Brown v. Amazon LLC

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

CHRISTOPHER BROWN,

Plaintiff, DECISION AND ORDER

v. 6:24-CV-06158 EAW

AMAZON.COM SERVICES LLC,

Defendant.

INTRODUCTION

Pro se plaintiff Christopher Brown (“Plaintiff”) filed this action against defendant

Amazon LLC, alleging both federal and state law violations.1 (Dkt. 19 at ¶¶ 62-129). On

May 16, 2024, Plaintiff filed an amended complaint that instead named Amazon.com

Services, LLC (“Defendant”) as defendant. (Dkt. 19).

Presently before the Court is Defendant’s motion to dismiss the amended complaint

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) (Dkt. 28) and Plaintiff’s motion for

miscellaneous relief (Dkt. 36). For the following reasons, Defendant’s motion to dismiss

1 Plaintiff has filed many lawsuits in this Court. See Brown v. Amazon.com Services

LLC, 6:24-CV-06730 EAW (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 17, 2024); Brown v. Dep’t of Lab., 6:23-CV-

06680 EAW (W.D.N.Y. Nov. 30, 2023); Brown v. Jeremiah’s Comput. Store, 6:23-CV-

06673 EAW (W.D.N.Y. Nov. 29, 2023); Brown v. AT&T, et al., 6:23-CV-06592 EAW

(W.D.N.Y. Oct. 12, 2023); Brown v. T-Mobile, 6:23-CV-06588 EAW (W.D.N.Y. Oct. 11,

2023); Brown v. Allied Universal, et al., 6:23-CV-06587 EAW (W.D.N.Y. Oct. 11, 2023);

Brown v. Dolco Commodore, et al., 6:23-CV-06582 EAW (W.D.N.Y. Oct. 6, 2023); Brown

v. Allied Universal, 6:23-CV-06581 EAW (W.D.N.Y. Oct. 6, 2023); Brown v. Securitas,

6:23-CV-06572 EAW (W.D.N.Y. Oct. 3, 2023); Brown v. AT&T, 6:23-CV-06571 EAW

(W.D.N.Y. Oct. 3, 2023); Brown v. Digit. Forensics Corp., 6:23-CV-06566 EAW

(W.D.N.Y. Oct. 2, 2023); Brown v. Verizon, 6:23-CV-06242 EAW (W.D.N.Y. May 3, 2023).

the amended complaint (Dkt. 28) is granted and Plaintiff’s motion for miscellaneous relief

(Dkt. 36) is denied. Because of his pro se status, Plaintiff is granted leave to file a second

amended complaint consistent with this Decision and Order within 30 days of its date.2

BACKGROUND

I. Factual Background

The facts set forth herein are taken from Plaintiff’s amended complaint. (Dkt. 19).

Plaintiff was hired by Defendant at a compensation rate of “$17 per hour with a

supplemental rate of approximately $2.60.” (Id. at ¶¶ 7-8). Plaintiff began work on May

28, 2024, and several representations were made to him regarding the compensation scale

and benefits. (Id. at ¶ 11). Plaintiff claims he sought a job at Defendant’s “place of

business for one purpose and one purpose only[:] to figure out why his younger sister was

not being properly compensated for the amount of hours in which she was working.” (Id.

at ¶ 13).

Plaintiff alleges he signed up for overtime through an online portal and was “never

compensated properly in accordance with the online representation by” Defendant. (Id. at

¶ 15). Plaintiff states acceptance of the overtime payment would result in a “lightning bolt”

appearing next to his pay. (Id. at ¶ 17). While Plaintiff should have received between $170

2 Plaintiff has attached numerous exhibits to the amended complaint but many of

those exhibits have no apparent relation to the allegations contained in the amended

complaint and there is no reference to the exhibits within the body of the amended

complaint. Plaintiff is cautioned that any amended pleading should comply with, among

other things, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2)’s requirement of “a short and plain

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief” and he should explain

the purported relevance of any exhibits in the body of the amended pleading.

and $240, Plaintiff was not compensated at that rate. (Id.). Plaintiff discussed the

compensation rate with other employees and discovered that they were not compensated

by Defendant at the agreed-upon rate, resulting in the majority of them quitting or being

terminated by Defendant. (Id. at ¶ 18). Plaintiff also alleges he did not receive any benefits.

(Id. at ¶ 20).

On February 7, 2024, Plaintiff was hired by Defendant’s “IT department.” (Id. at

¶ 22). Plaintiff’s compensation was supposed to be between $31,200 and $43,700. (Id. at

¶ 23). After speaking with Defendant’s IT manager, Plaintiff believed he would also

receive overtime. (Id. at ¶ 24). But Plaintiff ended up earning less than his original position

and his pay decreased to between $600 and $750 weekly. (Id. at ¶¶ 30-31).

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant’s security guards would force Plaintiff to remove

religious garments and clock him into work late. (Id. at ¶ 33).

Plaintiff suffered an injury while off-the-clock wearing Defendant’s authorized

work shoes. (Id. at ¶ 35). Plaintiff was forced to continue wearing these work shoes, which

harmed Plaintiff’s ability to walk and resulted in a broken foot and ruptured tendon. (Id.).

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant ignored Plaintiff’s request for accommodations. (Id. at

¶ 36).

Plaintiff also claims that after filing suit against Defendant, he was removed from

his position, his compensation was changed, the number of hours and days in which

Plaintiff worked was changed, he endured reputational abuse, he suffered emotional stress,

and his preexisting injury was aggravated. (Id. at ¶ 34).

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant’s employees would “attempt to intimidate, threaten,

harass, and [] try to ensure fights with [P]laintiff,” but that such employees were removed

by Defendant. (Id. at ¶ 39). Plaintiff contends that Defendant’s employees tried to “start

a disciplinary paperwork trail” against Plaintiff. (Id. at ¶ 40).

Plaintiff met with several female employees. (Id. at ¶ 46). One female stated she

had “to f to work [sic],” one “threw up her gang sign,” and another “attempt[ed] to perform

sexual favors for” Plaintiff. (Id. at ¶¶ 46-47, 49). On a separate occasion, Plaintiff went to

fix an employee’s work laptop and the employee “move[d] their head towards the

[P]laintiff[’s] genital area” and stated that they could have sexual relations. (Id. at ¶¶ 53-

54). Plaintiff replied that “such is not needed for [P]laintiff to perform the requirements of

his job.” (Id. at ¶ 55).

Plaintiff also believes that Defendant’s employees are “under an internal

investigation due to a multitude of equipment just going missing from certain

departments.” (Id. at ¶ 57).

Plaintiff seeks $20,000,000 from Defendant. (Id. at 2).

II. Procedural Background

Plaintiff filed this action on March 15, 2024. (Dkt. 1). On May 3, 2024, Defendant

filed a motion to dismiss (Dkt. 16), which was denied as moot (Dkt. 22) because Plaintiff

filed an amended complaint on May 16, 2024 (Dkt. 19). Defendant moved to dismiss the

amended complaint on June 28, 2024. (Dkt. 28). In accordance with the scheduling order

issued by the Court (Dkt. 29), Plaintiff submitted a response in opposition to the motion

(Dkt. 31) and Defendant replied (Dkt. 41). Plaintiff then submitted an untimely letter

purportedly in further opposition to the motion to dismiss. (Dkt. 39). Also, on July 31,

2024, Plaintiff filed a motion for miscellaneous relief (Dkt. 36) to which Defendant

responded (Dkt. 37).3

DISCUSSION

I. Legal Standard

“In considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule

12(b)(6), a district court may consider the facts alleged in the complaint, documents

attached to the complaint as exhibits, and documents incorporated by reference in the

complaint.” DiFolco v. MSNBC Cable L.L.C., 622 F.3d 104, 111 (2d Cir. 2010). A court

should consider the motion by “accepting all factual allegations as true and drawing all

reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.” Trs. of Upstate N.Y. Eng’rs Pension Fund

v. Ivy Asset Mgmt., 843 F.3d 561, 566 (2d Cir. 2016). To withstand dismissal, a plaintiff

must set forth “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl.

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the

plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that

the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Turkmen v. Ashcroft, 589 F.3d 542, 546

(2d Cir. 2009) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)).

3 In Plaintiff’s motion for miscellaneous relief, Plaintiff requests permission to

engage in discovery of third-party sources. (Dkt. 36 at ¶ 1). Plaintiff’s motion for

miscellaneous relief is essentially a motion for reconsideration of the Court’s July 22, 2024

Text Order which granted Defendant’s motion to stay discovery and restrict service of

documents. (Dkt. 34). Plaintiff’s motion for miscellaneous relief is denied.

“While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need

detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the grounds of his

entitle[ment] to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation

of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (internal

quotations and citations omitted). “To state a plausible claim, the complaint’s ‘[f]actual

allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.’” Nielsen

v. AECOM Tech. Corp., 762 F.3d 214, 218 (2d Cir. 2014) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at

555). While the Court is “obliged to construe [pro se] pleadings liberally, particularly when

they allege civil rights violations,” McEachin v. McGuinnis, 357 F.3d 197, 200 (2d Cir.

2004), even pleadings submitted pro se must satisfy the plausibility standard set forth in

Iqbal and Twombly, see Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009) (“Even after

Twombly, though, we remain obligated to construe a pro se complaint liberally.”).

II. FLSA Overtime Violations—Plaintiff’s First Cause of Action

Plaintiff’s first cause of action contends that Defendant failed to compensate him

for overtime in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201 et seq.

(“FLSA”). (Dkt. 19 at ¶¶ 62-71). Defendant argues that the claim must be dismissed

because Plaintiff provided no detail about the overtime that allegedly went unpaid and, in

his exhibits attached to the amended complaint, it is clear that Defendant paid overtime.

(Dkt. 28-12 at 13-14). Defendant made the same argument directed to Plaintiff’s original

complaint (Dkt. 16-1 at 10-11), and in response, Plaintiff filed the amended complaint.

“In an action to recover unpaid overtime wages under FLSA, a plaintiff must show

that: ‘(1) he was an employee who was eligible for overtime ([i.e.,] not exempt from the

Act’s overtime pay requirements); and (2) that he actually worked overtime hours for which

he was not compensated.’” DeSilva v. N. Shore-Long Island Jewish Health Sys., Inc., 770

F. Supp. 2d 497, 507 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) (quoting Hosking v. New World Mortg., Inc., 602 F.

Supp. 2d 441, 447 (E.D.N.Y. 2009)). “To plead a plausible FLSA overtime claim, Plaintiffs

must provide sufficient detail about the length and frequency of their unpaid work to

support a reasonable inference that they worked more than forty hours in a given week.”

Nakahata v. New York-Presbyterian Healthcare Sys., Inc., 723 F.3d 192, 201 (2d Cir.

2013); see also Herrara v. Comme des Garsons, Ltd., 84 F.4th 110, 115 (2d Cir. 2023)

(“[P]laintiffs must plead FLSA overtime claims with ‘specificity.’”).

Plaintiff has failed to plausibly allege that he worked overtime hours for which he

was not compensated. Plaintiff has not provided enough detail about the length and

frequency of his unpaid work. Instead, Plaintiff broadly asserts that he signed up for

overtime through an online portal and was “never compensated properly in accordance

with the online representation by” Defendant. (Dkt. 19 at ¶ 15). To support this allegation,

Plaintiff attaches his payroll documents. (Dkt. 19-4 at 16-34). But as Defendant points

out (Dkt. 28-12 at 14), those documents show Plaintiff received overtime pay (Dkt. 19-4

at 16-34). Thus, Plaintiff has failed to allege a violation of overtime pay under the FLSA.

Because Plaintiff has already attempted to amend this claim, the dismissal of the FLSA

overtime cause of action is with prejudice and without leave to amend. Baptiste v. Doe,

680 F. Supp. 3d 186, 192 (N.D.N.Y. 2023) (“[A]n opportunity to amend is not required

where the plaintiff has already been afforded the opportunity to amend.”).

III. FLSA “Straight Pay” Violations—Second Cause of Action

Plaintiff’s second cause of action alleges “straight pay violations” of the FLSA.

(Dkt. 19 at ¶¶ 72-76). But as Defendant correctly argues (Dkt. 28-12 at 14-15), Plaintiff’s

allegations that he was not paid for the time worked—unrelated to any allegations of failure

to pay the minimum wage—does not state an FLSA violation.

“The FLSA requires certain employers to pay a minimum wage and to provide

overtime pay for work exceeding forty hours per week.” Rosenbaum v. Meir, 658 F. Supp.

3d 140, 146 (E.D.N.Y. 2023) (quoting Ilyina v. Fantasy Lake Resort, Inc., No. 19-CV-4845,

2022 WL 16855879, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 10, 2022)). But the FLSA “is unavailing where

wages do not fall below the statutory minimum and hours do not rise above the overtime

threshold.” Nakahata, 723 F.3d at 201.

Plaintiff does not allege that Defendant failed to pay a minimum wage. Instead, he

appears to be alleging that he was not paid for time worked under 40 hours a week because

of errors with the time clock,4 but this does not state an FLSA claim. Because Defendant’s

initial motion to dismiss directed to Plaintiff’s original complaint raised this very issue

(Dkt. 16-1 at 9-10), and Plaintiff failed to correct the deficiencies with his amended

complaint, this cause of action is dismissed with prejudice and without leave to replead.

4 In his response to Defendant’s motion to dismiss, Plaintiff argues that Defendant

altered or changed “evidence after the filing of [the] lawsuit.” (Dkt. 31 at 2). The document

Plaintiff attaches in support of this argument appears to be a filing reporting “a missed

punch” and changes to punch times in February 2024. (Id. at 22-24). But, as Defendant

notes, the documents “do[] not support a claim that [Defendant] paid Plaintiff less than

minimum wage or failed to pay him any overtime wages that were owed to him.” (Dkt. 41

at 6). Instead, the filing appears to be an inquiry into the procedures for proper time

keeping and do not show that Plaintiff was not appropriately paid. (See Dkt. 31 at 22-24).

IV. FLSA Retaliation—Third Cause of Action

Plaintiff’s third cause of action alleges that he was subject to retaliation after he filed

this suit against Defendant because Defendant removed Plaintiff from his position of

employment, attempted to injure Plaintiff by forcing him to stand for long periods of time

when he had a foot injury for which he sought accommodations, refused to let him work

overtime, did not offer him any training, and subjected him to discrimination and

harassment in violation of the FLSA. (Dkt. 19 at ¶¶ 77-85). Defendant states that

Plaintiff’s FLSA retaliation claim should be dismissed because Plaintiff’s amended

complaint discusses internal complaints that are not specific enough to allow Defendant to

determine whether Plaintiff was complaining about a violation of the FLSA, none of

Defendant’s actions would have dissuaded a reasonable employee from making an FLSA

claim, and Plaintiff does not establish a causal connection. (Dkt. 28-12 at 16-17).

Defendant also argues that the alleged retaliatory action occurred before the protected

activity. (Dkt. 41 at 7).

“To establish a prima facie claim of retaliation under the FLSA . . . , a plaintiff must

show: ‘(1) participation in protected activity known to the defendant, like the filing of a

FLSA lawsuit; (2) an employment action disadvantaging the plaintiff; and (3) a causal

connection between the protected activity and the adverse employment action.’” Kassman

v. KPMG LLP, 925 F. Supp. 2d 453, 472 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (quoting Mullins v. City of N.Y.,

626 F.3d 47, 53 (2d Cir. 2010)). But, at the pleading stage, “courts ‘generally assess[ ] the

plausibility of [the plaintiff’s] claim based on the facts alleged in the [complaint].’”

Galante v. Watermark Servs. IV, LLC, 722 F. Supp. 3d 170, 178 (W.D.N.Y. 2024) (citation

omitted).

Although Plaintiff has alleged that Defendant took several adverse employment

actions against him in retaliation for filing this action, most of the alleged retaliatory action

appears to have occurred before Plaintiff filed this lawsuit. Indeed, based on the amended

complaint, it appears the only adverse employment action taken after filing the lawsuit was

Plaintiff’s placement in an alternate employment position. (Dkt. 19 at ¶ 34). Plaintiff does

not explain the nature of this alternate employment position so as to gauge whether it

constituted an adverse employment action. Shaffer v. IEP Techs., LLC, 557 F. Supp. 3d

191, 206 (D. Mass. 2021) (“Whether a reassignment constitutes an adverse employment

action depends upon all of the circumstances viewed from the perspective of a reasonable

person in the plaintiff’s position.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); Porter

v. Roosa, 259 F. Supp. 2d 638, 657 (S.D. Ohio 2003) (“when citing a change in work duties

as one’s adverse employment action, the plaintiff must demonstrate that []he experienced

significantly diminished material responsibilities, and that the alleged change in

employment conditions must be more disruptive than a mere inconvenience or an alteration

of job responsibilities”) (internal quotation marks omitted).

As a result, Plaintiff has failed to plausibly allege an FLSA retaliation claim.

However, because the amended complaint represented Plaintiff’s first attempt to plead such

a claim, and because the Court cannot conclude that Plaintiff could not assert such a claim

with more detailed factual allegations, the dismissal is without prejudice and with leave to

replead.

V. Forced Labor—Seventh Cause of Action

Plaintiff’s seventh cause of action claims that he will be subject to termination by

Defendant if he does not perform his work duties in violation of the Thirteenth Amendment.

(Dkt. 19 at ¶ 113). Plaintiff further explains that he has been threatened with people using

their fingers to simulate a gun, that he is forced to stand 13 hours to perform his work

duties, and that he is monitored because of his use of Defendant’s “twitch services.” (Id.

at ¶¶ 111-118). Plaintiff cites to 18 U.S.C. § 1589 in support of this claim. (Dkt. 31 at

¶¶ 26-29). Defendant argues that Plaintiff has not alleged any facts to support a claim that

Defendant intentionally schemed to lead Plaintiff to believe that a failure to perform work

for Defendant would result in serious harm or physical restraint. (Dkt. 41 at 11).

18 U.S.C. § 1589 proscribes obtaining labor or services of a person by any of the

following: “(1) by means of force, threats of force, physical restraint, or threats of physical

restraint to that person or another person; (2) by means of serious harm or threats of serious

harm to that person or another person; (3) by means of the abuse or threatened abuse of

law or legal process; or (4) by means of any scheme, plan, or pattern intended to cause the

person to believe that, if that person did not perform such labor or services, that person or

another person would suffer serious harm or physical restraint. . . .” 18 U.S.C. § 1595(a)

provides a private right of action to “an[y] individual who is a victim of a violation of [18

U.S.C. § 1589].” Baldia v. RN Express Staffing Registry LLC, 633 F. Supp. 3d 693, 703

(S.D.N.Y. 2022). “‘[T]he fundamental purpose of § 1589 is to reach cases of servitude

achieved through nonviolent coercion – namely serious harm, the threat of serious harm,

or the abuse or threatened abuse of legal process.’” Id. at 704 (citation omitted).

Plaintiff has not alleged facts sufficient to state a plausible violation of § 1589.

However, because of Plaintiff’s pro se status and because he has not previously been

afforded an opportunity to attempt to amend this claim, the cause of action is dismissed

without prejudice and with leave to replead.

VI. ADA Claim

Although not pleaded as a separate cause of action, Plaintiff’s amended complaint

appears to assert allegations that he suffered a foot injury, requested accommodations from

Defendant for that injury, and was denied or ignored in violation of the Americans with

Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12111 et seq. (“ADA”). (Dkt. 19 at ¶¶ 35-38). Defendant

argues that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies before filing his amended

complaint. (Dkt. 28-12 at 18). Defendant also notes that Plaintiff has not alleged that he

has a disability under the ADA, that Defendant was aware of the disability, and that Plaintiff

needed a reasonable accommodation to perform his job which Defendant refused to make.

(Id. at 19 n.8).

“‘[A] plaintiff seeking to bring a claim pursuant to the [ADA] . . . must exhaust

administrative remedies through,’ . . . the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

[(“EEOC”)].” Spillers v. N.Y. City Health & Hosps. Corp., 763 F. App’x 138, 139 (2d Cir.

2019) (quoting Soules v. Conn., Dep’t of Emergency Servs. & Pub. Prot., 882 F.3d 52, 57

(2d Cir. 2018)). “To make out a prima facie failure to accommodate claim, a plaintiff must

show that: (1) plaintiff is a person with a disability under the meaning of the ADA; (2) an

employer covered by the statute had notice of [his] disability; (3) with reasonable

accommodation, plaintiff could perform the essential functions of the job at issue; and (4)

the employer has refused to make such accommodations.” Gomez v. N.Y. City Police Dep’t,

191 F. Supp. 3d 293, 301 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (citing McMillan v. City of N.Y., 711 F.3d 120,

125-26 (2d Cir. 2013)); Kelly v. N.Y. State Off. of Mental Health, 200 F. Supp. 3d 378, 398

(E.D.N.Y. 2016) (“A plaintiff can state a claim for employment discrimination premised

on an employer’s failure to accommodate her disability by alleging facts showing that: (1)

[P]laintiff is a person with a disability under the meaning of the ADA; (2) an employer

covered by the statute had notice of his disability; (3) with reasonable accommodation,

plaintiff could perform the essential functions of the job at issue; and (4) the employer has

refused to make such accommodations.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

“The ADA’s definition of disability may be satisfied if a plaintiff demonstrates ‘a record’

of an impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities.” Levine v.

Smithtown Cent. Sch. Dist., 565 F. Supp. 2d 407, 425 (E.D.N.Y. 2008) (citing 42 U.S.C.

§ 12102(2)(B)).

Here, it does not appear that Plaintiff obtained a right to sue letter from the EEOC.5

In addition, Plaintiff’s allegations are so sparse that he has failed to plausibly allege a

failure to accommodate claim, including by failing to allege that he qualifies as a person

with a disability under the meaning of the ADA. See, e.g., Earl v. Good Samaritan Hosp.

5 Plaintiff appears to have filed some documentation with the EEOC (Dkt. 19-6 at 5-

20; see also Dkt. 42), but the status of those proceedings is unclear. If Plaintiff attempts to

replead this cause of action, he should clarify whether he filed a charge with the EEOC,

what it alleged, and whether he obtained a right to sue letter. While the Court recognizes

that failure to exhaust is an affirmative defense, Defendant appears to have established the

applicability of that defense based on the allegations in the amended complaint and

documents attached thereto.

of Suffern NY, 625 F. Supp. 3d 292, 306 (S.D.N.Y. 2022), aff’d, No. 22-2505-CV, 2023 WL

8708417 (2d Cir. Dec. 18, 2023) (“Plaintiff’s bare allegations that these impairments now

make certain tasks ‘arduous’ or ‘difficult’ fail to sufficiently establish, first, that these

activities are major life activities, and second, how these activities are substantially limited

in comparison to the average person.”); Bush v. Donahoe, 964 F. Supp. 2d 401, 420 (W.D.

Pa. 2013) (“Plaintiff describes her condition with so few details that the court cannot infer

whether the activity limited by plaintiff’s impairment is a major life activity or whether

plaintiff’s impairment substantially limits a major life activity.”). Therefore, Plaintiff’s

ADA claim is dismissed, though without prejudice and with leave to replead.

VII. Remaining State Law Causes of Action

Plaintiff’s amended complaint alleges several state-law claims including conversion

through wage theft (fourth cause of action), fraudulent inducement to employment contract

(fifth cause of action), spoliation of evidence (sixth cause of action), civil conspiracy

(eighth cause of action), and arguably a breach of contract claim, though not expressly

pleaded as such. (Dkt. 19 at ¶¶ 86-110, 119-129). Defendant argues that the Court should

decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s remaining state-law claims

because all of Plaintiff’s federal claims are subject to dismissal. (Dkt. 28-12 at 21).

A district court has discretion to hear state-law claims where the relationship

between a plaintiff’s federal and state claims present “but one constitutional case” and

“derive from a common nucleus of operative fact.” United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383

U.S. 715, 725 (1966) (internal quotation marks omitted). When a federal court dismisses

federal claims, the court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state-

law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). See also Carlsbad Tech., Inc. v. HIF Bio,

Inc., 556 U.S. 635, 639 (2009) (“A district court’s decision whether to exercise that

jurisdiction after dismissing every claim over which it had original jurisdiction is purely

discretionary.”).

“Courts ‘consider and weigh in each case, and at every stage of the litigation, the

values of judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity in order to decide whether

to exercise’ supplemental jurisdiction.” Lundy v. Cath. Health Sys. of Long Island, Inc.,

711 F.3d 106, 117-18 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S.

343, 350 (1988)). “Once all federal claims have been dismissed, the balance of factors will

‘usual[ly]’ point toward a declination.” Id. at 118 (citation omitted); see also Brzak v.

United Nations, 597 F.3d 107, 113-14 (2d Cir. 2010) (“[I]f a plaintiff’s federal claims are

dismissed before trial, the state claims should be dismissed as well.”) (internal quotation

marks omitted).

Given the decision at this stage that all of Plaintiff’s federal claims are subject to

dismissal, the Court will decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state-

law claims. If Plaintiff successfully repleads any of the federal claims that have been

dismissed without prejudice and with leave to replead, he may also replead the state causes

of action, with two exceptions.

First, Plaintiff concedes that his fourth cause of action, conversion through wage

theft, is not sustainable and withdraws the claim. (See Dkt. 31 at ¶ 23 (Plaintiff “will drop

the conversion” claim because “it [is] not permissible in the courts.”)). Accordingly,

Plaintiff’s fourth claim for conversion through wage theft is dismissed with prejudice and

may not be repleaded.

Second, Plaintiff’s sixth claim for spoliation cannot stand as an independent cause

of action. See, e.g., Farquharson v. Lafayette, No. 19-CV-3446 (NSR), 2020 WL 1699985,

at *12 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 7, 2020) (“[A]lthough Plaintiff asserts a spoliation claim, New York

does not recognize spoliation of evidence as an actionable tort.”); Perez v. Gen. Motors,

LLC, No. 1:15-CV-0240 GTS/CFH, 2015 WL 1823438, at *5 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 21, 2015)

(“[Spoliation] of evidence is not clearly recognized as a distinct cause of action under New

York law. . . .”); Sterbenz v. Attina, 205 F. Supp. 2d 65, 71-72 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (“[N]early

every lower state court in New York to examine the issue, as well as decisions of federal

courts construing New York law, have ‘follow[ed] the majority view and do not recognize

spoliation of evidence as a cognizable tort action.’” (citations omitted)). Therefore,

because Plaintiff’s claim for spoliation is not cognizable as a standalone claim, it is

dismissed with prejudice and may not be repleaded.

As to the remaining state-law claims for fraudulent inducement to employment

contract, civil conspiracy, and breach of contract, the Court declines to assess the viability

of these claims at this stage given the procedural posture of this case.

VIII. Leave to Amend

As noted above, some of the causes of action have been dismissed without prejudice

and with leave to replead. Specifically, the FLSA retaliation cause of action, the claim of

forced labor in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1589, the ADA failure to accommodate claim, and

the state law causes of action (other than the conversion claim which Plaintiff voluntarily

withdrew, and the spoliation of evidence claim which is plainly not viable). In his filings

and in portions of his complaint, it appears that Plaintiff may be attempting to assert other

causes of action, including potentially a claim for violating Title VII of the Civil Rights

Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. But at this stage, Plaintiff has failed to assert any

such claims as a separately pleaded cause of action. If he desires to pursue any claim not

specifically alleged in the amended complaint and addressed herein, he must seek leave of

Court through formal motion practice that includes a proposed amended complaint.

As a result, Defendant’s motion to dismiss is granted (Dkt. 28) but Plaintiff is

granted leave to attempt to replead the following causes of action: FLSA retaliation, the

claim of forced labor in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1589, the ADA failure to accommodate

claim, and the state law causes of action of fraudulent inducement to employment contract,

civil conspiracy, and breach of contract. Plaintiff is advised that an amended complaint is

intended to completely replace the prior complaint in the action. “It is well established that

an amended complaint ordinarily supersedes the original and renders it of no legal effect.”

Arce v. Walker, 139 F.3d 329, 332 n.4 (2d Cir. 1998) (quoting Int’l Controls Corp. v. Vesco,

556 F.2d 665, 668 (2d Cir. 1977)); see also Shields v. Citytrust Bancorp, Inc., 25 F.3d

1124, 1128 (2d Cir. 1994). Therefore, Plaintiff’s amended complaint must include all of

his allegations, so that the amended complaint may stand alone as the sole complaint in

this action which Defendant must answer.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons discussed above, Defendant’s motion to dismiss the amended

complaint (Dkt. 28) is granted and Plaintiff's motion for miscellaneous relief (Dkt. 36) is

denied. Plaintiff may file a second amended complaint in accordance with this Decision

and Order within 30 days of the date hereof. If Plaintiff fails to file a second amended

complaint within that time, the Clerk of Court is directed to dismiss this case with prejudice

and without further Order of the Court.

SO ORDERED.

\_ple

ELIZABETH & WOLEKORH

iefJiidge

United States District Court

Dated: February 24, 2025

Rochester, New York

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