. (SAPORITO, J.)

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF

PENNSYLVANIA, .,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM

Plaintiff Dante Parrish has filed an amended complaint (Doc. 12)

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, primarily alleging that the defendants

violated his Fourteenth Amendment rights by placing him in disciplinary

segregation at the York County Prison without due process. The Court

will permit Parrish to proceed on Fourteenth Amendment claims against

two defendants, Kruber and Alexis, and dismiss all other claims.

I. BACKGROUND

A prior version of Parrish’s amended complaint (Doc. 10) did not

clearly identify the intended defendants. The Court granted Parrish

leave to file a second amended complaint and attach the prior filing as

part of a renewed statement of facts, which he did. (Doc. 11, 12-1).

Accordingly, the Court summarizes the factual allegations in both the

operative complaint (Doc. 12) and the attachment (Doc. 12-1).

Parrish alleges as follows: Around 7:00 a.m. on October 5, 2022, as

a pretrial detainee at the York County Prison, Parrish was involved in an

“altercation” with C.O. Daryman and Sgt. Arnold. Parrish alleges that

Arnold “attacked” him, which “forced” him to take Daryman and Arnold

to the ground and restrain them. The incident ended when Parrish was

shot with a stun gun by another officer. After receiving “minimum

medical assistance” for his wounds from the stun gun, he was taken to a

segregated housing unit.

Although he anticipated a disciplinary charge from the incident,

Parrish never received written notice of any charge, which Arnold and

Daryman “were supposed to draft.” Nonetheless, on the same day1,

Parrish was taken to a disciplinary hearing before hearing examiner Lt.

Kruber and his “assistant,” Alexis. At the hearing, Parrish still had no

written notice of the charge and was not permitted to offer witness

1 In his first amended complaint, Parrish asserted that the hearing

occurred “roughly ten hours later,” but in the operative complaint, he

alleges that it occurred at approximately 12:00 p.m., which would have

been five hours after the alleged attack.

testimony. When Parrish complained about this, Kruber allegedly

responded by saying “[w]e can do what we want.” Alexis “remained silent”

during this exchange. Parrish ultimately received a sanction of 120 days

in segregated housing. While in segregation, he was confined to his cell

for 23 hours per day, permitted 15 minutes of telephone use per month,

and denied access to a TV, radio, and reading material, among other

restrictions.

After receiving a written report of the hearing, Parrish appealed

the decision to the Associate Warden on the grounds that he had not

received written notice or an opportunity to present witnesses. The

Associate Warden denied the appeal, and allegedly said: “I don’t see how

giving you a write up would change what I saw on the tape.” Parrish

appealed to the Warden and Solicitor General but received no response.

Parrish now asserts claims based on a denial of due process, violation of

equal protection, and “unlawful confinement.” His named defendants

include York County, the Attorney General of Pennsylvania, Adam Ogle

(the Warden), Valerie Conway (the Associate Warden), and Daryman.

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the Court is obligated to screen a civil

complaint in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity

or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a);

, 230 Fed. App’x 195, 197 (3d Cir. 2007). The

Court must dismiss the complaint if it is “frivolous” or “fails to state a

claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1). The

Court has a similar obligation with respect to actions brought

and actions concerning prison conditions. 28 U.S.C. §

1915(e)(2)(B)(i); . § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii); 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)(1);

, 568 F. Supp. 2d 579, 587–89 (W.D.

Pa. 2008) (summarizing prisoner litigation screening procedures and

standards).

The legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to state a

claim under § 1915A(b)(1), § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), or § 1997e(c) is the same as

that for dismissing a complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure. , 481 Fed. App’x 705, 706

(3d Cir. 2012) (per curiam); , 696 F. Supp. 2d 454, 471

(M.D. Pa. 2010); , 568 F. Supp. 2d at 588. “Under Rule 12(b)(6), a

motion to dismiss may be granted only if, accepting all well-pleaded

allegations in the complaint as true and viewing them in the light most

favorable to the plaintiff, a court finds the plaintiff’s claims lack facial

plausibility.” , 643 F.3d 77, 84 (3d Cir.

2011) (citing , 550 U.S. 544, 555–56

(2007)). In deciding the motion, the Court may consider the facts alleged

on the face of the complaint, as well as “documents incorporated into the

complaint by reference, and matters of which a court may take judicial

notice.” , 551 U.S. 308, 322

(2007). Although the Court must accept the fact allegations in the

complaint as true, it is not compelled to accept “unsupported conclusions

and unwarranted inferences, or a legal conclusion couched as a factual

allegation.” , 719 F.3d 160, 165 (3d Cir. 2013) (quoting

, 481 F.3d 187, 195 (3d Cir. 2007)).

Parrish brings this action for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 provides in pertinent part:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,

regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or

the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be

subjected, any citizen of the United States or other

person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation

of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the

Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party

injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper

proceeding for redress . . . .

42 U.S.C. § 1983. To establish a Section 1983 claim, a plaintiff must

establish that the defendants, acting under color of state law, deprived

the plaintiff of a right secured by the United States Constitution.

, 51 F.3d 1137, 1141 (3d Cir. 1995). To avoid

dismissal for failure to state a claim, a civil rights complaint must state

the conduct, time, place, and persons responsible for the alleged

violations. , 423 F.3d 347, 353 (3d Cir. 2005). Further,

“[c]ivil rights claims cannot be premised on a theory of

. Rather, each named defendant must be shown . . . to have been

personally involved in the events or occurrences which underlie a claim.”

, 8 F. Supp. 3d 601, 613 (M.D. Pa. 2014)

(citation omitted). As explained by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals:

A defendant in a civil rights action must have personal

involvement in the alleged wrongs . . . . [P]ersonal

involvement can be shown through allegations of

personal direction or of actual knowledge and

acquiescence. Allegations of participation or actual

knowledge and acquiescence, however, must be made

with appropriate particularity.

, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Due Process

Parrish’s amended complaint clarifies that he was a pretrial

detainee at the time of this incident. The Due Process Clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment protects pretrial detainees from conditions of

confinement amounting to “punishment.” , 441 U.S. 520,

535 (1979). “Generally, prisons may sanction a pretrial detainee for

misconduct that he commits while awaiting trial, as long as it is not a

punishment for the ‘underlying crime of which he stands accused.’”

, 739 F. App’x 111, 116 (3d Cir. 2018) (quoting ,

172 F.3d 999, 1003-06 (7th Cir. 1999)). However, “the imposition of

disciplinary segregation for violation of prison rules and regulations

cannot be imposed without providing the due process protections set forth

in , 418 U.S. 539 (1974).” , 739 F. App’x at 116.

These protections “include the right to receive written notice of the

charges at least 24 hours before the hearing, the opportunity to present

witnesses and documentary evidence, and a written statement of the

reasons for the disciplinary action taken and the supporting evidence.”

. (citing , 418 U.S. at 563-66).

Here, Parrish’s complaint supports a plausible inference that

Kruber and Alexis2 knowingly imposed disciplinary segregation on

Parrish without appropriate due process protections. However, it is still

unclear if Parrish intended to name Kruber and Alexis as defendants.

Although he appears to assert Fourteenth Amendment claims against

them in his statement of facts ( Doc. 12-1 at 2 (alleging that Kruber

and Alexis “sentenced [Parrish] without proper process”)), he does not

include them in his list of intended defendants, even though he did so in

a prior version of the complaint. (Doc. 1 at 4). Given that

pleadings are to be read liberally, the Court construes Parrish as

asserting Fourteenth Amendment claims against Kruber and Alexis and

will direct that they be restored to the docket as defendants in this case.

, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (“[A] pro se complaint,

however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than

2 Parrish alleges that Alexis was Kruber’s “assistant,” but that both

officers “sentenced” him. Parrish does not attribute any statement or

action specifically to Alexis, so it is unclear what Alexis’s precise role was.

Nonetheless, the complaint supports a plausible inference that Alexis

was present to assist with Parrish’s disciplinary proceeding, heard

Parrish’s complaints at the hearing regarding the alleged lack of due

process, and had the “actual knowledge and acquiescence” required for

liability under Section 1983. , 845 F.2d at 1207; , ,

, 630 F. Supp. 3d 679, 684-685 (W.D. Pa. 2022) (finding a

reasonable inference of actual knowledge or acquiescence where the

allegations about the defendants’ job duties implied their participation).

formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.”) (quoting , 429

U.S. 97, 106 (1976)); , No. 3:18-CV-1136, 2019 WL

1140231, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 12, 2019) (“[because the plaintiff] is

proceeding pro se, the Court will liberally construe his inclusion of

[individuals’] names in his ‘Claims for Relief’ as an attempt” to name

them as defendants); Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e) (“Pleadings must be

construed so as to do justice.”).

However, none of Parrish’s other defendants are appropriate for

this claim as pled. Parrish names the Attorney General, alleging that the

Attorney General “failed to oversee the enforcement of [prison]

regulations” and “allowed the jail to create” a system in which officers

“can do what [they] want and [inmates] just have to write it up.” Beyond

these conclusory statements, there are no facts suggesting that the

Attorney General had any personal involvement in enforcing rules at the

York County Prison. The allegation that the Attorney General “failed to

oversee” enforcement of regulations falls short of the “personal direction

or [] actual knowledge and acquiescence” required for Section 1983

liability. , 845 F.2d at 1207. Parrish attempts to sue York County,

but a municipality is liable under Section 1983 only when its “policy or

custom” inflicted the injury. , 478 F.3d 144,

155 (3d Cir. 2007) (citing

, 436 U.S. 658 (1978)). Parrish does not identify any policy or

custom of York County; the complaint offers nothing from which to infer

York County’s responsibility other than the alleged failings of its

employees in Parrish’s case. “[A] municipality cannot be subjected to

liability solely because injuries were inflicted by its agents or employees.”

, , 503 F.3d 247, 249 (3d Cir.

2007).

Parrish’s claims against other officers fare no better. He alleges that

Daryman, an officer involved in the initial altercation, was “responsible

for” drafting an incident report, and that his failure to do so “[led] to” the

alleged denial of due process. However, he does not allege that Daryman

himself decided to subject him to discipline or participated in the

disciplinary process. The complaint does not support an inference that

Daryman knew Parrish would be punished without due process merely

because Daryman did not draft an incident report within ten hours of the

incident.3 Parrish also names the Warden and Associate Warden,

presumably based on their responses to his grievance appeals, but post-

hoc review of a grievance is not sufficient to show personal involvement

in the underlying deprivation, even if Parrish believes his appeals were

wrongly rejected. , 957 F.3d 366, 374 (3d Cir. 2020).

B. Remaining Claims

Parrish fails to state any other plausible claim for relief. He asserts

a “violation of equal protection,” but has not alleged that other prisoners

were treated more favorably, or that those prisoners were “similarly

situated” to him, as would be required to state a Fourteenth Amendment

equal protection claim. , 622 F.3d 315, 337 (3d

Cir. 2010). He also asserts an unspecified claim of “unlawful

confinement.” Disciplinary segregation of pretrial detainees is

permissible if imposed for a legitimate penological purpose4; moreover, if

3 Sgt. Arnold, the other officer involved in the initial altercation, is

not among the defendants listed in the second amended complaint, but

any claim against him would fail for the same reasons.

4 See Hope v. Warden York Cnty. Prison, 972 F.3d 310, 326 (3d Cir.

2020) (citations omitted). The complaint indicates that Parrish’s

segregation was reasonably related to a legitimate purpose, even though

Parrish believes the officers were wrong to impose it. , ,

(continued on next page)

Parrish intended to claim that the specific conditions imposed on him

during his segregation were unconstitutional, his complaint does not

identify any defendant with personal involvement in those conditions.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons described above, Parrish will be granted leave to

proceed on Fourteenth Amendment claims against Kruber and Alexis,

and all other claims will be dismissed. An appropriate order follows.

Dated: February 24, 2025

JOSEPH F. SAPORITO, JR.

United States District Judge

, No. 4:24-CV-00783, 2024 WL 3330595, at *2-3 (M.D. Pa. July

8, 2024).