Wisconsin Bell, Inc. v. United States ex rel. Heath

(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2024 1

Syllabus

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is

being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.

The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been

prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.

See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

WISCONSIN BELL, INC. v. UNITED STATES EX REL.

HEATH

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR

THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT

No. 23–1127. Argued November 4, 2024—Decided February 21, 2025

The E-Rate (short for Education-Rate) program, established under the

Telecommunications Act of 1996, subsidizes internet and other tele-

communications services for schools and libraries across the United

States. To finance those subsidies, Congress required that telecommu-

nications carriers pay into a fund (now known as the Universal Service

Fund) that is administered by the Universal Service Administrative

Company, a private not-for-profit corporation. The Company collects

and distributes the resulting pot of money to beneficiaries pursuant to

regulations prescribed by the Federal Communications Commission

(FCC). In addition to providing for subsidies, those regulations impose

upon carriers a rule called the “lowest corresponding price” rule, which

prohibits them from charging schools and libraries more than what

they would charge a “similarly situated” non-residential customer.

Once an appropriate charge is set, a school can obtain its subsidy by

paying the carrier a discounted price and requiring the carrier to seek

the remainder from the Fund, or by paying the carrier full freight and

then applying for reimbursement from the Fund.

Respondent Todd Heath is an auditor of telecommunications bills

who believes that petitioner Wisconsin Bell defrauded the E-Rate pro-

gram out of millions of dollars. According to Heath, Wisconsin Bell

consistently overcharged schools in violation of the “lowest correspond-

ing price” rule. Heath brought suit under the False Claims Act (FCA),

which enables private parties to bring civil actions on the Govern-

ment’s behalf to protect federal programs and funds from fraud. The

FCA imposes civil liability on any person who “knowingly presents, or

causes to be presented, a false or fraudulent claim” as statutorily de-

fined. 31 U. S. C. §3729(a)(1)(A). In Heath’s view, Wisconsin Bell’s

2 WISCONSIN BELL, INC. v. UNITED STATES EX REL. HEATH

Syllabus

violations of the “lowest corresponding price” rule led to reimburse-

ment requests for amounts higher than the E-Rate program should

have paid. The premise of Heath’s suit is that an E-Rate reimburse-

ment request can give rise to FCA liability because it qualifies as a

“claim,” which, as relevant here, requires the Government to “pro-

vide[ ] or ha[ve] provided any portion of the money” requested.

§3729(b)(2)(A)(ii)(I).

Wisconsin Bell moved to dismiss Heath’s suit. In its view, an E-rate

reimbursement request can never qualify as a “claim” under the FCA

because the money comes from private carriers and is handled by a

private corporation, meaning the Government does not “provide[ ] any

portion of the money” requested. The District Court and the Seventh

Circuit rejected that argument. The Court of Appeals held that the

Government “provided” E-Rate program funding for two independent

reasons. First, it held that the Government provided all the money in

the program through its regulatory role in the collection and distribu-

tion of contributions. Second and more narrowly, it found that the

Government provided some “portion” of E-Rate funding by depositing

into the Fund, in the relevant years, more than $100 million directly

from the U. S. Treasury.

Held: The E-Rate reimbursement requests at issue are “claims” under

the FCA because the Government “provided” (at a minimum) a “por-

tion” of the money applied for by transferring more than $100 million

from the Treasury into the Fund. §3729(b)(2)(A)(ii)(I). The question

is whether the Government “provided”—in ordinary meaning, sup-

plied, furnished, or made available—any portion of the money sought.

While the parties (mirroring the Seventh Circuit’s opinion) discuss two

independent theories under which the Government potentially “pro-

vided” the requested funds, here it is enough that the Government pro-

vided some E-Rate moneys through the Treasury’s own transfer of over

$100 million into the Fund. That amount consisted of delinquent con-

tributions that the FCC and Treasury Department collected from car-

riers, as well as civil settlements and criminal restitution payments

from Justice Department activities in response to wrongdoing in the

E-Rate program. The Government therefore “provided [a] portion of

the money” disbursed from the Fund to reimburse E-Rate program

participants.

Wisconsin Bell argues that even the $100 million was provided only

by the carriers, with the Government playing no more than an inter-

mediary role. But to start with, Wisconsin Bell mischaracterizes the

Government’s role. Rather than acting as a passive throughway for

the transmission of the $100 million, it generated that money itself by

extracting it from carriers and by prosecuting wrongdoing in the E-

Rate program. And anyway, a simple intermediary can sometimes also

Cite as: 604 U. S. ____ (2025) 3

Syllabus

“provide” things to a recipient—and the Government, even if viewed

only in that light, would do so here. For example, a proctor for an exam

“provides” blue books and pencils to students, even if she has not pur-

chased them herself and has instead gotten them from the school. The

same is true here: The Government “provided” the relevant $100 mil-

lion to the Fund by collecting it and routing it through Treasury ac-

counts.

Here, in the years relevant to Heath’s FCA suit, the Government

“provided” a “portion of the money requested” for E-Rate subsidies by

collecting, holding, and transferring $100 million by way of the Treas-

ury. Indeed, those transfers look like most Government spending:

Money usually comes to the Government from private parties, and it

then usually goes out to the broader community to fund programs and

activities. That conclusion is enough to enable Heath’s FCA suit to

proceed. Pp. 7–14.

92 F. 4th 654, affirmed and remanded.

KAGAN, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. THOMAS, J.,

filed a concurring opinion, in which KAVANAUGH, J., joined, and in which

ALITO, J., joined as to Part I. KAVANAUGH, J., filed a concurring opinion,

in which THOMAS, J., joined.

Cite as: 604 U. S. ____ (2025) 1

Opinion of the Court

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the

United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of

Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543,

pio@supremecourt.gov, of any typographical or other formal errors.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 23–1127

_________________

WISCONSIN BELL, INC., PETITIONER v. UNITED

STATES, EX REL. TODD HEATH

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT

[February 21, 2025]

JUSTICE KAGAN delivered the opinion of the Court.

The E-Rate (short for Education-Rate) program subsi-

dizes internet and other telecommunications services for

schools and libraries across the United States. Established

under the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 110 Stat. 56,

the program disburses funds—collected from telecommuni-

cations carriers and managed by a private corporation—to

cover a substantial percentage of a school’s internet costs.

The funds are payable, under Federal Communications

Commission (FCC) regulations, to either a carrier or a

school upon receipt of a reimbursement request.

This case asks us to decide whether such a request can

count as a “claim” under the False Claims Act (FCA or Act),

31 U. S. C. §§3729–3733. The FCA protects government

funds and programs by imposing civil liability on any per-

son who knowingly presents a false or fraudulent “claim” as

statutorily defined. In the part of the definition relevant

here, a request for money qualifies as a claim if the Govern-

ment “provides or has provided any portion of the

money . . . requested.” §3729(b)(2)(A)(ii)(I). We hold today

that the E-Rate reimbursement requests at issue satisfy

that requirement because the Government provided (at a

2 WISCONSIN BELL, INC. v. UNITED STATES EX REL. HEATH

Opinion of the Court

minimum) a “portion” of the money applied for. In the years

in which those requests were made, the Government trans-

ferred more than $100 million from the Treasury into the

pool of funds used to pay E-Rate subsidies. That is enough

to create a “claim” under the Act, and to allow a suit alleg-

ing fraud to go forward.

I

Congress and the FCC have long worked to ensure that

“all the people of the United States” have access, at reason-

able prices, to telecommunications and information ser-

vices. 47 U. S. C. §151; see §254(b). In keeping with that

goal, the Telecommunications Act of 1996 directed the FCC

to establish several so-called universal-service programs for

populations or institutions needing improved access. See

§254. That statute identified, for example, consumers in

rural areas, consumers with low incomes, and—critical

here—elementary schools, secondary schools, and libraries

as appropriate recipients of subsidies or other assistance.

See §§254(b), (h)(1).

To finance those measures, Congress required that tele-

communications carriers pay into a fund—now known as

the Universal Service Fund—as FCC regulations prescribe.

See §254(d). Under those rules, the FCC determines each

quarter the percentage of revenues that a carrier must con-

tribute. See 47 CFR §§54.706, 54.709(a) (2023). The FCC,

however, does not manage the Fund’s day-to-day opera-

tions. Rather, it has “appointed” the Universal Service Ad-

ministrative Company, a private not-for-profit corporation,

as the Fund’s “Administrator.” §54.701(a); see App. 34.

The Administrative Company generally bills and collects

contributions from carriers—though the FCC plays a role

in pursuing delinquents. See §54.702; App. 37–38, 40–43;

infra, at 8. And the Company distributes the resulting pot

of money, as FCC rules provide, to program beneficiaries.

Cite as: 604 U. S. ____ (2025) 3

Opinion of the Court

See §54.702(b).1

Among those beneficiaries are public and private schools

and libraries, under what is commonly called the E-Rate

program. See 47 U. S. C. §§254(b)(6), (h)(1)(B); 47 CFR

§54.500 et seq. That program subsidizes between 20 and 90

percent of a school’s total charges for internet and other tel-

ecommunications services, with higher percentages for

schools in rural or low-income areas. See §§54.505(a)–(c).

And the program protects the value of that subsidy by pre-

venting a carrier from inflating its non-discounted prices.

Under the “lowest corresponding price” rule, a carrier may

not charge a school a higher sticker price than it would

charge a “similarly situated” customer. §§54.500,

54.511(b). Once an appropriate charge is set, a school can

obtain its subsidy in either of two ways. See §54.514(c).

The school can pay the carrier only the discounted price,

thus requiring the carrier to seek the remainder from mon-

eys held in the Fund. Or the school can pay the carrier full

freight and itself apply for reimbursement.

Respondent Todd Heath is an auditor of telecommunica-

tions bills who believes that petitioner Wisconsin Bell de-

frauded the E-Rate program out of millions of dollars. Ac-

cording to Heath, the carrier flouted the FCC’s “lowest

corresponding price” rule for more than a decade (from 2002

to 2015) by charging schools a higher full price than it

charged other, similarly situated customers. And as Heath

notes, overcharges of that kind inevitably lead to overpay-

ments from the Fund. Take a hypothetical example. If the

lowest corresponding price for a service is $1,000 and a

——————

1 The precise relationship between the FCC and the Administrative

Company is in dispute in other litigation. See, e.g., Consumers’ Research

v. FCC, 109 F. 4th 743, 750 (CA5) (en banc), cert. granted, 604 U. S. ___

(2024). The details of that relationship are irrelevant here, and we ex-

press no views on that score. Nor do we comment on any other matter

pertaining to the constitutionality of the universal-service programs.

4 WISCONSIN BELL, INC. v. UNITED STATES EX REL. HEATH

Opinion of the Court

school is entitled to a 60% subsidy, then the E-Rate pro-

gram should pay out $600. But if Wisconsin Bell, in viola-

tion of the rule, instead charged the school a full price of

$1,500, then the program would instead confer a subsidy of

$900. (And the school, rather than pay $400, would pay

$600.) The carrier, in Heath’s view, thus wrongly amassed

revenues at the E-Rate program’s expense.

That accusation is at the heart of a lawsuit Heath

brought against Wisconsin Bell under the FCA. Enacted

during the Civil War to protect federal programs and funds

from fraud, that law enables private parties to bring civil

actions on the Government’s behalf, and to share in any

monetary recovery. See United States ex rel. Polansky v.

Executive Health Resources, Inc., 599 U. S. 419, 424–425

(2023). A defendant is liable under the Act if it “knowingly

presents, or causes to be presented, a false or fraudulent

claim for payment.” 31 U. S. C. §3729(a)(1)(A). In Heath’s

view, Wisconsin Bell engaged in that conduct many times

over by way of violating the FCC’s “lowest corresponding

price” rule. App. 62–82 (complaint). All those violations led

to reimbursement requests, by either Wisconsin Bell or a

school, for amounts higher than the E-Rate program should

have had to pay. Plus, all Wisconsin Bell’s own requests

included a false certification (or so Heath alleged) that it

had complied with the program’s rules, including the one

about pricing.

The premise of Heath’s suit is that an E-Rate reimburse-

ment request can give rise to FCA liability because it fits

within the statute’s definition of the term “claim.” That def-

inition varies depending on whether a “request or demand”

for money is made to a federal employee or agent, or instead

to an “other recipient.” §3729(b)(2)(A). Assuming that the

Administrative Company—the recipient of E-Rate reim-

bursement requests—falls within the “other” rather than

the “agent” category, such a request must meet two require-

Cite as: 604 U. S. ____ (2025) 5

Opinion of the Court

ments to count as an FCA “claim.”2 First, the money re-

quested must be “spent or used on the Government’s behalf

or to advance a Government program or interest.”

§3729(b)(2)(A)(ii). And second, the Government must “pro-

vide[ ] or ha[ve] provided any portion of the money” re-

quested. §3729(b)(2)(A)(ii)(I). The statutory definition,

though, also offers a caveat: It is immaterial, in assessing

whether those requirements are met, “whether or not the

United States has title to the money” at issue.

§3729(b)(2)(A).3

Wisconsin Bell moved to dismiss Heath’s suit, arguing

that under the FCA’s definition an E-Rate reimbursement

request can never qualify as a “claim.” The carrier did not

deny that the money so requested “advance[s] a Govern-

ment program,” as the definition first requires. That

money, after all, simply is the E-Rate program’s subsidy.

But Wisconsin Bell contended that an E-Rate reimburse-

ment request flunks the second requirement, because the

Government does not “provide[ ] any portion of the money”

——————

2 The parties have disputed throughout this litigation whether the Ad-

ministrative Company is actually an “agent” of the United States, and

therefore not subject to the two requirements about to be described. But

our disposition of this case makes that issue immaterial, and we there-

fore express no view of its merits. See infra, at 6, n. 4 (noting the Court

of Appeals’ treatment of the question).

3 Congress’s most recent amendments to the “claim” definition (which

included adding the title provision) occurred in 2009, after some of the

disputed reimbursement requests were made. But Wisconsin Bell does

not contend that those amendments require separate analysis of the pre-

and post-2009 requests to resolve the issues we address. In discussing

those issues, the carrier cites the current definition and describes the

amendments (including the title provision) as merely clarifying existing

law. See Brief for Wisconsin Bell 24–25, 39; Reply Brief 5–6. We assume

without deciding that its characterization is correct, and thus use only

the FCA’s current definition of “claim.” Cf. Universal Health Services,

Inc. v. United States ex rel. Escobar, 579 U. S. 176, 185, n. 1 (2016) (not-

ing in another FCA case involving both pre- and post-2009 requests that

no party argued and “we thus do not consider[ ] whether pre-2009 con-

duct should be treated differently”).

6 WISCONSIN BELL, INC. v. UNITED STATES EX REL. HEATH

Opinion of the Court

requested. In Wisconsin Bell’s view, all the money in the

E-Rate program is “private,” rather than “federal.” No.

2:08–cv–00724 (ED Wis., Nov. 25, 2014), ECF Doc. 97, p. 6.

That is because the money comes from private carriers’ con-

tributions, and a private corporation handles its collection

and disbursement. See id., at 12–13. “The federal govern-

ment,” Wisconsin Bell averred, does not provide “a single

penny to the Fund.” Id., at 12.

After the District Court denied the motion, the Court of

Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that E-Rate reim-

bursement requests fit the FCA’s definition of “claim.” The

Court of Appeals found two “independent paths” for con-

cluding, contra Wisconsin Bell, that the Government “pro-

vided” E-Rate program funding. 92 F. 4th 654, 666 (2024).

First, the court held that the Government provided all the

money in the program through its regulatory role in the

“collection and distribution” of contributions—most nota-

bly, by initially requiring the carriers to pay into the Fund.

Id., at 671; see id., at 669. Second and more narrowly, the

court found that the Government provided some “portion”

of E-Rate funding by depositing into the Fund, in the rele-

vant years, “more than $100 million directly from the U.S.

Treasury.” Id., at 667. That contribution of Treasury

money, even if a small part of the Fund’s total, was enough

to qualify the E-Rate reimbursement requests as FCA

“claims.” See ibid.4

In a similar case, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Cir-

cuit held that E-Rate reimbursement requests do not so

qualify—although that court considered only the “broad[er]

view” of how the Government “provides” E-Rate funding.

United States ex rel. Shupe v. Cisco Systems, Inc., 759 F. 3d

——————

4 Finding yet a third path to the same outcome, the Seventh Circuit

also held that the Administrative Company is an “agent” of the Govern-

ment. See 92 F. 4th, at 667–668. As noted above, that conclusion (if

correct) obviates the FCA’s requirement that the Government “provide”

any part of the requested money. See supra, at 5, n. 2.

Cite as: 604 U. S. ____ (2025) 7

Opinion of the Court

379, 383–384 (2014) (per curiam); id., at 387–388 (finding

the FCC’s “regulatory supervision” of the program insuffi-

cient to show that the Government provided E-Rate funds).

We granted certiorari to resolve the circuit split over

whether E-Rate reimbursement requests are FCA “claims.”

602 U. S. ___ (2024). We need reach no further today than

the narrower ($100 million) ground on which the court be-

low ruled. The requests at issue qualify as claims because,

in the years they were submitted, the U. S. Treasury depos-

ited money into the Fund for disbursement to those entitled

to E-Rate subsidies.

II

The E-Rate reimbursement requests at issue count as

FCA “claims” if the Government “provides or has provided

any portion of the money” requested. §3729(b)(2)(A)(ii)(I).

Is that language satisfied when a school or carrier asks for

E-Rate program funds? Because the Act does not define the

word “provides,” we look to its ordinary meaning. To “pro-

vide” means to “supply,” to “furnish,” or to “make available.”

American Heritage Dictionary 1411 (4th ed. 2000); 12 Ox-

ford English Dictionary 713 (2d ed. 1989); see Little Sisters

of the Poor Saints Peter and Paul Home v. Pennsylvania,

591 U. S. 657, 676 (2020) (defining “provide” the same way).

The question thus becomes whether the Government sup-

plied, furnished, or made available any portion of the

money here sought.

The parties’ arguments on that score mirror the two “in-

dependent paths” laid out in the Seventh Circuit’s opinion.

92 F. 4th, at 666; see supra, at 6. Wisconsin Bell and Heath

dispute whether the Government provides all E-Rate mon-

eys through its regulatory authority over the program, es-

pecially its mandate that carriers contribute to the Fund.

But so too the parties contest whether the Government has

provided some E-Rate moneys through the Treasury’s own

8 WISCONSIN BELL, INC. v. UNITED STATES EX REL. HEATH

Opinion of the Court

transfer into the Fund of over $100 million, to pay for pro-

gram subsidies.

If Heath prevails on either one of those theories, he has

met the FCA’s definition of “claim.” Under that definition,

providing some funds is just as good as providing all: The

Government, recall, need provide only “any portion” of the

amount requested. §3729(b)(2)(A)(ii)(I); see United States

ex rel. DRC, Inc. v. Custer Battles, LLC, 562 F. 3d 295, 303

(CA4 2009) (“So long as ‘any portion’ of the claim is or will

be funded by U.S. money,” the “full claim satisfies the def-

inition”). Wisconsin Bell acknowledges that point, as it

must. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 24. So if the Government, by

making direct payments, has provided even a small fraction

of the money used to fund E-Rate reimbursements, the

question presented here is resolved. It is then immaterial

whether the Government, by exercising regulatory control,

provides all the money so used. Even supposing not, the

reimbursement requests are “claims” for payment, and

Heath’s suit for fraud can go forward.

And as the Court of Appeals explained, the Govern-

ment—more specifically, the U. S. Treasury—has put sub-

stantial money into the Fund to finance E-Rate subsidies.

See 92 F. 4th, at 667. The more than $100 million deposited

in the relevant years came from two sources. About half

consisted of delinquent contributions (plus associated inter-

est and penalties) that the FCC and Treasury Department

collected from carriers after the Administrative Company

proved unable to do so. Those federal agencies, acting un-

der a law providing for the collection of sums “owed to the

United States,” placed the money they garnered in Treas-

ury accounts. 31 U. S. C. §3701(b)(1); see §§3711, 3717;

App. 35–38, 40–43. From there, the Treasury made peri-

odic transfers to the Fund for disbursement to program par-

ticipants. See id., at 37–38, 42–43. The other half of the

$100 million derived from Justice Department activities.

Cite as: 604 U. S. ____ (2025) 9

Opinion of the Court

See id., at 38, 43. When that Department learns of wrong-

doing in the E-Rate program, its lawyers may proceed in

diverse ways against the malefactors—maybe under the

FCA itself, or under antitrust laws, or under criminal bans

on mail or wire fraud. Any civil settlements or criminal res-

titution payments resulting from those actions go into

Treasury accounts. And once again, that money eventually

makes its way to the Fund to bankroll E-Rate subsidies.

So to return to the language of the relevant definitional

provision: The Government “provided [a] portion of the

money” disbursed from the Fund to reimburse E-Rate pro-

gram participants. §3729(b)(2)(A)(ii)(I). Or to use the syn-

onyms previously offered: The Government supplied funds,

furnished funds, and made available funds for that purpose.

It is a simple matter, as the saying goes, of following the

money. Again, federal agencies accumulated the roughly

$100 million and placed it in the U. S. Treasury—the repos-

itory for “all monies received by the United States.” K.

Stith, Congress’ Power of the Purse, 97 Yale L. J. 1343,

1356 (1988). And the Treasury later transferred those

sums to the Fund for use in fulfilling E-Rate reimburse-

ment requests. Or as the Seventh Circuit put the point:

Because the Treasury held and conveyed to the Fund the

$100 million, “quite literally, the Treasury provide[d]

money to the E-Rate program.” 92 F. 4th, at 670.5

——————

5 The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, although rejecting the reg-

ulatory-control theory of providing funds, never addressed the alterna-

tive, follow-the-money theory just described. See United States ex rel.

Shupe v. Cisco Systems, Inc., 759 F. 3d 379, 382–388 (2014) (per curiam);

supra, at 6–7. That omission apparently resulted from the Government’s

litigation choices. Only in the Seventh Circuit—not in the Fifth—did the

Government press the narrower theory and submit supporting evidence

about the Treasury’s deposit of moneys into the Fund. Had the Fifth

Circuit seen the same evidence, it may well have responded as the Sev-

enth did. Indeed, its own analysis suggests as much. For under the Fifth

Circuit’s approach, the definition of “claim” is met “when United States

Treasury dollars flow to the defrauded [program].” Shupe, 759 F. 3d, at

10 WISCONSIN BELL, INC. v. UNITED STATES EX REL. HEATH

Opinion of the Court

Wisconsin Bell resists that conclusion, arguing that even

the $100 million was provided by, and only by, the carriers.

See, e.g., Brief for Wisconsin Bell 27 (“The E-rate program

is funded entirely by private carriers’ contributions”). On

that alternative view, the Government played no more than

an intermediary role: It “merely collected and held” the car-

riers’ required payments “pending their return” to “their

rightful owner, the Administrative Company.” Id., at 31.

And “facilitat[ing] the transfer of money,” Wisconsin Bell

says, does not amount to “provid[ing]” money. Id., at 30.

Rather, the deposits that the Treasury put into the Fund

“are no different than” the carriers’ “contributions them-

selves.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 5; see id., at 23. The former stand

in for the latter, and remain just as private.

But to start with, Wisconsin Bell mischaracterizes the

Government’s role in bringing the $100 million to the Fund.

The Government was not a passive throughway for the

transmission of E-rate moneys from one private party (the

carrier) to another (the Administrative Company). Nor

were the Government’s activities confined to “facilitating”

such transfers, as Wisconsin Bell would have it. Take first

the $50 million in delinquent contributions, on which Wis-

consin Bell almost wholly focuses. The FCC and Treasury

Department extracted those moneys from carriers that,

even after the Administrative Company’s entreaties, re-

fused to pay on schedule. Without the agencies’ dunning,

the contributions would have come in yet later—or might

never have arrived. (And if no contributions, likely no in-

terest or penalties either.) Still less does the other $50 mil-

lion—from settlement and restitution awards—align with

——————

383; see ibid. (noting with approval that “courts have found that the Gov-

ernment ‘provides any portion’ of the money requested when the Govern-

ment has given [a program] even a drop of treasury money”); id., at 388

(concluding that the Government did not provide any of the requested

money because “there are no federal funds involved in the [E-Rate] pro-

gram”).

Cite as: 604 U. S. ____ (2025) 11

Opinion of the Court

Wisconsin Bell’s story. Those awards came from the Justice

Department’s efforts to prosecute wrongdoing in the E-Rate

program. And the amounts obtained thus reflected not the

carriers’ regular contributions but the harms that fraudu-

lent conduct had imposed on the Fund and its beneficiaries.

So the Government, in forwarding those payments to the

Fund, did not serve as a program middleman or facilitator.

Rather, the Government itself generated the moneys it pro-

vided.

And anyway, a simple intermediary can sometimes also

“provide” things to a recipient—and the Government, even

if viewed only in that light, would do so here. Wisconsin

Bell assumes that only one entity can provide a thing, so

that if a carrier gave a contribution to the Government to

give to the Fund, then the carrier alone provided the money.

But why not say that both did so—the originator of the

money and the transmitter alike? Consider a perhaps

dated example used at oral argument. See id., at 13–14. A

proctor for an exam gives out blue books and pencils to stu-

dents. She has not purchased them herself; rather, she has

gotten them from the school. It would still be natural to say

that she (along with the school) has “provided”—has sup-

plied, furnished, or made available—the booklets and pen-

cils. Similar real-world examples abound. A bank teller

“provides” an account holder with money, even though the

recipient’s employer deposited the relevant funds. A UPS

driver “provides” a person with a package, even though the

driver first picked up the box from a department store. In

each case, not only the original source but also the middle-

man (the intermediary, transmitter, facilitator, what have

you) provides the thing at issue. And the same is true here.

Supposing that carriers “provided” the relevant $100 mil-

lion to the Fund, so too did the Government by collecting it

and routing it through Treasury accounts.

Nothing about the ownership of the $100 million while in

12 WISCONSIN BELL, INC. v. UNITED STATES EX REL. HEATH

Opinion of the Court

the Treasury matters to that conclusion, in the way Wiscon-

sin Bell at times suggests. In its view, those moneys were

first owned by private carriers and then owned by the pri-

vate Administrative Company—but not owned by the Gov-

ernment in the interim period when it had “temporary pos-

session.” Id., at 22. Perhaps. Or perhaps not—the

Government (as well as Heath) takes the opposite view. See

Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 21–22. The im-

portant point here is that the answer is irrelevant. Con-

sider the examples just given: No one would say that the

proctor or the teller or the UPS driver does not “provide”

(again, supply, furnish, or make available) the relevant

item just because she does not own it while making the

transfer. And so too here. Were there any doubt, another

aspect of the FCA’s definition of the term “claim” clears it

away. Recall that the definition—including its provides-

the-money requirement—can be met “whether or not the

United States has title to the money” at issue.

§3729(b)(2)(A); see supra, at 5.6 So as the FCA sees the

matter, the technical ownership of the $100 million that the

Government conveyed to the Fund makes not a whit of dif-

ference. Either way, its transfers can form the basis of an

FCA suit.

Those transfers, indeed, look like most Government

spending—neither more nor less private, neither more nor

less public. Money usually comes to the Government from

private parties—through taxes, fines, or fees of all kinds.

And then money usually goes out to the broader commu-

nity, to fund any number of programs and activities. Be-

tween the time money comes in and the time money goes

out, it sits—as the $100 million here did—in Treasury ac-

——————

6 As noted earlier, we assume without deciding that this provision, en-

acted in 2009, merely clarified existing law, and thus that the view it

takes is relevant to the pre-2009, as well as the post-2009, claims in this

case. See supra, at 5, n. 3.

Cite as: 604 U. S. ____ (2025) 13

Opinion of the Court

counts. In this broad array of schemes, the funding re-

ceived may be more or less earmarked, and it may be dis-

bursed more or less quickly. But the basic mechanism re-

mains the same. Money enters and then exits the public

fisc; the Government collects money and then furnishes it

for some use. And so it was here, in the years relevant to

Heath’s FCA suit. The Government obtained $100 million

in delinquent contributions, settlement awards, and resti-

tution payments related to the E-Rate program. It held

that money for a time in the U. S. Treasury. And then it

supplied that money to reimburse program participants—

“provid[ing],” as the FCA requires, a “portion of the money”

requested for schools’ E-Rate subsidies.

III

What we have said above is enough to enable Heath’s

FCA suit to proceed. The reimbursement requests at issue

qualify as “claims” under the FCA because, in the years

they were made, the Government deposited money into the

Fund to pay for E-Rate subsidies. And all the statute re-

quires is that those deposits provide “any portion”—not the

whole—of the sums requested. For that reason, we need

not address the alternative theory that the Government

provides all E-Rate funds by exercising regulatory control

over the program. Whether or not that is so, Heath can

press his claim that, by violating the “lowest corresponding

price” rule, Wisconsin Bell “knowingly present[ed], or

cause[d] to be presented,” a set of “false or fraudulent

claim[s] for payment.” §3729(a)(1)(A).

If Heath prevails on the merits, issues about damages

may well emerge. At oral argument, the parties forecast

their differences on those issues—including about whether

(and, if so, how) the amount of money the Government de-

posited should limit the damages Heath can recover. See,

e.g., Tr. of Oral Arg. 24–26, 29–32, 53–54, 66–68, 93–94.

But those issues were not briefed in this Court, and in any

14 WISCONSIN BELL, INC. v. UNITED STATES EX REL. HEATH

Opinion of the Court

event are a long way away. We therefore leave them for the

courts below to decide, should it ever become necessary to

do so.

For the reasons stated, we affirm the judgment of the

Court of Appeals and remand the case for further proceed-

ings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

Cite as: 604 U. S. ____ (2025) 1

THOMAS, J., concurring

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 23–1127

_________________

WISCONSIN BELL, INC., PETITIONER v. UNITED

STATES, EX REL. TODD HEATH

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT

[February 21, 2025]

JUSTICE THOMAS, with whom JUSTICE KAVANAUGH joins,

and with whom JUSTICE ALITO joins as to Part I, concur-

ring.

I join the Court’s opinion in full because it correctly holds

that, for purposes of the False Claims Act (FCA), the Fed-

eral Government “provides” money to the Education Rate

(E-Rate) program when the Government itself collects over-

due contributions, interest, penalties, settlements, and res-

titution payments, and then transfers that money from

U. S. Treasury accounts into the E-Rate program. See 31

U. S. C. §3729(b)(2)(A)(ii)(I). The Court saves for another

day two more difficult questions: First, whether the Gov-

ernment “provides” the money that it requires private car-

riers to contribute to the E-Rate program, see ibid.; and sec-

ond, whether the E-Rate program’s administrator is an

agent of the United States. I express no definitive views on

those questions today. I write separately only to highlight

that the Government’s positions on these questions might,

if accepted, have significant implications for both the scope

of the FCA and the lawfulness of the E-Rate program.

I

The question presented in this case is whether reim-

bursement requests submitted to the E-Rate program are

“claims” under the FCA. See §3729(b)(2). As the Court’s

2 WISCONSIN BELL, INC. v. UNITED STATES EX REL. HEATH

THOMAS, J., concurring

opinion explains, ante, at 4–5, the definition of “claim” de-

pends on the person or entity to whom the request for

money is made. If the request is made to a federal officer,

employee, or agent, then any request for money qualifies as

a “claim.” §3729(b)(2)(A)(i). But, if the request is made to

some “other recipient,” then the request is a “claim” only in

limited circumstances, such as if the Federal Government

“provides or has provided any portion of the money” re-

quested and the money is to be spent or used “to advance a

Government program or interest.” §3729(b)(2)(A)(ii).

All agree that E-Rate reimbursement requests are made

to the Universal Service Administrative Company (Admin-

istrative Company). The Administrative Company is a pri-

vate not-for-profit corporation whose parent entity, the Na-

tional Exchange Carrier Association (Carrier Association),

is another private not-for-profit corporation. See 47 CFR

§§54.5, 69.602 (2023).

The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has

“appointed” the Administrative Company as “Administra-

tor” of the Universal Service Fund (Fund). See §54.701(a).

The Fund is composed primarily of money from private tel-

ecommunications carriers. It is undisputed that a federal

statute requires certain carriers to contribute “to the spe-

cific, predictable, and sufficient mechanisms established by

the [FCC] to preserve and advance universal service.” See

47 U. S. C. §254(d). FCC regulations in turn mandate that

certain carriers contribute to the Fund on a quarterly basis.

47 CFR §§54.706(a)–(b), 54.709(a). FCC regulations also

task the Administrative Company with disbursing the

money in the Fund to beneficiaries of the E-Rate program

and other universal service initiatives. §54.702(b).*

The Government offered us three different paths to find-

ing that an E-Rate reimbursement request satisfies the

——————

*As the Court’s opinion explains, see ante, at 3, n. 1, the nature of the

relationship between the FCC and the Administrative Company is the

Cite as: 604 U. S. ____ (2025) 3

THOMAS, J., concurring

FCA’s definition of “claim.” First, assuming that the Ad-

ministrative Company is an “other recipient,” the Govern-

ment argued that the Government provides all the money

in the Fund because federal law requires private carriers to

contribute to it. Second, the Government contended that

even if it does not provide all the money, it provided at least

a “ ‘portion’ ” of it during the years relevant to this case be-

cause “the [FCC], the Department of the Treasury, and the

Department of Justice collected more than $100 million in

contributions, interest, and penalties from delinquent car-

riers; held the money in Treasury accounts; and then depos-

ited the money in the Fund.” Brief for United States as

Amicus Curiae 7–8. Third, the Government argued that

even if it does not provide any money to the Fund, an E-

Rate reimbursement request is a “claim” under the FCA be-

cause the Administrative Company—the entity to whom a

request for money is made—is an “agent of the United

States.” §3729(b)(2)(A)(i).

The Court resolves this case on the second ground alone.

During the years relevant here, the Treasury Department

deposited more than $100 million directly into the Fund. Of

that sum, approximately $50 million came from delinquent

contributions and related interest and penalties, and the

other $50 million came from settlements and restitution

awards obtained by the Justice Department. I understand

the Court to have decided that on the facts of this case—

where the Government itself exercised its power to collect

overdue contributions, interest, penalties, settlements, and

restitution awards, and then transferred those funds from

U. S. Treasury accounts into the Fund—the Government

“provided” money within the meaning of the FCA.

§3729(b)(2)(A)(ii).

I do not understand the Court to have opined on any other

——————

subject of ongoing litigation. I express no view on that matter.

4 WISCONSIN BELL, INC. v. UNITED STATES EX REL. HEATH

THOMAS, J., concurring

set of facts. The opinion explains that, in making the trans-

fers at issue here, the Government “was not a passive

throughway.” Ante, at 10. Rather, the FCC and the Treas-

ury Department used the power of the Government to “ex-

trac[t]” money from private carriers. Ibid. The Justice De-

partment, for its part, “prosecute[d] wrongdoing,” and then

obtained settlements and restitution awards. Ibid. The

Court observes that, “[w]ithout the agencies’ dunning,” the

money the Government collected would have come later “or

might never have arrived.” Ibid. Thus, that “the Govern-

ment itself generated the moneys it provided” is an essen-

tial component of our decision. Ante, at 11. I do not under-

stand us to have resolved whether the Government would

have “provided” money in the relevant sense,

§3729(b)(2)(A)(ii), if it had acted as a “passive throughway”

or a mere “transmitter” or “facilitator,” ante, at 10–11. I

agree with the Court’s resolution of the narrow question be-

fore us, and I am pleased to join in full. The remainder of

this opinion considers issues that the Court does not reach.

II

A

The Government’s leading theory in this case was that

the FCA applies to E-Rate reimbursement requests because

the Government provides all the money in the Fund. Brief

for United States as Amicus Curiae 12–16; Tr. of Oral Arg.

85 (asserting that the United States would “prefer to win

on th[is] ground”). It is undisputed that federal law and the

FCC’s implementing regulations require private telecom-

munications carriers to contribute on a quarterly basis to

the Fund. See 47 U. S. C. §254(d); 47 CFR §§54.706(a)–(b),

54.709(a). According to the Government, because a federal

statute compels these contributions, the Government “pro-

vides” all the money that private carriers pay. 31 U. S. C.

§3729(b)(2)(A)(ii).

Two Courts of Appeals have considered this argument.

Cite as: 604 U. S. ____ (2025) 5

THOMAS, J., concurring

The Seventh Circuit agreed with the Government in the de-

cision below. It observed that, in deciding whether the FCA

applies to alleged fraud aimed at a particular entity, “courts

have asked whether there is a ‘sufficiently close nexus’ be-

tween the defrauded entity or program and the federal gov-

ernment ‘such that a loss to the former is effectively a loss

to the latter.’ ” 92 F. 4th 654, 669 (2024). The court con-

cluded that the “high degree of government involvement in

the E-Rate program demonstrates that such a nexus exists

here.” Ibid.

The Fifth Circuit reached the opposite conclusion, hold-

ing that the Government’s “broad view” is “unsupported by

the cases interpreting the FCA.” United States ex rel.

Shupe v. Cisco Systems, Inc., 759 F. 3d 379, 383 (2014). The

Fifth Circuit explained that courts have traditionally “lim-

ited the FCA’s application to instances of fraud that might

result in financial loss to the Government.” Id., at 385 (in-

ternal quotation marks omitted; emphasis added). And, it

observed that courts have declined to extend the FCA’s pro-

tections to programs that “do not receive federal funds” and

“have too tenuous of a relationship to the Government to be

considered a Government entity.” Id., at 384. While ac-

knowledging that “the FCC retains some oversight and reg-

ulation” over the Administrative Company, the Fifth Cir-

cuit nevertheless concluded that the FCA’s protections do

not apply to E-Rate reimbursement requests because the

Administrative Company is “a private corporation owned

by an industry trade group.” Id., at 387.

Critically, both the Fifth and Seventh Circuits recognized

that courts have traditionally interpreted the FCA to cover

fraud against only those defrauded entities that receive fed-

eral funding or operate with a “high degree of government

involvement.” 92 F. 4th, at 669; see also 759 F. 3d, at 383–

385. The courts disagreed about whether the relationship

between the Administrative Company and the Federal Gov-

ernment is sufficiently close. But, neither court posited

6 WISCONSIN BELL, INC. v. UNITED STATES EX REL. HEATH

THOMAS, J., concurring

that the FCA covers fraud against private entities that lack

both federal funding and a “sufficiently close nexus” with

the Federal Government. 92 F. 4th, at 669 (internal quota-

tion marks omitted).

This Court’s case law strongly suggests that the FCA

does not cover fraud against purely private entities with

purely private funding sources. We have always assumed

that the FCA does not cover acts directed toward parties

that are not “the Government.” Allison Engine Co. v.

United States ex rel. Sanders, 553 U. S. 662, 669–670

(2008). We have said that the purpose of the FCA was “to

provide for restitution to the government of money taken

from it by fraud.” United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317

U. S. 537, 551 (1943). And, we have repeatedly remarked

that the FCA exists to “ ‘protect the funds and property of

the Government.’ ” United States ex rel. Polansky v. Execu-

tive Health Resources, Inc., 599 U. S. 419, 424 (2023) (quot-

ing Rainwater v. United States, 356 U. S. 590, 592 (1958);

emphasis added); see also United States v. McNinch, 356

U. S. 595, 599 (1958) (explaining that Congress enacted the

FCA because it “wanted to stop th[e] plundering of the pub-

lic treasury”); United States v. Neifert-White Co., 390 U. S.

228, 233 (1968) (explaining that a prior version of the FCA

extended to “all fraudulent attempts to cause the Govern-

ment to pay out sums of money” (emphasis added)).

Relying on this understanding of the scope of the FCA,

lower courts have determined that a program does not re-

ceive FCA protections unless it receives money that belongs

to the Government or the Government controls the pro-

gram. For example, the Eighth Circuit held that false pay-

ment requests submitted to a private trust fund created to

finance a CERCLA Superfund cleanup project did not qual-

ify as “claims” under the FCA. Costner v. URS Consultants,

Inc., 153 F. 3d 667, 677 (1998). While recognizing that the

funds might not have existed if the Government had not

helped negotiate the trust fund’s creation, the court still

Cite as: 604 U. S. ____ (2025) 7

THOMAS, J., concurring

held that the Government did not “provide” the funds be-

cause none of the funds came from the Treasury, the Gov-

ernment did not have access to the trust fund, and the Gov-

ernment did not control the trust fund’s disbursement.

Ibid. Similarly, the Third Circuit refused to apply the FCA

to fraudulent legal bills submitted for approval to a United

States Bankruptcy Court because the Government itself

would not suffer any financial loss. Hutchins v. Wilentz,

Goldman & Spitzer, 253 F. 3d 176, 182–184 (2001). The

court explained that “the submission of false claims to the

United States government for approval which do not or

would not cause financial loss to the government are not

within the purview of the False Claims Act.” Id., at 184.

The Fifth Circuit identified several other examples of courts

interpreting the FCA in a similar way. See Shupe, 759

F. 3d, at 384–385 (collecting cases).

In this case, the Government paid scant attention to the

fact that courts historically have not applied the FCA to

cover fraud on nongovernment entities unless the Govern-

ment itself will face a financial loss. Assuming that ap-

proach is correct, it is not obvious to me that the Govern-

ment puts its own funds at risk when it requires private

parties to fund the E-Rate program. Ordinary E-Rate con-

tributions come from private carriers. And, if the carrier

contributions are insufficient to fund the E-Rate program,

the Administrative Company must turn to private sources

of credit—not the Federal Government—to remedy any

budgetary shortfall. See 47 CFR §54.709(c). It is difficult

for me to see how the loss of ordinary contributions from

carriers is necessarily a loss to the Government.

The political branches chose to separate the program

from the public fisc. That choice was made in part to pre-

vent the E-Rate program from being “turned into a piggy

bank which can be raided” “for budgetary gains.” 143 Cong.

Rec. 16054 (1997) (statement of Sen. Kerrey); accord, ibid.

(statement of Sen. Daschle). Whatever the merits of that

8 WISCONSIN BELL, INC. v. UNITED STATES EX REL. HEATH

THOMAS, J., concurring

choice, I suspect it might carry consequences for the ap-

plicability of the FCA.

B

Before we accept the Government’s theory that the FCA

applies so long as the Government requires one private

party to pay another private party, we ought to grapple

with that argument’s implications. If the Government’s po-

sition is correct, then the FCA would seem to cover a wide

range of matters until now understood to be outside the

scope of the statute. Consider a few examples.

Federal law authorizes States to withhold federal pay

and retirement benefits “to enforce the legal obligation of

the individual to provide child support.” 42 U. S. C.

§659(a). This law therefore facilitates a payment from one

private party to another. If this Court were to accept that

such a law is all it takes for the Government to “provid[e]”

money under the FCA, then the FCA would seem to cover

false or fraudulent claims made against a recipient of child-

support payments because a request for money is made to

an “other recipient,” and the money is spent or used to ad-

vance a Government “interest.” 31 U. S. C. §3729(b)(2)

(A)(ii). But, applying the FCA in this context would signif-

icantly expand the reach of the statute.

Or, consider a civil judgment for money damages entered

by a federal court. The entry of such a judgment has the

effect of requiring a private party to pay a sum of money to

another private party. If this Court were to hold that the

Government “provides” money for FCA purposes so long as

the Federal Government requires a person to pay a sum of

money to someone else, then it seems possible that the FCA

might cover at least some false or fraudulent requests for

money made to a recipient of money damages. The request

would be made to an “other recipient” and, at least in some

instances, money damages might be spent or used “to ad-

vance a Government . . . interest.” §3729(b)(2)(A)(ii).

Cite as: 604 U. S. ____ (2025) 9

THOMAS, J., concurring

Another example is the individual mandate component of

the Affordable Care Act, 124 Stat. 119. That provision re-

quires individuals to purchase “minimum essential” health

insurance coverage. 26 U. S. C. §5000A(a). If we were to

accept the Government’s broad theory of what it means to

provide money for purposes of the FCA, I am not sure why

the FCA would not cover at least some false or fraudulent

requests for money made to private health insurance com-

panies whose customers purchased health insurance be-

cause of the individual mandate. A health insurance com-

pany appears to be an “other recipient,” and it is at least

plausible that the money health insurers spend on medical

care “advance[s] a Government program or interest.” 31

U. S. C. §3729(b)(2)(A)(ii).

Perhaps the Government can explain why the FCA

sweeps far broader than has been traditionally understood.

Or, perhaps there are meaningful ways to differentiate

these examples or other reasons why the FCA would not

apply even if this Court accepted the Government’s broad

theory of what it means to “provide” money under the FCA.

But, the Government has not engaged with or appreciated

the drastic consequences that might follow if this Court

were to accept its primary argument.

I express no definitive view on the merits of the Govern-

ment’s broad theory. I simply note that if this question re-

turns to us, we ought to carefully consider what the Gov-

ernment’s theory might mean for the scope of the FCA.

III

The Government offered this Court another avenue to

finding that the FCA applies to E-Rate reimbursement re-

quests. It argued that any request for money made to the

Administrative Company qualifies as a “claim” because the

Administrative Company is an “agent of the United States.”

§3729(b)(2)(A)(i). But, if the Government is correct, then

10 WISCONSIN BELL, INC. v. UNITED STATES EX REL. HEATH

THOMAS, J., concurring

the E-Rate program would seem to run afoul of the Govern-

ment Corporation Control Act (GCCA), 59 Stat. 597.

The GCCA provides that “[a]n agency may establish or

acquire a corporation to act as an agency only by or under

a law of the United States specifically authorizing the ac-

tion.” 31 U. S. C. §9102. In other words, the statute “pro-

hibit[s] [the] creation of new Government corporations

without specific congressional authorization.” Lebron v.

National Railroad Passenger Corporation, 513 U. S. 374,

390 (1995).

The FCC should be familiar with the GCCA. In the Tel-

ecommunications Act of 1996, 110 Stat. 56, Congress di-

rected the FCC to establish a set of universal service pro-

grams. See 47 U. S. C. §254. In its first attempt at carrying

out that statutory command, the FCC instructed the Car-

rier Association to create the Administrative Company as

an “independently functioning not-for-profit subsidiary”

that would “assure significant industry-wide representa-

tion in the administration” of universal service programs.

In re Changes to Bd. of Directors of Nat. Exchange Carrier

Assn., Inc., 12 FCC Rcd. 18400, 18401, 18415 (1997) (em-

phasis added). The FCC also directed the Carrier Associa-

tion to create two freestanding corporations to manage the

E-Rate program and another universal service initiative.

Id., at 18430–18431.

Shortly thereafter, a group of Senators inquired whether

the FCC had exceeded its authority when it directed the

Carrier Association to create private corporations. In re-

sponse to these inquiries, the General Accounting Office

(GAO), known today as the Government Accountability Of-

fice, conducted an investigation. The GAO did not object to

the FCC’s use of the Carrier Association as “a neutral third-

party administrator.” GAO, Testimony Before the Subcom-

mittee on Telecommunications, Trade and Consumer Pro-

tection, Committee on Commerce, House of Representa-

tives, TELECOMMUNICATIONS: FCC Lacked Authority

Cite as: 604 U. S. ____ (2025) 11

THOMAS, J., concurring

To Create Corporations To Administer Universal Service

Programs 2 (GAO/T–RCED/OGC–98–84, 1998). Nor did it

object to the FCC’s instruction to create the Administrative

Company—the “independently functioning, not-for-profit

subsidiary” of the Carrier Association. 12 FCC Rcd., at

18415; see GAO Testimony, at 18–20. But, the GAO did

object to the FCC’s attempt to create government corpora-

tions. Id., at 13. The GAO determined that the FCC had

violated the GCCA by attempting to establish freestanding

corporations to manage certain universal service programs

and “act as its agents in carrying out functions assigned by

statute to the [FCC].” Ibid. In light of this report, Congress

instructed the FCC to “propose a new structure for the

implementation of universal service programs.”

H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 105–504, p. 87 (1998).

The FCC responded by asking Congress for “specific stat-

utory authority . . . to create or designate, . . . one or more

entities, such as the Universal Service Administrative

Company, to administer the federal universal service sup-

port mechanisms.” Report in Response to Senate Bill 1768

and Conference Report on H. R. 3579, 13 FCC Rcd. 11810,

11819 (1998). But, Congress refused the agency’s request.

Congress’s choice left the FCC with the “independently

functioning” Administrative Company, 12 FCC Rcd., at

18415, but no government corporations to “act as its

agents,” GAO Testimony, at 13. The FCC published a final

rule appointing the Administrative Company as the perma-

nent administrator of the Universal Service programs. See

Final Rule, Changes to the Board of Directors of the Na-

tional Exchange Carrier Association, Inc., Federal-State

Joint Board on Universal Service, 63 Fed. Reg. 70564–

70565, 70572–70573 (1998) (codified, as amended, at 47

CFR §54.701).

The upshot is that the Administrative Company was orig-

inally understood to be—and the lawfulness of the E-Rate

program turned upon the Administrative Company being—

12 WISCONSIN BELL, INC. v. UNITED STATES EX REL. HEATH

THOMAS, J., concurring

an independent, nongovernment entity. To this day, Con-

gress has never passed a law approving the Administrative

Company as a government corporation, nor has it author-

ized the FCC to formally label the Administrative Company

a subagency. The Government nevertheless contends be-

fore this Court that the Administrative Company is now an

agent of the United States.

Whether the Administrative Company is in fact an agent

of the United States is a complex question that we do not

resolve today. That determination appears to turn on the

kind and degree of control that the FCC exercises over the

Administrative Company. And, those issues are the subject

of another case that this Court will consider soon. See Con-

sumers’ Research v. FCC, 109 F. 4th 743 (CA5) (en banc),

cert. granted, 604 U. S. ___ (2024). I express no view on

whether the Government’s agency argument is correct. I

simply note that if the Government is correct, then it will

need to explain how the E-Rate program’s current structure

is compatible with the GCCA. The Government relied on

the independent, nongovernmental nature of the Adminis-

trative Company to establish compliance with the GCCA.

Now, the Government asserts that the Administrative

Company is essentially an arm of the FCC. I doubt that the

Government can have it both ways.

IV

The Court resolves this case on a narrow, fact-specific

ground. In a future case, however, we may need to confront

the Government’s other arguments—namely, that the FCA

applies to funds that private parties pay to other private

parties, and that the Administrative Company is an agent

of the United States. If these issues return to us, I hope we

will carefully consider their consequences.

Cite as: 604 U. S. ____ (2025) 1

KAVANAUGH, J., concurring

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 23–1127

_________________

WISCONSIN BELL, INC., PETITIONER v. UNITED

STATES, EX REL. TODD HEATH

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT

[February 21, 2025]

JUSTICE KAVANAUGH, with whom JUSTICE THOMAS joins,

concurring.

I join the Court’s opinion, which decides a narrow

statutory question regarding the scope of the False Claims

Act. That statutory issue arises in the context of a qui tam

suit. The Act’s qui tam provisions raise substantial

constitutional questions under Article II. See, e.g., United

States ex rel. Polansky v. Executive Health Resources, Inc.,

599 U. S. 419, 442 (2023) (KAVANAUGH, J., concurring); id.,

at 449–452 (THOMAS, J., dissenting). Those constitutional

questions are not before the Court in this case. But in an

appropriate case, the Court should consider the competing

arguments on the Article II issue.