The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
WESTERN DIVISION
)
CHRISTOPHER MCNEARY, Father )
and Next Friend of L.M., a )
Minor; JACQUITA LEDLOW, )
Mother and Next Friend of )
L.M., a Minor; and L.M., a )
Minor and a Student, )
)
Plaintiffs, )
)
v. ) No. 2:23-cv-02501-SHM-atc
)
BARTLETT CITY BOARD OF )
EDUCATION and UHS OF )
LAKESIDE, LLC, )
)
Defendants. )
)
ORDER DENYING UHS OF LAKESIDE’S RENEWED MOTION TO DISMISS
Plaintiffs sue Defendant UHS of Lakeside (“Lakeside”) for
assault and battery, false imprisonment, intentional infliction
of emotional distress (“IIED”), and negligence and negligent
supervision.
Before the Court is Lakeside’s Renewed Motion to Dismiss
(the “Renewed Motion”). (ECF No. 35.) Plaintiffs have responded
(the “Response”). (ECF No. 38.) Lakeside invites the Court, inter
alia, to revisit its Order Granting Plaintiffs’ Motion to Amend
Complaint (“Amendment Order”). (ECF No. 27.) Lakeside’s Renewed
Motion is DENIED.
I. Background
Plaintiffs filed their Complaint against Defendants
Lakeside and Bartlett City Board of Education (“Bartlett”) on
August 14, 2023. (ECF No. 1.) On May 30, 2024, the Court granted
Plaintiffs’ Motion to Amend. (ECF No 27.) Plaintiffs filed their
First Amended Complaint on June 12, 2024. (See ECF No. 29.) The
First Amended Complaint added claims of negligence and negligent
supervision against Lakeside. On July 11, 2024, the Court denied
Lakeside’s first Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 11) after determining
that the First Amended Complaint mooted the pending motion. (See
ECF No. 34.)
The facts relevant to the Renewed Motion are alleged in
Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
On January 6, 2023, Ellendale School, a campus of the
Bartlett City Board of Education, became aware that L.M.,
Christopher McNeary’s nine-year-old daughter and a student at
Ellendale, had harmed herself on the bus on the way to school.
(See ECF No. 29 ¶¶ 8-13.) L.M. had been repeatedly bullied at
school and had cut herself with a razor blade that morning. (See
id. ¶¶ 11, 25.) Ellendale called for someone to pick up L.M.
from school. When her aunt came to the school, the school
counselor told the aunt that L.M. would need paperwork showing
that a mental health assessment had been completed before L.M.
could return to school. (See id. ¶¶ 8-13.) The school counselor
told L.M.’s aunt that Ellendale “had a ‘school liaison’ for this
purpose [who] would like to speak to them,” but the aunt
declined. (Id. ¶ 13.)
On information and belief, Plaintiffs allege the school
liaison at Ellendale Elementary “is an actual paid employee of
Lakeside Hospital” and that Lakeside “is paid per child that is
admitted and has a financial incentive to get children referred
to their facility, admitted and potentially hospitalized for
long periods of time.” (Id. ¶ 31.) The school referred the family
to Lakeside Hospital for an assessment. (See id. ¶ 15.)
McNeary called Lakeside and spoke with a “Business
Development Specialist” there who told McNeary that the
“assessment was actually a doctor’s visit” and that Lakeside
would not be able to “complete an assessment because [the
family’s] insurance was like having TennCare.” (See id. ¶ 16.)
When the Business Development Specialist learned the family’s
insurance had been obtained through McNeary’s employment,
“immediately her tone changed” and she told McNeary to bring
L.M. to Lakeside. (See id. ¶¶ 16-17.) At Lakeside, L.M. was
assessed via ZOOM. (See id. ¶¶ 18-20.) After confirming the
family’s insurance benefits, Lakeside admitted L.M. to the
Hospital “over the objections of the family members present.”
(See id.) L.M. was separated from her parents, and “her parents
were threatened with arrest if they did not leave the Lakeside
premises.” (See id.) Lakeside called the Bartlett Police
Department, and the family was forced to leave around 1:30 a.m.
(See id. ¶ 20.)
During her confinement, L.M. “was kept in a common room at
first with children of all ages both male and female.” (Id. ¶
47.) Then she was placed in a room where “she was alone, and she
could hear children crying and screaming late into the night in
the facility.” (Id.) L.M. “was unable to sleep during her
confinement” and “did not change clothes for forty-eight (48)
hours despite beginning to menstruate during her confinement.”
(Id.) These events have caused her to suffer from “nightmares
and flashbacks” and PTSD. (See id. ¶¶ 34, 47.)
L.M. was held involuntarily and without parental consent
from the evening of January 6, 2023, until the end of the day on
January 9, 2023, the first time she had spent a night away from
her family. (See id. ¶ 20-23.) McNeary called his insurance
company to alert them that he had not authorized any treatment
for his daughter at Lakeside, and repeatedly declined Lakeside’s
requests to medicate L.M. during her involuntary commitment.
(See id. ¶ 22.)
After Lakeside released L.M., the McNeary family took L.M.
to a private therapist for treatment, in whose care she remains.
(See id. ¶¶ 23, 34.) She “suffers from PTSD based on her
involuntary confinement at Lakeside, and the failure of the
[school] administration to keep her safe from repeated contact”
with her bully. (See id.)
II. Jurisdiction and Choice of Law
The Court has federal question jurisdiction based on
Plaintiffs’ Title IX claim against Bartlett. 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
(See ECF No. 27 at 10.) The Court has supplemental jurisdiction
over Plaintiffs’ state law claims against Lakeside. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1367(a). (See id. at 7-11 (analysis of the Court’s jurisdiction
over Plaintiff’s claims finding that the state claims against
Lakeside and the federal Title IX claim against Bartlett “derive
from a common nucleus of fact”).)
Because Plaintiffs’ claims against Lakeside arise under
Tennessee law and invoke the Court’s supplemental jurisdiction,
the Court applies the substantive law of the State of Tennessee
to the extent it does not conflict with federal law. See Super
Sulky, Inc. v. U.S. Trotting Ass’n, 174 F.3d 733, 741 (6th Cir.
1999).
III. Legal Standard
To survive a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6), “a plaintiff must allege facts that, if
accepted as true, are sufficient ‘to raise a right to relief
above the speculative level,’ and to state a ‘claim to relief
that is plausible on its face.’” Kovalchuk v. City of Decherd,
95 F.4th 1035, 1037 (6th Cir. 2024) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). The plaintiff must provide
sufficient factual content for the court “to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Id. (quoting Ctr. for Bio-Ethical Reform, Inc. v.
Napolitano, 648 F.3d 365, 369 (6th Cir. 2011)).
The Court must “view the complaint in the light most
favorable to [plaintiff] as the nonmovant, accepting the
complaint’s well-pleaded factual allegations as true and drawing
all reasonable inferences in favor of [plaintiff].” Zakora v.
Chrisman, 44 F.4th 452, 464 (6th Cir. 2022). However, the Court
“need not accept as true legal conclusions or unwarranted factual
inferences, and conclusory allegations or legal
conclusions masquerading as factual allegations will not
suffice.” Philadelphia Indem. Ins. Co. v. Youth Alive, Inc., 732
F.3d 645, 649 (6th Cir. 2013) (quoting Terry v. Tyson Farms,
Inc., 604 F.3d 272, 275–76 (6th Cir. 2010)).
IV. Analysis
Lakeside argues that Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint
fails to state a claim on which relief can be granted. (See ECF
No. 35 at 1.) Lakeside maintains that Plaintiffs’ claims are
governed by the Tennessee Health Care Liability Act (“THCLA”),
Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 29-26-101, et seq. Lakeside argues that
Plaintiffs did not follow the mandatory procedures in § 29-26-
121 and § 29-26-122, and that their failure requires dismissal
of Plaintiffs’ claims. Lakeside argues alternatively that
Plaintiffs’ case fails because the First Amended Complaint does
not allege sufficient facts to satisfy the elements of their
claims, and that Lakeside followed all of the relevant statutory
requirements when it hospitalized L.M.
A. Applicability of the THCLA
Lakeside’s first argument is that Plaintiffs were required
to comply with the pre-suit certification and notice requirements
of the THCLA although Plaintiffs brought their claims in federal
court. (See ECF No. 35-1 at 3.) The Court addressed this issue
in its Amendment Order. (See ECF No. 27.) Because the Sixth
Circuit’s decision in Albright v. Christensen, 24 F.4th 1039
(6th Cir. 2022), was first raised by the Court, Lakeside had not
addressed it and has chosen to do so in its Renewed Motion. (See
ECF No. 35-1 at 3-13.)
Albright held that a nearly identical Michigan statute’s
certificate-of-good-faith and notice provisions were procedural
and superseded by the Federal Rules. See 24 F.4th at 1039.
Therefore, the THCLA’s certificate-of-good-faith and notice
provisions are invalid in federal court. All of the District
Court cases cited by Lakeside preceded Albright. (See ECF No.
35-1 at 5.) The District Courts deciding those cases did not
have the benefit of the Sixth Circuit’s Albright opinion and
were not bound by Albright.
Superseding the pre-Albright cases cited by Lakeside are
those this Court cited in its Amendment Order and Plaintiffs
cite in their Response. (See ECF No. 27 at 23-25, n. 6; ECF No.
38 at 5.) District Courts sitting in Tennessee are bound by
Albright. (See id.) Lakeside’s arguments that this Court should
reverse itself, disagree with other Tennessee District Courts
that have considered the issue post-Albright, and distinguish
binding Sixth Circuit precedent are unpersuasive. Even if
Albright were not strictly binding, the Court would be persuaded
by Albright’s reasoning to apply it to the nearly identical
Tennessee statute at issue in this case.
The procedural notice and certification provisions of the
THCLA conflict with federal law. Plaintiffs have complied with
federal procedures. They are litigating their case in federal
court, and their claims will not be dismissed for failure to
comply with conflicting state procedural law.
B. Failure to State a Claim
Lakeside argues in the alternative that, even if Plaintiffs
could proceed without complying with the THCLA, they would fail
to state claims on which relief can be granted for assault and
battery, IIED, and false imprisonment.
1. Assault and Battery
Lakeside argues that Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint
“does not contain any factual allegations whatsoever to support
their assault and battery claim.” (ECF No. 35-1 at 15.) Lakeside
does not elaborate or cite the legal standard for this claim
under Tennessee law. Lakeside focuses instead on the IIED and
false imprisonment claims. (See id.)
Plaintiffs dispute Lakeside’s bare contention. They argue
that “the tort of assault and battery” in Tennessee includes
“willful and malicious injury,” and that Plaintiffs need only
show an act or omission that led to the harm alleged. (See ECF
No. 38 at 6.) Based on the allegations in the First Amended
Complaint, Plaintiffs argue that they have supported their
assault and battery claims. Plaintiffs also fail to cite the
elements of assault and battery under Tennessee law. (See id.)
“Under certain circumstances, psychiatrists and other
health-care professionals or employees may be subject to
liability for assault and battery.” See § 26:2 Actions
constituting tort, 8 Am. L. Torts § 26:2 (Feb. 2024). The
healthcare providers need not have the specific intent to harm
the patient for the action to proceed, but the providers must
intend to take a physical healthcare action that is not consented
to or otherwise justified. See id. Plaintiffs allege that
Lakeside’s staff intentionally detained L.M. and exceeded both
the scope of consent and the law when Lakeside involuntary
committed L.M. with threats of arrest. (See id.) The parties
dispute whether the involuntary commitment was ultimately
justified.
Absent any specific argument by Lakeside addressing the
reasons Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim for assault and
battery on which relief can be granted, the Renewed Motion to
Dismiss that claim is DENIED.
2. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
To state a claim for IIED in Tennessee, plaintiffs must
allege facts that show: (1) the defendant’s conduct was
intentional or reckless; (2) the defendant’s conduct was so
outrageous that it cannot be tolerated in a civilized society;
and (3) the defendant’s conduct resulted in a serious mental
injury to the plaintiff. See Lourcey v. Estate of Scarlett, 146
S.W.3d 48, 51 (Tenn. 2004) (citing Bain v. Wells, 936 S.W.2d
618, 622 (Tenn. 1997)).
Lakeside contends that the facts surrounding its
involuntary commitment of L.M., as Lakeside presents them, and
the way in which L.M. was treated cannot constitute IIED as a
matter of law. However, the Court must analyze Lakeside’s
argument based on the facts as Plaintiffs allege them, not as
Lakeside does. See Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678.
Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint alleges that Lakeside:
intentionally and forcibly kidnapped L.M., not to provide
healthcare, but to profit from the family’s insurance provider;
used the police to keep the parents from their child; did not
consider less traumatic courses of treatment; did not render any
beneficial medical treatment; left L.M. locked up alone in a
dark room for days, without adequate sanitary supplies or a
change of clothes, to suffer in her own blood and hear the
screams of fellow “patients”; and caused serious mental injury
that persists because of this traumatic experience. (See ECF No.
29 ¶¶ 16-47.)
The events described may have occurred differently, but the
Court accepts these specific and plausible factual allegations
as true for purposes of analyzing the Renewed Motion to Dismiss.
Plaintiffs have pled outrageous conduct. The case alleged “is
one in which the recitation of the facts to an average member of
the community would arouse his resentment against the actor, and
lead him to exclaim, ‘Outrageous!’” See Jenkins v. Nashville
Public Radio, 2005 WL 3358871 at *4 (M.D. Tenn. 2005) (quoting
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 cmt. d (1965)). Lakeside’s
argument that it was providing appropriate medical care
authorized by Tennessee law is not an appropriate determination
for the Court at the motion-to-dismiss stage. The Renewed Motion
to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ IIED claim is DENIED.
3. False Imprisonment
Lakeside argues that Plaintiffs’ false imprisonment claim
should be dismissed because Lakeside has evidence that its
involuntary commitment of L.M. complied with Tennessee law.
Lakeside attaches exhibits to its Renewed Motion to Dismiss
showing that two of its physicians completed certificates of
need for involuntary admission, the General Sessions Court of
Shelby County was notified, and Judge Betty Thomas Moore approved
the involuntary commitment. (See ECF No. 35-1 at 18-19.) Lakeside
asks the Court to dismiss the claim based on its exhibits. These
considerations are more appropriate at summary judgment.
Plaintiffs do not argue that Lakeside failed to satisfy the
legal requirements for involuntary commitment. Plaintiffs
essentially allege that Lakeside did not meet the statutory
requirements for commitment in good faith. When Lakeside
discovered it could profit from the family’s insurance, Lakeside
moved forward with commitment and attempted to cover its tracks
with false representations. That is the state of the record
before the Court.
The Court decides a motion to dismiss on the facts alleged
in plaintiffs’ pleadings. If Lakeside has evidence to test the
sufficiency of Plaintiffs’ claims, that evidence is
appropriately considered in a motion for summary judgment, not
a motion to dismiss. The Renewed Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’
false imprisonment claim is DENIED.
V. Conclusion
Plaintiffs brought this case in federal court. They need
not comply with Tennessee procedural rules that conflict with
federal rules. At this stage, the Court accepts the plausible
factual allegations in Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint, even
if Defendant purports to provide exonerating evidence.
Plaintiffs’ claims against Lakeside may proceed. Lakeside’s
Renewed Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 35) is DENIED.
SO ORDERED this 20th day of February, 2025.
/s/ Samuel H. Mays, Jr.
SAMUEL H. MAYS, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE