Ashbrook v. Meigs County, Tennessee

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE

AT CHATTANOOGA

HANNAH ASHBROOK, )

)

Plaintiff, )

) 1:24-cv-165

v. )

) Judge Curtis L. Collier

MEIGS COUNTY, TENNESSEE, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

)

M E M O R A N D U M

Before the Court is a motion to dismiss Defendant Casey Stokes on the grounds of judicial

immunity. (Doc. 36.) Plaintiff has responded. (Doc. 38.) Defendant Stokes has replied. (Doc.

41.) This matter is now ripe for review.

I. BACKGROUND1

On May 11, 2023, Plaintiff Hannah Ashbrook accompanied her boyfriend, Steven Kelsey,

to the Meigs County General Sessions Court where Defendant, Meigs County General Sessions

Court Judge Casey Stokes, presided as judge. (Doc. 38 at 4.) Plaintiff and her boyfriend arrived

at the courthouse around 8:30 AM (Doc. 39 at Camera 11, Part 1, 8:30:01) and entered the

courtroom at 8:54 AM (id. at 8:54:32). At 9:09 AM, Defendant Stokes entered the courtroom

through the main public hallway. (Id. at Camera 10, Part 1, 9:09:25.) Defendant Stokes was

wearing jeans and a polo shirt rather than a judicial robe. (See id.)

Plaintiff and her boyfriend exited the courtroom for the first time at 9:37 AM and are seen

talking to a person who appears to be the boyfriend’s lawyer. (Doc. 39 at Camera 9, Part 1,

1 This summary of the facts accepts all the factual allegations in Plaintiff’s complaint as

true. See Gunasekera v. Irwin, 551 F.3d 461, 466 (6th Cir. 2009).

9:37:24.) Plaintiff reentered the courtroom at 9:43 AM. (Id. at 9:43:46.) Plaintiff and her

boyfriend exited the courtroom for the last time over an hour later at 10:48 AM. (Id. at Camera

11, Part 2, 10:48:02.) Plaintiff denies that she engaged in inappropriate conduct while in Defendant

Stokes’ courtroom. (Doc. 38 at 6.)

As part of a bond condition, Defendant Stokes ordered Plaintiff’s boyfriend to a urine drug

screen. (Doc. 38 at 5.) Following the hearing, Plaintiff waited some time with her boyfriend in

the hallway but she eventually left the courthouse at 11:06 AM. (Doc. 39 at Camera 11, Part 2,

11:06:27.) Plaintiff contends she left the premises without limitation and “no one sought to restrain

her, counsel her, admonish her, or detain her.” (Doc. 38. at 15.)

Less than twenty minutes later, at 11:25 AM, Plaintiff returned to the Meigs County

Courthouse to retrieve her boyfriend’s phone. (Doc. 39 at Camera 11, Part 2, 11:25:05.) This was

only one minute after Plaintiff’s boyfriend was placed in custody for failing to comply with his

bond conditions. (Id. at 11:23:25; Doc. 38 at 5.) When she returned to the courthouse hallway,

she “approached an officer to ask where [her boyfriend] was.” (Doc. 38 at 8.) Defendant Stokes,

who was standing near the hallway, then ordered officers to detain and drug test her. (Doc. 1 ¶ 29;

Doc. 39 at Camera 10, Part 2, 11:25:19.) According to Plaintiff, without probable cause or reason,

Plaintiff was forced to submit to the drug test. (Doc. 1 ¶ 29.) Defendant Stokes was not wearing

a judicial robe at this time. (Id. ¶ 28; Doc. 39 at Camera 10, Part 2, 11:25:19.)

Plaintiff asserts she was taken into the bathroom and given thirty seconds to give a urine

sample. (Doc. 1 ¶¶ 37–38.) Based on a verbal announcement that Plaintiff was positive for drugs,

Plaintiff was handcuffed and arrested. (Id. ¶ 43.) Defendant Stokes then “sua sponte entered [a]

Judgment . . . stating that Plaintiff was in criminal contempt and ordered that she be incarcerated

in the Meigs County Jail for a period of ten (10) days.” (Id. ¶ 47.) The reason for her confinement

was listed as “PRE TRIAL MISDEMEANOR” in the Meigs County Sheriff’s Department’s

Booking Report. (Id. ¶¶ 53–54.) Plaintiff was incarcerated in Meigs County Jail for ten

consecutive days. (Id. ¶ 55.)

During the morning of May 11, 2023, the courthouse footage shows Defendant Stokes

standing right outside the courtroom, which is adjacent to the hallway, multiple times. (See, e.g.,

Doc. 39 at Camera 10, Part 2 at 11:00–11:20; id. at Camera 11, Part 2, 11:02–11:09.) This area

was visible from the hallway, and Plaintiff walked past Defendant Stokes while he was standing

there. (Id. at Camera 11, Part 2, 11:05:20.) The footage also shows Defendant Stokes walking in

the public courthouse hallway multiple times that morning. (See, e.g., id. at Camera 9, Part 1, at

8:54:10; id. at Camera 9, Part 2, at 10:39:36, 10:45:34, 11:02:11; id. at Camera 11, Part 1, 9:53:40,

10:05; id. at Camera 11, Part 2 at 10:39:36–10:41:13, 10:44:37, 10:58:45–11:00:03.) Plaintiff

passed by Defendant Stokes in the hallway. (Id. at Camera 9, Part 1, at 9:54:37; id. at Camera 11,

Part 1, at 9:54:37.) At no time was Defendant Stokes wearing a judicial robe.

Based on these allegations, Plaintiff Hannah Ashbrook filed a complaint against Meigs

County, Tennessee, Judge Casey Stokes, Sheriff Jackie Melton, Probation Officer Carol Petit, and

Deputy Ben Christian on May 8, 2024.2 (Doc. 1.) Plaintiff invoked 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988,

constitutional law, and Tennessee state law as the legal basis for her complaint. (Id. at 1–2.) She

asserts claims for false arrest, unlawful seizure, excessive force, denial of the right to notice and

counsel, denial of due process, false arrest, and false imprisonment. (Id. at 11–29.) Defendants

answered the complaint and denied the allegations. (Doc. 12.) Defendant Stokes now moves the

2 The parties stipulated that Plaintiff’s action against Jackie Melton, Carol Petit, and Ben

Christian and the official capacity action against Casey Stokes be dismissed as redundant since

Meigs County, Tennessee is also a party Defendant. (Doc. 40.)

Court to dismiss the case against him with prejudice on the grounds of judicial immunity. (Doc.

36.)

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A defendant may move to dismiss a claim for “failure to state a claim upon which relief

can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). In ruling on a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6),

a court must accept all the factual allegations in the complaint as true and construe the complaint

in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Gunasekera v. Irwin, 551 F.3d 461, 466 (6th Cir. 2009)

(quoting Hill v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mich., 49 F.3d 710, 716 (6th Cir. 2005)). The court

is not, however, bound to accept bare assertions of legal conclusions as true. Papasan v. Allain,

478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986).

In deciding a motion under Rule 12(b)(6), a court must determine whether the complaint

contains “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp.

v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). Although a complaint need only contain a “short and plain

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.

662, 677–78 (2009) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)), this statement must nevertheless contain

“factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable

for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 678. Plausibility “is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’

but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. (quoting

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more

than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not ‘show[n]’—

‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.’” Id. at 679 (alteration in original) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P.

8(a)(2)). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory

statements, do not suffice.” Id. at 678.

Rule 12(d) provides that “[i]f, on a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) . . . matters outside the

pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion must be treated as one for

summary judgment under Rule 56.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d). The Sixth Circuit has taken a “liberal

view” of matters falling within the pleadings for purposes of Rule 12(b)(6). Armengau v. Cline, 7

F. App’x 336, 334 (6th Cir. 2001). “If extrinsic materials merely ‘fill in the contours and details’

of a complaint, they add nothing new and may be considered without converting the motion to one

for summary judgment.” Id. Here, the Court will review the courthouse footage without

converting the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment, as it tends to fill in details

of allegations within Plaintiff’s complaint. See id.; see, e.g., Rodriguez v. Providence Cmty. Corr.,

Inc., 191 F. Supp. 3d 758, 763 (M.D. Tenn. 2016).

III. DISCUSSION

Defendant Stokes argues that Plaintiff’s allegations, even if true, are barred by the doctrine

of judicial immunity. (Doc. 37 at 7.)

“Judicial officers generally are absolutely immune from civil suits for monetary damages

under § 1983 for their judicial actions.” Cooper v. Parrish, 203 F.3d 937, 944 (6th Cir. 2000)

(citing Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 9–10 (1991)); see also Leech v. DeWeese, 689 F.3d 538, 542

(6th Cir. 2012) (“It is well-established that judges enjoy judicial immunity from suits arising out

of the performance of their judicial functions.” (quoting Brookings v. Clunk, 389 F.3d 614, 617

(6th Cir. 2004))). “While this doctrine may seem unfair to an individual litigant seeking to

vindicate his or her rights against a judge, it ultimately protects the public at large because there is

‘a long-settled understanding that the independent and impartial exercise of judgment vital to the

judiciary might be impaired by exposure to potential damages liability.’” Orta v. Repp, No.

3:22-cv-00359, 2022 WL 17617308, at *3 (N.D. Ohio Dec. 13, 2022), aff’d. No. 23-3034, 2023

WL 5666161 (6th Cir. Sept. 1, 2023) (quoting Barnes v. Winchell, 105 F.3d 1111, 1115 (6th Cir.

1997)). “[J]udicial officers should be free to make controversial decisions and act upon their

convictions without fear of personal liability.” Cooper, 203 F.3d at 944 (citing Stump v. Sparkman,

435 U.S. 349, 355–56 (1978)); see also Mireles, 502 U.S. at 10. “Judicial immunity exists even

where a judge acts corruptly or with malice.” Leech, 689 F.3d at 542 (citations omitted).

While absolute judicial immunity is generally protective of judicial officers, it does not

apply in two circumstances. Orta v. Repp, No. 23-3034, 2023 WL 5666161, at *2 (6th Cir. Sept.

1, 2023) (citing Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11). First, judicial immunity does not apply to “actions not

taken in the judge’s judicial capacity.” Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11 (citations omitted). Second, judicial

immunity does not apply to “actions, though judicial in nature, taken in the complete absence of

all jurisdiction.” Id. at 12 (citations omitted). As the party asserting judicial immunity, Defendant

Stokes bears the burden of establishing that it exists. See Leech, 689 F.3d at 542 (quoting

Brookings, 389 F.3d at 617).

Defendant Stokes moves the Court to dismiss the case against him, arguing that he is

entitled to absolute immunity pursuant to the doctrine of judicial immunity. (Doc. 36 at 1.) The

parties agree that Defendant Stokes is generally protected by the doctrine of judicial immunity.

(See Doc. 38 at 11.) Plaintiff argues, however, that Defendant’s conduct fell under the exceptions

to the judicial immunity defense. (Id.) The Court will evaluate the two exceptions in turn.

A. Whether Defendant Acted in the Absence of All Jurisdiction

In evaluating the defense of judicial immunity, the first question the Court addresses is

whether Defendant Stokes had jurisdiction to act. See Mireles, 502 U.S. at 12. The Sixth Circuit

has held that “where a court has some subject matter jurisdiction over the underlying legal actions,”

there is sufficient jurisdiction for immunity purposes. Cooper, 203 F.3d at 946 (emphasis in

original). The scope of the judge’s jurisdiction is construed broadly. Stump, 435 U.S. at 356.

Therefore, a judge only loses protection from immunity for actions that clearly fall outside of the

boundaries of a judge’s power. Marchant v. Moore, No. 3:09-cv-1218, 2010 WL 3872867, at *2

(M.D. Tenn. Sept. 28, 2010). A judge will not be deprived of immunity just because an action

was taken in error or in excess of authority. Mireles, 502 U.S. at 12.

Here, Defendant Stokes bears the burden of showing he had at least “some subject matter

jurisdiction over the underlying legal actions.” See Cooper, 203 F.3d at 946. Defendant Stokes

argues that he was the “presiding judicial officer in the General Sessions Court for Meigs County,

Tennessee, and therefore all cases pending and other happenings in court fell totally within his

jurisdiction.” (Doc. 37 at 2.)

In response, Plaintiff contends that “[a]t the time the Plaintiff was wrongly seized by police

at the direction of Defendant Stokes she was (1) not a party before the [c]ourt; (2) she was not a

witness to a preceding pending before the [c]ourt, and (3) the [c]ourt was not conducting any

proceeding.” (Doc. 38 at 3.) Plaintiff explains that after her boyfriend’s hearing ended, Plaintiff

left the courthouse premises entirely. (Id. at 8.) She contends she left without limitation and “no

one sought to restrain her, counsel her, admonish her, or detain her.” (Id. at 15.) Shortly after,

Plaintiff returned to retrieve her boyfriend’s personal property. (Id. at 8, 15.) It was only then that

Defendant Stokes ordered Plaintiff to be seized by officers in the hallway and forced to submit to

a drug test. (Id. at 15.) For this reason, Plaintiff argues that when Plaintiff returned to the

courthouse on a personal errand to collect her boyfriend’s property, Defendant Stokes acted in the

absence of all jurisdiction by “requiring a private citizen who is not before his [c]ourt to forcibly

submit to a drug test . . . absent a bond condition or other order requiring negative drug tests.” (Id.

at 14.)

When evaluating the jurisdiction exception, courts must consider the judge’s power to hear

a particular case and the full scope of the judge’s statutory judicial authority. Marchant, 2010 WL

3872867, at *2. In Tennessee, trial judges have broad discretion when it comes to management of

their courtrooms. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 16-1-102 (2021) (“Every court has the power to: (1)

Enforce order in its immediate presence, or as near thereto as is necessary to prevent interruption,

disturbance, or hinderance to its proceedings.”). Trial courts also have the authority to regulate

the premises of the courthouse. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 358 (1966) (“The courtroom

and courthouse premises are subject to the control of the court.”)

Further, trial judges have the inherent discretionary power to punish for contempt in order

to preserve the power and dignity of the court. In re Brown, 470 S.W.3d 433, 443 (Tenn. Ct. App.

2015) (quoting Black v. Bount, 938 S.W.2d. 394, 398 (Tenn. 1996)). This principle has been

codified in Tennessee Code Annotated § 16-1-103, which states “[f]or the effectual exercise of its

powers, every court is vested with the power to punish for contempt.”

Here, Defendant Stokes had the general power to control the courthouse and hold

individuals present there in contempt. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 16-1-103. Viewing the facts in the

light most favorable to the Plaintiff, Plaintiff was never disruptive in front of Defendant Stokes

and never received warnings for her behavior. (Doc. 1 ¶ 24; Doc. 38 at 13.) Nevertheless, whether

Defendant Stokes used his power appropriately is not the relevant question. See Mireles, 502 U.S.

at 12. “Even if we assume that Defendant [Stokes] acted in excess of his authority by detaining

Plaintiff without probable cause or reasonable suspicion, Defendant did not act in the clear absence

of jurisdiction because the power to detain was within the scope of his authority.” See Marchant,

2010 WL 3872867, at *3 (finding a Tennessee state judge who ordered a spectator to take a drug

test had jurisdiction for the purposes of judicial immunity even if he acted in excess of his

authority). Misapplication of the law is an act in excess of jurisdiction, not in absence of it. See

Stump, 435 U.S. at 357 n.7 (citation omitted).

Moreover, the Court recognizes that Defendant Stokes may have been in error by

summarily holding Plaintiff in contempt and sentencing her to jail instead of scheduling a hearing.

See Tenn. R. Crim. Pro. 42; In re Brown, 470 S.W.3d at 445 (noting summary contempt powers

should be used sparingly in exceptional circumstances because summary punishment “departs,

often dramatically, from traditional notions of due process that are the hallmarks of criminal

justice” (quotations and citation omitted)). The Court further recognizes that Defendant Stokes

may have violated state procedural requirements by failing to specify the contemptuous conduct

in the contempt judgment. See Tenn. R. Crim. Pro. 42. Although the exercise of his authority

might have been “flawed by the commission of grave procedural errors,” see Stump, 435 U.S. at

359, Defendant Stokes may still invoke the shield of absolute immunity because he had at least

some subject matter jurisdiction. See Cooper, 203 F.3d at 946. Therefore, because Defendant

Stokes was not acting in the absence of all jurisdiction, this exception to judicial immunity does

not apply in this case. See Mireles, 502 U.S. at 12; Marchant, 2010 WL 3872867, at *3.

B. Whether Defendant’s Acts were Judicial

The next question is whether Defendant’s acts were judicial. See Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11.

Drawing the line between judicial and nonjudicial acts can be difficult. See Forrester v. White,

484 U.S. 219, 227 (1988) (“Difficulties have arisen primarily in attempting to draw the line

between truly judicial acts, for which immunity is appropriate, and acts that simply happen to have

been done by judges.”). Whether an act is judicial or nonjudicial depends “on ‘the nature of the

function performed, not the identity of the actor who performed it.’” Barrett v. Harrington, 130

F.3d 246, 257 (6th Cir. 1997) (quoting Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 269 (1993)); see

also Mireles, 502 U.S. at 13. First, courts should look to whether the action is a function that is

normally performed by a judge. Stump, 435 U.S. at 362. Second, courts should look to “the

expectations of the parties,” including whether they were dealing with the judge in his judicial

capacity. Id.

In Marchant v. Moore, a Tennessee state court judge ordered a spectator in his courtroom

to take a drug test despite not having any suspicion that he was under the influence. 2010 WL

3872867, at *1. The plaintiff argued that the alleged actions were not judicial acts because “judges

do not normally detain courtroom spectators for no reason and subject them to drug testing.” Id. at

*4. The district court explained that this argument misconstrues the requirements of the exception

laid out in Stump, stating:

When examining whether the behavior is normally performed by a judge, a court

must look at the general type of behavior that the judge was undertaking, rather

than the specific actions a judge took in any particular case. See Mireles, 502 U.S.

at 12. Thus, the key inquiry here is not into the particulars of Defendant’s behavior

and whether or not it comported with the law; rather, the Court must consider

whether the general nature and function of the act are acceptable. Id. As noted

above, a sitting judge has substantial authority to control the behavior of those

present in her courtroom. See, e.g., Cameron, 38 F.3d at 271. Therefore, because

Defendant’s behavior falls within a general category of behavior normally

performed by a judge, the first prong of the Stump judicial behavior test is satisfied.

Id.

Similarly, in this case, Plaintiff argues that “instructing law enforcement to force a private

citizen who is not before the court in any capacity and who is not engaged in outrageous conduct

to submit to a drug test against the person’s will is not a ‘function normally performed by a judge.’”

(Doc. 38 at 13 (quoting Mireles, 502 U.S. at 12).) Plaintiff argues Defendant Stokes acted more

like a “cop” than a judge. (Id. at 11–12.) As explained in Marchant, the Court need not inquire

into the particulars of Defendant Stokes’ behavior or whether it comported with the law. See 2010

WL 3872867, at *4. Instead, the Court must consider the general type of behavior Defendant

Stokes was undertaking. See id.

As explained above, as the sole Sessions Court Judge, Defendant Stokes had substantial

authority to control the behavior of those within his courtroom and the courthouse. See Tenn.

Code Ann. § 16-1-102; Sheppard, 384 U.S. at 358. Defendant Stokes also had authority to hold

individuals within the courthouse in contempt. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 16-1-103. Although

Defendant Stokes’ actions may have not been common, or even justified, he was still performing

a normal function of a judge when he ordered Plaintiff, a recent spectator in his courtroom, to be

detained and drug tested. See Marchant, 2010 WL 3872867, at *4.

When evaluating this exception, the Court must also consider the expectations of Plaintiff

when she interacted with Defendant Stokes. See Stump, 435 U.S. at 362. This inquiry looks to

whether the behavior occurred within a proper judicial context. Marchant, 2010 WL 3872867, at

*5. Here, by attending her boyfriend’s hearing before Defendant Stokes (Doc. 38 at 4), Plaintiff

dealt with Defendant in his official capacity, even if Plaintiff was merely a spectator and not a

party to any pending action before the court. See Marchant, 2010 WL 3872867, at *5.

Plaintiff, however, argues that she did not intend to deal with Defendant Stokes in a judicial

manner when she returned to the courthouse to retrieve her boyfriend’s personal property as a

private citizen. (Doc. 38 at 8, 15.) Plaintiff further argues “[t]he events did not even occur in

Defendant Stokes’ chambers[,] Defendant Stokes was not on the bench, was not clothed in the

vestments of his position, and was not conducting any apparent court business when he

encountered Plaintiff in the hallway of the [c]ourthouse while Plaintiff was performing a private

errand as a private citizen.” (Id. at 13–14.)

The Supreme Court has noted that absolute immunity is still available for judges who hold

a litigant in contempt even when they are “not in [their] ... robes, ... no[r] in the courtroom itself.”

Stump, 435 U.S. at 361 (quotations and citations omitted). However, it is important to consider

whether the “confrontation arose directly and immediately out of a visit to the judge in his official

capacity.” Id. In Otra v. Repp, the Sixth Circuit drew a distinction in its analysis, noting that

dealing with a judge in his courtroom during a proceeding is different than “encountering him

elsewhere in the courthouse while on a personal errand.” 2023 WL 5666161, at *2 (6th Cir. Sept.

1, 2023).

On May 11, 2023, Plaintiff accompanied her boyfriend to the Meigs County General

Sessions Court where Defendant Stokes presided as judge. (Doc. 38 at 4.) Plaintiff and her

boyfriend exited the courtroom for the last time at 10:48 AM. (Doc. 39 at Camera 11, Part 2,

10:48:02.) Defendant Stokes ordered Plaintiff’s boyfriend to take a urine drug screen as a bond

condition. (Doc. 38. at 4.) After waiting some time with her boyfriend in the hallway, Plaintiff

left the courthouse at 11:06 AM. (Doc. 39 at Camera 11, Part 2, 11:06:27.) She returned less than

twenty minutes later to retrieve her boyfriend’s phone at 11:25 AM. (Id. at Camera 11, Part 2,

11:25:05.) This was only one minute after Plaintiff’s boyfriend had been placed in custody in the

courthouse hallway. (Id. at Camera 11, Part 2, 11:23:25.)

When she returned to the courthouse, she “approached an officer to ask where [her

boyfriend] was.” (Doc. 38 at 8.) Accordingly, rather than fulfilling a personal errand, her objective

at the courthouse was directly connected to her boyfriend’s encounter with Defendant Stokes. See

Otra, 2023 WL 5666161, at *2 (6th Cir. Sept. 1, 2023). Unlike the distinction made in Otra v.

Repp, see id., the “confrontation arose directly and immediately out of [her] visit to the judge in

his official capacity” when she asked officers about her boyfriend’s status after attending his

hearing before Defendant Stokes earlier that morning. See Stump, 435 U.S. at 361.

Moreover, while Defendant Stokes was not wearing a robe when he encountered Plaintiff

in the courthouse hallway, Defendant Stokes also did not wear a robe in his courtroom during the

judicial proceedings that day. (Doc. 39 at Camera 10, Part 1, 9:09:25, 10:08:38.) Plaintiff, as a

spectator in Defendant Stokes’ courtroom earlier in the day, cannot reasonably argue that

Defendant Stokes’ dress affected her expectations in the hallway. See Stump, 435 U.S. at 362.

Additionally, although the encounter did not happen in Defendant Stokes’ courtroom or

chambers, the courthouse hallway is very close in proximity to Defendant Stokes’ courtroom and

chambers. (See, e.g., Doc. 39 at Camera 11, Part 1.) The courthouse footage shows Defendant

Stokes standing directly outside the courtroom, which is adjacent to the hallway, multiple times

during the morning of May 11, 2023. (See, e.g., id. at Camera 10, Part 2 at 11:00–11:20; id. at

Camera 11, Part 2, 11:02–11:09.) The footage also shows Defendant Stokes walking in the

courthouse hallway multiple times that morning. (See, e.g., id. at Camera 9, Part 1, at 8:54:10; id.

at Camera 9, Part 2, at 10:39:36, 10:45:34, 11:02:11; id. at Camera 11, Part 1, 9:53:40–10:05; id.

at Camera 11, Part 2 at , 10:39:36–10:41:13, 10:44:37, 10:58:45–11:00:03.) Plaintiff even passed

by Defendant Stokes in the hallway during a break from court. (Id. at Camera 9, Part 1, at 9:54:37.)

Thus, it would be reasonable for Plaintiff to expect to encounter Defendant Stokes in his judicial

capacity in the hallway when she returned to the courthouse. See Stump, 435 U.S. at 362.

Therefore, when taken together, the facts support the conclusion that this exception does not apply

in this case because Defendant Stokes was acting in his judicial capacity.

IV. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, Defendant’s motion to dismiss (Doc. 36) will be GRANTED. Plaintiff’s

claims against Defendant Stokes will be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. Pursuant to the

Scheduling Order (Doc. 17), an additional scheduling conference will be held on March 13, 2025,

at 3:00 p.m. Eastern.

AN APPROPRIATE ORDER WILL ENTER.

/s/___________________________

CURTIS L. COLLIER

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE