Soanes v. Maddox

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

JACKSONVILLE DIVISION

KEITH SOANES,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 3:23-cv-1278-MMH-MCR

M. MADDOX, et al.,

Defendants.

___________________________

ORDER

I. Status

Plaintiff Keith Soanes, an inmate in the Florida Department of

Corrections (FDOC), initiated this case by filing a pro se Civil Rights

Complaint (Doc. 1). He is proceeding on a verified Amended Complaint (Doc.

15; Amended Complaint) against Defendants Maddox, Price, and Goodman.1

Soanes alleges Defendants violated his First and Fourteenth Amendment

rights when they deleted his incoming and outgoing emails, along with his

1 Soanes signed the Amended Complaint under penalty of perjury. See Amended

Complaint at 55. In his Amended Complaint, Soanes included claims against other

individuals, but the Court has dismissed all claims against Defendants Thompson,

Davis, Dixon, Williams, Doe, Bennet, Lane, and Allen. See Order of Partial Dismissal

Without Prejudice (Doc. 16).

incoming scanned routine mail, without notice, and also censored his outgoing

emails providing him only with vague and broad censorship notices. See

generally id.

Before the Court is Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint

(Doc. 23; Motion) with exhibits (Docs. 23-1 to 23-11). Soanes filed a Response

in opposition to the Motion (Doc. 24; Response) with exhibits (Docs. 24-1 to 24-

4). With the Court’s leave, see Order (Doc. 26), Defendants filed a Reply (Doc.

27; Reply) with additional exhibits (Docs. 27-1 to 27-6). Soanes filed a “Rebuttal

in Support of Plaintiff’s Response to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss” (Doc. 28;

Rebuttal).2 The Motion is ripe for review.

II. Amended Complaint3

According to Soanes, he was placed in confinement on June 23, 2020, “for

organizing against prison overseers[’] violence, abuse and brutality against

prisoners in handcuff[s].” Amended Complaint at 15. On July 23, 2020, he was

2 Although Soanes did not seek the Court’s permission to file the Rebuttal, the Court

will consider it.

3 In considering the Motion, the Court must accept all factual allegations in the

Amended Complaint as true, consider the allegations in the light most favorable to

Soanes, and accept all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from such allegations.

Hill v. White, 321 F.3d 1334, 1335 (11th Cir. 2003); Jackson v. Okaloosa Cnty., 21

F.3d 1531, 1534 (11th Cir. 1994). As such, the facts recited here are drawn from the

Amended Complaint, and may well differ from those that ultimately can be proved.

2

transferred to Florida State Prison (FSP), where the incidents giving rise to

his claims are alleged to have occurred. Id.

On April 20, 2023, prison officials issued Soanes a tablet, and he “learned

that all his incoming emails and scanned routine mail between 7/23/20 and

1/9/23 [we]re missing, not showing in email account, inbox or on kiosk” and his

“emails which were paid for had been arbitrarily deleted without notice of any

kind by” Defendant Maddox and mailroom personnel. Id. According to Soanes,

Defendants Price, Goodman, and Maddox “had been intercepting and deleting

all [of his] incoming email and scanned routine mail [from his JPay mail

account], while [Soanes] was housed on CM-I and CM-II status, . . . thereby

printing and issuing to [Soanes] only the emails and scanned routine mail they

feel, or decide, prisoners (Soanes included) should have or not have, all without

notice of any kind required by law.” Id. Soanes contends that these Defendants’

actions denied prisoners, including himself, “a service and product paid for.”

Id. at 16. He concludes that “[l]ots of scanned routine mail and emails being

sent to [him] were not being printed and issued, thereby holding [him] semi-

incommunicado without notice of any kind while on CM-I and CM-II status.”

Id.; see also id. at 31 (“Scores of incoming emails and scanned routine mail

were deleted from [Soanes’s] JPay email account, kept from showing in [his]

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email inbox and account after being received by FSP Mailroom email

database.”).

Upon receiving his tablet, Soanes also noticed that “he was still on email

restriction installed by Maddox,” and all emails he had attempted to send since

January 2023 “were still sitting in [the] outbox, not sent.” Id. at 16. Eight days

later, after several verbal and written complaints, officials lifted the restriction

and his emails were finally sent out. Id. However, Soanes contends that even

though his emails were being shown as “sent,” the intended recipients were not

receiving them because Maddox, Price, and Goodman were withholding the

emails. Id.

On May 29, 2023, after sending over 40 emails between April 25, 2023

and May 29, 2023, Soanes received 11 censorship notices regarding his

outgoing emails. Id. at 16-17. He asserts that Maddox, Price, and Goodman

“issued censorship notices only stating as reasons” that the email advocated

hatred, contained “STG [(Security Threat Group)] terminology,” or referenced

the KKK (“Amerikkka”), but the notices were otherwise broad and vague

without any detail. Id. at 17. And on October 13, 2023, Soanes received three

additional “vague and unconstitutional censorship notices” regarding emails

he had sent out months earlier. Id. at 26. As of the date of the Amended

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Complaint, Soanes had received approximately 31 “vague and broad”

censorship notices. Id. at 17.

On September 7, 2023, family members advised Soanes that they had

not received two poems he sent on August 22 and 26, 2023. Id. at 24. Soanes

checked his “sent box” and discovered “that despite his log showing that those

two poems . . . were sent,” Maddox, Price, and Goodman had deleted the emails

without any notice even though he was charged digital postage fees for them.

Id. Likewise, on September 11, 2023, Soanes realized that Maddox, Price

and/or Goodman deleted his email sent the day before without notice even

though he was charged for it. Id. He lists an additional nine emails that were

deleted without notice between July 17, 2023, and September 11, 2023, but

contends that after submitting an informal grievance on October 5, 2023,

which was never returned to him, five of those emails reappeared in his sent

box. Id. at 25. Then on October 12, 2023, another one of those emails “was

placed back in [his] ‘sent box’ and allowed to be released by family.” Id. at 26.

As a result of these actions, Soanes contends Defendants violated his

First and Fourteenth Amendment rights when they (1) deleted his incoming

emails and scanned routine mail without notice between July 23, 2020, and

January 9, 2023; (2) withheld his outgoing mail between January 2023 and

April 2023; (3) censored his outgoing emails and provided vague censorship

5

notices between April 25, 2023 and May 29, 2023, and on October 13, 2023; and

(4) deleted his outgoing emails without notice between July 17, 2023, and

September 11, 2023.4 See id. at 15-17, 24-26. Soanes requests monetary

damages and injunctive relief. See id. at 36-40.

III. Motion to Dismiss Standard

In ruling on a motion to dismiss, the Court must accept the factual

allegations set forth in the complaint as true. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.

662, 678 (2009); Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 508 n.1 (2002); see

also Lotierzo v. Woman’s World Med. Ctr., Inc., 278 F.3d 1180, 1182 (11th Cir.

2002). In addition, all reasonable inferences should be drawn in favor of the

plaintiff. See Randall v. Scott, 610 F.3d 701, 705 (11th Cir. 2010). Nonetheless,

the plaintiff must still meet some minimal pleading requirements. Jackson v.

BellSouth Telecomm., 372 F.3d 1250, 1262-63 (11th Cir. 2004). Indeed, while

“[s]pecific facts are not necessary[,]” the complaint should “‘give the defendant

fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’”

Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (per curiam) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp.

4 The parties separate and describe Soanes’s allegations in these four counts. See

generally Motion; Response. The Court notes that the fourth count is referred to as

“Ground Five” in Soanes’s Amended Complaint and referred to as Count Five in the

parties’ filings. See Amended Complaint at 24; Motion at 14; Response at 12. Thus,

for ease of reference and consistency, the Court will refer to the counts in the same

manner as the parties.

6

v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Further, the plaintiff must allege

“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly,

550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads

factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).

A “plaintiff’s obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief

requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the

elements of a cause of action will not do[.]” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (internal

quotations omitted); see also Jackson, 372 F.3d at 1262 (explaining that

“conclusory allegations, unwarranted deductions of facts or legal conclusions

masquerading as facts will not prevent dismissal”) (internal citation and

quotations omitted). Indeed, “the tenet that a court must accept as true all of

the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions[,]”

which simply “are not entitled to [an] assumption of truth.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at

678, 679. Thus, in ruling on a motion to dismiss, the Court must determine

whether the complaint contains “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to

‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face[.]’” Id. at 678 (quoting

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).

7

IV. Discussion

In the Motion, Defendants contend that Soanes failed to exhaust his

administrative remedies prior to filing this case. See Motion at 2-24.

Alternatively, Defendants argue they are entitled to qualified immunity. See

id. at 24-29. Each argument is addressed in turn.

a. Exhaustion

i. Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) Requirements

The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has held the exhaustion of

administrative remedies by a prisoner is “a threshold matter” to be addressed

before considering the merits of a case. Chandler v. Crosby, 379 F.3d 1278,

1286 (11th Cir. 2004); see also Myles v. Miami-Dade Cnty. Corr. & Rehab.

Dep’t, 476 F. App’x 364, 366 (11th Cir. 2012)5 (noting that exhaustion is “a

‘threshold matter’ that we address before considering the merits of the case”)

(citation omitted). It is well settled that the PLRA requires an inmate wishing

to challenge prison conditions to first exhaust all available administrative

remedies before asserting any claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See 42 U.S.C. §

5 The Court does not rely on unpublished opinions as binding precedent; however,

when cited in this Order it is because the Court finds them persuasive on a particular

point. See McNamara v. GEICO, 30 F.4th 1055, 1060-61 (11th Cir. 2022); see

generally Fed. R. App. P. 32.1; 11th Cir. R. 36-2 (“Unpublished opinions are not

considered binding precedent, but they may be cited as persuasive authority.”).

8

1997e(a); Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 524 (2002). A prisoner, however, is

not required to plead exhaustion. See Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 216 (2007).

Instead, the United States Supreme Court has recognized that “failure to

exhaust is an affirmative defense under the PLRA[.]” Id. Notably, exhaustion

of available administrative remedies is “a precondition to an adjudication on

the merits” and is mandatory under the PLRA. Bryant v. Rich, 530 F.3d 1368,

1374 (11th Cir. 2008). Not only is there an exhaustion requirement, the PLRA

“requires proper exhaustion.” Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 93 (2006).

Because exhaustion requirements are designed

to deal with parties who do not want to exhaust,

administrative law creates an incentive for these

parties to do what they would otherwise prefer not to

do, namely, to give the agency a fair and full

opportunity to adjudicate their claims. Administrative

law does this by requiring proper exhaustion of

administrative remedies, which “means using all steps

that the agency holds out, and doing so properly (so

that the agency addresses the issues on the merits).”

Pozo,[6] 286 F.3d, at 1024 (emphasis in original).

Woodford, 548 U.S. at 90. And, “[p]roper exhaustion demands compliance with

an agency’s deadlines and other critical procedural rules.” Id.

The United States Supreme Court has instructed that “[c]ourts may not

engraft an unwritten ‘special circumstances’ exception onto the PLRA’s

6 Pozo v. McCaughtry, 286 F.3d 1022 (7th Cir. 2002).

9

exhaustion requirement. The only limit to § 1997e(a)’s mandate is the one

baked into its text: An inmate need exhaust only such administrative remedies

as are ‘available.’” Ross v. Blake, 578 U.S. 632, 648 (2016). For an

administrative remedy to be available, the “remedy must be ‘capable of use for

the accomplishment of [its] purpose.’” Turner v. Burnside, 541 F.3d 1077, 1084

(11th Cir. 2008) (quoting Goebert v. Lee Cnty., 510 F.3d 1312, 1322-23 (11th

Cir. 2007)). In Ross, the Supreme Court identified three circumstances in

which an administrative remedy would be considered “not available.” Ross, 578

U.S. at 643-44. First, “an administrative procedure is unavailable when

(despite what regulations or guidance materials may promise) it operates as a

simple dead end—with officers unable or consistently unwilling to provide any

relief to aggrieved inmates.” Id. at 643. Next, “an administrative scheme might

be so opaque that it becomes, practically speaking, incapable of use.” Id.

Finally, a remedy may be unavailable “when prison administrators thwart

inmates from taking advantage of a grievance process through machination,

misrepresentation, or intimidation.” Id. at 644.

Because failure to exhaust administrative remedies is an affirmative

defense, a defendant bears “the burden of proving that the plaintiff has failed

to exhaust his available administrative remedies.” Turner, 541 F.3d at 1082.

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In accordance with Eleventh Circuit precedent, a court must employ a two-step

process when examining the issue of exhaustion of administrative remedies.

After a prisoner has exhausted the grievance

procedures, he may file suit under § 1983. In response

to a prisoner suit, defendants may bring a motion to

dismiss and raise as a defense the prisoner’s failure to

exhaust these administrative remedies. See Turner,

541 F.3d at 1081. In Turner v. Burnside we

established a two-step process for resolving motions to

dismiss prisoner lawsuits for failure to exhaust. 541

F.3d at 1082. First, district courts look to the factual

allegations in the motion to dismiss and those in the

prisoner’s response and accept the prisoner’s view of

the facts as true. The court should dismiss if the facts

as stated by the prisoner show a failure to exhaust. Id.

Second, if dismissal is not warranted on the prisoner’s

view of the facts, the court makes specific findings to

resolve disputes of fact, and should dismiss if, based

on those findings, defendants have shown a failure to

exhaust. Id. at 1082-83; see also id. at 1082 (explaining

that defendants bear the burden of showing a failure

to exhaust).

Whatley v. Warden, Ware State Prison, 802 F.3d 1205, 1209 (11th Cir. 2015).

At step two of the procedure established in Turner, the Court can consider facts

outside the pleadings as long as those facts do not decide the case and the

parties have had sufficient opportunity to develop the record.7 Bryant, 530 F.3d

7 In an unpublished decision, the Eleventh Circuit suggests that a pro se plaintiff

must receive notice of his opportunity to develop the record on exhaustion. See Kinard

v. Fla. Dep’t of Corr., No. 24-10359, 2024 WL 4785003, at *7 (11th Cir. Nov. 14, 2024)

(per curiam). Here, the Court notified Soanes that he had forty-five days to respond

to any motion to dismiss. See Order (Doc. 17) at 3. Soanes responded to Defendants’

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at 1376; see also Jenkins v. Sloan, 826 F. App’x 833, 838-39 (11th Cir. 2020).

In evaluating whether a plaintiff has satisfied the exhaustion requirement, the

Court notes that the Eleventh Circuit has determined that a “prisoner need

not name any particular defendant in a grievance in order to properly exhaust

his claim.” Parzyck v. Prison Health Servs., Inc., 627 F.3d 1215, 1218 (11th

Cir. 2010).

ii. Florida’s Prison Grievance Procedure

State law “determines what steps are required to exhaust.” Dimanche v.

Brown, 783 F.3d 1204, 1207 (11th Cir. 2015); see also Jones, 549 U.S. at 218

(stating that “it is the prison’s requirements, and not the PLRA, that define

the boundaries of proper exhaustion”). The FDOC provides an internal

grievance procedure for its inmates. See Fla. Admin. Code R. 33-103.001

through 33-103.018. Generally, to properly exhaust administrative remedies,

a prisoner must complete a three-step sequential process. First, an inmate

must submit an informal grievance at the institutional level to a designated

staff member responsible for the specific problem. See Fla. Admin. Code R. 33-

Motion (Doc. 24) and filed a Rebuttal to their Reply (Doc. 28). In his Response and

Rebuttal, Soanes substantively addresses Defendants’ exhaustion argument, and he

filed several exhibits in support of his position, including his Declaration (Doc. 24-1)

and a copy of his personal grievance log (Doc. 24-2). Soanes does not suggest that he

requires additional discovery. As such, Soanes has received notice and an opportunity

to develop the record on exhaustion.

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103.005. If the issue is not resolved, the inmate must submit a formal grievance

at the institutional level. See Fla. Admin. Code R. 33-103.006. If the matter is

not resolved through formal and informal grievances, the inmate must file an

appeal to the Office of the FDOC Secretary. See Fla. Admin. Code R. 33-

103.007. However, under certain specified circumstances, an inmate can

bypass the informal-grievance stage and start with a formal grievance at the

institutional level. See Fla. Admin. Code R. 33-103.005(1); 33-103.006(3). Or

an inmate can completely bypass the institutional level and proceed directly to

the Office of the FDOC Secretary by filing a “direct grievance.” See Fla. Admin.

Code R. 33-103.007(3). Emergency grievances and grievances of reprisal are

types of “direct grievances” that may be filed with the Office of the FDOC

Secretary. See Fla. Admin. Code R. 33-103.007(3)(a).8

8 None of the enumerated exceptions apply to Soanes’s claims; thus, he was not

permitted to skip the informal grievance step. See Fla. Admin. Code R. 33-103.005(1)

(“Inmates may skip [the informal grievance] step and initiate the process at the

formal institutional level for issues pertaining to the following: grievance of an

emergency nature, grievance of reprisal, grievance alleging violations of the

Americans with Disabilities Act, medical grievance, grievance involving gain

time[,] . . . grievance challenging placement in close management or subsequent

reviews, grievances regarding the return of incoming mail governed by subsection 33-

210.101(14)[,] . . . grievances regarding disciplinary action (does not include corrective

consultations)[,] . . . and grievances regarding allegations of sexual abuse . . . .

Inmates may proceed directly to the Office of the Secretary on the following issues[:]

. . . grievance of emergency nature, grievance of reprisal, protective management,

admissible reading material, sentence structure issues (release date calculations),

and inmate banking issues. Grievances alleging a violation of the Health Insurance

13

Florida Administrative Code Rule 33-103.011 provides time frames for

the submission of grievances. Informal grievances must be received within

twenty days from the date on which the grieved incident or action occurred.

See Fla. Admin. Code R. 33-103.011(1)(a). Formal grievances must be received

no later than fifteen days from the date of the response to the informal

grievance. See Fla. Admin. Code R. 33-103.011(1)(b). Similarly, grievance

appeals to the Office of the FDOC Secretary must be received within fifteen

days from the date that the response to the formal grievance is returned to the

inmate. See Fla. Admin. Code R. 33-103.011(1)(c). According to Rule 33-

103.014, an informal grievance, formal grievance, direct grievance, or

grievance appeal “may be returned to the inmate without further processing if,

following a review of the grievance, one or more . . . conditions are found to

exist.” Fla. Admin. Code R. 33-103.014(1). The rule provides an enumerated

list as “the only reasons for returning a grievance without a response on the

merits.” See Fla. Admin. Code R. 33-103.014(1)(a)-(y). A grievance can be

returned without action if it: is untimely; “addresses more than one issue or

complaint”; is “so broad, general or vague in nature that it cannot be clearly

investigated, evaluated, and responded to”; is “not written legibly and cannot

Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) must be filed directly with the Office of

the Secretary . . . .”).

14

be clearly understood”; is a supplement to a previously-submitted grievance

that has been accepted for review; does not “provide a valid reason for by-

passing the previous levels of review as required or the reason provided is not

acceptable”; or does not include the required attachments. See Fla. Admin.

Code R. 33-103.014(1).

iii. Exhaustion Analysis

In support of their position, Defendants submit the Declaration of Alan

McManus, the Bureau Chief of the Bureau of Policy Management and Inmate

Appeals (Doc. 23-1); grievance logs showing the informal grievances, formal

grievances, and grievance appeals Soanes filed between January 1, 2020, and

May 14, 2024 (Doc. 23-2); copies of Soanes’s pertinent grievances and the

responses thereto (Docs. 23-3 to 23-8; 23-11); Soanes’s acknowledgment of

receipt of grievance orientation (Doc. 23-9); his inmate movement history (Doc.

23-10); an ICT hearing decision (Doc. 27-3); the Declaration of Jeffrey R.

McClellan, an Assistant Warden of Programs at FSP (Doc. 27-5); and the

Declaration of Mike Workman, a State Classification CPA (Doc. 27-6).9

In his Declaration, McManus explains the FDOC’s grievance process and

avers that between January 1, 2020, and May 14, 2024, Soanes filed 118

9 To the extent Defendants re-filed exhibits already in the record (Docs. 27-1, 27-2,

27-4), the Court will cite to such exhibits where they were originally filed.

15

informal grievances, 56 formal grievances, and 80 grievance appeals. See Doc.

23-1 at 1-4. McManus states that he reviewed Soanes’s grievance files to

determine which grievances related to the claims Soanes raises in the

Amended Complaint, and he summarizes each one. See id. at 4-15.

In response, Soanes argues that he did exhaust his administrative

remedies. See generally Response. He asserts that to the extent Defendants

contend that he did not properly follow the grievance process with respect to

certain claims, such administrative remedies were unavailable to him because

his grievances were thrown away and/or the prison is consistently unwilling to

provide any relief through the grievance process. See generally id. To support

his position, Soanes submits his own Declaration (Doc. 24-1), which mirrors

the “Statement of Fact” section of his Amended Complaint; a copy of his

personal log of submitted grievances (Doc. 24-2); a dismissal order from an

unrelated case (Doc. 24-3); and rough drafts of “deleted emails” he sent on

August 22 and 26, 2023 (Doc. 24-4).

The Court will analyze Soanes’s exhaustion efforts as to each of his

claims separately.

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Count One: Defendants Deleted Soanes’s Incoming Emails and Scanned

Routine Mail Without Notice from July 23, 2020 to January 9, 2023

The parties identify the following four sets of grievances as relevant to

Soanes’s first claim. See Motion at 3-9; Response at 3-5, 21-22; Amended

Complaint at 43-44.

On August 21, 2021, Soanes authored an informal grievance (#205-2108-

0896) regarding “photos sent via JPay mail not being delivered.” Doc. 23-3 at

5. He advised that on August 13, 2021, his wife told him that she sent two

pictures via JPay mail, but Soanes had not yet received them. Id. He requested

that his wife be refunded because her photos were not allowed. Id. On August

25, 2021, the institution “returned without processing” Soanes’s informal

grievance because “the act of asking questions or seeking information,

guidance or assistance is not considered to be a grievance.” Id.

Upon receipt of that response, Soanes filed a formal grievance (#2108-

205-290) repeating the same allegations as the informal grievance (#205-2108-

0896) and arguing that the response to his informal grievance was inadequate,

because he did not ask any questions or seek information. Id. at 4. The warden

denied Soanes’s formal grievance stating: “A review of your JPay account was

conducted[. A]lthough your wife stated she attached photos in the email she

failed to actually attach the photos.” Id. at 3.

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Soanes then appealed (#21-6-26808), contending that the warden was

lying and stating that he “will never take the word of such evil people as you

over my wife.” Id. at 2. The Secretary’s office denied the appeal, stating that

“[t]he response that [Soanes] received at the formal level has been reviewed

and is found to appropriately address [his] concerns.” Id. at 1.

Soanes began another round of grievances on January 6, 2022, when he

submitted an informal grievance (#205-2201-0242) regarding “ongoing and

blatant and rampant withholding and delaying of incoming mail.” Doc. 23-4 at

5. He stated that a family member advised him on January 3, 2022, that she

sent him an email, Kwanza card, and photo on December 29, 2021, but Soanes

had not yet received them. Id. He requested that the mail room adhere to the

rules and policies which require that all incoming and outgoing mail be

processed within 48 hours. Id. The institution denied Soanes’s grievance,

noting that “routine mail is processed as received,” and all of his JPay emails

were printed and forwarded to him with the exception of one that was sent to

security on December 31, 2024. Id.

Soanes filed a formal grievance (#2201-205-110) on January 13, 2022,

stating that he still had not received any of his mail, and complaining that he

did not receive notice that a piece of his mail had been sent to security. Id. at

4. The warden denied this formal grievance, because the response he received

18

to his informal grievance was deemed to adequately address the issue. Id. at 3.

Subsequently, the Secretary’s office denied Soanes’s appeal (#22-6-04281) and

advised him that the response he received at the institutional level

appropriately addressed the issue he raised. Id. at 1.

On August 22, 2022, Soanes authored an informal grievance (#205-2208-

0604) complaining that his “incoming J-Mail letters and photos [are] not being

printed out and delivered.” Doc. 23-5 at 5. He stated that on August 16, 2022,

his fiancé advised him that she had mailed two letters and two photos, but he

only received one letter. Id. He requested that his “fiancé receive the JPay

service that she paid for;” the letter and photo from his fiancé be printed and

forwarded to him; and that the FSP mail room adhere to the rules and

regulations. Id. The institution denied Soanes’s grievance, stating that “those

pictures were printed on 8/15/22 [and] forwarded to you.” Id.

Soanes initiated a formal grievance (#2208-205-219) stating that “there

is no way FSP mail room processed and printed [the one email] out and

delivered it to [him] on the very same day (8/15/22)” and regardless, the fixed

wing video camera will show that he did not receive any mail on that date. Id.

at 4. The warden denied his grievance, advising him that the response he

received to his informal grievance adequately addressed his concerns. Id. at 3.

Soanes appealed (#22-6-27139), and the Secretary’s office denied the appeal,

19

advising him that the response to his formal grievance appropriately addressed

his concerns. Id. at 1.

On July 17, 2023, Soanes submitted another informal grievance (#205-

2307-0412) regarding “the fact that the [specified] emails [we]re not showing

up on [his] tablet inbox.” Doc. 23-11 at 13. He advised that “many of [his] emails

[we]re showing on printout but not on [his] email inbox on the tablet,” and he

listed 30 emails and facility support letters dating from July 13, 2021 to

December 12, 2022, that were missing from his inbox. Id. at 13-14. He

requested the specified “emails (and any others) to show in the inbox on [his]

tablet.” Id. at 14. The institution denied Soanes’s informal grievance, stating:

“When reviewing your account, I can only see back to 1/19/23. If you were CM1

or 2 [at] those times, they won’t show up on your tablet.” Id. at 13.

Soanes filed a formal grievance (#2307-205-154) reiterating the same

complaints. Id. at 10-11. He added that the institution’s response was

inadequate as it “fails to address the fact that these emails are in the JPay

System being withheld by the institution and should be on the kiosk and Tablet

inbox.” Id. at 11. He further stated that the institution only provides the

inmates on CM 1 and 2 the mail the institution “wants to print out and issue

to prisoners.” Id. The warden denied the formal grievance, advising Soanes

that the response he received from the institution adequately addressed his

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issue, and that if he has issues with his tablet, he “can place a trouble ticket

using [his] tablet.” Id. at 9.

Soanes submitted an appeal (#23-6-24236) raising the same arguments

and requesting the same remedies as he did in his informal and formal

grievances. Id. at 8. The Secretary’s office denied the appeal, finding that the

response Soanes received at the institutional level appropriately addressed the

issue he raised. Id. at 7.

At the first step of the Turner analysis, taking Soanes’s allegations as

true, the Court finds that dismissal is not warranted, and thus, the Court

proceeds to the second step. The parties agree that the above-listed four sets of

grievances are the relevant grievances with respect to Count One. The parties

dispute whether the substance of those grievances exhausted Soanes’s first

claim, namely that Defendants deleted his incoming emails and scanned

routine mail without notice from July 23, 2020 to January 9, 2023.

Upon review, the Court agrees with Defendants that none of these

grievances would have placed the prison on notice that Soanes believed

Defendants or FSP staff were deleting all of his incoming emails and scanned

routine mail without providing him notice. See Whatley, 802 F.3d at 1214-15

(“The purpose of the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement is to ‘afford corrections

officials time and opportunity to address complaints internally before allowing

21

the initiation of a federal case.’” (quoting Woodford, 548 U.S. at 93)). Soanes

argues that he did not know Defendants were “deleting” his emails until he

received the response to his July 17, 2023 informal grievance (#205-2307-

0412). Response at 4, 21. But even taking that assertion as true, Soanes did

not then submit any grievances relating to his allegations of “deletion” after he

became aware of that fact. Nor did he advise the institution or the Secretary’s

office in his formal grievance or grievance appeal of the July 17, 2023 informal

grievance that Defendants were allegedly deleting all of his incoming mail

without notice as he alleges in the Amended Complaint.

Soanes also argues that the grievance process is unavailable because

“[D]efendants and their administration ha[ve] a culture and practice of doing

all in their arbitrary power to discourage and hinder prisoners’ access to the

court, by officers unable or consistently unwilling to provide any relief to

aggrieved prisoners” through the grievance process. Response at 22. Just

because Soanes did not get the responses he desired does not mean that the

grievance process was unavailable to him. And to the extent that the

institution improperly returned without action his August 21, 2021 informal

grievance (#205-2108-0896), the warden and Secretary’s office both denied

Soanes’s subsequent formal grievance and grievance appeal, respectively, on

22

the same issues. Thus, Soanes suffered no prejudice from the institution’s

alleged improper response.

Defendants have shown, through reference to the exhibits attached to

their Motion and Reply, that the grievance process was available to Soanes

during the relevant timeframes. Thus, the burden shifts to Soanes to show the

process was unavailable to him. See Geter v. Baldwin State Prison, 974 F.3d

1348, 1356 (11th Cir. 2020) (recognizing that once the defendant meets his

burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff, “who, pursuant to Turner, must

demonstrate that the grievance procedure was ‘subjectively’ and ‘objectively’

unavailable to him” (quoting Turner, 541 F.3d at 1085)). He has not done so.

Soanes proceeded through the three-step grievance process multiple times, but

his grievances simply did not allege the same issue as he raises in Count One.

Thus, the Court finds that Soanes failed to exhaust his administrative

remedies as to Count One.10

10 The Court also finds that to the extent Soanes asserts in the Amended Complaint

that he received printed incoming emails and scanned mail during the relevant time

but those items did not appear in his inbox on his tablet, he fails to state a claim of

constitutional dimension. There is no constitutional requirement that inmates

receive the same piece of incoming mail in multiple forms, i.e., printed and via

electronic means.

23

Count Two: Defendants Withheld Soanes’s Outgoing Mail Beyond the

72-Hour Processing Time From January 2023 to April 2023, and on July

17, 2023

The parties identify the following grievances as relevant to Soanes’s

second claim. See Motion at 9-11; Response at 6-7, 18-20; Amended Complaint

at 44-45.

On February 7, 2023, Soanes authored a formal grievance (#2302-205-

063) stating that he submitted an informal grievance on January 12, 2023, but

had not yet received a response so he was proceeding to the formal grievance

step. Doc. 23-6 at 2. He alleged that on January 9, 2023, he received a tablet

but was unable to access emails between July 23, 2020 and the present. Id. He

requested that officials unblock his ability to send emails and stop withholding

his incoming mail without issuing notice to him and/or the sender. Id. The

warden returned without action this formal grievance, because Soanes did not

first submit an informal grievance or otherwise show an acceptable reason for

not following the rules. Id. at 1. “Soanes took no further action” with respect to

this formal grievance. Doc. 23-1 at 9.

On May 23, 2023, Soanes filed another formal grievance (#2305-205-159)

in which he stated that he submitted an informal grievance on May 9, 2023,

but he had not received a timely response so he was proceeding to the next

level of the grievance process. Doc. 23-6 at 6. He alleged a “blatant and

24

rampant withholding of incoming and outgoing emails, disparity in treatment,

discrimination, violation of equal production [sic]” and “retaliation for writing

grievances and being a Prisoners[’] Rights Activist.” Id. He stated that between

April 25, 2023, and May 5, 2023, he sent out 15 emails to family and friends,

but none of his family or friends had received the emails, and on May 5, 2023,

his sister sent him two emails that he had yet to receive. Id.

The warden returned this formal grievance without action for failure to

first file an informal grievance. Id. at 5 (“A review of the log does not reflect an

informal grievance was received from you concerning this issue.”). Soanes filed

a grievance appeal (#23-6-18332) arguing that the formal grievance response

was insufficient because it failed to recognize or address that he advised that

his informal grievance was thrown in the trash. Id. at 4. The Secretary’s office

returned the appeal without action, “because [Soanes’s] grievance at the

institutional level was determined to be in non-compliance with the

requirements of the rule.” Id. at 3.

At the first step of Turner, taking Soanes’s allegations as true, the Court

finds that dismissal is not warranted because Soanes contends that he filed

informal grievances on January 12, 2023, and May 9, 2023, that were never

returned to him. See Response at 6-7. Thus, he argues that the informal

grievance step of the process was unavailable to him, and the warden and

25

Secretary’s office failed to consider his explanation for “by-passing” the

informal grievance step. See id. at 18-20. Therefore, the Court turns to the

second step of the Turner analysis.

Considering the record and the evidence submitted by the parties, the

Court finds that Defendants have met their burden of showing Soanes failed

to exhaust his administrative remedies with respect to his allegations in Count

Two. Specifically, Defendants have shown, through McManus’s and

McClellan’s declarations and relevant exhibits, that the FDOC offers an

administrative grievance procedure in which Soanes actively participated, but

he failed to properly do so for the issue he raises in Count Two. Insofar as

Soanes argues that the informal grievance stage was unavailable to him

because he submitted grievances that were thrown away, he fails to carry his

burden. See Geter, 974 F.3d at 1356. Soanes relies on his own personal

grievance log and his verified statements to contend that he filed informal

grievances that were thrown in the trash. See Doc. 24-2. Notably, however,

while the January 12, 2023 informal grievance appears on Soanes’s personal

log, the alleged May 9, 2023 informal grievance does not. See id. at 2, 4, 6, 8;

see also Rebuttal at 4 (acknowledging that Soanes’s “personal grievance log

may not be complete or fit FDOC standard of record keeping, but it is accurate

as can be”). Thus, given the inaccuracy of Soanes’s personal log, the Court finds

26

it is not credible evidence showing that he actually submitted these informal

grievances. Additionally, Soanes’s conclusory assertion that his informal

grievances were thrown away is insufficient to establish that the informal

grievance process was unavailable to him in light of his grievance-filing

history. Indeed, the record shows that Soanes not only had knowledge of the

grievance process, but that he was proficient in using it. See Whatley v. Smith,

898 F.3d 1072, 1083 (11th Cir. 2018) (noting that the district court

“appropriately considered [the prisoner’s] history of filing grievances as

evidence that the defendants did not make administrative remedies

unavailable to him or lose or destroy his grievances”). As such, the Court finds

that Defendants’ Motion is due to be granted to the extent it seeks dismissal of

Count Two for Soanes’s failure to exhaust.

Count Three: Defendants Censored Soanes’s Outgoing Emails Between

April 25, 2023 and May 29, 2023, and on October 13, 2023, and Provided

him with Vague Censorship Notices

The parties identify the following grievances as relevant to Soanes’s

third claim. See Motion at 11-14; Response at 7-12, 19-20; Amended Complaint

at 45-46.

Soanes contends that he submitted an informal grievance on June 1,

2023, that was “never returned.” Amended Complaint at 45. According to

Soanes, this grievance was regarding “unconstitutional censorship and

27

withholding of [his] outgoing email correspondence simply to eliminate

unflattering or unwelcomed opinions or factually inaccurate statements,

unjustified government interference in violation of First [and] Fourteenth

Amendment right[s], in blatant and rampant retaliation for writing grievances

and being a Prisoners[’] Rights Activist. Censorship notice vague and broad,

[he is] being singled-out, discriminated against.” Id. Soanes asserts that upon

expiration of the time frame in which the institution had to respond to this

grievance, Soanes submitted a formal grievance (#2306-205-173) to the

warden. Id. at 45-46; Doc. 23-2 at 9. The warden returned the formal grievance

without action. See Amended Complaint at 45-46; Doc. 23-2 at 9.

Upon receipt of the response to his formal grievance (#2306-205-173),

Soanes submitted another informal grievance. See Doc. 23-7 at 1. On June 27,

2023, the institution received Soanes’s informal grievance (#205-2306-0778)

regarding the “unconstitutional censorship and withholding of [his] outgoing

email correspondence.” Doc. 23-7 at 1. He indicated on the form that he

“originally submitted” this grievance on June 1, 2023. Id. He stated that on

May 30, 2023, he received censorship notices regarding eleven of his outgoing

emails, but the notices were unconstitutionally vague. Id. He requested, inter

alia, that “all retaliatory censorship and withholding of [his] incoming and

outgoing emails be stopped,” and an “end” to the “vague censorship.” Id. at 2.

28

The institution approved the grievance, noting that Soanes’s “allegations have

been documented and reported.” Id. at 1.11

On July 28, 2023, Soanes submitted an informal grievance (#205-2307-

0683) regarding the institution’s failure to follow through on his approved

grievance (#205-2306-0778). Doc. 23-7 at 11-12. The institution returned the

grievance without action because Soanes addressed more than one issue or

complaint. Id. at 11. Dissatisfied with that response, Soanes submitted a

formal grievance (#2308-205-086), repeating the same allegations as he did in

the informal grievance, and adding that the institution’s response failed to

address the issue he raised regarding his approved grievance. Id. at 9-10. The

warden “returned without action” the formal grievance due to Soanes’s failure

to properly comply with the grievance process. Id. at 8 (“You have not attached

a copy of an informal grievance as required by Chapter 33-103. You attached a

returned informal grievance that does not meet the requirements of Chapter

33-103.006.” (capitalization omitted)). Soanes submitted a grievance appeal

(#23-6-26973), which was similarly returned without action due to his non-

compliance with the grievance process. Id. at 5-7.

11 Defendants do not discuss this grievance because they “admit[] that [Soanes] has

exhausted that informal grievance, in that on May 30, 2023, [Soanes] received 11

notices of censorship that were vague.” Motion at 11 n.2.

29

On October 19, 2023, Soanes authored an informal grievance (#205-

2310-0568) complaining that on October 5, 2023, he received a notice of

censorship of incoming mail/emails, but the notice failed to provide sufficient

information, thus it was unconstitutionally vague. Doc. 23-7 at 15. He

requested that the “censorship notice be made in accordance” with the First

Amendment and Florida Administrative Code, “and that unconstitutionally

censored mail/email be reversed and allowed to be received.” Id. The institution

“returned without action” the grievance, citing as the reason for the return that

“the inmate is using the grievance process to ask questions or seek information,

guidance or assistance.” Id.

Upon receiving that response, Soanes filed a formal grievance (#2310-

205-199), repeating the same allegations and arguing that his informal

grievance was improperly returned “as means of abusing pseudo authority in

avoidance of addressing issue of unconstitutional and vague censorship notice.”

Id. at 14. The warden returned the formal grievance without action, stating:

“This grievance is being returned without further processing in that you have

not attached a copy of an informal grievance as required by Chapter 33-103.

You attached a returned informal grievance that does not meet the

requirements of Chapter 33-103.006.” Id. at 13 (capitalization omitted).

Although Soanes argues that he submitted an appeal that was “never

30

returned,” Response at 12, there is no record of Soanes filing an appeal of this

formal grievance.

The Court finds, at the first step of Turner, that dismissal is not

warranted, and at the second step, concludes that Soanes properly exhausted

this claim. The institution “approved” Soanes’s June 27, 2023 informal

grievance (#205-2306-0778), in which he complained about the

“unconstitutional censorship and withholding of [his] outgoing email

correspondence,” and the eleven vague censorship notices that he received on

May 20, 2023. Doc. 23-7 at 1. Although Soanes received additional censorship

notices after this grievance was approved, “[n]othing in the FDOC’s grievance

procedures requires inmates to file new grievances addressing every

subsequent act by a prison official that contributes to the continuation of a

problem already raised in an earlier grievance.” Parzyck, 627 F.3d at 1219.

Soanes’s approved informal grievance (#205-2306-0778) properly exhausted

his claim regarding the alleged unconstitutional censorship of his outgoing

emails between April 25, 2023, and May 29, 2023, and on October 13, 2023.

Thus, Defendants’ Motion is due to be denied to the extent it seeks dismissal

of Count Three for failure to exhaust.12

12 Defendants seem to recognize that their exhaustion argument with respect to

Count Three is not persuasive. See Reply at 10 (seeking dismissal of Counts One,

31

Count Five: Defendants Deleted Soanes’s Outgoing Emails Without

Notice Between July 17, 2023 and September 11, 2023

The parties identify the following grievance as relevant to Soanes’s

fourth claim. See Motion at 14-15; Response at 12-13, 21-22; Amended

Complaint at 48.

On September 11, 2023, Soanes authored an informal grievance (#205-

2309-0253) regarding the “blatant and rampant violation of Rule 33-210.101,”

and the “deleting of [his] outgoing emails (poems) for which [he is] being

charged and without notice.” Doc. 23-8 at 1. He requested that the mailroom

and Defendant Maddox stop retaliating against him by “deleting [his] outgoing

emails.” Id. The institution denied this grievance, noting that Soanes’s emails

were censored in accordance with the rules governing kiosks and tablets. Id.

(citing Fla. Admin. Code R. 33-602.900, which permits the censoring of an

incoming or outgoing eCommunication if “any part of it . . . depicts, describes,

or encourages activities that may lead to the use of physical violence or group

disruption” and/or “is dangerously inflammatory in that it advocates or

encourages riot, insurrection, disruption of the institution or violation of

Department or institution rules”). The FDOC’s records reflect that Soanes did

Two, and Five for failure to exhaust, and dismissal based on qualified immunity for

Count Three).

32

not take any further action after receiving this response. See Doc. 23-1 at 15.

But in his Amended Complaint, Soanes states that he filed a formal grievance

on September 18, 2023, that was never returned. See Amended Complaint at

48. He appears to acknowledge in his Amended Complaint that he did not file

a grievance appeal. See id. Confusingly, he asserts in his Response that he

“proceeded to step II and III, but his grievances were never returned.”

Response at 13; see id. at 20 (“[Soanes] did in fact submit[] formal grievance

and appeal regarding issue raised in informal grievance no. 205-2309-0253,

those formal grievances did not return.”).

At the first step of Turner, accepting Soanes’s assertions as true, the

Court finds dismissal is not warranted. Thus, proceeding to the second step,

the Court determines that Defendants have met their burden, through

reference to McManus’s Declaration and the other exhibits, that Soanes failed

to exhaust his administrative remedies as to this claim. Soanes contends that

he filed a formal grievance and grievance appeal that were never returned to

him, but there is no evidence to support his conclusory assertions. The FDOC’s

grievance logs and Soanes’s grievances in the record clearly show that Soanes

knew how to use the grievance process, was well aware of its requirements,

and was a well-documented user of the system. Here it appears Soanes simply

failed to properly comply with the grievance procedure with respect to this

33

claim. Therefore, Defendants’ Motion is due to be granted with respect to the

argument that Soanes failed to exhaust his claim raised in Count Five.

b. Qualified Immunity13

Defendants alternatively argue that they are entitled to qualified

immunity on Soanes’s claims. See Motion at 24-29. Because the Court finds

that Soanes only properly exhausted Count Three, the Court will address

Defendants’ qualified immunity argument with respect to that Count only.

“Qualified immunity protects from civil liability government officials

who perform discretionary functions if the conduct of the officials does not

violate ‘clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a

reasonable person would have known.’” Nolin v. Isbell, 207 F.3d 1253, 1255

(11th Cir. 2000) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). As a

result, the qualified immunity defense protects from suit “all but the plainly

13 While Soanes states in the Amended Complaint that he sues each Defendant in his

or her individual and official capacity, he fails to allege any facts to support an official-

capacity claim against any Defendant. Indeed, he does not allege that a custom,

policy, or practice was the “moving force” behind any alleged constitutional violation.

Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 693-94 (1978) (concluding that municipal

liability under § 1983 occurs “when execution of a government’s policy or custom” is

“the moving force” behind the constitutional violation). To the contrary, he argues

that Defendants violated prison policy and acted on their “own personal inculcated

prejudice, sentiments, opinions and interests” when “screening and reviewing”

Soanes’s incoming emails and scanned routine mail. Response at 26. Thus, any

official-capacity claims are due to be dismissed. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

34

incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.” Carr v. Tatangelo, 338

F.3d 1259, 1266 (11th Cir. 2003) (internal quotations and citation omitted).

Indeed, as “‘[g]overnment officials are not required to err on the side of caution,’

qualified immunity is appropriate in close cases where a reasonable officer

could have believed that his actions were lawful.” Lee v. Ferraro, 284 F.3d

1188, 1200 (11th Cir. 2002) (quoting Marsh v. Butler Cnty., Ala., 268 F.3d

1014, 1031 n.8 (11th Cir. 2001)).

“To invoke qualified immunity, a public official must first demonstrate

that he was acting within the scope of his or her discretionary authority.” Jones

v. Fransen, 857 F.3d 843, 851 (11th Cir. 2017). “The term ‘discretionary

authority’ covers ‘all actions of a governmental official that (1) were

undertaken pursuant to the performance of his duties, and (2) were within the

scope of his authority.’” Hinson v. Bias, 927 F.3d 1103, 1116 (11th Cir. 2019)

(quoting Jordan v. Doe, 38 F.3d 1559, 1566 (11th Cir. 1994)). If the official does

so, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate that qualified immunity is

not appropriate using the two-prong test established by the Supreme Court in

Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001). In accordance with Saucier, the

Court must ask whether the facts viewed in the light most favorable to the

plaintiff “show the officer’s conduct violated a constitutional right[.]” Id.; see

also Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 736 (2002); Beshers v. Harrison, 495 F.3d

35

1260, 1265 (11th Cir. 2007) (quoting Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 377 (2007)).

The court must also ask whether the right allegedly violated was clearly

established at the time of the violation. Hope, 536 U.S. at 739; Saucier, 533

U.S. at 201; Scott, 550 U.S. at 377; Underwood v. City of Bessemer, 11 F.4th

1317, 1328 (11th Cir. 2021) (“[W]e ask two questions: (1) whether the facts that

a plaintiff has alleged or shown make out a violation of a constitutional right,

and (2) if so, whether the right at issue was clearly established at the time of

the defendant’s alleged misconduct.”) (internal quotations omitted). The Court

may consider these questions in whichever order it chooses, and qualified

immunity will protect the defendant if the answer to either question is “no.”

Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232, 236 (2009); Underwood, 11 F.4th at

1328. Notably, “[b]ecause § 1983 ‘requires proof of an affirmative causal

connection between the official’s acts or omissions and the alleged

constitutional deprivation,’ each defendant is entitled to an independent

qualified-immunity analysis as it relates to his or her actions and omissions.”

Alcocer v. Mills, 906 F.3d 944, 951 (11th Cir. 2018) (quoting Zatler v.

Wainwright, 802 F.2d 397, 401 (11th Cir. 1986)).

In Count Three, Soanes asserts that Defendants censored his outgoing

emails and provided him with vague censorship notices between April 25, 2023,

36

and May 29, 2023, and on October 13, 2023.14 While he labels his request for

relief as “monetary, declaratory, and injunctive relief,” he fails to request any

declaratory relief. Amended Complaint at 37. Instead, he seeks either

injunctive relief or monetary damages. See id. Indeed, he requests either an

order that directs all STG and mailroom personnel, including but not limited

to Defendants, to (1) “[a]llow an independent and objective audit of FSP main

prisoner email database for the list of all outgoing emails censored by”

Defendants; (2) “[e]nd all unconstitutional censorship, based on desire to

eliminate unwelcoming, or unflattering, or dissenting, or unfavorable

statements, speech, or opinions;” (3) “[e]nd all unjustified government

interference of outgoing emails;” (4) modify the censorship notice

requirements; and (5) require that “all unconstitutionally censored outgoing

emails . . . be replaced” in Soanes’s email account; or award him $10,000 “for

destruction of work for publication in each outgoing email unconstitutionally

censored.” Id. at 37-38.

14 Although Soanes states that Defendants violated his First and Fourteenth

Amendment rights, his allegations in Count Three align with a procedural due

process claim under the Fourteenth Amendment only. He does not challenge a prison

policy as violative of the First Amendment. And his allegations of “retaliation” are

entirely conclusory. Thus, to the extent Soanes attempts to raise any First

Amendment claim, such claim is due to be dismissed without prejudice. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

37

Soanes’s allegations make clear that Defendants were carrying out their

discretionary tasks while reviewing and censoring Soanes’s outgoing emails.

Indeed, Soanes recognizes that part of Defendants’ job is “to screen prisoners[’]

incoming and outgoing emails and scanned routine mail.” Response at 25-26.

He simply disagrees with how Defendants performed their jobs, but Soanes’s

disagreement does not change the fact that Defendants were exercising their

discretionary authority. See Benning v. Comm’r, Georgia Dep’t of Corr., 71

F.4th 1324, 1333 (11th Cir. 2023), cert. denied, 144 S. Ct. 1457 (2024)

(recognizing that prison staff “were carrying out discretionary tasks” when

“intercepting and withholding [the inmate’s] three emails”). Thus, because

Defendants were acting within their discretionary authority, the burden shifts

to Soanes to show that Defendants violated a clearly established constitutional

right.

Courts “examine procedural due process questions in two steps.”

Kentucky Dep’t of Corr. v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989) (citations

omitted). First, the court “asks whether there exists a liberty or property

interest which has been interfered with by the [s]tate[;]” and second, the court

“examines whether the procedures attendant upon that deprivation were

constitutionally sufficient.” Id. Notably, on June 23, 2023, the Eleventh

Circuit, as a matter of first impression, found that inmates have a protected

38

liberty interest in their outgoing emails. See Benning, 71 F.4th at 1329-31

(concluding that a Georgia inmate had a liberty interest in his outgoing emails

that triggered due process protections). Thus, for any conduct prior to the June

2023 Benning decision, Soanes’s liberty interest in his outgoing emails was not

“clearly established.” See id. at 1334 (“[A]t the time [the defendants] acted [in

September and October 2017,] there was no governing and materially similar

precedent concerning the due process implications of confiscating,

intercepting, or censoring outgoing emails generated by inmates).

Moreover, Soanes fails to allege that the notices he received violated the

Due Process Clause. He contends that the eleven notices he received from

emails he sent between April 25, 2023, and May 29, 2023, were “broad and

vague” and failed to list the names of the sender and intended recipient, the

date, or the specific statute or rule violated; provide an example of the violative

speech; give notice whether the intended recipient was notified; or indicate the

name of the person conducting or authorizing the censorship. Amended

Complaint at 17. As to the notices he subsequently received, Soanes states:

“On 10/13/23, [Soanes] received three (3) more vague and unconstitutional

censorship notices of emails which had been sent out months prior,

unconstitutionally censored by [Defendants] via practice of using vague and

unconstitutional censorship notice is ongoing.” Id. at 26. While Soanes may

39

desire a more detailed censorship notice, he is not constitutionally entitled to

one.15 See Peterka v. Dixon, No. 4:21CV367-WS-MAF, 2024 WL 4251914, at *7

(N.D. Fla. Aug. 20, 2024), report and recommendation adopted, 2024 WL

4347873 (Sept. 30, 2024) (“There is no requirement that notice be elaborate,

explanatory, or elucidative.”).16 Due process simply requires “that the inmate

be ‘notified of the rejection of [the] letter written by . . . him,’ and that he be

‘given a reasonable opportunity to protest that decision,’ with his complaint

being ‘referred to a prison official other than the person who originally

disapproved the correspondence.’” Benning, 71 F.4th at 1332 (quoting

Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 418-19 (1974)). According to Soanes’s own

allegations, he received notice of the censored emails, he was able to file

grievances regarding his complaints of vague and unconstitutional censorship,

and those grievances were decided by staff other than Defendants. Thus,

15 Additionally, insofar as Soanes alleges that Defendants’ censorship notices violated

prison policy, such an allegation does not amount to a constitutional violation. See

Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 481-82 (1995) (recognizing that prison regulations

are “not designed to confer rights on inmates”); see also Taylor v. Adams, 221 F.3d

1254, 1259 (11th Cir. 2000) (“[F]ailure to follow procedures does not, by itself, rise to

the level of deliberate indifference because doing so is at most a form of negligence.”).

16 Although decisions of other district courts are not binding, they may be cited as

persuasive authority. See Stone v. First Union Corp., 371 F.3d 1305, 1310 (11th Cir.

2004) (noting that “[a]lthough a district court would not be bound to follow any other

district court’s determination, the decision would have significant persuasive

effects”).

40

Soanes fails to allege a due process violation with respect to the “vague and

unconstitutional” censorship notices he received,17 and Defendants are entitled

to qualified immunity on this claim.

Accordingly, it is

ORDERED:

1. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint (Doc. 23) is

GRANTED to the extent that Counts One, Two, and Five are DISMISSED

without prejudice for Soanes’s failure to exhaust his administrative

remedies, and Count Three is DISMISSED with prejudice based on

qualified immunity.

2. To the extent Soanes attempted to raise a claim under the First

Amendment in Count Three or any official-capacity claims, such claims are

DISMISSED without prejudice for failure to state a claim.

17 Qualified immunity does not apply to requests for injunctive or declaratory relief.

See Benning, 71 F.4th at 1335 (“[Q]ualified immunity is only a defense to personal

liability for monetary awards resulting from government officials performing

discretionary functions, and may not be effectively asserted as a defense to a claim

for declaratory or injunctive relief.” (internal quotations and citation omitted)).

However, because the Court finds that Soanes fails to state a due process claim, the

Court finds it appropriate to also dismiss Soanes’s requests for injunctive relief.

41

3. The Clerk shall enter judgment accordingly, terminate any

pending motions, and close the file.

DONE AND ORDERED at Jacksonville, Florida, this 21st day of

February, 2025.

MARCIA MORALES HOWARD

United States District Judge

JAX-3 2/18

C:

Keith Soanes, #191981

Counsel of Record

A2