“[T]he statute requires that the prisoner’s complaint seek to redress an imminent danger of serious physical injury and that this danger must be fairly traceable to a violation of law alleged in the complaint.”
How later courts described this case
- “[T]he statute requires that the prisoner’s complaint seek to redress an imminent danger of serious physical injury and that this danger must be fairly traceable to a violation of law alleged in the complaint.”
- stating that, in applying 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), “the issue is whether [the] complaint, as a whole, alleges imminent danger of serious physical injury”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
SOUTHERN DIVISION
QUINCETTA Y. CARGILL, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Case No. 2:25-cv-0022-AMM-JHE
)
UNITED STATES, et al., )
)
Defendants. )
ORDER OF DISMISSAL
Plaintiff Quincetta Y. Cargill filed a pro se complaint, alleging violations of
her civil rights. Docs. 1, 2. Ms. Cargill names as defendants the United States of
America, the U.S. Attorney’s Office, and Assistant U.S. Attorney Melissa K.
Atwood. Doc. 1 at 1. Ms. Cargill challenges her federal convictions and requests
discovery which she asserts will establish that law enforcement officials and federal
prosecutors “knowingly and intentionally presented false claims” to initiate criminal
proceedings against her. Doc. 1 at 1–2; Doc. 2 at 3–4.
On January 16, 2025, the magistrate judge entered a report recommending the
court dismiss this action without prejudice pursuant to the three strikes provision of
28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). Doc. 4. The magistrate judge noted that Ms. Cargill has filed
three or more cases that have been dismissed as frivolous or for failure to state a
claim and her claims in the present complaint do not establish that she meets the
imminent danger exception to § 1915(g). Id. at 2. The magistrate judge advised Ms.
Cargill of her right to file written objections within 14 days. Id. at 2–3. On February
3, 2025, Ms. Cargill filed a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, Doc. 5,
and objections to the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation, Doc. 6.
In her objections, Ms. Cargill contends that she meets the imminent danger
exception to the three strikes provision. Id. at 1–5. She states that an unidentified
prison official physically assaulted her on an unidentified date while she was housed
at FCI-Tallahassee.1 Id. at 1–2; Doc. 6-3 at 1. Ms. Cargill further asserts that she has
endured retaliation, threats, and “violent assaults” from unidentified prison officials
at different institutions for her support of sexually abused inmates. Doc. 6 at 2–4.
Additionally, she alleges that her health is declining due to inadequate medical care
and the Bureau of Prisons’ “staffing crisis.” Id. at 3.
To qualify for the imminent danger exception to the three strikes provision, a
prisoner must allege “specific fact allegations of ongoing serious physical injury” or
“a pattern of misconduct evidencing the likelihood of imminent serious physical
injury.” Sutton v. Dist. Att’y’s Office, 334 F. App’x 278, 279 (11th Cir. 2009). Here,
Ms. Cargill’s allegations of past injuries are insufficient to establish imminent
danger. Medberry v. Butler, 185 F.3d 1189, 1193 (11th Cir. 1999) (“[A] prisoner’s
allegation that he faced imminent danger sometime in the past is an insufficient basis
1 Ms. Cargill is currently incarcerated at FCC-Hazelton in West Virginia. Doc. 1 at 3.
to allow him to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to the imminent danger
exception to the statute.”). To the extent Ms. Cargill contends generally that she has
not received adequate medical care or that she faces danger in the future, Doc. 6 at
3, 5, her allegations are speculative and/or unsupported by specific facts.
Furthermore, Ms. Cargill’s allegations of retaliation, threats, physical assaults,
and inadequate medical care are unrelated to her claims in the complaint in which
she alleges federal prosecutors conspired to initiate criminal proceedings against her.
See Daker v. Robinson, 802 F. App’x 513, 515 (11th Cir. 2020) (explaining that the
allegations of imminent danger must be related to “the crux of the complaint”) (citing
Pettus v. Morgenthau, 554 F.3d 293, 297 (2d Cir. 2009) (“[T]he statute requires that
the prisoner’s complaint seek to redress an imminent danger of serious physical
injury and that this danger must be fairly traceable to a violation of law alleged in
the complaint.”)); Brown v. Johnson, 387 F.3d 1344, 1350 (11th Cir. 2004) (stating
that, in applying 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), “the issue is whether [the] complaint, as a
whole, alleges imminent danger of serious physical injury”). While Ms. Cargill
states her wrongful incarceration amounts to “torture,” Doc. 6 at 4, her complaint
and objections are devoid of specific factual support that she faces imminent or
ongoing serious physical injury. Accordingly, Ms. Cargill’s objections, Doc. 6, are
OVERRULED.
Having carefully reviewed and considered de novo all the materials in the
court file, including the report and recommendation, Doc. 4, and Ms. Cargill’s
objections, Doc. 6, the court ADOPTS the magistrate judge’s report and ACCEPTS
his recommendation. Ms. Cargill has not established that she is under imminent
danger of serious physical injury to warrant an exception to the three strikes
provision under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). Because Ms. Cargill did not pay the filing and
administrative fee of $405 when she filed the complaint, this action is DISMISSED
WITHOUT PREJUDICE pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). Additionally, Ms.
Cargill’s motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, Doc. 5, is DENIED.
For information regarding the cost of appeal, see the attached notice.
DONE and ORDERED this 21st day of February, 2025.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
United States Court of Appeals
Eleventh Circuit
56 Forsyth Street, N.W.
Atlanta, Georgia 30303
David J. Smith In Replying Give Number
Clerk of Court of Case and Names of Parties
NOTICE TO PRISONERS CONCERNING CIVIL APPEALS
The Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (effective April 26, 1996) now REQUIRES that
all prisoners pay the Court’s $600 docket fee plus $5 filing fee (for a total of $605) when appealing
any civil judgment.
If you wish to appeal in a civil case that Act now requires that upon filing a notice of
appeal you either:
(1) Pay the total $605 fee to the clerk of the district court from which
this case arose; or
(2) arrange to have a prison official certify to the district court from
which the appeal arose the average monthly deposits and balances
in your prison account for each of the six months preceding the filing
of a notice of appeal.
If you proceed with option (2) above, the Act requires that the district court order you to
pay an initial partial fee of at least 20% of the greater of either the average monthly deposits or
of the average monthly balances shown in your prison account. The remainder of the total $605
fee will thereafter be deducted from your prison account each month that your account balance
exceeds $10. Each such monthly deduction shall equal 20% of all deposits to your prison account
during the previous month, until the total $605 fee is paid. (If your prison account statement shows
that you cannot pay even the required initial partial fee, your appeal may nevertheless proceed,
BUT THE TOTAL $605 FEE WILL BE ASSESSED AGAINST AND WILL BE DEDUCTED
FROM FUTURE DEPOSITS TO YOUR PRISON ACCOUNT.)
Fees are not refundable, regardless of outcome, and deductions from your prison account
will continue until the total $605 fee is collected, even if an appeal is unsuccessful.
David J. Smith
Clerk of Court
PLRA Notice