Doe v. Directions For Mental Health, Inc.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

TAMPA DIVISION

JANE DOE,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No: 8:24-cv-02530-WFJ-LSG

DIRECTIONS FOR MENTAL HEALTH,

INC. d/b/a Directions for Living

Defendant.

__________________________________/

ORDER

Before the Court is Defendant Direction for Mental Health, Inc. d/b/a

Directions for Living’s (“DFL”) Motion to Dismiss the Complaint. Dkt. 10. Plaintiff

Jane Doe has filed a Response in Opposition. Dkt. 13. Upon careful consideration,

the Court grants the motion to dismiss the Complaint without prejudice.

BACKGROUND

This case revolves around an alleged unlawful termination due to Plaintiff’s

alcoholism disability. Plaintiff worked at DFL as a “Peer Specialist.” Dkt. 1 ¶ 7. The

Florida legislature has specifically defined the qualifications to be a peer specialist:

Qualifications– A person may seek certification as a peer specialist if

he or she has been in recovery from a substance use disorder or mental

illness for the past 2 years or if he or she is a family member or caregiver

of a person with a substance use disorder or mental illness.

Fla. Stat. § 397.417(2). “Peer specialists provide effective support services because

they share common life experiences with the persons they assist.” Id. §

397.417(1)(a)(3.).

Plaintiff alleges that “[a]t the time of hiring and throughout her employment,

Plaintiff met the necessary lived experience disclosure requirements for her position

with DFL.” Id. ¶ 10. However, on or about June 5, 2023, Defendant asked Plaintiff

to either disclose her alcoholism disability or be terminated. Id. ¶ 11. Specifically,

Plaintiff’s immediate supervisor, Matthew Peterson, allegedly requested that

Plaintiff sign documentation disclosing her status as a recovering alcoholic who was

attending Alcoholics Anonymous meetings. Id. ¶ 12. At first, Plaintiff declined to

sign any form and informed DFL she was not comfortable disclosing her disability.

Id.

On or about June 23, 2023, Plaintiff alleges she received an email from

Program Director Jennifer Whealey stating she must sign the documentation or be

terminated. Id. ¶ 15. Plaintiff signed the documentation disclosing her status and

participation in Alcoholics Anonymous on June 29, 2023. Id. ¶ 16. Plaintiff

contends she was “forced to do so . . . against her will.” Id. On the same day Plaintiff

signed the disclosure document, she was “verbally placed on a 30-day Performance

Improvement Plan, pending termination.” Id.

According to Plaintiff, her efforts to maintain non-disclosure led to DFL

terminating her employment on July 26, 2023. Id. ¶ 17. Plaintiff claims the real

reason for termination is her alcoholism disability and the decision to engage in

“protected activity by resisting the instruction to complete the paperwork disclosing

her status.” Id. ¶ 18. Based on this belief, Plaintiff timely filed a complaint with the

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), Charge No. 15H-2024-

00002. Id. ¶ 4. The EEOC issued a “Determination and Notice of Suit Rights to

Plaintiff,” and Plaintiff filed the instant action thereafter in a timely manner. Id. 5-6.

In Plaintiff’s Complaint, she raises six causes of action that stem from her

status as “a qualified individual with an alcoholism disability.” Id. ¶ 9. The six counts

are as follows: (1) Disability Discrimination – Disparate Treatment in Violation of

the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq.; (2)

Disability Discrimination – Disparate Treatment in Violation of the Florida Civil

Rights Act (“FCRA”), Fla. Stat. § 760.10; (3) Hostile Work Environment in

Violation of the ADA; (4) Hostile Work Environment in Violation of FCRA; (5)

Retaliation in Violation of the ADA; and (6) Retaliation in Violation of the FCRA.

Id. ¶¶ 20-76.

On January 8, 2025, Defendant DFL filed the instant motion to dismiss,

seeking dismissal on all counts since Plaintiff has “failed to plead all elements

required to state a cause of action for any of her six (6) causes of action alleged [and]

she failed to even allege that she has a qualifying disability.” Dkt. 10 at 14.

LEGAL STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires a short and plain statement

of the claim showing that the plaintiff is entitled to relief in order to give the

defendant fair notice of the claims and grounds. See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,

550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citation omitted). The plaintiff is required to allege “more

than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of

action will not do.” Id. (citation omitted).

In considering a motion to dismiss, the court must construe the facts in the

light most favorable to the Plaintiff. Wiersum v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 785 F.3d 483, 485

(11th Cir. 2015). A complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as

true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face” to survive a motion to

dismiss. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks

omitted). “A claim is facially plausible when the court can draw the reasonable

inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 662. The

standard on a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) motion is not whether the

plaintiff will ultimately prevail in his claims, but whether the allegations are

sufficient to allow the case to proceed to discovery in an attempt to prove those

claims. See Jackam v. Hospital Corp. of Am. Mideast, Ltd., 800 F.2d 1577, 1579

(11th Cir. 1986).

DISCUSSION

For the reasons discussed below, the Court finds Plaintiff has failed to

properly plead all six counts. The Court grants Defendant’s motion to dismiss the

Complaint without prejudice.

I. Counts I and II- ADA and FCRA Disability Discrimination Claims

The ADA prohibits Defendant DFL “from discriminating based upon the

known physical or mental impairments of a qualified individual with a disability.”

Stewart v. Happy Herman’s Cheshire Bridge, Inc., 117 F.3d 1278, 1285 (11th Cir.

1997). This prohibition includes discharging an employee based on her disability.

42 U.S.C. § 12112(a); Connelly v. WellStar Health Sys., Inc., 758 F. App’x 825, 828

(11th Cir. 2019). Similarly, the FCRA prohibits an employer from discriminating

against an employee because of her disability. See Fla. Stat. § 760.10; Holly v.

Clairson Industries, L.L.C., 492 F.3d 1247, 1255 (11th Cir. 2007).

To establish a prima facie case of disability discrimination, a plaintiff must

show that: “(1) she is disabled, (2) she was a ‘qualified individual’ when she was

terminated, and (3) she was discriminated against on account of her disability.”

Frazier-White v. Gee, 818 F.3d 1249, 1255 (11th Cir. 2016) (citing Wood v. Green,

323 F.3d 1309, 1312 (11th Cir. 2003)). A plaintiff’s “disability discrimination claim

under the FCRA includes the same essential elements.” Id.; see also Greenberg v.

BellSouth Telecomm., Inc., 498 F.3d 1258, 1263–64 (11th Cir. 2007) (“Claims raised

under the Florida law are analyzed under the same framework as the ADA.”).

As to the first prima facie element, Plaintiff must show that she has a disability

under three possible avenues: “(A) a physical or mental impairment that

substantially limits one or more major life activities . . .; (B) a record of such an

impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an impairment[.]” 42 U.S.C. §

12102(1)(A)–(C). In other words, a plaintiff has a “disability” under the ADA if the

person has an impairment that substantially limits a major life activity, has a record

of such an impairment, or is regarded as having such an impairment by an employer.

See Mazzeo v. Color Resolutions Int’l, LLC, 746 F.3d 1264, 1268 (11th Cir. 2014).

Under a “major life activities” claim, the ADA defines “major life activities”

as “caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, seeing, hearing, eating, sleeping,

walking, standing, lifting, bending, speaking, breathing, learning, reading,

concentrating, thinking, communicating, and working[,]” as well as “the operation

of a major bodily function, including but not limited to, functions of the immune

system, normal cell growth, digestive, bowel, bladder, neurological, brain,

respiratory, circulatory, endocrine, and reproductive functions.” 42 U.S.C. §

12102(2)(A)-(B).

Here, Defendant argues that Plaintiff has “failed to support her conclusion that

she has a disability and provided no allegations of how alcoholism substantially

limits a major life activity.” Dkt. 10 at 7. Plaintiff’s response almost concedes this

point by citing cases questioning “whether alcoholism should automatically be

designated as a covered disability” and requests that Plaintiff “be permitted to amend

her Complaint to reflect her impairment substantially limits at least one major life

activity.” Dkt. 13 at 4. The Court agrees Plaintiff has failed to sufficiently allege

whether her alcoholism qualifies as a disability under the ADA. Without any factual

allegations about what major life activities have been substantially limited, the

Complaint summarily states, “Plaintiff is a qualified individual with an alcoholism

disability.” Dkt. 1 ¶ 3. This is an unsupported legal conclusion that the Court need

not accept as true. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Plaintiff must amend her Complaint

and properly allege what major life activities have been substantially limited due to

her disability. See Roberts v. Rayonier, Inc., 135 F. App’x 351, 355 (11th Cir. 2005)

(“Although this circuit has not analyzed an alcohol-related ADA claim in depth, it

is clear in the instant case that Roberts has to prove that his condition is one that

substantially limits one or more major life activities.”).

Moreover, as currently pled, it is unclear whether Plaintiff is proceeding on a

“regarded as” claim. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(C). An individual can satisfy the

“regarded as” definition under the ADA under the following conditions:

(3) Regarded as having such an impairment

For purposes of paragraph (1)(C):

(A) An individual meets the requirement of “being regarded as

having such an impairment” if the individual establishes that he

or she has been subjected to an action prohibited under this

chapter because of an actual or perceived physical or mental

impairment whether or not the impairment limits or is perceived

to limit a major life activity.

(B) Paragraph (1)(C) shall not apply to impairments that are

transitory and minor. A transitory impairment is an impairment

with an actual or expected duration of 6 months or less.

42 U.S.C. § 12102(3). Under this “regarded as” definition of disability, “[t]he

relevant inquiry . . . is not the plaintiff’s actual condition, but how the Defendant

‘perceived [his] condition, including the reactions and perceptions of the persons

interacting with or working with him.’” Smart v. DeKalb Cty., Ga., No. 1:16-cv-

826-WSD, 2018 WL 1089677, at *9 (N.D. Ga. Feb. 26, 2018) (quoting E.E.O.C. v.

Am. Tool & Mold, Inc., 21 F. Supp. 3d 1268, 1275 (M.D. Fla. 2014)); see also Kim

v. Friends Tek, LLC, No. 1:20-CV-4276-AT-JSA, 2020 WL 11885523, at *8 (N.D.

Ga. Dec. 21, 2020) (“[B]ecause Plaintiff alleges in the Amended Complaint that

Defendant regarded him as having a disability, he is not required to allege additional

facts to show that his alleged perceived disability limits him in a major life activity,

or that Defendant believed that his physical impairment limited him in a major life

activity.”), report and recommendation adopted, No. 1:20-CV-4276-AT-JSA, 2021

WL 4839090 (N.D. Ga. Jan. 8, 2021).

Here, parts of the Complaint seem to suggest that Plaintiff is proceeding on a

“regarded as” claim since it alleges Plaintiff was “told by DFL she was also required

to disclose her alcoholism disability or be separated from employment.” Dkt. 1 ¶¶ 3,

11, 18. In other words, Plaintiff alleges Defendant DFL knew of her alcoholism

“disability” and required her to disclose the status or face termination. Plaintiff’s

response, however, defends the Complaint as making a “major life activities” claim

under 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A), not § 12102(1)(C). See Dkt. 13 at 4. Plaintiff should

clarify which of the three types of disability is being alleged under 42 U.S.C. §

12102(1)(A)–(C). Counts I and II are dismissed without prejudice.

II. Counts III and IV- Hostile Work Claims

As an initial matter, the Eleventh Circuit has never held in a published opinion

that a hostile work environment claim exists under the ADA. See Menzie v. Ann

Taylor Retail, Inc., 549 F. App’x 891, 896 n.9 (11th Cir. 2013) (“We have never

held in a published opinion that a hostile work environment claim is available under

the ADA. We do not decide that issue today because [plaintiff] never asserted such

a claim.”); Gilliard v. Ga. Dep’t of Corr., 500 F. App’x 860, 868 (11th Cir. 2012)

(“We have not addressed the availability of a claim for hostile work environment

under either the ADA or the Rehab Act.”); see also Stewart v. Jones Util. &

Contracting Co. Inc., 806 F. App’x 738, 741 n.2 (11th Cir. 2020) (assuming an ADA

hostile work environment claim existed for that case, but noting that “we need not

decide whether that cause of action does in fact exist”).

The Eleventh Circuit has, however, expressly recognized the existence of a

retaliatory hostile work environment claim under Title VII. Gowski v. Peake, 682,

F.3d 1299, 1311-12 (11th Cir. 2012). Indeed, “several other circuits have concluded

that the ADA provides a cognizable claim for a disability-based hostile work

environment.” Cooper v. CLP Corp., 679 F. App’x 851, 853 n.2 (11th Cir. 2017).

Moreover, several district courts within the circuit have assumed this claim exists.

See Phillips v. Harbor Venice Mgmt., LLC, No. 8:19-CV-2379-T-33TGW, 2020 WL

2735201, at *3-5 (M.D. Fla. May 26, 2020); Ellison v. Northside Hosp., No. 1:18-

CV-03382-LMM, 2022 WL 18932818, at *3 (N.D. Ga. May 16, 2022); Shaling v.

UPS Ground Freight, 202 F. Supp. 3d 1283, 1290–91 (N.D. Ala. 2016);

Schwertfager v. City of Boynton Beach, 42 F. Supp. 2d 1347, 1365–67 (S.D. Fla.

1999). Therefore, for the purposes of ruling on this Motion, the Court will assume

that a disability-based hostile work environment claim is actionable under the ADA.

See Phillips, 2020 WL 2735201, at *3. Furthermore, given their similar frameworks,

this Court will evaluate Plaintiff’s claim under the jurisprudence of Title VII. The

FCRA also protects employees from a hostile work environment in the same manner

as Title VII. See Johnson v. Miami-Dade Cnty., 948 F.3d 1318, 1325 (11th Cir. 2020)

(citation omitted).

To adequately allege a hostile work environment claim, a plaintiff must allege

that: “(1) [s]he belongs to a protected group; (2) [s]he suffered unwelcome

harassment; (3) the harassment was based on a protected characteristic of the

employee . . .; (4) the harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the

terms and conditions of employment and create a discriminatorily abusive working

environment; and (5) the employer is responsible for that environment under a theory

of either direct liability or vicarious liability.” Fernandez v. Trees, Inc., 961 F.3d

1148, 1153 (11th Cir. 2020) (citing Miller v. Kenworth of Dothan, Inc., 277 F.3d

1269, 1275 (11th Cir. 2002)).

Here, to the extent such a claim exists, Plaintiff has failed to sufficiently plead

a hostile work environment claim. The Complaint vaguely states that “Defendant

regularly discriminated against and harassed Plaintiff by, among other things:

threatening her employment via email and in-person because Plaintiff wished not to

disclose her status, and ultimately terminating her employment based upon

pretextual accusations.” Dkt. 1 ¶ 42. However, “a single incident of harassing

conduct cannot support a hostile work environment claim.” Uppal v. Hosp. Corp. of

Am., 482 F. App’x 394, 397 (11th Cir. 2012). The “very nature” of hostile work

environment claims “involves repeated conduct.” Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v.

Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 115 (2002). In other words, a hostile work environment claim

is “based on the cumulative effect of individual acts.” Id.

The Court finds that Plaintiff being asked to sign a disclosure document via

email and in person (Dkt. 1 ¶¶ 12, 15) fails to sufficiently allege a “severe or

pervasive” hostile work environment. In the amended complaint, Plaintiff must

sufficiently allege all elements of a hostile work environment claim, including facts

demonstrating how the workplace was “permeated with discriminatory intimidation,

ridicule, and insult that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of

the victim’s employment and create an abusive environment.” Tonkyro v. Sec’y,

Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 995 F.3d 828, 836-37 (11th Cir. 2021) (citation omitted).

Moreover, the “intimidation, ridicule, and insult” must have connotations related to

the employee’s protected status (here, Plaintiff’s alcohol disability) to be actionable.

See id. at 837. Counts III and IV are dismissed without prejudice.

III. Counts V and VI- Retaliation Claims

Finally, Defendant challenges Plaintiff’s claim of retaliation under the ADA

(Count V) and FCRA (Count VI). Dkt. 10 at 13. The FCRA provides that an

employer cannot “discriminate against any person because that person has opposed”

an unlawful employment practice or made a charge under the FCRA. Fla. Stat. §

760.10(7). As with disability discrimination claims, retaliation claims brought under

the FCRA are analyzed under the ADA framework. Monroe v. Florida Dep’t of

Corr., 793 F. App’x 924, 928 (11th Cir. 2019) (citing Frazier-White, 818 F.3d at

1258). The ADA, in turn, provides that “[n]o person shall discriminate against any

individual because such individual has opposed any act or practice made unlawful

by [the ADA] or because such individual made a charge . . . under [the ADA].” 42

U.S.C. § 12203(a).

To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, a plaintiff must allege that: (1)

she engaged in a statutorily protected expression; (2) she suffered an adverse

employment action; and (3) there was a causal link between the adverse action and

his protected expression. Schaaf v. Smithkline Beecham Corp., 602 F.3d 1236, 1243

(11th Cir. 2010). The ADA’s anti-retaliation provision mirrors the language of Title

VII, so the Eleventh Circuit has upheld the use of Title VII’s retaliation framework

on claims arising under the ADA. Stewart, 117 F.3d at 1287. “The first element may

be met by a request for a reasonable accommodation.” Frazier-White, 818 F.3d at

1258 (citation omitted). “The third element requires a showing of but-for causation.”

Id. (citing Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 361–62 (2013)).

For an expression to be statutorily protected, “a plaintiff must not only show

that he subjectively (that is, in good faith) believed that his employer was engaged

in unlawful employment practices, but also that his belief was objectively reasonable

in light of the facts and record presented.” Covel v. Cmty. Physicians of N. Port,

P.A., No. 23-10853, 2024 WL 1923256, at *3 (11th Cir. May 1, 2024) (citing Little

v. United Techs., Carrier Transicold Div., 103 F.3d 956, 960 (11th Cir. 1997)).

Additionally, “where binding precedent squarely holds that particular conduct is not

an unlawful employment practice by the employer . . . an employee’s contrary belief

that the practice is unlawful is unreasonable.” Id. (citing Butler v. Ala. Dep’t of

Transp., 536 F.3d 1209, 1214 (11th Cir. 2009)).

Here, Plaintiff claims she engaged in statutory protected expression “on

multiple occasions,” with the most important instance being her resistance to

“disclosing her disability, which is her legal right to maintain as confidential.” Dkt.

1 ¶¶ 58, 70. However, at this stage in the proceeding, it is unclear whether refusing

to disclose a disability on a document is an objectively reasonable expression that is

statutorily protected. Defendant’s motion to dismiss argues that Plaintiff’s refusal to

disclose her status is not statutorily protected, but the motion fails to cite a case to

support this proposition. Dkt. 10 at 13. Plaintiff’s response is even less helpful.

Without citing any legal authority, Plaintiff summarily states that “[Plaintiff’s] initial

resistance is the protected action and what ultimately got her fired.” Dkt. 13 at 6.

While some caselaw suggests a refusal to answer employer questions about

medical conditions is statutorily protected conduct, it is unclear whether refusing to

disclose one’s disability on a form is a protected activity. See e.g., Batson v.

Salvation Army, 897 F.3d 1320, 1325 (11th Cir. 2018) (finding the plaintiff engaged

in protected activity when “she told her interviewers that she knew federal law and

believed they were not permitted to ask about her medical condition”); Ward v. U.S.

Xpress, Inc., No. 5;18CV00644-UJH-AKK, 2018 WL 4951973, at *2 (N.D. Ala.

Oct. 12, 2018) (finding the plaintiff properly pled “protected activity after [the

defendant] questioned her ability to perform the position given her prior cancer

diagnosis,” and the plaintiff told the defendant it was discriminatory to deny her

employment because of her medical history); Firster v. Athens Heart Ctr., P.C., 305

F. Supp. 3d 1368, 1376 (M.D. Ga. 2017) (finding the plaintiff engaged in statutorily

protected conduct when she complained about a fellow employee accessing her

medical records). As such, Plaintiff should flesh out the other “multiple occasions”

where Plaintiff engaged in statutorily protected expression and clarify how refusing

to disclose her disability on a form qualifies as a statutorily protected activity.

The Court notes, however, that the ADA does restrict an employer’s ability to

make medical examinations or inquiries that relate to an employee’s disability status.

See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d). Pursuant to § 12112(d)(4)(A) of the ADA:

[a] covered entity shall not require a medical examination and shall not

make inquiries of an employee as to whether such employee is an

individual with a disability or as to the nature or severity of the

disability, unless such examination or inquiry is shown to be job-related

and consistent with business necessity.

42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(4)(A). Plaintiff should clarify whether she is attempting to

bring a cause of action under § 12112(d)(4)(A) because Defendant made an allegedly

improper inquiry into (i.e., requested her to disclose) her disability that she wished

to keep confidential.

Plaintiff should also explain how one can become a “peer specialist” without

a history or discussion of one’s recovery. The statute seems to contemplate just that.

See Fla. Stat. § 397.417(2). Plaintiff must address this.

If Plaintiff is actually making a claim under § 12112(d)(4)(A), she must also

allege “damages—emotional, pecuniary, or otherwise.” Russell v. City of Mobile

Police Dept., 552 F. App’x 905, 907 (11th Cir. 2014) (citing Harrison v. Benchmark

Elecs. Huntsville, Inc., 593 F.3d 1206, 1216–17 (11th Cir. 2010)). As pled, Counts

and V and VI are dismissed without prejudice.

CONCLUSION

Plaintiff has not adequately pled her case. Notwithstanding, because the

Complaint is the first operative complaint dismissed by the Court, Plaintiff will have

another opportunity to do so. Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED and

ADJUDGED that:

1. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, Dkt. 10, is GRANTED. Plaintiff’s

Complaint, Dkt. 1, is DISMISSED without prejudice.

2. If Plaintiff chooses to file an Amended Complaint, she shall do so within

fourteen (14) days of this Order.

DONE AND ORDERED in Tampa, Florida, on February 24, 2025.

/s/ William F. Jung

WILLIAM F. JUNG

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

COPIES FURNISHED TO:

Counsel of Record