Opinion

Padmarao Jevaji v. Department of Health and Human Services

Court: Merit Systems Protection Board
Filed: Feb 20, 2025
Status: Unpublished
Cited by: 0 cases
Authority: More cited than 34.1%

explaining that only after Board jurisdiction is established is the Board required to provide the appellant with a hearing on the merits of an IRA appeal

How later courts described this case

explaining that only after Board jurisdiction is established is the Board required to provide the appellant with a hearing on the merits of an IRA appeal

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

PADMARAO JEVAJI, DOCKET NUMBER

Appellant, DE-1221-20-0216-W-2

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND DATE: February 20, 2025

HUMAN SERVICES,

Agency.

THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

Daniel K.R. Maharaj , Esquire, Tampa, Florida, for the appellant.

Althea Smiley , Esquire, Denver, Colorado, for the agency.

Jennifer Smith , Washington, D.C., for the agency.

BEFORE

Cathy A. Harris, Chairman

Henry J. Kerner, Vice Chairman*

Raymond A. Limon, Member

*Vice Chairman Kerner recused himself and

did not participate in the adjudication of this appeal.

FINAL ORDER

The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which

denied his request for corrective action in his individual right of action (IRA)

A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add

significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,

but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not

required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a

precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board

as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).

appeal. Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only in the following

circumstances: the initial decision contains erroneous findings of material fact;

the initial decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of statute or regulation

or the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case; the administrative

judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial decision were

not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of discretion, and

the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and material evidence

or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due diligence, was not

available when the record closed. Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations,

section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115). After fully considering the filings in this

appeal, we conclude that the petitioner has not established any basis under section

1201.115 for granting the petition for review. Therefore, we DENY the petition

for review. Except as expressly MODIFIED to VACATE the administrative

judge’s findings that the appellant did not exhaust all alleged disclosures with the

Office of Special Counsel (OSC), we AFFIRM the initial decision.

BACKGROUND

The appellant was a Supervisory Physician (Clinical Director), GP-15, with

the Indian Health Service at the Fort Belknap Service Unit (FBSU) in Harlem,

Montana. Jevaji v. Department of Health and Human Services, MSPB Docket

No. DE-1221-20-0216-W-2, Appeal File (W-2 AF), Tab 14 at 12, Tab 45 at 8. In

January 2020, the agency issued a notice of termination to the appellant during

his 1-year probationary period, and the appellant resigned to avoid termination.

W-2 AF, Tab 14 at 13-14, 27-31. He subsequently filed a whistleblower

retaliation complaint with OSC. W-2 AF, Tab 10. After OSC closed its

investigation into his complaint, id. at 71, the appellant filed an IRA appeal with

the Board, Jevaji v. Department of Health and Human Services, MSPB Docket

No. DE-1221-20-0216-W-1, Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 1. The appeal was

dismissed without prejudice and automatically refiled by the Board. IAF, Tab 13;

W-2 AF, Tabs 1-3.

The administrative judge issued an order apprising the appellant of the

jurisdictional requirements for an IRA appeal and ordering him to submit

argument and evidence on jurisdiction. W-2 AF, Tab 4. Both parties responded.

W-2 AF, Tabs 10, 13-14. After considering those submissions, the administrative

judge issued a jurisdictional ruling finding that the appellant exhausted four

alleged disclosures with the OSC but made nonfrivolous allegations of only two

protected disclosures. W-2 AF, Tab 34 at 4-20. He also found nonfrivolous

allegations that those disclosures were a contributing factor in covered personnel

actions of a threat of termination and involuntary resignation. Id. at 20-23; W-2

AF, Tab 43. After holding the requested hearing, the administrative judge issued

an initial decision incorporating his jurisdiction rulings and finding that the

appellant did not meet his burden of proving that he made a protected

whistleblowing disclosure. W-2 AF, Tab 55, Initial Decision (ID).

The appellant has filed a petition for review, reraising all allegedly

protected disclosures raised before the administrative judge, arguing that they

were a contributing factor in the agency’s personnel action, and asserting that the

agency did not prove by clear and convincing evidence that it would have issued

him a notice of termination absent his protected disclosures. Petition for Review

(PFR) File, Tabs 1, 3. The agency has filed a response. PFR File, Tab 4.

ANALYSIS

The appellant exhausted his administrative remedies with OSC concerning all

alleged disclosures raised in his Board appeal.

In an IRA appeal based on whistleblower reprisal under the Whistleblower

Protection Act (WPA), 2 an appellant shall seek corrective action from OSC before

The WPA has been amended several times, including by the Whistleblower Protection

Enhancement Act. The references herein to the WPA include those amendments.

seeking corrective action from the Board. 5 U.S.C. § 1214(a)(3); Chambers v.

Department of Homeland Security, 2022 MSPB 8, ¶ 5. This requirement of

administrative exhaustion entails both substantive and procedural requirements .

Chambers, 2022 MSPB 8, ¶ 5. The administrative judge, while finding that the

appellant satisfied the procedural requirements, found that the appellant did not

satisfy the substantive requirements for some of his allegedly protected

whistleblowing disclosures. W-2 AF, Tab 34 at 3-6.

The substantive requirements of exhaustion are met when an appellant has

provided OSC with sufficient basis to pursue an investigation. Chambers,

2022 MSPB 8, ¶ 10. An appellant may demonstrate exhaustion through his initial

OSC complaint or correspondence with OSC or, in the alternative, through other

sufficiently reliable evidence, such as an affidavit or declaration attesting that the

appellant raised with OSC the substance of the facts in his Board appeal. Id.,

¶ 11. Here, the appellant’s OSC complaint and attached exhibits provided OSC

with sufficient basis to pursue an investigation concerning all alleged disclosures

raised in his Board appeal. W-2 AF, Tab 10. We expressly vacate the

administrative judge’s findings concluding otherwise. W-2 AF, Tab 34 at 4-6.

Specifically, we modify the administrative judge’s jurisdictional order

incorporated in the initial decision to find that the appellant exhausted with OSC

the following additional disclosures: (1) his July 10, 2019 statement that a

supervisor at the FBSU had misused government vehicles, W-2 AF, Tab 10 at 44,

56, 71; (2) his November 2019 complaint that a former chief executive officer

(CEO) of the FBSU had displayed favoritism to a nurse practitioner, id. at 28, 65;

and (3) his contemporaneous complaint regarding this supervisor’s inappropriate

conduct on November 7, 2019, id. at 46-48, 63-65.

The appellant did not nonfrivolously allege that these additional disclosures were

protected whistleblowing disclosures.

The Board must address the matter of jurisdiction before proceeding to the

merits of the appeal. Bishop v. Department of Agriculture, 2022 MSPB 28, ¶ 11.

Only after Board jurisdiction is established is the Board required to provide the

appellant with a hearing on the merits. Spencer v. Department of the Navy,

327 F.3d 1354, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2003). If an appellant has exhausted his

administrative remedies before OSC, he can establish Board jurisdiction by

nonfrivolously alleging that (1) he made a protected disclosure described under

5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or engaged in protected activity described under 5 U.S.C.

§ 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D); and (2) the disclosure or protected activity

was a contributing factor in the agency’s decision to take or fail to take a

personnel action as defined by 5 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(2)(A). Chambers, 2022 MSPB

8, ¶ 14. Thus, we have considered whether the appellant has made nonfrivolous

allegations concerning the three allegedly protected disclosures erroneously

excluded in the jurisdictional order based on the exhaustion requirement.

The Board’s regulations define a nonfrivolous allegation as an assertion

that, if proven, could establish the matter at issue. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.4(s). 3 As the

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in Hessami v. Merit Systems

Protection Board, 979 F.3d 1362, 1364, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2020) determined:

“[T]he question of whether the appellant has non-frivolously alleged protected

disclosures [or activities] that contributed to a personnel action must be

determined based on whether the employee alleged sufficient factual matter,

accepted as true, to state a claim that is plausible on its face.” 4

A nonfrivolous allegation of a protected whistleblowing disclosure is an

allegation of facts that, if proven, would show that the appellant disclosed a

matter that a reasonable person in his position would believe evidenced a

category of wrongdoing under section 2302(b)(8)(A). Gabel v. Department of

The regulation further provides that an allegation generally will be considered

nonfrivolous when, under oath or penalty of perjury, an individual makes an allegation

that (1) is more than conclusory; (2) is plausible on its face; and (3) is material to the

legal issues in the appeal. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.4(s). Pro forma allegations are insufficient

to meet the nonfrivolous standard. Clark v. U.S Postal Service, 123 M.S.P.R. 466, ¶ 6

(2016), aff’d, 679 F. App’x 1006 (Fed. Cir. 2017), and overruled on other grounds by

Cronin v. U.S. Postal Service, 2022 MSPB 13, ¶ 20 n.11.

Veterans Affairs, 2023 MSPB 4, ¶ 6. The test to determine whether a putative

whistleblower has a reasonable belief in the disclosure is an objective one:

whether a disinterested observer with knowledge of the essential facts known to

and readily ascertainable by the employee could reasonably conclude that the

actions of the agency evidenced a violation of law, rule, or regulation, gross

mismanagement, a gross waste of funds, an abuse of authority, or a substantial

and specific danger to public health or safety. Id. The disclosures must be

specific and detailed, not vague allegations of wrongdoing. Id.; see El v.

Department of Commerce, 123 M.S.P.R. 76, ¶ 6 (2015), aff’d, 663 F. App’x 921

(Fed. Cir. 2016).

Concerning the appellant’s disclosure of a supervisor’s misuse of a

government vehicle, i.e., disclosure (1), the administrative judge made an

alternative finding that the appellant’s disclosure was an example of “vague,

conclusory, unsupported” alleged wrongdoing that did not meet the Board’s

nonfrivolous pleading standard. W-2 AF, Tab 34 at 6 n.6 ( citing El,

123 M.S.P.R. 76, ¶ 6). We affirm this alternative finding. The appellant reported

to the CEO of the FBSU that the supervisor “had misused GSA vehicles”

but provided no specifics such as what actions constituted “misuse.” W-2 AF,

Tab 10 at 56. Therefore, the appellant has not made nonfrivolous allegations

concerning this disclosure.

Concerning the appellant’s disclosure of favoritism, i.e., disclosure (2), the

administrative judge also stated that this disclosure was too vague. W-2 AF,

Tab 34 at 6. To the extent that the administrative judge found that the appellant

did not make nonfrivolous allegations of a protected disclosure, we agree. The

Historically, the Board has been bound by the precedent of the Federal Circuit on

these types of whistleblower issues. However, pursuant to the All Circuit Review Act,

Pub. L. No. 115-195, 132 Stat. 1510, appellants may file petitions for judicial review of

Board decisions in whistleblower reprisal cases with any circuit court of appeals of

competent jurisdiction. See 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1)(B). Therefore, we must consider

these issues with the view that the appellant may seek review of this decision before

any appropriate court of appeal.

appellant’s written disclosure, which he allegedly submitted to the acting CEO at

the time, contained assertions that the former CEO had displayed favoritism

towards a nurse practitioner with whom she had a close friendship. W-2 AF,

Tab 10 at 63-65. Specifically, he asserted that the nurse practitioner received

frequent overtime, received a higher retention bonus than others, and was

“rescue[d]” by the former CEO during conflicts with other staff members. Id.

at 65.

In this disclosure, we find no assertion that the former CEO’s actions

violated a law, rule, or regulation, and the appellant has not identified an

applicable law, rule, or regulation in any of his pleadings. See, e.g., W-2 AF,

Tab 10 at 10, Tab 35 at 11; PFR File, Tab 3 at 13-14. Considering whether his

disclosure of favoritism might amount to a nonfrivolous allegation of any of the

other categories listed under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8)(A)(ii), we note that the most

relevant category is an abuse of authority. 5 The Board has historically defined an

abuse of authority as an arbitrary and capricious exercise of power by a Federal

official or employee that adversely affects the rights of any person or results in

personal gain or advantage to herself or to other preferred persons. See Chavez v.

Department of Veterans Affairs, 120 M.S.P.R. 285, ¶ 22 (2013). Abuse of

authority does not incorporate a de minimis standard. Embree v. Department of

the Treasury, 70 M.S.P.R. 79, 85 (1996). In Smolinski v. Merit Systems

Protection Board, 23 F.4th 1345, 1351-52 (Fed. Cir. 2022), the Federal Circuit

defined an abuse of authority more broadly as an arbitrary and capricious exercise

of authority that is contrary to the agency’s mission. In any event, a claim of

non-merit-based favoritism resulting in personal gain to a preferred person

appears to fall within the bounds of abuse of authority.

The Board does not require, as a basis for its jurisdiction, that an appellant in an IRA

appeal correctly label a category of wrongdoing. Rzucidlo v. Department of the Army,

101 M.S.P.R. 616, ¶ 13 (2006).

We find, however, that a disinterested observer with knowledge of the

essential facts known to and readily ascertainable by the appellant would not

reasonably conclude that the former CEO engaged in non-merit-based preferential

treatment constituting an abuse of authority. We can discern no specific facts

from the appellant’s alleged disclosure or pleadings that support such a belief.

W-2 AF, Tab 10 at 11, 65, Tab 35 at 11; Hearing Transcript, May 5, 2023 (HT-2)

at 52-53 (testimony of the appellant); PFR File, Tab 3 at 13-14. First, the

appellant’s complaint of disproportionate overtime was vague and conclusory:

for example, he asserted that the former CEO had an “overly soft corner towards

[the nurse practitioner’s] frequent overtime grants” and that the timekeeper had

raised questions regarding “unusual overtime.” W-2 AF, Tab 10 at 65. It is

unclear whether the appellant believed that the nurse practitioner was requesting

overtime more frequently than others or whether the former CEO approved her

overtime while denying requests by others under the same circumstances. Id.

at 11, 65; HT-2 at 52-53 (testimony of the appellant); PFR File, Tab 3 at 13.

Similarly, although the appellant asserted that the nurse practitioner was awarded

a higher retention bonus than any other provider, he did not expressly allege that

the CEO was responsible for the alleged disproportionality or provide any facts

regarding her involvement in that decision. W-2 AF, Tab 10 at 11, 65, Tab 35

at 11; PFR File, Tab 3 at 13. Lastly, the appellant’s disclosure that the former

CEO regularly went to the nurse practitioner’s rescue when conflicts arose with

other employees only vaguely alleged wrongdoing and was devoid of details.

W-2 AF, Tab 10 at 65. Accordingly, we find that the appellant’s vague disclosure

of favoritism does not satisfy the Board’s nonfrivolous pleading standard and is

not within the Board’s jurisdiction. See El, 123 M.S.P.R. 76, ¶ 6.

Disclosure (3) involves the appellant’s alleged complaints that a supervisor

temporarily acting as CEO had repeatedly yelled at him during an impromptu

meeting on November 7, 2019, because she was upset on learning that a

complaint that he had submitted about the nurse practitioner had been forwarded

to area executives the previous day. W-2 AF, Tab 10 at 46-48, 62-65, Tab 35

at 9-12; HT-2 at 47 (testimony of the appellant); PFR File, Tab 3 at 12-14. We

find that one instance of yelling, alone, would not form the basis of a reasonable

belief in a violation of law, rule, or regulation; abuse of authority; or any other

category of wrongdoing under section 2302(b)(8). Importantly, we find that it

was not a retaliatory personnel action under the WPA because it did not have a

significant impact on the overall nature or quality of the appellant’s working

conditions, responsibilities, or duties. See Skarada v. Department of Veterans

Affairs, 2022 MSPB 17, ¶¶ 14-16 (explaining that harassment may constitute a

personnel action under the WPA but must be considered on a case-by-case

basis). 6 In other words, assuming arguendo that the appellant held a reasonable

belief that his supervisor perceived him as a whistleblower as a result of his

November 6, 2019 complaint, he did not disclose a matter that a reasonable

person in his position would have believed evidenced whistleblower reprisal. We

also find that he has not made a sufficiently specific disclosure that he was

subjected to a threat of personnel action covered under the WPA, or to threats

that might evidence a reasonable belief in an abuse of authority. W-2 AF, Tab 10

at 63-65; cf. Cooper v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 2023 MSPB 24, ¶¶ 11-13

(discussing agency actions that amount to a threat to take a personnel action

under the WPA); Murphy v. Department of the Treasury, 86 M.S.P.R. 131, ¶¶ 6-7

(2000) (finding that a supervisor’s use of his influence to denigrate other staff

members in an abusive manner and to threaten the staff members with whom he

disagreed constituted an abuse of authority).

The appellant also allegedly disclosed that he was not given a proper orientation, was

excluded from meetings to which he should have been invited, and, when he was invited

to meetings, felt uninvolved in the matters discussed. W-2 AF, Tab 10 at 65. We note

that while these actions together might constitute a retaliatory personnel action covered

by WPA if they involved a change in his working conditions, the appellant complained

that the alleged mistreatment began more or less on his entry to the position. Id. In any

event, he did not clearly link these alleged actions to any specific whistleblower

activity. Id.

Because we find that the appellant has not made nonfrivolous allegations

concerning these disclosures, we find no material error in the administrative

judge’s jurisdictional rulings. W-2 AF, Tabs 34, 43; see generally Spencer,

327 F.3d at 1356 (explaining that only after Board jurisdiction is established is

the Board required to provide the appellant with a hearing on the merits of an

IRA appeal).

We affirm the administrative judge’s remaining findings.

Of the four allegedly protected disclosures that the administrative judge

found to have been exhausted with OSC, he found that the appellant made

nonfrivolous allegations with respect to only two allegedly protected disclosures.

W-2 AF, Tab 34 at 6-20. Following a hearing on the merits, he found that the

appellant did not meet his burden of proving by preponderant evidence that he

made a protected whistleblowing disclosure. ID at 6-14. We find no error in the

administrative judge’s thorough and well-reasoned findings on these issues. 7 Id.

Although the appellant challenges these findings on review, his arguments

constitute mere disagreement with the administrative judge’s explained findings

and, thus, are not a basis to disturb the initial decision. PFR File, Tab 3 at 15-19;

see Dieter v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 2022 MSPB 32, ¶ 14.

Accordingly, we find that the administrative judge correctly found that the

appellant did not make a prima facie case of whistleblower reprisal and properly

denied the appellant’s request for corrective action. ID at 15; see 5 U.S.C.

§ 1221(e)(1)-(2); Webb v. Department of the Interior, 122 M.S.P.R. 248, ¶ 6

(2015). We affirm the initial decision as modified.

Applying the definition of abuse of authority in Smolinski, 23 F.4th at 1351-52, we

reach the same result.

NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 8

The initial decision, as modified by this Final Order, constitutes the

Board’s final decision in this matter. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113. You may obtain

review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By statute, the nature of

your claims determines the time limit for seeking such review and the appropriate

forum with which to file. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b). Although we offer the following

summary of available appeal rights, the Merit Systems Protection Board does not

provide legal advice on which option is most appropriate for your situation and

the rights described below do not represent a statement of how courts will rule

regarding which cases fall within their jurisdiction. If you wish to seek review of

this final decision, you should immediately review the law applicable to your

claims and carefully follow all filing time limits and requirements. Failure to file

within the applicable time limit may result in the dismissal of your case by your

chosen forum.

Please read carefully each of the three main possible choices of review

below to decide which one applies to your particular case. If you have questions

about whether a particular forum is the appropriate one to review your case, you

should contact that forum for more information.

(1) Judicial review in general . As a general rule, an appellant seeking

judicial review of a final Board order must file a petition for review with the U.S.

Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which must be received by the court

within 60 calendar days of the date of issuance of this decision. 5 U.S.C.

§ 7703(b)(1)(A).

If you submit a petition for review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the

Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the following

address:

Since the issuance of the initial decision in this matter, the Board may have updated

the notice of review rights included in final decisions. As indicated in the notice, the

Board cannot advise which option is most appropriate in any matter.

U.S. Court of Appeals

for the Federal Circuit

717 Madison Place, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20439

Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal

Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular

relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is

contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.

If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to

the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at

http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation

for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The

Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that

any attorney will accept representation in a given case.

(2) Judicial or EEOC review of cases involving a claim of

discrimination . This option applies to you only if you have claimed that you

were affected by an action that is appealable to the Board and that such action

was based, in whole or in part, on unlawful discrimination. If so, you may obtain

judicial review of this decision—including a disposition of your discrimination

claims —by filing a civil action with an appropriate U.S. district court ( not the

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit), within 30 calendar days after you

receive this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2); see Perry v. Merit Systems

Protection Board, 582 U.S. 420 (2017). If you have a representative in this case,

and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file

with the district court no later than 30 calendar days after your representative

receives this decision. If the action involves a claim of discrimination based on

race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or a disabling condition, you may be

entitled to representation by a court-appointed lawyer and to waiver of any

requirement of prepayment of fees, costs, or other security. See 42 U.S.C.

§ 2000e-5(f) and 29 U.S.C. § 794a.

Contact information for U.S. district courts can be found at their respective

websites, which can be accessed through the link below:

http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx .

Alternatively, you may request review by the Equal Employment

Opportunity Commission (EEOC) of your discrimination claims only, excluding

all other issues . 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). You must file any such request with the

EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations within 30 calendar days after you receive

this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). If you have a representative in this case,

and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file

with the EEOC no later than 30 calendar days after your representative receives

this decision.

If you submit a request for review to the EEOC by regular U.S. mail, the

address of the EEOC is:

Office of Federal Operations

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

P.O. Box 77960

Washington, D.C. 20013

If you submit a request for review to the EEOC via commercial delivery or

by a method requiring a signature, it must be addressed to:

Office of Federal Operations

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

131 M Street, N.E.

Suite 5SW12G

Washington, D.C. 20507

(3) Judicial review pursuant to the Whistleblower Protection

Enhancement Act of 2012 . This option applies to you only if you have raised

claims of reprisal for whistleblowing disclosures under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or

other protected activities listed in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D).

If so, and your judicial petition for review “raises no challenge to the Board’s

disposition of allegations of a prohibited personnel practice described in section

2302(b) other than practices described in section 2302(b)(8), or 2302(b)(9)(A)(i),

(B), (C), or (D),” then you may file a petition for judicial review either with the

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or any court of appeals of

competent jurisdiction. 9 The court of appeals must receive your petition for

review within 60 days of the date of issuance of this decision. 5 U.S.C.

§ 7703(b)(1)(B).

If you submit a petition for judicial review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for

the Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the following