Opinion

Brown, M. v. Rumer, J.

Court
Superior Court of Pennsylvania
Filed
Feb 25, 2025
Status
Unpublished
On the bench
King
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 34.1%

considering appeal from two judgments, but noting disapproval of procedure; among other things, statutory period allowed for appeal had already expired, precluding institution of proper appeals

How later courts described this case

  • considering appeal from two judgments, but noting disapproval of procedure; among other things, statutory period allowed for appeal had already expired, precluding institution of proper appeals
  • reiterating that where trial court’s conclusions are reasonable as shown by record evidence, and conclusions were not result of error of law, appellate court is bound by those conclusions

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

J-A01029-25

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

MICHAEL BROWN : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

: PENNSYLVANIA

Appellant :

:

:

v. :

:

:

JANINA RUMER : No. 1937 EDA 2024

Appeal from the Order Entered June 20, 2024

In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County Civil Division at

No(s): 2012-07624

BEFORE: DUBOW, J., KING, J., and SULLIVAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY KING, J.: FILED FEBRUARY 25, 2025

Appellant, Michael Brown (“Father”), appeals from the order entered in

the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, which granted the petition

for modification of custody filed by Appellee, Janina Rumer (“Mother”) and the

separate order entered that same day granting Mother’s petition for civil

contempt. We affirm.

The trial court opinion set forth the relevant facts and procedural history

of this appeal as follows:

On March 28, 2012, [Father] filed an emergency complaint

for custody with the Montgomery County Court of Common

Pleas, seeking custody of [G.B. (“Child”) (d.o.b. 8/11)].

This is an extremely high-conflict custody case that has

involved over 400 pleadings; 13 Protection from Abuse

Petitions (“PFA”); continuous police involvement; multiple

referrals to the Montgomery County Office of Children and

Youth (“OCY”); allegations against the other parent;

evidence of disparaging remarks between the parents and

in the presence of the child; and allegations of drug abuse,

J-A01029-25

alcohol abuse, and emotional and physical abuse of the

child. As a result, the court has made referrals to OCY and

appointed a guardian ad litem during the course of the

litigation based upon the allegations made by the parents

against each other.

A brief summary of recent litigation in this matter is as

follows:

On June 29, 2022, [Mother] filed an emergency petition for

modification of custody order seeking sole physical and legal

custody due to the child’s allegations that [Father]

physically abused her.1 The trial court deemed the matter

non-emergent due to the active PFA prohibiting contact with

the child, and the parents proceeded to custody conciliation.

1 At the time, there was an active temporary [PFA]

order against [Father], prohibiting him from

contacting [Mother] or the child. [Mother] made the

same allegations in [the] PFA petition as in the June

29, 2022 emergency petition for modification of

custody.

On December 20, 2022, the conciliator issued her report

recommending that the court order [Father’s] custody be

supervised by a mutually agreed upon third party, that is

also a mandatory reporter, and that [Father] and the child

begin reunification therapy. Following conciliation, the court

scheduled a conference and subsequently a hearing for May

5, 2023. On March 6, 2023, the court issued an interim

custody order granting [Father] supervised visitation with

the child for two hours on Sundays.

After the protracted hearing and child interview on May 5,

2023, the court issued a custody order granting [Father]

visitation with the child for four hours each week, supervised

by his mother, Paternal Grandmother, and scheduling the

matter for another conference on July 13, 2023. Following

the short list conference, the court scheduled the matter for

a protracted hearing on September 21, 2023. After this

hearing, the court amended the July 13, 2023 order, lifting

the supervisory requirement for [Father’s] visitation with

the child, and continuing the matter for the court ruling on

October 11, 2023.

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On October 12, 2023, the trial court issued the custody

order granting the parents shared legal and physical custody

of the child. For the first three weeks of the month, [Father]

was granted weekend custody from Friday after school until

Monday drop-off at school, as well as a weekly Wednesday

dinner visit. For the fourth week of the month, [Father] was

granted custody from Tuesday after school until Friday

morning drop-off at school.

On December 4, 2023, [Mother] filed an emergency petition

for modification of the October 12, 2023 custody order

alleging that [Father] interfered with her ability to enroll the

child in therapy. On the same day, [Mother] filed an

emergency petition for civil contempt for disobedience of

custody order alleging that [Father] withheld the child from

her for several weeks. The court conducted a multi-day

protracted hearing on the outstanding petitions, during

which testimonial and documentary evidence were

presented. The court also conducted several child

interviews in camera of the minor child, pursuant to 23

Pa.C.S. § 5328(a)(7).

On June 20, 2024, the trial court issued the instant custody

order making modifications of the October 12, 2023 physical

custody order, granting Mother sole legal custody with

regards to the child’s therapy. The trial court also issued an

order finding [Father] in contempt of a number of provisions

of the October 23, 2023 order and imposing sanctions.

(Trial Court Opinion, filed 8/20/24, at 1-3) (record citations and unnecessary

capitalization omitted). On July 19, 2024, Father timely filed a single notice

of appeal purporting to appeal from both the custody and contempt orders. 1

____________________________________________

1 “It has been held that a single appeal is incapable of bringing on for review

more than one final order, judgment or decree[.]” General Elec. Credit

Corp. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 437 Pa. 463, 470, 263 A.2d 448, 452

(1970)). Nevertheless, where an appellant has filed a timely, albeit

discouraged, appeal of multiple orders, circumstances may permit this Court

(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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The notice of appeal included a concise statement of errors complained of on

appeal.

Father now presents two issues for this Court’s review:

Did the Court of Common Pleas abuse its discretion and fail

to protect and promote the best interests of [Child] in

granting to [Mother] sole legal custody regarding the child’s

therapy and medical treatment—empowering [Mother] to

make these decisions unilaterally without any input from

[Father]?

Did the Court of Common Pleas abuse its discretion and fail

to apply governing law in finding [Father] in contempt of

provisions of the court’s October 12, 2023 order and

imposing sanctions on [Father]?

(Father’s Brief at 2).

In his first issue, Father complains that the court modified the October

12, 2023 custody order by: 1) giving Mother the ability to choose Child’s

pediatrician and enroll Child in individual therapy; and 2) making Mother the

final decision maker when the parties cannot agree on a course of action for

Child. Father insists that the facts adduced at the custody hearings did not

support these modifications. Father emphasizes the court’s findings that Child

loves both parents, and both parents can fulfill their parental duties. Father

also relies on his own testimony for the proposition that he has worked in

____________________________________________

to refrain from quashing the whole appeal. See id. (considering appeal from

two judgments, but noting disapproval of procedure; among other things,

statutory period allowed for appeal had already expired, precluding institution

of proper appeals). Under the circumstances of the instant case, we decline

to quash Father’s appeal.

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“good faith” with Mother while providing “consistent care for his daughter’s

needs in all regards.” (Id. at 21).

Father acknowledges that Child’s medical and mental health

appointments have been an ongoing point of contention between the parties.

Nevertheless, Father denies interfering with Child’s medical care. Father also

contends “that he had consistently taken his daughter to her [therapy]

appointments—missing only one appointment” due to a family emergency.

(Id. at 22). To the extent that Mother attempted to characterize Father as

“difficult and unwilling at times to comply with all scheduled visits,” Father

argues that the parents’ disagreements amount to “typical frictions in such

situations.” (Id. at 24). Based upon the foregoing, Father concludes that the

trial court’s decision to modify the custody order was manifestly unreasonable.

We disagree.

In reviewing a child custody order:

[O]ur scope is of the broadest type and our standard is

abuse of discretion. This Court must accept findings of the

trial court that are supported by competent evidence of

record, as our role does not include making independent

factual determinations. In addition, with regard to issues of

credibility and weight of the evidence, this Court must defer

to the trial judge who presided over the proceedings and

thus viewed the witnesses first hand. However, we are not

bound by the trial court’s deductions or inferences from its

factual findings. Ultimately, the test is whether the trial

court’s conclusions are unreasonable as shown by the

evidence of record. We may reject the conclusions of the

trial court only if they involve an error of law, or are

unreasonable in light of the sustainable findings of the trial

court.

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S.J.S. v. M.J.S., 76 A.3d 541, 547-48 (Pa.Super. 2013) (quoting A.D. v.

M.A.B., 989 A.2d 32, 35-36 (Pa.Super. 2010)).

[I]t is not this Court’s function to determine whether the

trial court reached the ‘right’ decision; rather, we must

consider whether, ‘based on the evidence presented, given

due deference to the trial court’s weight and credibility

determinations,’ the trial court erred or abused its discretion

in awarding custody to the prevailing party.

E.B. v. D.B., 209 A.3d 451, 468 (Pa.Super. 2019) (quoting King v. King, 889

A.2d 630, 632 (Pa.Super. 2005)).

The paramount concern in any case under the Child Custody Act is the

best interests of the child. See 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5328 (stating: “In ordering

any form of custody, the court shall determine the best interest of the child

by considering all relevant factors…”); 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5338 (stating: “Upon

petition, a court may modify a custody order to serve the best interest of the

child”). Section 5328(a) sets forth the best interest factors that the trial court

must consider in awarding custody:

§ 5328. Factors to consider when awarding custody

(a) Factors.—In ordering any form of custody, the court

shall determine the best interest of the child by considering

all relevant factors, giving weighted consideration to those

factors which affect the safety of the child, including the

following:

(1) Which party is more likely to encourage and

permit frequent and continuing contact between

the child and another party.

(2) The present and past abuse committed by a

party or member of the party’s household, whether

there is a continued risk of harm to the child or an

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abused party and which party can better provide

adequate physical safeguards and supervision of

the child.

(2.1) The information set forth in section

5329.1(a) (relating to consideration of child abuse

and involvement with protective services).

(3) The parental duties performed by each party

on behalf of the child.

(4) The need for stability and continuity in the

child’s education, family life and community life.

(5) The availability of extended family.

(6) The child’s sibling relationships.

(7) The well-reasoned preference of the child,

based on the child’s maturity and judgment.

(8) The attempts of a parent to turn the child

against the other parent, except in cases of

domestic violence where reasonable safety

measures are necessary to protect the child from

harm.

(9) Which party is more likely to maintain a

loving, stable, consistent and nurturing

relationship with the child adequate for the child’s

emotional needs.

(10) Which party is more likely to attend to the

daily physical, emotional, developmental,

educational and special needs of the child.

(11) The proximity of the residences of the

parties.

(12) Each party’s availability to care for the child

or ability to make appropriate child-care

arrangements.

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(13) The level of conflict between the parties and

the willingness and ability of the parties to

cooperate with one another. A party’s effort to

protect a child from abuse by another party is not

evidence of unwillingness or inability to cooperate

with that party.

(14) The history of drug or alcohol abuse of a

party or member of a party’s household.

(15) The mental and physical condition of a party

or member of a party’s household.

(16) Any other relevant factor.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5328(a).2

Further:

The parties cannot dictate the amount of weight the trial

court places on the evidence. Rather, the paramount

concern of the trial court is the best interest of the child.

Appellate interference is unwarranted if the trial court’s

consideration of the best interest of the child was careful

and thorough, and we are unable to find any abuse of

discretion.

R.M.G., Jr. v. F.M.G., 986 A.2d 1234, 1237 (Pa.Super. 2009) (quoting S.M.

v. J.M., 811 A.2d 621, 623 (Pa.Super. 2002)).

Instantly, Mother filed her emergency petition for modification of

custody on December 4, 2023. In it, Mother claimed that Child was not

____________________________________________

2 Our legislature amended the custody factors, effective August 13, 2024.

See

Act of April 15, 2024, P.L. 24, No. 8, § 3. Because the current proceedings

took place prior to the effective date of the amendments, we consider the

version of Section 5328 in effect at the time of the custody hearing.

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attending school or therapy 3 on a regular basis, and Father had withheld Child

from certain custody exchanges. Mother blamed these issues on Father’s

inability to communicate with her. Thus, Mother requested that the court

award her sole legal custody of Child.

Thereafter, the court conducted hearings on the matter. Regarding

therapy, Mother testified that Father delayed Child’s enrollment in court-

ordered therapy by failing to sign the relevant paperwork until November

2023. (See N.T. Hearing, 3/1/24, at 57). Mother stated that Father signed

the paperwork only after she contacted Father’s attorney and threatened to

file a contempt petition. (Id.) Mother also provided an explanation for

Father’s reluctance:

He was very adamant on still sending [Child] to [her prior

mental health provider] which it was already decided that

she was no longer going to … and she was to go to Child and

Family Focus through the court. He was still adamant about

sending her there. I explained that she’s going to Child and

Family Focus.

He created a lot of problems there and said that they—he

was going and demanding paperwork saying they don’t

provide court-ordered counseling. They obviously do. It’s

where she goes now and he was just making it extremely

difficult and was really like not willing to let her go to Child

and Family Focus.

____________________________________________

3 The relevant custody order provided: “Child shall undergo mental health

treatment at … Child and Family Focus immediately upon a therapist

becom[ing] available for her to begin meeting with.” (Order, dated 10/12/23,

at 2).

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(N.T. Hearing, 6/12/24, at 19-20). After Child’s enrollment, Father neglected

to take her to appointments:

Initially, Father wasn’t taking her to any … appointments.

Like he made scheduling impossible initially and then finally

when we got a schedule he wasn’t taking her on—like I had

three days out of a month and he had one and he wasn’t

taking her to that, and then she was about to get discharged

which was my concern.

(Id. at 20).

Mother also expressed concerns about Father’s lack of communication

surrounding Child’s medical appointments. Mother recounted an incident in

October 2023, where Father picked up Child at school and took her to a

dermatology appointment without informing Mother. (See N.T. Hearing,

3/1/24, at 39). After this appointment, Child had an allergic reaction to the

new dermatology medication. Without telling Mother, Father then took Child

to her pediatrician to treat the reaction. (See id. at 39, 41). For his part,

Father conceded that he did not inform Mother about all of Child’s doctors’

visits during his custodial periods. (See N.T. Hearing, 6/12/24, at 154).

At the conclusion of her testimony, Mother succinctly summarized her

concerns with Father’s co-parenting:

He has violated the [custody] order in pretty much every

fashion possible. He does not follow any orders. He never

has and he’s not going to.

* * *

I think the decision making when you have somebody that’s

deliberately making everything difficult intentionally is

impossible and it really makes it hard to just do the

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appropriate necessary things for our daughter like doctors’

appointments, like therapy, vocal lessons, school.

(Id. at 46-47).

On June 14, 2024, the court conducted another hearing to provide an

on-the-record analysis of the custody factors. The court noted that the parties

would regularly contact each other related to Child’s care and well-being, but

the communications would needlessly escalate into a conflict. The court

emphasized one series of communications, which occurred on December 19,

2023. At that time, Mother used Our Family Wizard to inform Father that Child

was sick with a fever, was seen by the pediatrician, and she could not return

to school. (See Mother’s Exhibit 6, submitted 6/12/24). Father’s response

immediately escalated the situation:

(Id.) (Child’s name redacted). Within minutes, Father added:

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(Id.) (Child’s name redacted).

After reading these messages into the record, the court admonished

Father:

This is your writing. And this is how you respond. This is

an example of what I am talking about. And I am just going

to be clear for the record, a lot of what I am talking about

is the high conflict in this case, which is the overarching

issue in this case.

* * *

Do you do all of this when you take [Child] to the doctor?

Do you check their machines for calibration? Do you ask

the doctors for their medical credentials? Do you do all of

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this every time you meet with a doctor? I don’t think you

do, sir.

(N.T. Hearing, 6/14/24, at 12-13). The court correctly observed that Father

was “obstructing rather than collaborating.” (Id. at 13). Consequently, the

court modified the existing custody order to give Mother decision-making

authority over Child’s medical care and mental health providers.

On this record, we cannot say that court’s decision to modify the custody

order was unreasonable. See S.J.S., supra. We also decline Father’s

invitation to reweigh the evidence in his favor. See C.R.F. v. S.E.F., 45 A.3d

441, 443 (Pa.Super. 2012) (reiterating that where trial court’s conclusions are

reasonable as shown by record evidence, and conclusions were not result of

error of law, appellate court is bound by those conclusions). Additionally, this

is a case where the parties provided ample testimony over the course of

multiple, contentious hearings. We recognize that the court made first-hand

observations of the parties spanning these hearings, and we grant due

deference to the conclusions based upon those observations. See E.B.,

supra. Thus, Father is not entitled to relief on his first claim.

In his second issue, Father asserts that the court found him in contempt

of the October 12, 2023 custody order.

The court said that [Father’s] actions regarding custody

were done with wrongful intent as well, including his

disparaging [Mother] and attempting to manipulate the

situation to his preference. [Father’s] confrontational

behavior regarding [Child’s] therapy choices was criticized,

as well, with the court underscoring the need for such

behavior to cease.

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(Father’s Brief at 25). Father insists, however, that mere noncompliance with

the custody order was insufficient to establish contempt. Father proceeds to

analyze each of his behaviors that formed the bases for the contempt findings,

offering excuses for his conduct and an assurance that he was acting in good

faith. Father concludes that the court abused its discretion by finding him in

contempt. We disagree.

“In reviewing a trial court’s finding on a contempt petition, we are

limited to determining whether the trial court committed a clear abuse of

discretion. This Court must place great reliance on the sound discretion of the

trial [court] when reviewing an order of contempt.” Rogowski v. Kirven,

291 A.3d 50, 57 (Pa.Super. 2023) (internal citation and quotation marks

omitted).

“To be in contempt, a party must have violated a court order, and the

complaining party must satisfy that burden by a preponderance of the

evidence.” Id. (quoting J.M. v. K.W., 164 A.3d 1260, 1264 (Pa.Super.

2017)).

Specifically, the complainant must prove certain distinct

elements: (1) that the contemnor had notice of the specific

order or decree which he[, or she,] is alleged to have

disobeyed; (2) that the act constituting the contemnor’s

violation was volitional; and (3) that the contemnor acted

with wrongful intent.

Id. (quoting J.M., supra at 1264).

[W]hen making a determination regarding whether a

defendant acted with wrongful intent, the court should use

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common sense and consider context, and wrongful intent

can be imputed to a defendant by virtue of the substantial

certainty that his actions will violate the court order.

Gross v. Mintz, 284 A.3d 479, 492-93 (Pa.Super. 2022), appeal denied, ___

Pa. ___, 293 A.3d 563 (2023) (quoting Commonwealth v. Reese, 156 A.3d

1250, 1258 (Pa.Super. 2017)).

“[A] mere showing of noncompliance with a court order, or even

misconduct, is never sufficient alone to prove civil contempt.” Habjan v.

Habjan, 73 A.3d 630, 637 (Pa.Super. 2013) (quoting Lachat v. Hinchcliffe,

769 A.2d 481, 488 (Pa.Super. 2001)). “To impose civil contempt the trial

court must be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt from the totality of

evidence presented that the contemnor has the present ability to comply with

the Order.” In re Estate of DiSabato, 165 A.3d 987, 992-93 (Pa.Super.

2017) (quoting Sinaiko v. Sinaiko, 664 A.2d 1005, 1009 (Pa.Super. 1995)).

Instantly, the court found Father in contempt of the October 12, 2023

custody order on four grounds: 1) failure to provide Mother with information

regarding Child’s healthcare appointments/interference with Child’s

enrollment in individual therapy with Child and Family Focus; 2) unilaterally

withholding Child from Mother on her custodial days from November 15, 2023

until December 7, 2023; 3) failing to demonstrate consistent use of Our Family

Wizard to communicate with Mother; and 4) failing to return Child to Mother

by 8:00 p.m. on Memorial Day, May 7, 2024. (See Contempt Order, dated

6/20/24, at 1-2). Our review of the record revealed ample evidence to support

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the court’s findings on each ground.

Regarding Father’s failure to provide Mother with information regarding

Child’s healthcare appointments, we have already addressed the October 2023

incident where Father took Child to a dermatology appointment, and follow-

up care with the pediatrician, without informing Mother. (See N.T. Hearing,

3/1/24, at 39). Likewise, we discussed Father’s interference with Child’s

enrollment in therapy at Child and Family Focus. (Id. at 57).

As to Father withholding Child from Mother on her custodial days in

November and December 2023, the parties testified about this ordeal at

length. Mother initially explained that she “put [Child] on the bus and sent

her to school” on November 15, 2023, but Child was not returned to her

custody until December. (Id. at 21). (See also N.T. Hearing, 6/12/24, at

39). Significantly, Father did not dispute that he withheld Child during

Mother’s custodial time. Rather, Father attempted to blame Child for making

the unilateral decision to stay at his home during this period:

When [Child] was supposed to go back to her mom’s house

after my time was up, she said there’s a lot of stuff going

on. Mom is drinking a lot, I’m not going. I said, what do

you mean you’re not going? I said, you have to go.

(N.T. Hearing, 6/12/24, at 148-49). Father claimed to have had “lengthy

conversations” with Child to convince her to return to Mother. (Id. at 149).

Father also claimed to have involved the police and OCY in an attempt to

change Child’s mind. On cross-examination, however, Father conceded that

he did not attempt to file for emergency custody at that time, even though he

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had made such requests in the past. (See id. at 189-90).

Regarding the parties’ usage of Our Family Wizard, Father’s attorney

admitted: “Sometimes they do. Sometimes they don’t.” (N.T. Hearing,

3/1/24, at 48). Mother added:

He was using it. Then he stopped using it and claimed it

didn’t work until it would benefit him for it to work, and then

all of the sudden it started working. Then he started

messaging again and being as it’s our only form of

communication it’s kind of necessary, and now he is back to

pretending it doesn’t work.

(N.T. Hearing, 6/12/24, at 32). Again, Father did not deny his failure to use

Our Family Wizard. Instead, Father complained that technological difficulties

hindered his consistent usage:

I don’t know what’s going on with a lot of my apps. My Cash

App is messed up. My Our Family Wizard is messed up. My

Facebook sometimes is crashing. I’m having problems with

a lot of my stuff, but I got the new phones. I changed some

cookies, whatever that, and then I took my RMS messages

off, but at home, no, I still can’t get my apps to work all the

way. I don’t need Our Family Wizard when I’m out. I need

Our Family Wizard when I’m at home. That’s when I mostly

need it. If I’m at like a Wawa and I get Wi-Fi, I have no

problems.

(Id. at 195).

Finally, Mother’s testimony established that Father did not return Child

to Mother by 8:00 p.m. on Memorial Day 2024. Mother explained that the

October 12, 2023 custody order specifically dictated the parties’ custody time

on holidays, and Father needed to return Child to Mother by 8:00 p.m. on

Memorial Day in 2024. (See id. at 36). Father did not return Child until the

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following day. When Mother asked Father why he did not return Child sooner,

“He said it was his time.” (Id. at 37).

Here, the custody order required Father to take certain actions, which

Father failed to do. Contrary to his assertions, this record leaves no doubt

that wrongful intent could be imputed to Father. See Gross, supra. Thus,

Father is not entitled to relief on his second issue. Accordingly, we affirm the

orders modifying custody and finding Father in civil contempt.

Orders affirmed.

Date: 2/25/2025

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This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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